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This thesis will argue that since the late 198DB, the
Community/Union has formulated and implemented an active,
consistent, common policy towards Eastern Europe. The
policy's principal aim has been to support the economic and
political transformation in the former communist countries.
As circumstances have changed in Eastern Europe, the
Community/Union has used different policy instruments to try
to fulfill that aim. By 1995, the EU had agreed to enlarge
itself to include the East European countries, had approved an
innovative and unprecedented pre-access ion strategy to
facilitate enlargement, and had launched the Pact on Stability
in Europe to prevent conflicts among the potential new
members.
The question at the heart of the thesis is why the EU
member states agreed to a joint policy towards Eastern Europe.
Several theories of cooperation will be evaluated in terms of
their usefulness in explaining this particular case of
cooperation. Explanations derived from International
Relations theory generally offer inadequate explanations of
cooperation within the sui aeneris EU. Rationalist theories
cannot explain the member states' continual compromising, or
the sense of collective interest and identity, made manifest
in the process of making a common policy towards Eastern
Europe. Neo-functionalism and constructivism are much more
useful for explaining why the EU formulated and implemented a
common policy. In particular, neo-functional insights into
spillover, externalization, the supranational style of
decision-making, and the Commission's role help explain the
making of the policy. The constructivist emphasis on how the
process of interaction among the member states can transform
their perceived interests and identities contributes to that
explanation, illuminating why the Community/Union could
formulate a joint policy reflecting its (collective)
interests, principles and goals.
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This thesis will analyze the extent to which the
Community/Union has formulated and implemented a common
foreign policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe and why
the EC/EU member states have cooperated on the policy. It
will argue that since the late 1980s, the Community/Union has
functioned as an effective international actor, conducting a
common policy towards Eastern Europe. The thesis will seek to
explain why the member states agreed to, lobbied for, or
simply accepted tacitly a common policy towards Eastern
Europe, and how the policy reflected the consensus. A number
of different explanations for foreign policy cooperation will
be evaluated in terms of their usefulness for explaining this
particular case of cooperation.
"Eastern Europe" refers to the following countries:
Bulgaria, the Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
Slovakia. 1 All of these countries were former members of the
CMEA (Czechoslovakia, of course, was one country then), and
all have now become EU associates. By focussing on these six
countries, the thesis can emphasize the development of the
Community/Union's relations with them from the Cold War to the
present. The Community's relations with the former East
Germany, also previously a CMEA member, will be covered up
1Several of these countries prefer to be considered
"Central European"; the Community/Union does in fact refer to
these countries (and others) as the "Central and East European
Countries" (or CEECs). The term "Eastern Europe", however,
will be used in this thesis as a convenient shorthand for
Central and Eastern Europe.
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until German unification. Recently, the newly independent
Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Slovenia
have negotiated association agreements with the EU, but the
thesis will not discuss the EU's relations with them in any
depth. 2 Nor will relations with Albania (in autarkic
isolation throughout the Cold War), or the other former Soviet
republics, be covered to a significant extent. In all but the
case of the former Soviet republics, the EU's policy has
followed the same lines developed in the policy towards the
first six East European associates.
The thesis will focus on the period between 1988 and
1995. Before 1988, the Community did not play a significant
role in relations with Eastern Europe because the member
states limited its role and because relations between Eastern
and Western Europe were constrained by the Cold War. In 1988,
the Community began to conclude trade and cooperation
agreements with the cHEA states, as they implemented reforms;
the Community was conducting a (limited) foreign policy, based
on the principle of conditionality, with the objective of
encouraging economic and political reform. In 1989, when
communism crumbled in country after country behind the Iron
Curtain, the Community assumed a leadership role in Europe and
conducted a much more active policy, based on the same
objectives and principles. Over the next few years, the
Community had to adapt the policy to reflect the extent of the
2Yugoslavia was a MEA associate prior to its
disintegration, but the Community's relations with Yugoslavia
will be discussed only briefly in this thesis; its involvement
in trying to end the war in the former Yugoslavia could be the
subject of another thesis, and will not be covered here.
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transformation in Eastern Europe; it eventually accepted the
prospect of enlargement to the east. In December 1994, the EU
set out a far-reaching and unprecedented pre-accession
strategy to prepare the associates for membership.
The thesis will analyze this remarkable evolution from
mere trading relations with the East European countries in
1988 to preparation for enlargement by late 1994. Because
conflict prevention has become a more important part of the
EU'S policy, several initiatives which continued through 1995
will also be discussed. Hence the period under consideration
in this thesis will extend into 1995.
During this period, the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated
and entered into force (on 1 November 1993). The European
Community became one of three pillars of the European Union,
and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), another EU
pillar, replaced European Political Cooperation (EPC). This
of course creates several difficulties with terminology (which
are compounded by the extent to which the line separating the
"pillars" or separate policy-making mechanisms has blurred in
the case of the policy towards Eastern Europe). As far as is
possible, the terms "Community"3 (or "EC") and "Union" (or
"EU") will be used, depending on the period and issue under
discussion, but sometimes it will be necessary to use the
3Again, the use of "Community" sometimes implies the EEC
as originally established by the Rome Treaty (leaving aside
the evolution of the three European Communities, including the
European Economic Community, into the European Community), and
sometimes it implies the Community and the member states,
acting within the bounds of the Rome Treaty and EPC. The
problem in the case of the policy towards Eastern Europe is
that any such differentiation becomes increasingly harder to
make. The EC also still exists - and it has international
status, whereas the EU does not.
11
awkward "Community/Union", in the interests of accuracy.
"Foreign policy" is yet another problematic term. As
Brian White has noted, "policy" has two very different
connotations. Policy can mean an explicit plan of action,
designed to serve specific objectives (an activist
conception). Or it can mean a series of habitual responses to
events in the international realm. 4 The Community/Union has
frequently been criticized as capable only of reacting to
outside events, rather than initiating active policies, in the
sense of long-term strategies to pursue its interests. 5 (Its
reactions could, though, still be considered "policy".) To a
certain extent, the policy towards Eastern Europe has arisen
in response to external events and demands, but the
Community/Union has also specified its policy objectives and
principles, and actively utilized a variety of instruments in
an attempt to fulfill its aims.
The meaning of "foreign", on the other hand, is fairly
clear-cut: the East European countries are "third countries"
(in EU jargon), or non-members, and thus the object of policy.
Interestingly, however, the policy towards Eastern Europe has
evolved from one directed towards third countries to one
increasingly directed towards near-members. The associates,
however, are still clearly "third countries".
4Brian White, "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and
Approaches", in Michael Clarke and Brian White, eds.,
Understandina Foreicin Policy: The Foreicm Policy Systems
ATrnroach (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989), pp. 6-7.
5Eberhard Rhein, "The Community's External Reach", in




Put the two terms ("foreign" and "policy") together in
the context of the Community/Union, and further problems
arise. All foreign policies encompass both economic and
political aspects. But analyzing the formulation and
implementation of foreign policy in the Community/Union is
complicated by the institutional division between the
frameworks for making "foreign economic policy" and for
coordinating "foreign policy". Responsibility for foreign
economic policy (or "external economic relations" as it is
more accurately called) has been largely entrusted to EC
bodies (pre- and post-Maastricht), while the member states
have formulated some common positions on some foreign policy
issues in an intergovernmental framework (EPC, now CFSP).
For this "collectivity" (member states and EC bodies
acting within these frameworks) to function as an
international actor, that is, actively and deliberately in
relation to other actors in the international system6,
numerous obstacles have to be overcome: agreement on a policy
or position must be reached by the member states within either
framework (depending on the issue at hand) or both; if
necessary, coordination problems between the intergovernmental
framework and EC framework (which has jurisdiction over many
useful policy instruments) must be resolved and "consistency"
ensured; and the limits posed by the lack of many of the
traditional foreign policy accoutrements, such as diplomatic
and military services, surpassed or circumvented. In the case
of Eastern Europe, these obstacles have largely been overcome:
6Gunnar Sjostedt, The External Role of the European
Community (Westmead: Saxon House, 1977), p. 15.
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the member states have agreed on an active, common foreign
policy; there has been an extensive "blurring of the line"
between the two frameworks; and the EU/EC has possessed or
acquired appropriate instruments to implement the policy.
1.1 FOREIGN POLICY VS. EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
To expand on the problem of international actorness, and
thus help illuminate why the case of cooperation on a policy
towards Eastern Europe is unique, this section will briefly
discuss the formal procedures and rules on making foreign
policy and foreign economic policy in the Community/Union.
In the Treaty of Rome, there are several provisions under
which the EC can conduct relations with non-member countries.
These provisions were modified only slightly by the Maastricht
Treaty. The Community can conclude association agreements with
other states (article 238) and it can extend membership to
other European states (article 237). Under articles 110-116,
the Community is to establish a Common Commercial Policy
(CCP), which is based on a common external tariff. Under
article 112, member states are to harmonize their export
credit systems. Article 113 states that the CCP is to be
based on uniform principles, regarding changes in tariff
rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements,
liberalization measures, export policy, and anti-dumping and
anti-subsidies measures. Agreements with third countries are
to be negotiated by the Commission, according to Council
directives. 7 Such agreements are to be concluded by the
7During negotiations, the Commission consults with a
special committee (the "Article 113 committee") of government
officials appointed by the Council.
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Council by a qualified majority vote. 8 Agreements not
specifically covered by the CCP could still be negotiated with
third parties by the Commission, under article 228 (Rome
Treaty and Maastricht Treaty) . only the Community has the
power to conclude international treaties; the Maastricht
Treaty did not endow the EU with similar international status.
As will be discussed further in the thesis, the member
states have not readily accepted EC jurisdiction over
commercial policy, especially with respect to Eastern Europe.
Only in 1975 were member states' trade treaties with East
European states replaced by a Community framework; even then,
they concluded "cooperation" agreements which were virtually
trade agreements in all but name. The member states have
still not agreed that export credit policy should be subjected
to Community rules.
Under the Rome Treaty, the European Parliament (EP) had
few formal powers with respect to the CCP or to association
and membership agreements. With the 1987 single European Act
(SEA), the EP acquired the right to approve association and
membership agreements. This was extended under the Maastricht
Treaty to all but very simple trade agreements (of which the
EC concludes very few, nowadays); but even before Maastricht,
the EP had been asked to approve trade and cooperation
kJnder the original article 114, replaced by the
Maastricht Treaty's provisions of article 228.
9me European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the 1970 ERTA
case ruled that the EC could conclude agreements with
outsiders in any area where it exercised power internally;
later, it ruled that the EC could do so whenever it was
necessary to attain one of the EC's specific objectives. Paul
Taylor, The Limits of European Inteciration (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983), pp. 123-124.
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agreements with the East European states (see chapter 4).
These legal powers allow the EC to send and receive
diplomatic representatives, participate in international
organizations and conferences, carry out a wide-ranging
development policy, run an extensive network of trading
relations, promote regional cooperation, and implement trade
sanctions. 10 The EC's stature has increased with the enormous
growth of the EC into the world's largest trader 11 : the
importance of trade and economic ties in an era of
interdependence reinforces the EC's influence.
The EC's relations with other countries, however, are
generally called "external economic relations", to distinguish
them from "foreign policy", even if in practice (particularly
in a world characterized by interdependence) the difference is
often hard to make out. This division perpetuates and
validates the rather artificial distinction between "low
politics" (economic relations) and "high politics" (matters of
security and defense).12
EPC was formed in 1970 for a number of reasons: to
'°Roy Ginsberg, Foreian Policy Actions of the European
Community : The Politics of Scale (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
1989), p. 42. See also Rhein 1992.
"In 1991, the EC's share of world imports was 22.4% and
its share of world exports was 19.9% (excluding intra-EC
trade); the US, the next largest trader, had a 17.8% share of
world imports and a 16% share of world imports. Commission of
the European Communities, Europe in a Chanin World: The
External Relations of the European Community (Luxembourg:
OOPEC, 1993), p. 8.
' 2See David Allen, "Foreign Policy at the European Level:
Beyond the Nation State?", in William Wallace and W.E.
Paterson, eds., Foreicin Policy Makina in Western Eurote: A
Comparative Aroach (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1978), pp.
139-140.
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balance the EC's economic weight, to allow member states to
speak with one voice in world affairs, and as a step towards
political union.'3 Philippe de Schoutheete delineated three
objectives for EPC. First, "une communauté d'information"
would be created, by means of frequent meetings, in which
information would be exchanged and serve as the basis for a
common analysis of foreign policy issues. Second, "une
conununauté de vues" would be built, in which a consensus of
positions would be sought. Finally, the consensus would be
translated into common declarations, the creation of "une
communauté d'action"
Until 1987, EPC was based on three reports, which set out
its principles and procedures: the 1970 Luxembourg Report, the
1973 Copenhagen Report, and the 1981 London Report. EPC was
separate from the EC: of the EC's institutions, only the
Commission played any role at all in the decision-making
process. The SEA consolidated many of the practices and
customs which had developed over the years (the "acauls
Do].itiaue") 15 , but did so under a separate title and referred
to the member states as 'high contracting parties' - thus
upholding the EC-EPC division.
At the top of the decision-making machinery was the
13See Simon Nuttall, European Political Cooperation
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), chapter 2 for an account of
the origins of EPC.
14Philippe de Schoutheete, La Cootératlon Politiaue
Euroéenne ( Brussels: Labor, 1980), p. 45.
15See Renaud Dehousse and Joseph H.H. Weller, "EPC and the
Single Act: From Soft Law to Hard Law?", in Martin Holland,
ed., The Future of EuroDean Political CooDeration: Essa ys on
Theory and Practice (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 132.
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European Council (summits of the heads of state or government,
set up in 1974), the only framework within which both EC and
EPC matters could formally be handled. 16 The foreign
ministers met regularly, sometimes "at the margins" of
meetings of the EC General Affairs Council (the foreign
ministers). The agendas of EPC and EC Council meetings were
separate until 1990, when the Irish and Italian presidencies
merged them. 17 EPC discussions were prepared by the Political
Committee (the political directors of the foreign ministries),
while EC discussions are prepared by the Committee of
Permanent Representatives (Coreper). The Political Committee
directed the EPC working groups, made up of national heads of
departments and organized geographically or by subject matter.
The Group of European Correspondents (middle-grade foreign
ministry officials) drafted the Political Committee's
conclusions. Although initially excluded, the Commission was
goon fully associated with EPC (officially so since 1981),
participating in meetings at all levels.
The Presidency'8 managed it all, setting agendas,
circulating position papers, and acting as a spokesman for all
the member states. To lessen the load, particularly in
contacts with third countries, the Presidency has been
accompanied by representatives of the previous presidency and
"Rarely, however, did the European Council play a major
role in EPC. From 1974, "Gyninich-type" meetings were held,
informal gatherings of the foreign ministers at which both EPC
and EC business was discussed, but no decisions were taken and
no official record was made. Nuttall 1992, pp. 14-15.
1TNuttall 1992, p. 15.
Member states held the presidency of the EC and EPC, and
of the EU's three pillars now, simultaneously.
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the next, and the Commission: the Troika. 19	The SEA
established a small, minimal secretariat, housed in the EC
Council's headquarters in Brussels. 20 There is no central
planning and analysis body. 21 A confidential telex network
known as Coreu connects the foreign ministries, the EPC
secretariat (now the CFSP unit in the Council Secretariat),
and the Commission.
The SEA declared that the member states will "endeavour
jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy"
(article 30.1). But since all decisions were taken by
consensus, often the member states could not reach agreement
on international issues or could agree to only modest
proposals.	 EPC's own instruments were basically limited to
declarations and demarches.	 Security was even a touchy
subject in EPC (because of Ireland's neutrality, and the
desire not to encroach on NATO' s jurisdiction), but the SEA
included the political and economic aspects of security as
areas that could be discussed within EPC (article 30.6).
The SEA stipulated that the EC's external policies and
the EPC's policies must be consistent, which is generally
understood to mean that the measures and actions taken in both
19Nuttall 1992, p. 19.
201t helped draft replies to questions from members of the
EP about EPC (just about the EP' s only involvement in EPC).
2 'The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, however, looks
set to make provisions for one.
Simon Nuttall maintains that where EPC could set its own
agenda, decisions did not represent the lowest common
denominator, but a median of the range of national views.
Nuttall 1992, pp. 314-315.
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frameworks must not conflict with one another. The
Presidency and the Commission were responsible for ensuring
that such consistency was sought and maintained (article
30.5). EPC and EC policies increasingly complemented one
another; the EC's economic instruments were used to
"reinforce" EPC declarations. To that end, the EC could
impose trade sanctions2'; it could adopt positive trade
measures (dropping import restrictions or lowering tariffs);
it could cut off development aid; and it could offer more
generous aid packages. Sometimes EPC organized a political
dialogue alongside the Community's economic dialogue with
third countries and organizations. In addition, the
Community's association agreements with third countries
provide for regular meetings of an Association Council, during
which EC foreign ministers may, informally, discuss political
issues with the country concerned. The Community was a
"civilian power" - dependent on economic and diplomatic
instruments - in contrast to the superpowers with their vast
Nuttall points out that it is unlikely that EPC and
Community policies would cancel each other out anyway. He
notes two further meanings of consistency: where EPC dictates
the political framework within which the Community then
operates; and where Community instruments are used to reach
foreign policy objectives. Nuttall 1992, pp. 319-320.
24This practice took a while to develop, and was
controversial through the early 1980s. See section 3.3.2.
In the case of the Lomé countries such measures were
long taken only in the case of extreme violations of human
rights.
Simon Nuttall, "Interaction between European Political
Co-operation and the European Community", Yearbook of EuroDean
no. 7, 1987, pp. 244-245.
20
military arsenals and emphasis on power politics.27
Although the distinction between EC and EPC gradually
blurred more and more, the two frameworks have remained
separate. Under the Maastricht Treaty, CFSP is a separate
pillar, although there has been some institutional
synthesis. The Commission is to be even more involved: it can
submit CFSP proposals, a privilege hitherto permitted only
of the member states. An enlarged EPC Secretariat has been
merged into the Council Secretariat, but the Political
Committee and Coreper are still separate bodies. Several EPC
and Council working groups have been combined, including those
on Eastern Europe (the two groups had already been cooperating
closely). 30 The European Council is to define CFSP's
principles and guidelines; the Council of foreign ministers
27Francois Duchêne first developed the concept, in 1973,
but emphasized that it reflected the Community's aim of
"domesticating" relations between states, much as relations
between EC member states resembled "home affairs" rather than
inter-state foreign relations. See Panos Tsakaloyannis, "The
EC: From Civilian Power to Military Integration", in Juliet
Lodge, ed., The European Community and the Challenge of the
Future (London: Pinter, 1989), and Christopher Hill, "European
Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model - or Flop?", in
Reinhardt Rummel, ed., The Evolution of an International
Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness (Boulder: Westview,
1990).
The first pillar is the EC, the second is CFSP, and
third consists of provisions for intergovernmental cooperation
in justice and home affairs.
Because of its new role, the Commission in early 1993
divided DG I (External Relations) into DG I, for External
Economic Relations, and DG IA, for External Political
Relations. This perpetuated a 'high politics-low politics'
dichotomy. The Commission president from January 1995,
Jacques Santer, attempted to move away from that division, by
giving responsibility for political and economic relations
with Eastern Europe to only one Commissioner.
30See Geoffrey Edwards, "Common Foreign and Security
Policy", Yearbook of European Law, no. 13, 1993, p. 499.
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will take decisions. The Presidency represents the EU in CFSP
matters. The Council and the Commission are to ensure the
consistency of the EU's external activities (article C).
Under the CFSP, the member states are to ensure that
"their combined influence is exerted as effectively as
possible by means of concerted and convergent action" (article
J.2). For that end, the CFSP provides for a new policy-making
instrument, Joint Action. Member states are bound to follow
the position agreed in the Joint Action, although there are
provisions for opting out of it. This is the first time such
an obligation has been agreed. The Council could decide
unanimously that further decisions on a Joint Action be taken
by a qualified majority vote.
Perhaps the most significant development contained in the
CFSP relates to defense. All areas of foreign and security
policy, including those with defense implications, can be
discussed. The Western European Union (WEU) can be asked to
carry out CFSP decisions that have defense implications. The
EU seems to be considering the possibility of becoming a
military power.
The CFSP did not actually transform the way in which the
EU formulated and implemented policy towards Eastern Europe.
The Maastricht Treaty did not reduce the need to ensure
consistency because the EC and CFSP are separate pillars, and
both before and after the Treaty entered into force,
consistency in relations with Eastern Europe had already been
achieved. The Commission's powers to submit CFSP initiatives
codify practice: it continually made proposals regarding
economic and political relations with Eastern Europe before
22
Maastricht. Only one Joint Action, the Stability Pact, has
been taken with respect to Eastern Europe. The EU has instead
set up the structured relationship, to integrate the
associates into all three pillars. The policy towards Eastern
Europe has not had defence implications; the EU-WEU link has,
however, been used to provide the EU'S associates with a
framework for security and defense integration.
The policy towards Eastern Europe is unique in that
formal rules were neither a constraint (an excuse for inaction
or ineffectiveness) nor a spur (in and of themselves) for
policy-making. The institutional frameworks were important in
a wider dimension, as fora for cooperation among the member
states. And in this particular case of cooperation, the
member states agreed to "supersede" the rules and procedures.
1.2 CONTRIBUTION OP THE THESIS
There is no dearth of literature on the Community's
relations with Eastern Europe before or after the Cold War.
Since the 1970s, numerous works have been written on the
subject. Peter Marsh, John Maslen (a Commission official),
Charles Ransom, and John Pinder, for example, wrote
extensively on EC-East European relations during the Cold War,
as the footnotes in chapter 3 make manifest. Since communism
collapsed and the Community began to play a significant role
in Eastern Europe, there has been considerably more interest
in the subject, but articles greatly outnumber longer works.3'
31The exceptions to this include: John Pinder, The
European Coimnunitv and Eastern Europe (London: Pinter, 1991),
and Susan Senior Nello, The New Euro pe: Chancing Economic
Relations Between East and West (New York: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1991). Richard Baldwin's book, Towards an
Integrated Eurooe (London: Centre for Economic Policy
23
Only a few of the recent works, however, use EC-East
European relations as a "case study" with implications for
theory. Peter van Ham uses neorealism and neoliberal
institutionalism, but with respect more to the European
integration process than to the Community's relations with
Eastern Europe. 32 Robin Niblett, in his 1995 DPhil (Oxford)
thesis, The EuroDean Community and the Central EuroDean Three
1989-1992: A Study of the Community as an International Actor,
uses several theoretical approaches (namely realism,
institutionalism, domestic politics, and a "three-level game")
to illuminate the constraints on the EC's ability to formulate
and implement a consistent foreign policy and the resources
that could allow it to overcome some of those constraints.
This thesis will contribute to the literature on the
Community/Union's relations with Eastern Europe and to the
literature on foreign policy cooperation within the EU.
Firstly it will seek to demonstrate that the Community/Union
formulated a common policy towards Eastern Europe. This
contrasts with the views of some authors. Heinz Kramer, for
example, argues that the Community's response to the fall of
communism was "more a conglomeration of discrete activities
than the result of a well-developed coherent strategy. The
Member States proved unable to overcome their political
Research, 1994), deals almost solely with economic relations.
A number of edited works have also been published, including
Jean-Claude Gautron, ed., Les Relations Communauté Européenne
- Europe de l'Est (Paris: Economica, 1991).
32Peter van Ham, The EC. Eastern Euro pe and European
Unity: Discord. Collaboration and Inte gration Since 1947
(London: Pinter, 1993).
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differences over the appropriate course of action."
Critical interpretations of the Community's response to the
events in Eastern Europe center on the long internal debate
over enlargement or the extent to which the Community agreed
to open its markets to East European goods. Many observers
have been disappointed with the content of the Community's
policy.
Other authors, however, have been impressed with the
Community's response, particularly in the immediate aftermath
of the collapse of communism. Françoise de La Serre argues
that the Community responded to developments in Eastern Europe
with a remarkably consistent policy, at the level of actors
and procedures, and of substance. 35 Jacques Pelkmans and Anna
Murphy maintain that the Community acted quickly and
effectively in Eastern Europe in 1989-199O. This thesis
will greatly expand on and update these arguments.
Secondly, this thesis will contribute to the more general
literature on foreign policy cooperation within the EU. The
Heinz Kramer, "The European Community's Response to the
'New Eastern Europe'", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.
31, no. 2, June 1993, p. 221.
John Redmond, for example, maintains that the Community
could not formulate a coherent long-term strategy towards
Eastern Europe as long as it "avoided" the membership issue.
John Redmond, "The Wider Europe: Extending the Membership of
the EC", in Alan Cafruny and Glenda Rosenthal, eds., The State
of the European Community Vol. 2: The Maastricht Debates and
Beyond (London: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 221.
35Francoise de La Serre (199lb), "La Politique de la
Communauté Européenne vis-a-vis de l'Est: Vers Une Approche
Globale?", in Gautron, ed. 1991, especially pp. 593-598.
Jacques Pelkmans and Anna Murphy, "Catapulted into
Leadership: The Community's Trade and Aid Policies Vis-ã-Vis
Eastern Europe", Journal of European Intecration, vol. 14,
nos. 2-3, 1991.
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key questions posed in this thesis concern why the member
states cooperate, and several different theoretical approaches
will be evaluated as to their usefulness in answering those
questions. In particular, the thesis will bring elements of
neo-functionalism and constructivism into an analysis of
foreign policy-making in the EU. As Martin Holland has
argued, "the case for the re-evaluation of neofunctionalism
with respect to foreign policy is strong" 37; but as yet, there
have not been many attempts to do so. There has also been
relatively little use of constructivism, as developed
particularly by Alexander Wendt, in analyses of cooperation
within the EU. This thesis will argue that insights from both
of those approaches are particularly helpful in explaining why
the member states cooperated on the policy towards Eastern
Europe, and how that policy was made.
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE
In Chapter 2, several theories of cooperation will be
reviewed, to see which might help solve the puzzle of why the
member states cooperated on the policy towards Eastern Europe.
Most International Relations theories offer inadequate
explanations of cooperation within the sui aeneris EU.
Sociological approaches and "home-grown" theories (most
notably neo-functionalism) are much more promising and
37Martin Holland, European Community Intearation (London:
Pinter, 1993), p. 130.
BOne of the aims of The EuroDean Communit y in World
Politics (London: Pinter, 1993), edited by Ole Norgaard,
Thomas Pedersen and Nikolai Petersen, is to assess Philippe
Sciunitter's externalization hypothesis. But neither of the
book's two chapters on EC-East European relations actually
does so.
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helpful. Questions generated by these theories will guide the
empirical research in chapters 3-6.
In Chapter 3, the Community's relations with Eastern
Europe through 1988 will be analyzed. Although Community-East
European relations remained quite limited, a certain legacy of
cooperation was established, which could be drawn on as the
communist regimes collapsed.
In chapters 4-6, the Community/Union's policy towards
Eastern Europe between 1988 and 1995 will be analyzed. The
policy will be sub-divided into the three chapters according
to the policy instruments used. Chapter 4 discusses the
development of a framework for relations with Eastern Europe
in 1988-1989, and two policy instruments, trade agreements and
aid, which the Community initially used to support reform in
Eastern Europe. Chapter 5 covers the development of
association and integration as policy instruments. Chapter 6
examines the Community/Union's efforts to prevent conflict in
Eastern Europe.
The final chapter will reconsider the questions raised in
chapter 2 and draw out the theoretical implications of the
responses to those questions. Neo-functionalism and
constructivism will be shown to be the most useful for
explaining why the member states cooperated on the common
policy.
CHAIER 2
EXPLAINING COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS $
THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The "puzzle" of this thesis is why and how the
Community/Union formulated a common policy towards Eastern
Europe in the period 1988-1995. Rather than concentrate on
the limits to formulating a common EU foreign policy, the
emphasis will be placed on explaining the joint policy-making
that did occur.
Clearly, conventional foreign policy models, developed to
explain national policies or policy-making, are inadequate in
analyzing the making of foreign policy in the EU. 1 Even if
the EU conducted an active foreign policy in pursuit of
defined objectives, it would still be difficult to envisage
the EU as a "rational actor". One must perforce be concerned
with how the policy was made: its goals, principles, and
instruments would have been decided in a process of
interaction among the member states and EU institutions. An
analogy with some "administrative process models", such as
bureaucratic politics, might help explain policy-making, but
the member states are not bureaucracies (however much autonomy
one considers bureaucracies to have) and this would beg the
question of why they could be likened to inter-state entities.
'For a very clear guide to foreign policy models, see
Michael Clarke, "Foreign Policy Analysis: A Theoretical
Guide", in Stelios Stavridis and Christopher Hill, eds.,
Domestic Sources of Foreicm Policy : West European Reactions to
the Falklands Conflict (Oxford: Berg, 1996). The classic
works on foreign policy analysis are Graham Allison, Essence
of Decision: Exlainina the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1971) and John D. Steinbruner, The
CYbernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political
Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
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For although the EC, now EU, is increasingly a
supranational organization, no EU policy can be approved
without at least the implicit consent of most, if not all, of
its members, and most CFSP measures must be approved
unanimously. Hence the questions at the heart of this thesis
are why the member states agreed to, lobbied for, or accepted
tacitly a joint policy towards Eastern Europe, and how that
policy reflected the consensus.
Some observers charge that the academic community has
been "unable either to relate EPC into any meaningful system
theory, integration theory or international relations theory
let alone create a new EPC general theory." 2 But as David
Allen pointed out almost 20 years ago, European foreign
policy-making is a process that "defies immediate
categorization": it involves elements of integration,
intergovernmentalism, transnationalism and bureaucratic
politics, all against a background of interdependence.3
Martin Holland warns that no single theory of EPC should be
promoted because "different conceptual approaches will be
appropriate for different theoretical questions and illuminate
a different set of empirical facts."'
There are a number of competing theories to explain why
states may or may not cooperate. Several theorists have
2Joseph Weller and Wolfgang Wessels, "EPC and the
Challenge of Theory", in Alfred Pijpers, Elfriede
Regelsberger, and Wolfgang Wessels, eds., Euro pean Political
Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western
Eurote? (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), p. 229.
3Allen 1978, p. 135.
4Martin Holland, "Introduction: EPC Theory and
Empiricism", in Holland, ed. 1991, p. 5.
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addressed the particular question of why the EC member states
cooperate, and why they might engage in joint foreign policy
activity. This thesis will not 'test' one theory in
particular. Instead, questions generated by several of these
theories - particularly those that seem most promising and
useful - will guide the empirical work in chapters 3-6. The
first part of this chapter will cover International Relations
(IR) theories of cooperation, divided into three broad groups:
systemic theories, unit-level theories, and approaches which
examine the symbiosis between international institutions and
states. The second part will discuss theories of cooperation
within the EC. Some of these are IR theories applied to the
Community; others are theories that have been developed within
the EC context. Most IR theories offer inadequate
explanations of cooperation within the sui aeneris EU, while
sociological approaches and "home-grown" theories seem more
helpful (but may not be so useful outside of the EU context).
2.1. IR THEORY AND COOPERATION
2.1.1 Systemic Theories
The current mainstream American debate on cooperation is
dominated by neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists.
Both sides agree on a definition of cooperation: it occurs
"when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or
anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy
coordination. " Policy coordination requires the actors to
negotiate to bring their actions into conformity with one
5Robert Keohane, After He gemony : Cooperation and Discord
in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984), p. 51.
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another. As Helen Mimer points out, this definition assumes
that each actor is behaving rationally, and implies that by
cooperating, the actors reap gains or rewards. 6 Neorealists
and neoliberal institutionalists differ over the conditions
(namely, the distribution of gains) under which cooperation is
likely, and over whether institutions can foster cooperation.
Kenneth Waltz's reformulation of realism into a
parsimonious systemic theory 7 has been termed neorsalism.
According to Joseph Grieco, three assumptions lie at the hard
core of the neorealist research program (in the Lakatosian
sense): "states are the key actors in world politics; they are
substantively and instrumentally rational; and their
preferences and choices are largely shaped by the absence of
effective centralized international authority, i.e., inter-
state anarchy." 8 Anarchy causes states to be interested above
all in their security and independence. States will thus seek
to balance stronger states, either by internal means
(increasing their military capability) or by external means
6Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation
among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses", World Politics, vol.
44, no. 3, April 1992, p. 468.
TKenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
8Joseph M. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and
Monetary Union and the Neo-realist Research Programme", Review
of International Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, 1995, p. 26. Robert
Keohane points out that the rationality assumption is crucial
in neorealism: if actors weren't rational, "state behavior
might have to be accounted for by variations in the
calculating ability of states." Keohane (1989b), "Theory of
World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", in Keohane,
International Institutions and State Power (Boulder: Westview,
1989), p. 41.
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(joining or strengthening an alliance) .
Cooperation, according to neorealists, is difficult
because states are primarily concerned with relative gains, or
whether or not other states will gain more than they do in any
cooperative venture. Friends won't necessarily remain
friendly, so states must ensure that even they don't become
relatively more powerful: "(t]here is even the danger, however
remote, that today's ally will become tomorrow's enemy."1°
Because states are uncertain about the future intentions of
other states, "they pay close attention to how cooperation
might affect relative caoabilities in the future."11
States thus accord international institutions only
minimal importance. Regimes are merely epiphenomenal and do
not affect states' behavior. The international system is
defined by states' own interests, power, and interaction.12
9See Kenneth Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of
Power", in Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
'°Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe.
America. and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1990), p. 47.
"Joseph Grieco (1993a), "Anarchy and the Limits of
Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism", in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and
Neolibera].ism: The Contemorarv Debate (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993), p. 128. Grieco, however, does admit
that a state's sensitivity to relative gains varies, depending
on, for example, whether the state's relationships approximate
a state of war or whether the issue is a security or economic
one. See Grieco (1993b) "Understanding the Problem of
International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal
Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory", in
Baldwin, ed. 1993, pp. 323-324.
12Stephen Krasner (1983a), "Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables", in Stephen
Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1983), p. 6.
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Bargains between states determine "who gets what" in the
international economy. 13 Related to this argument is the
hegemonic stability theory, which posits that order in world
politics is created by a single dominant power, and the
maintenance of order requires continued hegemony.
N.olib.ral institutionali.ts 14 , in contrast, claim that
cooperation among self-interested, rational states with shared
interests is more possible, and prevalent, than neorealists
acknowledge. Neo].iberal institutionalists base their case on
neorealist assumptions; in some respects the difference
between the two camps is insignificant.'5
Neoliberal institutionalists cite findings from iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma. 16 When states must continue to deal with
13Susan Strange, "Cave! Hic Dra gones: A Critique of Regime
Analysis", in Krasner, ed. 1983, p. 354.
The term "neo-liberal institutionalism" seems to have
been coined by Robert Keohane. See "Neoliberal
Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics" (1989a), in
Keohane 1989. Keohane later opts to be labelled just an
"institutionalist": he wants to avoid the "unfortunate
connotation of 'liberal' and the ambiguity of 'neoliberal'".
See his "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after
the Cold War", in Baldwin, ed. 1993, p. 298, fn. 3. This
confirms the change in his theoretical orientation from
transnationalism and interdependence theory to a much more
rational-choice perspective.
'5Liberalism's heritage is difficult to trace in
neoliberal institutionalism - long gone is any emphasis on the
peace-engendering effect of democracies and free trade. David
Long also criticizes the neoliberal emphasis on the state:
"many strands of liberalism go beyond the Harvard School's
understanding of state-centric international relations to
envision a world politics of individuals and groups..." See
"The Harvard School of Liberal International Theory: A Case
for Closure", Millennium, vol. 24, no. 3, Winter 1995, p. 503.
'6See in particular Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane,
"Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions", in Baldwin, ed. 1993. Axelrod had found that
when individuals have a sufficiently large chance of meeting
again, they have a stake in future interaction and will
33
each other and their governments place a high value on future
payoffs, then cooperation can emerge. Neoliberal
institutionalists also stress that cooperation is possible
because states are primarily concerned with absolute gains,
not relative ones. States' egoism means that "the preferences
of actors in world politics are based on their assessments of
their own welfare, not that of others." 17 More recently,
neoliberal institutionalists have acknowledged that "states
worry more about relative gains of enemies than of allies."'8
This further obscures the distinction with neorealism.
Institutions significantly affect the prospects for
cooperation. Increasing economic and ecological
interdependence creates a demand for rules and institutions to
try to control the phenomenon. Institutions may be formal
intergovernmental or cross-national nongovernmental
organizations, regimes, or informal conventions. 19 Much of
the literature deals with regimes. Regimes are "sets of
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge
in a given area of international relations." 20 They are more
than temporary arrangements, based on short-term calculations
cooperate. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Coo peration (New
York: Basic Books, 1984).
'TKeohane 1984, p. 66.
'8David Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World
Politics", in Baldwin, ed. 1993, p. 7.
Keohane 1989a, pp. 3-4. Keohane defines institutions
as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity,
and shape expectations." (p. 3)
20Krasner 1983a, p. 2.
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of interest. Regime participants feel obligated to comply
with the regime.2'
Regimes help overcome the obstacles posed by collective
action. They facilitate cooperation by helping to solve
defection problems and increase information about the behavior
of the players. NBy establishing legitimate standards of
behavior for states to follow and by providing ways to monitor
compliance, (regimes] create the basis for decentralized
enforcement founded on the principle of reciprocity."
States will sacrifice short-term interests because they expect
that others will reciprocate in the future. 24 The inclusion
of many related issues under one regime also helps cooperation
by facilitating side-payments.25
Armed with these findings, neoliberal institutionalists
demonstrate that cooperation can develop without a hegemon:
Whether a hegemon exists or not, international
regimes depend on the existence of patterns of
common or complementary interests that are perceived
or capable of being perceived by political actors.
This makes common action to produce joint gains
rational. A hegemon may help to create shared
interests by providing rewards for cooperation and
21Krasner 1983a, pp. 2-5. GATT and the Law of the Sea
(prior to its ratification) are the most oft-cited examples of
a regime.
Mancur Olson brought attention to this problem: unless
the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless
there is coercion or some separate incentive to make
individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interests. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action:
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1971), p. 2.
Keohane 1984, p. 245.
24Krasner 1983a, pp. 2-3.
Keohane 1984, p. 91.
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punishments for defection, but where no hegemon
exists, similar rewards and punishments can be
provided if conditions are favorable.26
Both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism can be
criticized on numerous fronts, only some of which are relevant
here. Both approaches treat state preferences as exogenous
(see section 2.1.3); they assume states are rational, self-
interested actors; and they portray the international system
as a self-help, anarchic one. These criticisms illuminate why
both theories may not be useful in explaining why the EU
member states cooperate.
Both approaches are based on the rational actor model,
made manifest in the use of game theory. But as James Rosenau
argues, "the rational actor who only calculates interests or
recognizes preferences is an ideal type." 27 Keohane has
argued that cooperation is even more likely if Herbert Simon's
notion of "bounded rationality" is used. Actors "find it
difficult to use available information to calculate the costs
and benefits of every alternative course of action. They
therefore use shortcuts such as rules of thumb in order to
"satisf ice" - achieving a satisfactory level of performance
rather than an optimal one." Keohane argues that the
construction and maintenance of international regimes becomes
even easier if we assume bounded rationality: "Regimes merely
substitute multilateral rules (presumably somewhat less
Keohane 1984, p. 78.
27james Rosenau, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes,
and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics", International
Orcanization, vol. 40, no. 4, Autumn 1986, p. 862.
28Robert 0. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study
of World Politics" in Keohane, ed. 1986, p. 12.
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congenial per se) for unilateral ones, with the advantage that
other actors' behavior thereby becomes more predictably
cooperative. "
Both theories also assume an actor pursues its self-
interest. If actors are human beings, this notion reflects a
rather limited view about the human character. James Caporaso
argues that it would be just as plausible to start with the
"idea of a socialized person, concerned with fairness, equity
and the welfare of others." Robert Jervis notes:
Considerations of morality, fairness, and obligation
are almost surely large parts of the explanation for
the fact that individuals in society cooperate much
more than the Prisoners' Dilemma would lead us to
expect. Only economists behave as the theory says
they should; others are likely to contribute to
public goods, especially when they believe that
fairness calls for them to do so.31
As discussed further below, considerations of fairness and
obligation certainly influence cooperation within the EU.
Keohane has also relaxed the egoism assumption. He lists
four ways in which actors see their own interests relative to
those of others: 1) actors may be indifferent to the welfare
of others; 2) actors may be interested in others' welfare only
insofar as others take action that affects them; 3) actors may
be interested in others' welfare because improvements in
others' welfare improve their own welfare; and 4) actors may
Keohane 1984, p. 115.
James Caporaso, "Microeconomics and International
Political Economy: The Neoclassical Approach to Institutions"
in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, eds., Global Chances
and Theoretical Chpl1ences: Aroaches to World Politics for
the 1990s (Toronto: Lexington, 1989), p.152.
31Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation",
World Politics, vol. 40, no. 3, April 1988, p. 348.
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be interested in the welfare of others for their own sake
(what he calls empathetic interdependence) 32 "Governments
that regard themselves as empathetically interdependent will
be more inclined than egoists to reach for greater joint gains
- solutions to international problems that lead to larger
overall value - even at the expense of direct gains to
themselves." Significantly, Keohane has cited the EC as an
entity in which actors may feel empathetically interdependent.
Robert Jervis has also noted that the "self" may be
larger than the state. "It is a central tenet in
international politics that people value the security and
well-being of their own state more than they do that of
others. M But "why should our attitudes toward others be
based on their geographic location rather than they values
they hold?...The degree of value integration, and therefore
the scope of the relevant self, may sometimes be larger than
we assume."35
It is difficult to understand why neoliberal
32Keohane 1984, pp. 122-123. These categories are similar
to Alexander Wendt's continuum of security systems. The
competitive system is at one end, in which states identify
negatively with each other's security and are concerned about
relative gains. In the middle is the individualistic security
system in which states are indifferent to others and are
concerned with absolute gains. At the other end is the
cooperative security system, in which states identify
positively with one other so that each state's security is
seen as the responsibility of all. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy
is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics", International Oraanization, vol. 46, no. 2, Spring
1992, pp. 400-401.
Keohane 1984, p. 125.
Jervis 1988, p. 341.
35jervis 1988, p. 342.
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institutionalists continue to assume states are rational
egoists, an ideal (nay, utopian) type if there ever was one.
Empathetic interdependence, for example, seems to come closer
to capturing the nature of cooperation and interaction in the
EU (granted, a special case) than a more traditional
neoliberal institutional approach. But as Andrew Hurrell
points out, "Can one relax the basic assumption of rational
egoism and accept the role of empathetic interdependence,
without the overall force of the rationalist project being
undermined?" Constructivists (section 2.1.3) would argue
that such a rationalist approach to cooperation is flawed.
Anarchy is another problematic assumption. Robert Powell
argues that the neorealist-neoliberal debate over relative
gains is misconceived:
Cooperation and concern for relative gains may co-
vary, but one does not cause the other. The causes
for both are the underlying features of the states'
strategic environment that jointly induce a concern
for relative gains and thereby make cooperation
difficult
Anarchy, a constant feature of the international system,
cannot account for any variation in a state's concern for
relative or absolute gains. 	 As Helen I4ilner argues, the
Andrew Hurrell, "International Society and the Study of
Regimes: A Reflective Approach", in Volker Rittberger, ed.,
Reime TheorY and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), p. 67.
37Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations
Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate", International
Organization, vol. 48, no. 2, Spring 1994, p. 337.
Powell 1994, p. 337.
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international system is interdependent as well as anarchic.
Int.rdep.nd.ncs theory offers a different view of the
international system than that of neorealists. But neoliberal
institutionalists also seem to ignore the theory, although it
shows why states may not be concerned with relative gains and
therefore, in the neoliberal view, more inclined to cooperate.
In Power and Interdependence, Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye developed the concept of complex interdependence.
Interdependence is a broad term referring to situations
characterized by reciprocal effects among actors; complex
interdependenc, is an ideal type of international system, the
opposite of realism. It has three characteristics: multiple
channels (interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational)
connect societies; the agenda of interstate relations consists
of many issues that are not arranged in a clear hierarchy; and
military force is not used towards other governments in a
region or on issues when complex interdependence prevails.
The many issues on the agenda mean that the distinction
between foreign policy and domestic policy blurs: economic
issues are no longer subordinated to national security issues
and trade and economic growth become priorities. Relations
among transnational actors and government bureaucracies affect
political outcomes. International organizations help set the
international agenda, bring officials together, and serve as
39Helen Mimer, "The Assumption of Anarchy in
International Relations Theory: A Critique", in Baldwin, ed.
1993.
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fora for initiatives and issue linkage by weak states.'°
International society theorists also envisage
international relations differently.' 1 Hedley Bull maintains
that there is an international society, which exists when
states, "conscious of certain common interests and common
values, form a society in the sense that they conceive
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common
institutions."'2 As Andrew Hurrell argues, "states follow
specific rules, even when inconvenient, because they have a
longer-term interest in the maintenance of law-impregnated
international community."'3
An international society perspective contrasts not only
with neorealisin, but also with much regime theory, which
considers "that a less-than-universal society may exist in
pockets or areas of actual agreement amongst states". 	 For
'°Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and
Interdependence, 2nd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and
Co., 1989), pp. 23-3 6. See also Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,
"Power and Interdependence Revisited",	 International
Organization, vol. 41, no. 4, Autumn 1987.
41Rather than deal with cooperation, however, "the English
school seeks to account for the prevalence of order, and
especially for the prevalence of order in international
society as a whole." Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, "Regime
Theory and the English School of International Relations: A
Comparison", Millennium, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1992, p. 339.
'2Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Societ y : A Study of Order
in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 13.
'3Hurrell 1995, p. 59.
A. Claire Cutler, "The 'Grotian Tradition' in
International Relations", Review of International Studies,
vol. 17, no. 1, January 1991, p. 59 (emphasis added). Oran
Young, Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala are regime theorists
who maintain that regimes are widespread. See Puchala and
Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive
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the same reason, the approach may not be so useful in
analyzing cooperation within a regional organization, in which
states evidently have a deeper sense of community.
Chris Brown argues that the international society
approach also contrasts with the notion of an incipient world
community, based not on sovereign states but on a
"cosmopolitan belief in the oneness of humanity".'5 "Within
the world composed of advanced industrial, liberal-democratic
states, something like an international society does exist."'6
But it may be more than a society. Sovereignty is not so
important: EU members have given up elements of their
sovereignty; the use of force is not a serious option in
relations between the advanced world's states; and complex
interdependence is a reality. "The states of the advanced
world may not yet form a community in the full sense of the
term - common identity is not yet fully present - but they
seem to be heading in that direction..."'7 The EU could be
even further along in that direction; a rationalist approach
to cooperation (based on self-interested actors) in the EU
would thus be inadequate.
2.1.2 Tb. Unit L.vsl
Although systemic-level theories produce a "comprehensive
Analysis", and Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of
International Regimes" in Krasner, ed. 1983.
'5chris Brown, "International Theory and International
Society: The Viability of the Middle Way?", Review of
International Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, April 1995, p. 185.
46Brown 1995, p. 195.
'7Brown 1995, p. 195.
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and total picture of international relations"', they
exaggerate the impact of the system on national actors. Peter
Gourevitch remarks:
However compelling external pressures may be, they
are unlikely to be fully determining, save for the
case of outright occupation. Some leeway of
response to pressure is always possible, at least
conceptually. The choice of response therefore
requires explanation. Such an explanation
necessarily entails an examination of politics: the
struggle among competing responses.49
Several theorists maintain that the domestic sources of
preferences regarding cooperation must be investigated; the
"black box" of the state must be opened. Geoffrey Garrett
argues that to explain why states choose to cooperate on a
given issue or in a particular way, the political interests of
national governments must be taken into account. 5° Helen
Mimer asserts that consideration of domestic politics would
tell us how preferences are aggregated and national interests
determined; it would shed light on the strategies states adopt
to realize their goals. International negotiators also know
that domestic actors have to agree with the terms negotiated
since agreements must be ratified domestically.5'
Robert Jervis notes several sources of preferences. The
J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in
International Relations", in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba,
eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 89.
49Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The
International Sources of Domestic Politics", International
Orcianization, vol. 32, no. 4, Autumn 1978, p. 911.
50Geoffrey Garrett, "International Cooperation and
Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal
Market", International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, Spring
1992, p. 541.
51Milner 1992, p. 493.
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nature of the state itself can affect "the goals states seek,
the costs they are willing to pay, and the instruments that
are believed to be appropriate..." 52 Transnational forces can
influence preferences. The beliefs of individual decision-
makers will affect states' choices. Preferences can change
when decision-makers are replaced by other officials, when the
external situation changes, through the process of interaction
itself, and with experience and knowledge.53
Mimer lists four theories of domestic politics which
could be used to generate hypotheses about international
cooperation: pluralist theories, which highlight interest
groups and party politics; elite theories, which concentrate
on the nature of national decision-makers; institutional
theories, such as bureaucratic or organizational politics; and
Marxism, which states that the national interest is determined
by the interests of capital.' Wayne Sandholtz, however,
warns that a neat, unitary theory of national preferences is
impossible: a combination of propositions is needed.55
Robert Putnam has proposed that international
negotiations be conceived of as a two-level game, thus
incorporating interests formed domestically. At the national
level, or level II, domestic groups pursue their interests by
pressing their government to adopt favorable policies, and
52jervis 1988, p. 325.
53jervis 1988, pp. 325-328.
54Milner 1992, pp. 494-495.
55Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and
Maastricht", International Organization, vol. 47, no. 1,
Winter 1993.
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politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among these
groups. At the international level, or level I, national
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy
domestic pressures while minimizing the adverse consequences
of foreign developments. Any agreement reached at level I
must be ratified at level II. The two levels cannot be
"modeled" independently because international pressures
reverberate within domestic politics and issues can be linked
synergistically.
Putnam acknowledged, however, that transnational
relations do not figure in his model. Two-level games in the
EC, for example, are influenced by direct ties among level II
participants. 57 Putnam also left out supranational actors,
such as the Commission, which has played a major role in the
EC's policy towards Eastern Europe.
2.1.3 sociological Lib.ralism and Constructivisa
Increasingly academics are considering the ways in which
interaction between states can change states' interests, a
more pertinent question in the context of the EU. Joseph Nye
calls this approach sociological liberalism, "which asserts
the transformative effect of transnational contacts and
coalitions on national attitudes and definitions of
interests." 58 He encourages academics to look again at the
5 obert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-Level Games", International Organization, vol.
42, no. 3, Summer 1988.
57putnam 1988, p. 459.
58Joseph Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism", World
Politics, vol. 40, no. 2, January 1988, p. 246. This is to be
added to traditional liberal theory.
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early work of Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas, which emphasized
"the political processes of learning and of redefining
national interests, as encouraged by institutional frameworks
and regimes."59
In Power and Interdependence, Keohane and Nye illuminated
how international institutions affect state interests, under
complex interdependence. 60 Although they may be established
in conformity with the distribution of capabilities among
states, international institutions subsequently
influence actors' abilities to use these
capabilities....Power over outcomes will be
conferred by organizationally dependent
capabilities, such as voting power, ability to form
coalitions, and control of elite networks; that is,
by capabilities that are affected by the norms,
networks, and institutions associated with
international organization as we have defined it.6'
They later suggested that regimes play a big role in
state learning because they can: change the standard operating
procedures of national bureaucracies; present new coalition
opportunities for subnational actors; change the attitudes of
participants through contacts within institutions; provide
information on the behavior of others; and facilitate learning
59Nye 1988, p. 239.
60According to the international organization model, one
of four models Keohane and Nye test to try to explain regime
change. They later acknowledged that complex interdependence
posits that state policy goals are not arranged in a hierarchy
and that policy instruments are limited. Because the approach
is defined in terms of state goals, it cannot explain how
state goals and instruments are affected by complex
interdependence. They urge that greater attention be directed
towards understanding how state aims change. Keohane and Nye
1987, p. 740.
61Keohane and Nye 1989, p. 55.
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within specialized groups of negotiators.
Stephen Krasner has argued that once established, regimes
may change states' calculations of how they can maximize their
interests, by changing the incentives and opportunities
presented to states. They may alter states' interests, by
increasing transaction flows, which promotes the interests of
some domestic groups and damages those of others, or by
creating property rights, and thus an interest in those
rights. Regimes facilitate knowledge, which could change the
way actors perceive their interests. Regimes could become a
source of power, or they could alter the power capabilities of
different actors .
Alexander Wendt calls for "mainstream" theorists
interested in the way international institutions affect state
interests and learning to join forces with "constructivist"
theorists. Rationalist theories treat interests as
exogenously given and focus on how agents' behavior generates
outcomes. 0	Institutions therefore change behavior, not
identities and interests. Those liberal theorists who want to
Keohane and Nye 1987, p. 751.
Krasner (1983b), "Regimes and the Limits of Realism",
in Krasner 1983, pp. 361-363. Stephen Haggard and Beth
Simmons argue that to verify whether regimes have actually
changed states' interests or preferences, one would need to
focus on domestic decision-making. See "Theories of
International Regimes", International Organization, vol. 41,
no. 3, Summer 1987, p. 514.
64Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism take the
preferences of states as given. Robert Jervis argues that
neorealists cannot make precise deductions about states'
preferences in any given situation, except possibly when
national security is at stake. Jervis 1988, p. 325.
Neolibera]. institutionalists do not question the neorealist
assumption that in an anarchic international system, states
are 'at base' motivated to survive. Powell 1994, pp. 320-321.
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go beyond this, however, face a contradiction. "Regimes
cannot change identities and interests if the latter are taken
as given." 65 Constructivists, in contrast, are interested in
how practice constitutes subjects; they consider identities
and interests to be endogenous to interaction, to process.
Wendt draws on Anthony Giddens' structuration theory to
make his argument. Structuration theory is an attempt to
"resolve" the agent-structure problem at the ineta-theoretical
level. It "conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually
constituted or co-determined entities. M "Social structures
are the result of the intended and unintended consequences of
human action, just as those actions presuppose or are mediated
by an irreducible structural context."67
Wendt tries to demonstrate that self-help and power
politics, which neorealists claim is caused by anarchy, are
Wendt 1992, p. 393. Earlier, Friedrich Kratochwil and
John Gerard Ruggie contended that the "emphasis on convergent
expectations as the constitutive basis of regimes gives
regimes an inescapable intersubjective quality" 
(p. 
764). The
positivist epistemology prevailing in regime analysis is
problematic because insofar as it considers intersubjective
meaning, it does so by inferring it from behavior. In
addition, "norms" are not easily explained by positivism,
given that they do not cause behavior, but guide, inspire or
justify it. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie,
"International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of
the State", International Oraanization, vol. 40, no. 4, Autumn
1986.
'6Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in
International Relations Theory", International Oraanization,
vol. 41, no. 3, Summer 1987, p. 350.
6TWendt 1987, p. 360. David Dessler likewise suggests two
connections between action and structure: "First, structure
both enables action and constrains its possibilities. Second,
structure is the outcome as well as the medium of action."
David Dessler, "What's At Stake in the Agent-Structure
Debate?", International Oraanization, vol. 43, no. 3, Summer
1989, p. 452.
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institutions that states have created. He points out that
states "act differently toward enemies than they do toward
friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.
Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell
us which is which."
Actors acquire identities by participating in "collective
meanings", or intersubjective understandings and expectations.
An institution is a stable set of identities and interests.
"(I]nstitutionalization is a process of internalizing new
identities and interests, not something occurring outside them
and affecting only behavior; socialization is a cognitive
process, not just a behavioral one." 69 Institutions are
created through reciprocal interaction. "Self-help security
systems evolve from cycles of interaction in which each party
acts in ways that the other feels are threatening to the self,
creating expectations that the other is not to be trusted.
Once such a social system is constituted, it may be difficult
to change it, because the system appears as "an objective
social fact" to actors, and actors may want to maintain
"stable role identities."71
Systemic change is possible, however. Wendt illustrates
a number of ways a self-help system can be changed, one of
which is through cooperation. Whereas rationalists use game
theory to analyze the interaction which can lead to
Wendt 1992, p. 397.
Wendt 1992, p. 399.
7°Wendt 1992, p. 406.
71Wendt 1992, p. 411.
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cooperation, constructivists
would concentrate on how the expectations produced
by behavior affect identities and interests... . (T]he
process by which egoists learn to cooperate is at
the same time a process of reconstructing their
interests in terms of shared commitments to social
norms. Over time, this will tend to transform a
positive interdependence of outcomes into a positive
interdependence of utilities or collective interest
organized around the norms in question.7'2
Wendt argues that through interaction, states might even
form collective identities and interests, thus redefining
Olson's logic of collective action, which takes rational,
self-interested actors as constant (see footnote 22). 7' He
points to the example of European cooperation: "four decades
of cooperation may have transformed a positive interdependence
of outcomes into a collective 'European identity' in terms of
which states increasingly define their 'self'-interests."T'
Collective identity "refers to positive identification
with the welfare of another", a situation of empathetic
interdependence: "This is a basis for feelings of solidarity,
community, and loyalty, and thus for collective definitions of
interest." 7' Wendt does not suggest that collective identity
supplants egoistic identity: there can be conflicts over
7'Wendt 1992, p. 417. The last sentence refers to game-
theoretic analyses of cooperation, in which cooperation will
take place only if the outcomes are positively interdependent,
meaning that cooperation could lead to gains that could not be
realized by unilateral action. Wendt 1992, p. 416.
73See Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and
the International State", American Political Science Review,
vol. 88, no. 2, June 1994.
T4wendt 1992, p. 417.
7'Wendt 1994, p. 386.
( LIN.)
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'multiple loyaltiesl.Th He does argue that "to the extent
that mechanisms are at work that promote collective
identities, models that ignore them will understate the
chances for international cooperation and misrepresent why it
occurs.
Wendt maintains there are two ways in which empirical
work could disprove the constructivist approach. If domestic
factors are found to be more important determinants of states'
interests, then a rationalist approach is appropriate because
interests are in fact exogenous to interaction. If interests
change only very slowly, then it may be appropriate to
consider interests as given.Th
Wendt's approach is state-centric, focusing on the
interaction of states; yet transnational ties and
interdependence (below the state level) may also influence
identities and interests, as may the transnational convergence
of domestic values such as democracy. As William Wallace
argues, the diffuse sense of identity and community in the
EU's core has evolved as much from the processes of informal
social integration as from formal political integration.80
Karl Deutsch's work and functionalism take less of a
76wendt 1994, p. 387.
Wendt 1994, p. 391.
ThWendt 1992, p. 423.
Wendt notes that such systemic processes can encourage
collective identity formation, but that "in the last analysis,
agents and structures are produced or reproduced by what
actors do." Wendt 1994, p. 390.
80William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Euroie
(London: Pinter, 1990), p. 104.
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statist view, and focus on the development of community
feeling amongst peoples in different states. As Ilurrell
argues, a sense of community is an especially important factor
in creating and maintaining regimes that deeply affect state
sovereignty (as foreign policy cooperation is seen to do)
Deutsch and his colleagues developed the concept of
"security community", in which there was a sense of community
and of institutions and practices strong enough to assure
long-term expectations that problems would be resolved
peacefully. There are two kinds of security community:
amalgamated, meaning the formal merger of two or more
previously independent units into one unit, with a common
government; or pluralistic, where the units retain their legal
independence. To form both kinds of community, values must be
compatible, the units must be able to respond to each other's
needs and actions quickly, and their behavior must be mutually
predictable. Amalgamated communities further require unbroken
links of social communication, high mobility of people, and
multiple ranges of communication and transactions. Deutsch
did not ask, however, how supranational institutions might
foster security communities.
For functionalism, the development of a socio-
psychological community is the dynamic of integration, and
functional institutions further that development.
Institutions could acquire powers only if they were capable of
81Hurrell 1995, pp. 61-65.
Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Communit y and the NortI
tic Area: International Organization in the Light of
rical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1957), pp. 44-67.
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attracting the loyalties of people, by providing benefits to
them. States would then be forced to grant more power to the
institutions. This is not so easy to translate to
institutions for foreign policy cooperation, however, since
public influence on foreign policy is unclear and the benefits
provided often nebulous.
2.2 EXPLAINING COOPERATION WITHIN THE EU
The EU is very much a sui aeneris institution, neither an
intergovernmental organization nor a completely supranational
one. There is a diffusion of authority in the EU: sovereignty
does not clearly lie either with the member states or with the
EU. As William Wallace has argued, the European policy-
making system is a halfway house "between sovereignty and
integration, between the management of interdependence and the
acceptance of central decision-making,	 between an
international regime and a federation."85
Furthermore, the EU is undoubtedly a "security
community", and may be becoming a "community" in Chris Brown's
sense of the word. Recent Eurobaroineter polls show that many
people in the EU are at least adding a European identity 'on
See Taylor 1983, chapter 1. David Mitrany, the leading
functionalist, did not want to see a European super-state
created, and focused on institution-building in specific
functional areas.
See Thomas Christiansen, European Intearation between
Political Science and International Relations Theor y ; The End
of Sovereianty, EUI Working Paper RSC no. 94/4 (Florence:
European University Institute, 1994).
William Wallace (1983b), "Less than a Federation, More
than a Regime: The Community as a Political System", in Helen
Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb, eds., Policy-making
in the European Community (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons,
1983), pp. 433-434.
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top' of their national (and regional) identities. 	 Polls
also show "functionalist" support for joint foreign policy
decision-making. 87 William Wallace notes that the "notion of
community implies and involves shared commitment and shared
benefits and sacrifices.NM Within the EU, he argues, this
largely applies, as the redistribution of resources between
rich and poor member states demonstrates. It is difficult,
however, to translate this sense of community into
explanations of cooperation (or the lack of it) in the area of
foreign policy, but it is an important underpinning for such
cooperation.
Questions generated solely by rationalist theories thus
seem inadequate for explaining foreign policy cooperation in
the EU. The rationalist definition of cooperation (section
2.1.1) is too limited, even for foreign policy issues (an area
where member states have more jealously guarded their
prerogatives). On some foreign policy issues, the separate
national policies of the member states are merely coordinated,
within EPC/CFSP. On others, such as the policy towards
Eastern Europe, a joint policy is hammered out: the member
states agree to act together as a bloc to achieve common
objectives, often using EC policy instruments (trade, aid).
This seems to indicate that they share a sense of collective
See "More-or-less European union", The Economist, 26
August 1995. To what extent the EU is responsible for this is
a matter for debate.
8TEurobarometer 42, spring 1995, p. 56. Of those polled
in the 12 EU member states, 70% said that they supported joint
EU decision-making in foreign policy; 51% supported joint
decision-making in defence.
Wallace 1990, p. 104.
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identity and interests.
Robert Keohane, however, argues that the "reflective"
school (including constructivism) is weak because it lacks "a
clear reflective research program that could be employed by
students of world politics." This rather esoteric form of
dichotomy between the rationalist and constructivist
frameworks does not really help guide empirical work on
cooperation, particularly within the EU. In fact, much of the
work on the Community lies between these extremes.
In the following sections, several approaches that might
help explain foreign policy cooperation within the EU will be
discussed. Because the EU is so particular, IR theories are
difficult to use to explain a common foreign policy. While
neoliberal institutionalism and unit-level approaches are
somewhat useful, approaches that examine the symbiosis between
the Union and its member states appear more helpful.
2.2.1 Systemic Th.ori.s
Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalisa
The rather pessimistic n.orealist view of international
institutions obviously extends to the Community/Union.
Kenneth Waltz asserts that cooperation among the West European
states only became possible with the advent of bipolarity:
The emergence of the Russian and American
superpowers created a situation that permitted wider
ranging and more effective cooperation among the
states of Western Europe. They became consumers of
security.. .For the first time in modern history, the
determinants of war and peace lay outside the arena
of European states, and the means of their
Robert Keohane (1989c), "International Institutions: Two
Approaches", in Keohane 1989, p. 173.
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preservation were provided by others.9°
John Mearsheimer argues that intra-EC relations flourished
because of the Cold War: Western democracies had to cooperate
to balance the Soviet Union. Relative gains were not an
obstacle to cooperation because each Western country wanted
its alliance partners to be strong.91
With the end of the Cold War, which is taken to mean the
end of bipolarity as well, neo-realists assert that it will
be very difficult for the EC to remain together. If the
Soviet threat disappears and US forces withdraw from Europe
(and so are no longer there 'to keep the situation under
control'), then relations among the EC member states will
deteriorate: mutual fear and suspicion will grow; relative
gains will once again become a problem; and, therefore,
cooperation will decline.
The Maastricht Treaty has caused neo-realists some
discomfort. Joseph Grieco has even suggested that neo-
realism's auxiliary hypothesis regarding international
institutions must be amended.	 He proposes a "voice
90Kenneth Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories", in
Keohane 1986, pp. 58-59.
91Jo J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability
in Europe After the Cold War", in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., fl,g
Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 1991), pp. 182-183.
Whether the structure of the international system was
bipolar during the entire Cold War is a matter of some debate.
Certainly the two countries with the biggest arsenals were the
US and the Soviet Union (although their military might could
not prevail in Vietnam or Afghanistan), but on most issues of
international salience, be they political or economic, "power"
was more diffuse.
The by now classic exposition of this view is
Mearsheimer 1991, p. 183.
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opportunities" hypothesis: if states negotiate rules
constituting a collaborative arrangement, "then the weaker but
still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules
so constructed will provide for sufficient opportunities for
them to voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent
or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger
partners.
Grieco's new hypothesis still leaves open the question of
why the stronger partners would agree to allow such a change
in the rules. Neorealism simply does not apply to the EU.
Relative gains cannot capture the nature of negotiation and
cooperation in the EU. Implicit in Grieco's approach is an
acknowledgement that the member states have voluntarily
limited their sovereignty and independence, by accepting
binding rules: this begins to resemble neoliberal
institutionalism!
With respect to foreign policy cooperation in the
Community, neorealists stress the limits that member states
place on such cooperation. Alfred Pijpers uses neorealism to
explain developments in EC foreign policy. Pijpers notes
that the Community has not eroded national foreign policy
competences. The EC's instruments of foreign policy, aid and
trade, are limited in scope and efficiency, whereas states
have armed forces and foreign ministries at their disposition.
There was no common European defense because Europe wanted to
Grieco 1995, p. 34.
Alfred Pijpers, "European Political Cooperation and the
Realist Paradigm", in Holland, ed. 1991. Although Pijpers
considers his theory realist, his approach is systemic and
thus neorealist.
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maintain the power equilibrium between East and West and did
not want to upset NATO. There was therefore no "spillover"
from the economic field into the military field.
To a certain degree, Pijpers' argument makes sense. But
his approach (and neorealism in general) will not help us to
explain why the line dividing EC and EPC may disappear on
occasion, why the member states may allow the Community to
conduct foreign policy, or why they may act together to pursue
collective goals. The emphasis is on the limits to
cooperation, not the factors that may encourage it. In fact,
neorealism stresses only two such factors: a common enemy
and/or a hegemon. And what neorealism says about the limits
to cooperation (concern for relative gains) doesn't fit well
with intra-EU politics, quite apart from the difficulty of
trying to measure and compare gains and losses. As a result,
neorealism does not appear very helpful in analyzing the case
of a common policy towards Eastern Europe.
Integration and cooperation within the EC are obviously
less of a theoretical problem for neoliberal
institutionalist.. Neoliberal institutionalism's statist and
rationalist approach to cooperation, however, clearly limits
its usefulness in the context of the EU.
In general, neoliberal institutionalists consider the EC
to be "more than a regime". 9' Keohane and Stanley Hoffman
state that "the flexible and dynamic Community is much more
centralized and institutionalized than an international regime
and receives a much higher level of commitment from its
9'As in William Wallace's title (l983b): "Less than a
Federation, More than a Regime".
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members."97
Keohane and Hoffman argue that institutional changes in
the EC, particularly those embodied in the SEA, mainly result
from intergovernmental bargaining and the convergence of
preferences among the major member states. The EC itself,
however, did not provoke the new definition of French and
British economic interests which made the SEA possible;
domestic and international pressures did. Likewise, Andrew
Moravscik finds that the factors which help greater European
unity are "the convergence of national interests, the pro-
European idealism of heads of government, and the decisive
role of the large member states."
The member states can limit integration: Keohane and
Hoffman argue that for this reason, cooperation will probably
not extend from the economic sphere to defense policy.100
Thirty years ago, Hoffman also argued that a "logic of
diversity" would limit the spillover process envisaged by neo-
97Robert 0. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, "Institutional
Change in Europe in the 1980s", in Robert 0. Keohane and
Stanley Hoffman, eds., The New Euroi:,ean Community:
Decisionmakin and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1991), p. 10. In 1982, however, Stanley Hoffman had
argued that the continuing resilience of the nation-state in
Western Europe was evidence that the EC was an international
regime. Regimes, "in exchange for curtailing the states'
capacity for unilateral action, serve to preserve the nation-
state as the basic unit in world affairs and actually help
governments perform their domestic tasks." See Stanley
Hoffman, "Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe
Today", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 21, nos. 1 and
2, September/December 1982, p. 35.
Keohane and Hoffman 1991.
"Andrew Moravscik, "Negotiating the Single European Act",
in Keohane and Hoffman, eds. 1991, p. 67. He calls this
approach "intergovernmental institutionalism".
1°°Keohane and Hoffman 1991, p. 28.
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functionalists (see below): the member states would block
integration in the political ("high politics") sphere. The
"logic of integration" could only work in the economic ("low
politics") sphere.'°' Hoffman largely bases his argument on
domestic-level factors: the member states' different
histories, cultures, and foreign policy traditions would
prevent cooperation in foreign policy, because external
developments and pressures would generate different responses.
The above approaches are intergovernmental: states are
the key actors; they pursue self-interested goals (which can
be derived from within the state, rather than from the state's
position in the international power structure, as neorealism
would maintain); the Community is the forum in which they
bargain to try to achieve those goals more effectively; and
states can block cooperation or prevent outcomes that are
anything more than the "lowest common denominator". The
approaches are similar to what Roy Ginsberg has defined as a
national interests theory, which contends that decision-makers
in the EU member states determine whether there will be joint
foreign policy action. Decision-makers try to maximize
benefits for and minimize costs to the state: when cooperation
brings mutual benefits, member states will support joint
foreign policy actions. The theory de-emphasizes the
influences of domestic politics, public opinion, regional
integration processes, and international pressures on joint
101 Stanley Hoffman, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of
the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe", Daedalus,
Summer 1966, especially pp. 881-882. Hoffman's approach
differs from realism principally in the importance assigned to
domestic factors, and to the Community in economic affairs.
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foreign policy making.102
Moravscik has tried to weave domestic politics into a
theory of intra-EU negotiations (similar to what Putnam
proposed). He calls his approach liberal intergoverrunentalism,
which has three essential elements: "the assumption of
rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national
preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of
interstate negotiation."' 03 He maintains that "governments
first define a set of interests, then bargain among themselves
in an effort to realize those interests."'°' Moravscik
argues that "the EC is best seen as an international regime
for policy co-ordination, the substantive and institutional
development of which may be explained through the sequential
analysis	 of	 national	 preference	 formation	 and
intergovernmental strategic interaction."105
Moravscik admits t1at this approach does not illuminate
foreign policy cooperation. Interest groups took little
interest in EPC, and it is impossible to calculate gains and
losses to such groups in this policy area. He attempts to
explain EPC as the reflection of ideologies and personal
commitments of leading politicians, and "interest-based
conceptions of the national interest", whatever that may
' 02Ginsberg 1989, pp. 13-15.
103Andrew Moravscik, "Preferences and Power in the
European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach",
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, December
1993, p. 480.
104Moravscik 1993, p. 481.
'°5Moravscik 1993, p. 480.
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be. 1 Interest groups are clearly interested in trade,
however, and to the extent that EU foreign policies rely on EC
trade instruments, their influence must be taken into account.
Christopher Hill has criticized the 'Harvard' school's
"highly materialist and rationalist" approach. "It does not
promise to translate well into the foreign policy field, where
past trauma, common values, institutional evolution and
ideological earthquakes are more likely to provide convincing
explanations of the changing patterns of diplomacy."107
None of the Harvard approaches consider that interaction
within the Community has changed national interests, which
could transform the dynamics of cooperation (even on foreign
policy issues). Alexander Wendt (citing Jeffrey Legro)
describes them as the "rationalist 'two-step'": "first
interests are formed outside the interaction context, and then
the latter is treated as though it only affected
behavior."'0' By sticking to a rationalist approach, Keohane
and Hoffman cannot fully explore their proposition that the EC
is a network, in which actors "have a preference for
interaction with one another rather than with outsiders, in
part because intense interactions create incentives for self-
interested cooperation and for the maintenance of reputations
for reliability."'09 As they acknowledge only in an endnote,
106Moravscik 1993, p. 494.
'°Tchristopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or
Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", Journal of
Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 3, September 1993, p. 308.
'°'Wendt 1994, p. 384.
'°9Keohane and Hoffman 1991, p. 14.
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in networks, "shared identities can become important; a sense
of solidarity may develop among elites..."'10
"Neo-].iberal" institutionalism also ignores aspects that
traditional liberal internationalism might highlight. Yet
Keohane himself cites liberal tenets to back up his optimism
about the EU's future:
As commercial liberalism or interdependence theory
emphasizes, the EC has provided substantial economic
and political gains for its members. Its members
are all resolutely democratic, in their social as
well as their political institutions: republican
liberalism stresses the significance of this
fact.... [E]xtensive transnational ties and
coalitions criss-cross the Continent. Finally, the
institutions of the EC are firmly entrenched and it
continues to perform crucial functions. Thus there
is a "synergy" among these four aspects of
liberalism,	 which	 are	 arguably	 mutually
reinforcing.'11
While neoliberal institutionalist and intergovernmental
approaches demonstrate how cooperation can be fostered by
institutions and why states abide by an institution's norms
and rules, they are still insufficient explanations of
cooperation within the EU. They do not examine how the EC/EU
could affect the interests and identities of the member states
(through the influence of supranational actors or the process
of interaction), and thus change the dynamics and context of
cooperation. Concepts such as empathetic interdependence and
networks seem more useful, but do not fit well into a
rationalist theory such as neoliberal institutionalism.
Interdependenc. Th.ory
0Keohane and Hoffman 1991, p. 36, fn. 21.
"'Keohane 1993, p. 289. In the same article, however,
Keohane dismisses commercial and republican liberalism as
"naive" (p. 285).
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The three characteristics of complex interdependence
certainly seem to fit intra-EU relations, but this may not get
us very far in explaining intra-EU politics. William Wallace
has argued that the dynamics of European integration stem from
informal flows of interaction, and economic and social trends
(both internal and external to Europe), as well as from
political integration 'from above' (and integration may be a
response to interdependence within Europe) • 112
Interdependence may make it difficult for the member
states to act as a unit. Ernst Haas noted that because global
politics is "turbulent", actors within the region could, for
example, prefer to cooperate with non-regional actors on
certain issues. 113 Global interdependence could act as a
centrifugal force on the EU.' 1' Or, it may force them to act
together. Roy Ginsberg's "interdependence logic" (one of his
three logics explaining EC joint foreign policy activity)
posits that EC joint foreign policies are an attempt to reduce
the adverse costs of global interdependence." 5 The policy
towards Eastern Europe does not really fit into such an
explanation (not least because ties between Eastern and
Western Europe were strengthened only post-Cold War, although
2Wallace 1990, especially chapters 4-6.
"Turbulence refers to "the confused and clashing
perceptions of organizational actors which find themselves in
a setting of great social complexity." Ernst Haas, "Turbulent
Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration", International
Oraanization, vol. 30, no. 2, spring 1976, p. 179.
'Regional interdependence (in Europe), however, would
become less and less of a dividing force as the
Community/Union enlarged.
"5Ginsberg 1989, pp. 29-32.
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the West European states tried to increase interdependence
with Eastern Europe during the Cold War, for political
purposes). Nor does interdependence theory help explain why
member states and outsiders felt the Community/Union should
take the lead in Eastern Europe.
Ginsberg also points out, however, that interdependence
illuminates how a civilian power such as the EC may pull
economic and diplomatic levers to effect political change.
This does help explain the goals, principles and instruments
of the Community's policy towards Eastern Europe.
World Byst.ma Th.ory
Before moving on to unit-level theories, an interesting
application of another systemic theory should be mentioned.
Stephen George has used a world systems perspective to analyze
EPC. This perspective posits that the world system is a
capitalist system, which perpetuates inequalities among a core
of wealthy countries, a semi-periphery, and a periphery of
weak and dependent countries. George maintains that Eastern
Europe is one area where the EC has taken a distinctive stance
in opposition to the US, because economic relations with
Eastern Europe are much more important to the EC than to the
US. Particularly in the early 1980s, the EC tried to prevent
the more abrasive US policy towards the Soviet Union and its
allies from damaging European detente (see chapter 3) •h16
While this approach may help explain the Community's
behavior during the Cold War, it does not seem to fit well
with what happened post-1989. The US generally supported the
116Stephen George, "European Political Cooperation: A
World Systems Perspective", in Holland, ed. 1991, pp. 63-64.
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EC's leading role in Eastern Europe. Given the economic costs
of opening markets to East European goods, and the enormous
economic and political problems that are posed by the promised
enlargement to the east, the policy towards Eastern Europe
does not easily fit into an explanation based solely on the
economic interests of the member states. As a systemic
theory, a world systems approach does not take into account
the very political process of policy-making.
2.2.2 Unit-Level Theories
A number of unit-level theories (similar to Milner's
suggestions) have been advanced to explain cooperation (or
more often, the lack of it) within the EC. As Roy Ginsberg
defines it, the .lit. actor theory holds that to understand
why the EC progresses or stagnates one must understand the
perceptions and motivations of political and interest-group
Andrew Moravscik, for example, tries to explain
EPC as the reflection of the ideologies and personal
commitments of leading politicians.'18
A few theorists maintain that consociational theory - a
theory of elites - is promising for analyzing the Community
and/or EPC. Paul Taylor argues that consociationalism helps
explain why at the regional level, "the state and
international organisation are capable of being mutually
reinforcing."" 9 EC elites are interested in increasing "the
7Ginsberg 1989, pp. 15-16.
"8Moravscik 1993, p. 494.
H9Paul Taylor, "The European Community and the State:
Assumptions, Theories and Propositions", Review of
International Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, April 1991, p. 109.
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size of the pie", but also want to protect the distinctiveness
of their constituency in comparison with others. Increasing
the size of the pie, however, could encourage transnational
links and affect their authority. National elites will thus
try to manipulate regional integration so as to consolidate
their power base, by giving them resources with which to buy
off sub-national groups.12°
Wessels and Weiler use the consociational approach to
explain the stability of EPC. 121 They note that EPC reflects
an elite consensus, and that change - particularly in the
direction of supranationalism - is unlikely.
Consociationalisin's emphasis on elites has been
criticized. Christopher Hill, for example, notes that public
opinion on international affairs is growing, and that it could
be "at once a powerful stimulus to EPC and a major
complication for it." 122 It would be difficult to take
initiatives unless they were grounded in the domestic base
(witness the problems in ratifying the Naastricht Treaty). On
the other hand, the influence of public opinion on policy-
making in international affairs is still patchy.
Ginsberg's domestic politics theory maintains that the
foreign policy interests of parochial, subnational, and
intranational units determine foreign policy action (or
120Taylor 1991, pp. 114-115. The consociational approach,
for all its emphasis on elites, seems quite similar to
intergovernmentalism described above.
12 Wessels and Weiler 1988, pp. 243-258.
1 Christopher Hill, "Research into EPC: Tasks for the
Future", in Pijpers, Regelsberger, and Wessels, eds. 1988, pp.
216-217.
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inaction). Governments have to be concerned with whether they
risk losing votes by cooperating on certain issues. The
influence of domestic interest groups may be crucial
particularly with respect to trade policy (an important
element in any EU foreign policy), where sectoral economic
interest groups tend to be well organized.
A bureaucratic politics approach stresses the influence
that civil servants have on the implementation and management
of policy. 12' Policy decisions could be the outcome of
bargaining between national government bureaucracies, each of
which has a different view of the state's interests. Given
the importance of trade and other economic instruments, EU
foreign policy-making is bound to involve some bargaining
between foreign ministries and economic ministries before
agreement on a common policy can be reached.
Ginsberg cautions that unit-level models are not very
useful for explaining what triggered joint action. They
disregard the process by which the separate national positions
are hammered into joint actions and the international
pressures on the EC to act as a unit despite opposition from
domestic actors. "They are more likely to be turned to as
explanations for the breakdown of common action or untried
attempts at common action than as explanations of what
triggers action."	 One could add that they also disregard
Ginsberg 1989, pp. 16-17.
' 24Ginsberg includes EC bureaucrats in this model, so that
the model helps to explain the Commission's role in policy-
making, but this is really closer to neo-functionalism.
Ginsberg 1989, pp. 17-18.
Ginsberg 1989, p. 18.
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cross-national ties and influences, and any development of a
"European" identity.
Domestic-level pressures do, however, help explain why
member states resisted some aspects of the policy towards
Eastern Europe (particularly trade concessions). This thesis
will thus consider whether and how domestic-level pressures
affected the policy towards Eastern Europe.
2.2.3 Neo-Punctionalism and Constructivisa
Neither unit-level or the systemic approaches outlined
above are fully satisfactory accounts of cooperation within
the Community. Wayne Sandholtz argues that "(n]ational
governments influence EC policies but are themselves
influenced by EC institutions and law." 1 There "is a link
between international institutions and state interest
formation in the EC. Community decisions are bargains that
reflect state interests, but those interests are shaped in
part by membership in the EC....States define their interests
in a different way as members of the EC than they would
without it."' 27 Hill has also argued that the EC member
states have clearly been forced "to reformulate their national
interests in the sphere of foreign policy.
One form of integration theory, neo-functionalisa,
developed specifically in the context of European integration,
focuses on how interaction can change state interests. It
1 Sandholtz 1993, p. 3.
127Sandholtz 1993, p. 3.
'Christopher Hill, "National Interests - The Insuperable
Obstacles?" in Christopher Hill, ed., National Forelan
Policies and Eurooean Political Coo peration (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 200.
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generates a number of useful questions as to why the EU
formulates joint foreign policies.
Ernst Haas (a leading neo-functionalist) contended that
for a political community to exist, there must be political
institutions which can translate the various ideologies of
interest groups into law. He defined 'political community' as
"a condition in which specific groups and individuals show
more loyalty to their central political institutions than to
any other political authority in a specific period of time and
in a definable geographical space."' In looking for
evidence of a political community, Haas stressed the
importance of interest groups, political parties, and
governments. When interest groups and political parties
endorsed supranational action over national action and
organized on a supranational level so as to participate in the
supranational decision-making process, community sentiment was
flourishing. They and governments also had to accept
supranational law. Governments in the supranational forum had
to try to reach agreement, and be willing to drop their
opposition to a decision when they were in a minority.130
Political integration, according to Haas, is a "process
whereby political actors in several distinct national settings
are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national
'Ernst Haas, The Unitin of Euroie: Political1 Social
and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (London: Stevens and Sons,
1958), p. 5.
130Haas 1958, pp. 9-10.
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states." 13' Haas assumes that as integration proceeds,
values will undergo change, interests will be redefined in
regional terms rather than national orientation, and separate
national group values will be superseded by a new and
geographically larger set of beliefs. Although the decision
to establish or join an integrative institution is determined
on the basis of national values, and those national values
influence the officials in the new institution, there will
also be a reverse process in which the new central decision-
makers will influence the national ones.132
Sector integration, as in that of the coal and steel
sectors, will beget its own impetus toward an extension, or
"spillover", to the entire economy. 133 Philippe Schmitter
states neo-functionalism's spillover hypothesis succinctly:
the process whereby members of an integration scheme
- agreed on some collective goals for a variety of
motives but unequally satisfied with their
attainment of these goals - attempt to resolve their
dissatisfaction either by resorting to collaboration
in another, related sector (expanding the sco pe of
the mutual commitment) or by intensifying their
commitment to the original sector (increasing the
'31Haas 1958, p. 16. Leon Lindberg refined this
definition, still considering it a process but not referring
to an end point. He defined political integration as: "1) the
process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to
conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of
each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to
delegate the decision-making process to new central organs;
and 2) the process whereby political actors in several
distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations
and political activities to a new center." Leon Lindberg, The
Political DYnamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 6.
'32Haas 1958, pp. 13-19.
Haas 1958, pp. 311-313.
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level of mutual commitment) or both.lM
Two factors contribute to the process: the interdependence of
the functional tasks, latent in the original convergence, but
capable of being mobilized by pressure groups, parties, or
governmental agencies; and the 'creative talents' of political
elites who seize opportunities to redefine and expand regional
organization tasks. Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen defines three
kinds of spillover: functional, inherent in the functional
tasks themselves; political, deriving from the socialization
of national elites; and cultivated, emphasizing the
Commission's role in upgrading the common interest.135
This spillover hypothesis was often understood,
especially by critics, to entail an automatic, even, conflict-
free expansion of tasks. Schmitter, however, points out that
conflict between national actors is very likely to
be forthcoming but that it is likely to be resolved
by expanding the scope or level of central
institutions. .. . Alone functional interdependence
based on high rates of mutual transactions is
impotent. It must be perceived, interpreted, and
translated into expressions of interest, strategies
of influence, and viable decisionmaking styles.'
At a certain point, spillover could become quite
controversial, as joint policy-making expands to more salient
areas. This "politicization" could trigger a widening of the
audience interested in integration, a transcendence of the
original objectives of integration, and a shift in actor
'34philippe Schinitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses
About International Integration", International Organization,
vol. 23, no. 1, Winter 1969, P. 162.
'35Jeppe Tranholm-Xikkelsen, "Neofunctionalism: Obstinate
or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of
the EC', Millennium, vol. 20, no. 1, spring 1991, pp. 4-6.
1 Schmitter 1969, p. 164.
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expectations and loyalty toward the regional center.'37
Haas found in 1957 that a "supranational" style of
decision-making had begun to take shape in the ECSC. In the
Council of Ministers, national interests were almost always
compromised. An 'atmosphere of cooperation' prevailed.
Governments preferred not to be the sole negative vote,
although in other international fora they might be willing to
veto decisions. Governments considered themselves 'engaged'
by the results of collective decision-making, identified with
the purposes and procedures of the ECSC, and were dedicated to
the informal code of conduct among the member states. They
were willing to negotiate until a consensus was obtained.1
Likewise, in his study of the EEC, Leon Lindberg
maintained that the Council considered itself a Community
institution - rather than an intergovernmental conference of
ministers. There was a clear awareness of running a common
project. Member states were sensitive to each other's needs,
and no single member state was habitually obstructive. All
made significant compromises to try to achieve a Community
solution to joint problems. 139 Most of the solutions were
not the "lowest common denominator" (determined by the most
stubborn member state), but represented an "upgrading of the
common interest".
137schmitter 1969, p. 166.
Haas 1958, pp. 490-527. Tony Barber has pointed out
that, in contrast to the adversarial style of British
politics, "on the Continent, coalition governments and
consensus politics are far more prevalent. This translates
into greater harmony at EU level." Tony Barber, "Always the
Bad Europeans", The IndeDendent on Sunday, 7 April 1996.
'39Lindberg 1963, pp. 74-76.
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Significant national powers have been thrust into a
new institutional setting in which powerful
pressures are exerted for 'Community' solutions:
that is, solutions which approximate the upgrading-
of-common-interests type. Our case studies have
revealed that important and divergent national
interests have been consistently accommodated in
order to achieve a decision.'4°
Absolutely crucial to the reaching of such decisions was the
active participation of the Commission - an institutionalized
mediator with autonomous powers - even in areas where the EEC
Treaty had not assigned it a formal role.141
"Real world" events have affected neo-functionalism's
fortunes. French President De Gaulle's 'obstructionism' of
the EC, and the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise (issues involving
very important interests of one or more partner must be agreed
by consensus) applied a brake to neo-functionalism. There
were limits to integration that could be effectively applied
by member states; spillover was not automatic. Member states
could protect their national prerogatives against
supranational encroachment.'42
After two decades, however, neo-functionalism became
popular again, seeming to help explain the EC in the mid to
late 1980s, what with the Single European Act, single European
market, Social Charter, plans for an Economic and Monetary
Union, increasing influence of the Commission and the European
140Lindberg 1963, p. 288.
Lindberg 1963, p. 285.
142See Taylor 1983 for an account of how and where the EC
member states chose to defend their sovereignty in the 1970s
and early 1980g.
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Parliament, and stronger regional policies. 143 Moravscik
draws on it to develop his concept of supranational
institutionalism, which stresses the role of supranational
factors (pressure from EC institutions, lobbying by
transnational interest groups, and Commission leadership) in
inducing EC institutional change.'"
Neo-functionalism has been criticized because it posits
that spillover will eventually lead to the establishment of
some kind of a state, whereas clearly the EU seems to be
somewhere between a super-state and an intergovernmental
organization. Loyalties have not shifted exclusively to the EU
level.'45 Several observers have argued that the mixed
national/Community system should be seen as "cooperative
federalism" in which there is concurrent jurisdiction between
both levels, rather than a shift in the distribution of power
between them. 146 Neo-functionalism's prediction of a federal
state can be set aside, however, and its insights instead used
to explain why common policy-making can occur in specific
cases, especially in the area of foreign policy, where the
'43See Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, and Paul Taylor, "The Ni
Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1980s", in Lodge, ed. 1989.
'"Moravscik 1991, pp. 43-45. He finds, however, that
intergovernmental institutionalism better explains the SEA.
145The vagueness of the end state envisaged by neo-
functionalism is also problematic. If there is no clear view
of what the process is leading to, how is it possible to
assess progress thus far? See Christiansen 1994, p. 2.
146See Simon Bulmer, "Analyzing European Political
Cooperation: The Case for Two-Tier Analysis", in Holland, ed.
1991; Wessels, "The EC Council: The Community's Decisionmaking
Center", in Keohane and Hoffman, eds. 1991, p. 137; and Emil
Kirchner, Decision-making in the European Community : The
Council Presidency and EuroDean Integration (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 11.
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member states have resisted even concurrent jurisdiction. A
number of insights seem useful: on spillover, externalization,
and the socialization of elites.
The fact that the Community still does not have
competences in "traditional" foreign policy has been
considered by some as proof that there is a definite limit to
spinover. 147 EPC was an intergovernmental forum, in which
defense and non-social and non-economic aspects of security
were not even to be discussed. To the extent, however, that
the EC carried out foreign policy activity (indicating
spillover between "external economic relations" and "foreign
policy"), or that the EC and EPC collaborated, then the
spillover hypothesis could be useful. In formulating and
implementing the policy towards Eastern Europe, there has
certainly been an extensive 'blurring of the line' between the
EC and EPC/CFSP, and could exemplify functional, political
and/or cultivated spillover. Spillover between external
economic relations and foreign policy would also make way for
the Commission's involvement, with potentially positive
implications for "upgrading the common interest".
One neo-functionalist hypothesis in particular considers
how the Community could find itself conducting a joint foreign
policy. Philippe Schmitter' s externalization hypothesis
posits that common EC policies, such as the Common
Agricultural Policy, will adversely affect non-member states,
which will demand relief from the Community, viewing it as a
single policy-making unit. Outsiders may also, for their own
14TFor example, Keohane and Hoffman 1991, p. 28, Hoffman
1966, and Pijpers 1991.
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policy purposes, decide to treat the Community as if it were
a viable, authoritative policy-making unit. The Community
would then have to respond to the outsiders as a whole and in
the process would be elaborating a common foreign policy.
This could occur for a variety of involuntary and voluntary
motives. After all, the member states often viewed
integration as a way to increase their collective bargaining
power vis-&-vis other international actors, and so would be
likely to use the Community as a way to appeal to or threaten
non-member	 .
Roy Ginsberg's 'regional integration logic' picks up on
this hypothesis. It emphasizes the negative effects of
internal EC policies on outsiders, who in turn press the EC
for compensation, forcing member states to respond jointly.
The EC will either extend membership or some form of
association to norimembers or it will respond defensively to
demands it cannot or will not accommodate. 149 Panayiotis
If estos also finds that external demands are an important
source of pressure for coordinated Community responses.15°
There is, of course, a negative hypothesis: "the
countries will react to these new opportunities and challenges
by indulging in an individualistic scramble for special and
exclusive advantage." 151 As Gunnar Sjöstedt pointed out, the
Schmitter 1969, p. 165.
149Ginsberg 1989, pp. 20-29.
150Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation:
Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy? (Aldershot:
Avebury, 1987), pp. 136-137.
1schmitter 1969, p. 165.
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member states have behaved independently of each other,
especially in areas which they considered important. But he
also noted that the member states have been able to behave as
a single unit towards some third party on numerous occasions:
the Community can be an international actor.152
To explain why member states agree to particular foreign
policy responses and do not react individually, one must
examine the evolution of their interests more closely. Here
another aspect of neo-functionalism could be particularly
useful: through the socialization of elites, a supranational
style of decision-making in EPC/CFSP could be established.
Philippe de Schoutheete traced the gradual redefinition
of the member states' interests in EPC. 153	EPC was
intergovernmental (the Commission played a limited role) and
took decisions on the basis of consensus. It brought,
however, a new "European" dimension to the national foreign
policy process by multiplying the direct contacts between
officials at the different national levels, administrative and
political, responsible for analyzing and taking decisions.
A force de se réunir, de se consulter, d'échanger
des informations, de rechercher des positions
communes gui concilient leurs preoccupations
respectives, lee responsables nationaux ont acquis
un réflexe européen gui lee améne, lorsgu'un
probléme se pose, & envisager aussi sa dimension
collective, l'intérêt qu'il peut presenter pour lee
autres partenaires, et & adapter eventuellement leur
position initiale. De même, la somme de travail,
d'études agrees, d'informations échangées, facilite
le moment venu une prise de position commune ou une
démarche	 .
152Sjostedt 1977, p. 14.
153de Schoutheete 1980.
de Schoutheete 1980, p. 118.
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The habit of working together made the search for a
consensus on new foreign policy developments - the
coordination reflex - a normal occurrence. This of course has
limits: often the most that came out of EPC was a common
declaration, with no policy instruments to back up the
position. Yet this is still a significant development, given
that states have long considered foreign policy to be an
absolute sovereign prerogative, regardless of the difficulties
of foreign policy making in an era of interdependence.
The development of the coordination reflex illustrates
how EPC affected member states' interests, and why the member
states might respond to external demands jointly rather than
separately. By pointing to the "Europeanization" of national
foreign policies, it gives clues as to how the member states
could eventually formulate a joint European policy.
The interdependence logic 	 (section 2.2.1)	 and
externalization imply that the EU acts as one only because of
outside pressures. Ginsberg's self-styled logic posits that
on some occasions, the Community may formulate foreign policy
on its own initiative. It stresses the Community's "internal
dynamics". "There is a symbiosis between the EC and member
actors and institutions that produces joint actions that are
uniquely European."' 55 The self-styled logic focuses on the
Community's "own foreign policy interests, and its own mission
and initiative in the world independent of the phenomena that
trigger other actions."' 5' The self-styled logic is rooted
155Ginsberg 1989, p. 36.
156Ginsberg 1989, p. 10.
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in the combination of three models: the national interests
model, the elite actor model, and neofunctionalism.157
Ginsberg did not develop his self-styled logic as fully
as he did his two other logics (integration and
interdependence), but the difference between self-styled logic
and externalization can perhaps be likened to Brian White's
two different connotations of policy (see chapter 1).
Externalization can result in a common foreign policy if the
Community responds collectively to external demands or events;
self-styled logic implies a more activist conception of
policy-making, the formulation of a plan to reach specific
objectives. In either case, however, why and how the member
states cooperated on a common policy must still be explained:
the EU can hardly be likened to a unitary actor (there is no
"black box" there to be opened).
Constructivist insights about the symbiosis between
states and institutions also appear to be useful, particularly
in understanding how the "supranational" style of decision-
making could develop, even in the foreign policy sphere. The
'national self' of the member states could be acquiring a
'European' dimension as a result of decades of cooperation and
integration. Ole Waver argues that it "is crucial to
recognize the diverse and concrete ways in which the European
157Ginsberg tries to classify EC foreign policy actions.
Quite a few of those he considers self-styled actions related
to Eastern Europe, but he is not very consistent. One
example: he classifies the rejection of an EC-MEA agreement
in 1978 as a self-styled action, but the opening of
negotiations on such an agreement in 1985 as an integration
logic" action.
80
dimension is included in national self-conceptions." 1 	He
cites the example of France:
when most of the significant political forces in
France try to imagine their country's future, the
E.U. is an implicit part of that vision. Europe has
become part of the meaning of France. Thus,
discussions about France's self-interest cannot be
seen as separate from E.U. issues; the "self"
already incorporates the E.U.'59
Waver maintains that even though the relative power of
the Commission vis-&-vis the Council has diminished, this does
not mean that integration has weakened, as neo-functionalism
might suggest. The Council has become a "Euro-organ", often
acting according to EU interests. Member states have "gained
in importance in the joint governance of the E.U., and lost
importance as rulers of their own territories." 160 Wolfgang
Wessels has also noted that the Council functions not as an
interstate body, but as a body at the supranational level.161
This could help explain why the self-styled logic might fit
with some cases of common foreign policies.
Neo-functionalism and constructivism thus offer a number
of useful hypotheses and generate interesting questions about
foreign policy cooperation and decision-making in the EU.
They highlight the ways in which interaction within the EU
affects the interests and identities of its member states,
generating the "Community method" of resolving problems.
15801e Waver, "Identity, Integration and Security: Solving
the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies", Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 48, no. 2, Winter 1995, p. 412.
' 59Wver 1995, p. 412.
°Wever 1995, p. 420.
'61Wessels 1991, p. 137.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis will be strongly influenced by the questions
that are raised by constructivist approaches and sociological
liberalism regarding how state interests can be transformed
through interaction, because they appear to be the most
helpful. Insights from neofunctionalism (on externalization,
the socialization of elites, the Community method, and the
Commission's role) seem particularly promising. The thesis
will also take into account unit-level factors (such as
interest groups) that could affect national positions on a
joint policy towards Eastern Europe. Neoliberal
institutionalists probably do not go far enough in exploring
the symbiosis between the Community and its member states, but
some of their concepts (like empathetic interdependence) could
be useful. In contrast, neorealism seems to offer rather less
in the way of explanation for common foreign policy-making.
The questions that will be posed in this thesis reflect
these approaches. What role did third parties play in forcing
the Community/Union to formulate a common policy? Was there
externalization? Or is this a case of self-styled logic?
What were the positions of the member states on a policy
towards Eastern Europe? How were these positions forged into
a joint policy? Did the member states make compromises? If
so, why? Were the member states concerned with relative
gains? Or were they more concerned with reaching equitable
solutions that provided greater joint gains (in a situation of
empathetic interdependence)?
Is there evidence of the "Europeanization" of the member
states' positions? Did they view the "problem" of supporting
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reform and preventing conflict in Eastern Europe and its
"solution" in collective terms? To what extent does the
policy towards Eastern Europe reflect Community (collective)
interests, principles, and goals?
What was the Commission's role in the making of the
policy towards Eastern Europe? Did it contribute to the
upgrading of the common interest, or was the policy of the
"lowest common denominator" type? Did it play the crucial
role in policy-making, as neo-functionalism emphasizes? Was
there spillover (political, cultivated and/or functional)
between external economic relations and foreign policy?
How important were domestic forces (such as interest
groups, political parties, and national bureaucracies) in
preventing or permitting compromise among the member states?
Were the member states' positions largely determined by the
positions of domestic interest groups, as the liberal
intergovernmentalist approach would postulate? How important
were elite attitudes in determining and revising positions?
These questions broadly correspond to those that several
observers have suggested should guide EU research: To what
extent is foreign policy cooperation the product of systemic
factors and to what extent is it affected by unit-level
pressures? To what extent does the external environment
hinder or help that cooperation? To what extent have the EC
and EPC been interlinked? To what extent are member state
preferences shaped by a socialization process? How autonomous
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is the Commission?1
In Chapter 7, the answers to these questions will be
reviewed to see how well the theories examined in this chapter
help explain why the member states cooperated on the policy
towards Eastern Europe.
1 The first three questions have been suggested by
Christopher Hill, in Hill 1988, pp. 216-221; the last two by
James Caporaso and John Keeler, in "The European Community and
Regional Integration Theory", Paper prepared for delivery as
a plenary address at the European Community Studies
Association conference, May 1993.
CHAPTER 3
TEE HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDs
Community-East European Relations Through 1988
Until 1988, the Community did not play a significant role
in relations with Eastern Europe. Relations between Eastern
and Western Europe were constrained by the Cold War, leaving
little room for an active Community policy. But the member
states also retained control over their bilateral relations
with the East European states, thereby limiting the
Community's role. The member states did, however, cooperate
on some aspects of relations with Eastern Europe: they forged
a common position on the Community's relations with the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (cMEA, or Comecon) and
its members; they coordinated their positions on the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and
they agreed on a common response to the 1981 Polish crisis, in
contrast to the US position. In so doing, the EC member
states clarified their common interests, established
precedents for cooperation, and identified the instruments
that could be used to implement common policies. When the
communist regimes began to fall in Eastern Europe, the
Community and its member states could draw on this learning
experience.
In this historical survey, two broad themes stand out:
the interrelation between economic and political issues, on
the one hand, and between the external and internal factors
pushing the member states to act jointly, on the other. Both




The distinction between "external economic relations" and
"foreign policy" broke down frequently in practice. John
Maslen maintained that in relations between the EC and state-
trading countries, "as in practically no other area of the
Community's relations economic and financial, legal and
institutional, political and ideological factors are
inextricably interwoven."' Trade with Eastern Europe was
highly politicized, and tensions arose over the degree to
which the Community could handle economic relations with
Eastern Europe, given the national economic and political
interests involved, With respect to those issues on which the
member states agreed to work together, there was spillover.
In assuming control over national trade policies with East
European countries, for example, the Community became involved
in making political decisions.
Internal and external pressures pushed the member states
to cooperate. The Commission actively sought to extend its
control over national trade policies, with the support of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Parliament
(EP). As this occurred, the East European states demanded
trade negotiations with the EC, which in turn forced the
Community to formulate a collective response. Other external
events - the CSCE negotiations and US pressures over sanctions
- spurred the EC member states to act jointly. Member states
themselves pushed for common positions, for a variety of
domestic factors, including the desire to secure Community
Maslen, "The European Community's Relations with
the State-Trading Countries, 1981-1983", Yearbook of Eurolean
L, no. 3, 1983, p. 323.
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backing for their own national policies.
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first
part, the formulation of the EC's position towards the cMEA
and its East European member states will be examined.
Attention will turn in the second part to the Community's role
in the CSCE process. In the final part, the connection
between security and trade with Eastern Europe will be further
discussed; conflicts with the US in the late 1970s and early
1980s over this issue led the EC member states to adopt a
common stance on it.
3.1 EC POLICY TOWARDS THE CMEA AND ITS MEMBER STATES
When the ECSC Treaty was signed in 1951, at the start of
the Cold War, relations between Eastern and Western Europe
were frosty. The two sectors involved - coal and steel - did
not directly affect the Eastern economies, but the lifting of
controls on West German industry had political implications.
In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Western moves were
portrayed as the beginning of an American-German hegemony over
the entire continent. 2 The EEC's establishment six years
later provoked another hostile Soviet reaction. In 1957, the
EEC was portrayed as the economic arm of NATO and an
instrument serving the interests of the monopolist class. The
contradictions inherent in capitalism would soon cause the EEC
to disintegrate.3
2Edmund Wellenstein, "The Relations of the European
Communities with Eastern Europe" in David O'Keefe and Henry G.
Schermers, eds., EssaYs in Euroiean Law and Intecration
(Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1982), p. 198.
"17 Theses on the Common Market", published in the
Soviet periodical Kommunist. See Pinder 1991, p. 8.
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When the EC instead proceeded with integration and began
to prosper, a 1962 article in Pravda acknowledged it as an
economic and political reality that promoted investment,
modernization, trade and wage increases.' Yet until the
1980s, the Soviet Union and its allies refused to deal
officially with the Community and tried to block its
participation in international organizations.5
From the Community side, the Cold War, and the US
position on relations with the Soviet bloc (see section 3.3),
precluded close ties with Eastern Europe in the 1950s and
early 1960s. East-West political dialogue was either absent
or acerbic and East-West trade relatively insignificant.
After the Cuban missile crisis, East-West tensions
relaxed somewhat, permitting freer exchanges between the two
halves of Europe. Trade between the EC and cMEA member states
expanded (see appendix 1) •6 CMEA members became increasingly
aware that they lagged behind the West and needed to import
advanced Western technology. The East European states
initiated reforms: economic decision-making was somewhat
decentralized and the foreign trade monopoly loosened.7
Import-led growth strategies increased the demand for imports
4Pinder 1991, p. 8.
5l4aslen 1983, p. 325.
6The volume of trade with the eastern bloc countries,
however, has never been as significant as that with most of
the EC's other trading partners.
TPeter Marsh, "The Development of Relations between the
EEC and the eMEA", in Avi Shlaim and G.N. Yannopoulos, eds.,
The EEC and Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978), p. 28.
88
of intermediate goods, machinery and equipment.'
The growth of East-West trade occurred just as the
Community was to assume the sole right to conduct a commercial
policy on behalf of its member states. The economic and
political benefits of a common EC stance on trade with Eastern
Europe were not initially apparent to the member states and it
took several years before such a stance emerged. The next
section will cover the debate on a common commercial policy
(CCP) towards the "state-trading countries".
3.1.1 Towards a Common Commercial Policy
The EC member states were quite reluctant to cede their
powers over trade with the communist bloc to the Commission by
the end of the transition period (1 January 1970), as provided
under the Rome Treaty. In the climate of East-West detente,
with expanding trade relations, the member states vied with
each other to meet the increased demand from the east. They
used export credits and cooperation agreements to secure
advantages for their domestic industries and to pursue
independent foreign policy objectives. Trade with the USSR
and Eastern Europe was an integral part of both France's anti-
bloc foreign policy and West Germany's OstD plitik. 9 In
addition, under de Gaulle's influence, France, and other
member states as well, jealously guarded national prerogatives
8George Yannopoulos, "EC External Commercial Policies and
East-West Trade in Europe", Journal of Common Market Studies,
vol. 24, no. 1, September 1985, pp. 22-23.
9While the Osttolitik began when Willy Brandt became
Chancellor in 1969, West Germany had set up trade missions in
East European countries from 1963. Timothy Garton Ash,
Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London:
vintage, 1993), p. 36.
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and hindered the development of common internal policies.10
This led one commentator to note critically in 1969, "Faced
with the choice between pooling their efforts as a strong
trading group for the purpose of improving trade falling
back on mutual competition for achieving short-term national
aims, members have opted in fact for the latter."11
The difficulty of trading with communist countries was
also cited as a reason for maintaining national commercial
policies. State planners in the CMEA countries completely
controlled trade patterns and goods were arbitrarily priced.
Uncontrolled trade with the east could have distorted free
market economies. Thus EC member states wanted to be able to
protect their domestic economies.'2
External factors helped push the EC member states towards
a collective position on trade and economic links with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Changes in the international
economy made the advantages of 'going it alone' less clear-
cut. Until the 1960s, the US and Japan had hardly been
present in East-West trade. Spurred by both detente and
recession in the early 1970s, American and Japanese companies
began to challenge the West Europeans' relative preponderance
in trade with the CMEA member states. 13 Furthermore, the
prospect of a pan-European Security Conference on economic and
10Frans A.I1. Alting von Geusau, Beyond the European
Community (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1969), pp. 152-154.
"Alting von Geusau 1969, p. 154.
' 2Charles Ransom, The Euro pean Community and Eastern
Europe (London: Butterworths, 1973), pp. 15-16 and pp. 38-39.
'3Marsh 1978, p. 40.
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political relations convinced the member states of the need
for a common approach to relations with Eastern Europe (see
section 3.2).
During the 1960s, the Commission attempted to gain
control over the member states' conventional trade activities,
such as import quotas and tariffs, but found it difficult to
do so. In 1960, the Council agreed that all bilateral trade
agreements should include an "EEC Clause" stating that the
agreement would be amended if the CCP so required. 1' A 1961
Council decision affirmed that trade agreements between member
states and third countries should not extend beyond the end of
the transitional period. 15 In 1964, the Commission called on
the member states to harmonize their commercial policies
towards the state-trading countries, so that they would not
adversely affect the internal market and would be able to take
a common position vis-â-vis the communist countries in
international trade talks.1'
In 1966, the member states began to liberalize their
imports from Eastern Europe, following British moves in that
"Ransom 1973, p. 39. The MEA countries allowed the
clause to be annexed to bilateral commercial treaties, but
still insisted they did not recognize the Community's
juridical status.
'5In Official Journal of the Euroiean Communities
(hereinafter OJ) 71, 4 November 1961.
16Ransom 1973, p. 46. Member states were increasingly
using Article 115 to block goods imported via another member
state. Under that article, member states could take safeguard
measures during the transitional period by notifying the
Commission and other member states. After the transition, the
Commission could authorize member states to take protective
measures.
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direction. 17 Under these circumstances, it is noteworthy that
in December 1969 the Commission obtained the Council's
approval for common arrangements for imports from state-
trading countries. Quantitative restrictions were removed on
a list of products and a Community surveillance system was
established, to allow the Community to take safeguard measures
against imports from communist countries. 18 Member states
could not unilaterally impose new quotas on products on the
list.
Member states, however, still insisted on holding onto
their right to negotiate trade treaties with state-trading
countries. In December 1969, the Council authorized member
states to continue negotiating bilateral agreements with the
MEA members until 31 December 1972, because the CMEA's policy
of non-recognition precluded the MEA states from negotiating
with the EC (see section 3 • 1.3) •19 The Community would be
responsible for negotiating trade agreements with the eastern
bloc countries only as of 1 January 1973. In practice, this
deadline was put of f again, as most bilateral agreements
expired at the end of 1974. A 1973 Council Decision
authorized the extension of member states' trade agreements
with the East European countries until 31 December 1974.20
17Ransom 1973, p. 44.
Regulation no. 109/70 in OJ L 19, 26 January 1970.
'9Decision no. 69/494 in OJ L 326, 29 December 1969.
20Decision no. 74/34 in OJ L 30, 4 February 1974. See
also European Parliament, Working Document 425/1974, Re port on
the European Community's Relations with the East Eurotean
State-Trading Countries and COMECON (hereinafter the Klepsch
Report), 9 January 1975, p. 11.
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Finally, in May 1974, the Council stated its willingness to
negotiate with individual MEA member states and reaffirmed
that from then on, all trade negotiations with state-trading
countries were to be conducted through the Community.2'
The Commission sought to make the most of the powers it
had acquired, proposing two commercial policies to replace
member states' agreements with the CMEA states. One, the
so-called "autonomous policy", would simply incorporate all of
the different national restrictions on imports from the state-
trading countries into an EC framework, in recognition of the
difficulty of harmonizing the varying policies. The other
would entail drafting an agreement between the EC and each
CMEA member state that provided for trade liberalization, the
reciprocal granting of most-favored-nation (MFN) status, and
supervision by a joint committee of representatives from the
EC and the cMEA state concerned.
In September 1974, the Council decided that the Community
should deliver the sample agreement to the state-trading
countries, to show that it was ready to negotiate new trade
agreements with them. In November, the Commission did so,
offering to open negotiations with them. 24 No replies came
21Commission of the European Communities, Bulletin of the
European Communities (hereinafter EC Bulletin), no. 5, 1974,
pt. 2330, and Marsh 1978, p. 49.
John Pinder (1977b), "Economic Integration and East-West
Trade: Conflict of Interests or Comedy of Errors?", Journal of
Common Market Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, September 1977, p. 2,
and Marsh 1978, pp. 49-52.
Commission of the European Communities, External
Relations Information no. 26/79, The EuroDean Communit y and
the Countries of Eastern Europe, December 1979, p. 1.
26EC Bulletin no. 11, 1974, pt. 1301.
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back, consistent with their traditional hostility to the EC
and with the cMEA's attempt to negotiate a bloc-to-bloc trade
agreement with the EC (see section 3.1.3) . The Council then
decided that the Community would proceed with the autonomous
policy, putting an EC stamp on the provisions of member
states' agreements; if state-trading countries did not agree
to negotiate those provisions, they would simply be unilateral
decisions by the Community. Member states' quotas on goods
from state-trading countries were incorporated into an EC
list; each year, the Council revised the list, usually
liberalizing imports. Community anti-dumping and anti-subsidy
procedures could be - and often have been - used in response
to complaints that artificially low priced goods from state-
trading countries were hurting EC producers.27
Although the Commission had managed somewhat to
'communitarize' trade policy towards Eastern Europe, little
room was left to the individual EC member states to conduct
trade negotiations anyway: provisions on tariffs and trade
liberalization were governed by GATT, to which Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, and Romania belonged at the time.28
Instead, the member states used cooperation agreements
Pinder 1977b, p. 2.
Decision 75/210 in OJ L 99, 21 April 1975. See Maslen
1983, p. 326.
27Maslen 1983, pp. 327-328.
Czechoslovakia was a founding but passive member of
GATT; Poland (1967), Romania (1971), and Hungary (1973) joined
later, under special protocols to account for their status as
state-trading countries. To reciprocate MFN benefits, state-
trading countries agreed to increase their imports by a
certain percentage each year.
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and export credits to secure advantages for their businesses
in Eastern Europe, and asserted their national prerogative to
do so. "This makes it possible to pursue national aims
bilaterally through export credits, barter deals, etc.,
provided the nation concerned assiduously avoids labelling
such agreements as 'commercial policy'."2'
West European governments promoted national exports with
an assertive use of state credit guarantees. 30 In 1962, the
Council decided that member states were to consult each other
when they intended to breach the Berne Union of Credit
Insurers agreement, but the decision was frequently ignored.31
In 1964, the UK guaranteed a 15-year credit for the Soviet
Union's purchase of a plant, breaking the five-year maximum of
the agreement. EC members France and Italy soon followed
with similar agreements, sparking a 'credit racel. B To tame
this competition, the Commission tried unsuccessfully to
coordinate EC member states' credit policies, supported by
West Germany and the Netherlands. France announced in 1966
2'Carl A. Ehrhardt, "The EC in the Network of its
Bilateral Agreements", Aussenolitik, vol. 31, no. 4, 1980, p.
373.
30me East European states borrowed heavily from the West
in the late 1960s and early 1970s; servicing the debt became
a serious problem by the late 1970s. After communism
collapsed, part of the West's aid to Eastern Europe had to be
directed to debt relief.
31Ransom 1973, pp. 39-40.
32Marsh 1978, p. 38.
European Parliament Working Document 1-531/82, Retort
drawn trn on behalf of the Committee of External Econoiiiic
Relations on relations between the Euro pean conuuun jty and the
East European state-trading countries and the CNEA (COMECON),
(hereinafter the Irmer Report), 28 July 1982, p. 16.
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that export credits were an element of foreign policy, which
remained the prerogative of the member states. In 1975 the
Commission obtained an ECJ judgment maintaining that export
credit policy fell under the EC's competence. 35 But the OECD
became the forum in which export credit guidelines were
stipulated, with Commission participation.
In long-term economic cooperation agreements with
communist states, a Western company, backed by its government,
provided technology, capital and know-how and the communist
state supplied labor and services. 37 Since the MEA states
sought to import Western technology but lacked the necessary
hard currency, cooperation agreements met their needs more
readily than straight trading arrangements. EC member states
regarded such agreements as instruments with which a national
economic policy could still be conducted.
France argued that economic cooperation agreements did
not fall under Article 113 and thus the Commission did not
have jurisdiction over them. Most member states, however,
could agree on the need for minimum Community coordination of
such agreements and in July 1974, the Council set up a
Ransom 1973, p. 40.
351n OJ C 268, 22 November 1975.
Wellenstein 1982, p. 204.	 There is still no EC
mechanism for coordinating export credits (see chapter 4).
37Marsh 1978, pp. 38-39.
West Germany, for example, concluded economic
cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in the early 1970s (part of
Ostholitik). The use of cooperation agreements declined later
as the economic and then political situation deteriorated.
Jurgen Notzold, "Political Preconditions of East-West Economic
Relations", Aussenpolitik, vol. 36, no. 1, 1985, p. 43.
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consultation procedure for cooperation agreements with state-
trading countries. 39 The Commission would be able to ensure
that the provisions of the agreements did not violate the CCP.
These procedures, however, frequently went unobserved.40
The absence of an EC economic cooperation policy towards
Eastern Europe contrasted with the EC's policies in other
regions: it concluded aid and cooperation agreements with
countries all over the world, including Yugoslavia. The
member states' reluctance to allow the EC to do the same with
East European countries partly reflects the degree to which
they guarded their own national economic and political
interests in the region, and partly the effects of the Cold
War and of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe.
Thus, the Community suffered from a lack of positive
instruments (credits, guarantees, etc.) for conducting
commercial relations with Eastern Europe.
So far, EC member states have (under Article 113)
only transferred to the Community the authority to
wield the stick, which also includes restrictive
import policy measures. But - notwithstanding
Article 113 - they have largely reserved the carrot
for themselves as an instrument of their export
policies 41
And the member states preferred to use "carrots" to encourage
liberalization in Eastern Europe (see section 3.3).
Progressive integration within the EC, however, elicited
a response from the East European states and from the MEA
itself, discussed in the next two sections. The East European
39Decision 74/393 in OJ L 208, 30 July 1974. See also
Marsh 1978, pp. 46-47.
40Wellenstein 1982, p. 206, and Ehrhardt 1980, p. 373.
41Ehrhardt 1980, p. 373.
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response in turn forced the EC to come up with a common stance
on relations with the cHEA and its members.
3.1.2 EC Relations with Individual CMEA Stat..
As the EC developed its internal policies on agriculture,
industry, and fisheries, beginning in the 1960s, non-member
states often found that their trade with the Community was
adversely affected (as the externalization hypothesis states).
They frequently approached the Commission - the only body
authorized to conduct trade negotiations - to seek
concessions. This held true for the East Europeans as well,
the official policy of not recognizing the EC aside. Their
exports (agricultural goods, chemicals, machinery, iron and
steel, textiles, and clothing) met with tariffs and
restrictive quotas at EC borders, while Soviet exports of raw
materials entered the Community duty-free. 42 With recession
in the mid-1970s, Community industrial policies became ever
more protectionist, further affecting trade with Eastern
Europe. Trade with the EC was a significant percentage of the
East Europeans' total foreign trade (25%), so they had good
reason to approach the Commission asking for concessions.43
As the Hungarian Prime Minister noted in 1968:
The Common Market is a fact and we, who are always
realists have to acknowledge its existence...If our
trade relations required us to call on some of the
'2Wellenstein 1982, p. 200.
'3Trade with the MEA was only 4% of the EC's total
foreign trade. Peter Marsh, "The European Community and East-
West Economic Relations", Journal of Common Market Studies,
vol. 23, no. 1, September 1984, p. 2. East Germany, however,
remained antagonistic to the EC, although it could afford to
do so because its goods entered West Germany free of tariffs,
under the provisions of the Rome Treaty's protocol relating to
intra-German trade. See Wellenstein 1982, p. 201.
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Brussels offices of the Common Market, we would not
consider this step a renunciation of our
principles."
The creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in
1960 spurred several MEA member states to break ranks with
the official policy of hostility towards the EC. There was
probably greater freedom to do so after the 1962 Pravda
article on the reality of the EC, and because with de Gaulle
obstructing any supranationalist moves, the Community did not
seem such a threatening institution.'5 Between 1965 and 1981,
agreements (by informal exchanges of letters) on agricultural
products were concluded with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The Commission agreed not to
charge a supplementary levy on specific products, and the East
European states agreed not to sell products below a certain
price. Voluntary restraint agreements on sheep and goat meat
were signed with the same 5 countries in 1981 and 1982.46
As the EC increasingly managed industrial problems
stemming from import competition, sectoral agreements were
reached with East European states. These agreements
"confirmed the Community's importance to the management of
East-West economic relations arising out of its wider
involvement in handling sectoral trade problems on behalf of
its members."'7
"Quoted in Alting von Geusau 1969, p. 149.
'5Ransom 1973, p. 25.
46Maslen 1983, pp. 330-331.
'Tpeter Marsh, "E.E.C. Foreign Economic Policy and the
Political Management of East-West Economic Relations",
Millennium, vol. 9, no. 1, Spring 1980, p. 44.
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In the late 1970s, the Community acted to protect EC
textile suppliers from low-cost competitors. Voluntary export
restraint agreements in the textiles sector were then signed
with Romania in 1976, Hungary in 1978, Bulgaria and Poland in
1979, and Czechoslovakia in 1981. Similarly, the increase
in Community management and protection of the steel industry
in 1977-78 prompted East European states to negotiate access
for their steel products with the Commission. Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland and Romania all reached informal voluntary
restraint agreements with the Commission in l978-79.' The
EC's growing management of sectoral trade problems thus
helped move the socialist states away from a policy
of non-recognition of the EEC'S competence in trade
matters and towards direct engagement in political
bargaining with the Commission on crucial issues of
East-West trade, on an informal basis.5°
Further integration in the Community even induced the
Soviet Union to approach the Commission. In 1976, the EC
member states agreed to extend their fishing rights to 200
nautical miles offshore and transfer jurisdiction over this
zone to the Community. The Commission would conduct
negotiations with third countries over fishing quotas within
the zone. The Soviet Union, with a large economic interest in
the fishing zone, sought an agreement on access to the zone
with the Commission. Poland and the GDR followed. 51 Yet the
'8Such agreements were periodically renewed. Maslen 1983,
p. 331.
49Marsh 1980, p. 46, and Maslen 1983, p. 331.
50Marsh 1980, p. 42.
51Carl A. Ehrhardt, "EEC and MEA Tediously Nearing Each
Other", Aussenpp].itik, vol. 28, no. 2, 1977, pp. 176-177, and
Robert M. Cutler, "Harmonizing EEC-cMEA Relations: Never the
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Soviet Union could still not bring itself to recognize the EC
nor accept a clause on the application of the Rome Treaty to
West Berlin, and the talks did not go well. By September
1977, negotiations with the three countries were suspended and
their ships left EC waters.52
In contrast, the EC "rewarded" Romania's independent
foreign policy. In 1972, Romania asked to begin negotiations
on a trade agreement with the EC. 53 In 1974, Romania
requested and obtained special treatment under the EC's
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). It also led the
way in reaching sectoral agreements. The first official
sectoral trade agreement between the EC and a MEA member was
concluded with Romania on textiles in 1976; another was
reached on steel in 1978. Two more far-reaching agreements
were concluded in 1980: the first created a joint committee on
trade matters and the second provided for the abolishment,
suspension or increase of certain import quotas on industrial
goods. 55 Romania agreed that it would expand and diversify
its imports from the EC at a rate not smaller than that of its
imports from other GATT countries. Attempting to keep up the
facade of non-recognition, Romania intended the trade
Twain Shall Meet?", International Affairs, vol. 63, no. 2,
Spring 1987, p. 264.
52External Relations Information no. 26/79, p. 2.
53Ransom 1973, p. 28.
GSP applies to imports from developing countries,
providing tariff-free access for industrial products
(including steel and textiles) and some agricultural products;
a tariff is applied on "sensitive products" above a certain
quota.
55Both agreements are in OJ L 352, 29 December 1980.
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agreement to be regarded officially as another sectoral
agreement, which is why the joint committee was established by
a separate agreement.
The Community also moved to strengthen its relations with
Yugoslavia, which was only associated with the cMEA. By
reaching agreements with Romania and Yugoslavia, the EC was
making a "political point". 58 It would extend benefits to
countries that had few qualms about recognizing it.
By the early 1980s, then, the Community was playing a
greater role in trade relations with Eastern Europe, largely
as a result of externalization. But these relations were
fairly low-key, and the member states still controlled most
instruments of foreign economic policy. In addition, the EC's
role was constrained by Cold War realities and, in particular,
relations with the cMEA.
3.1.3 EC-cHEA Institutional Relations
From 1973 through 1981, the possibility of the EC and the
MEA concluding some sort of agreement was discussed.
Although talks between the two sides were held, they came to
John Maslen, "A Turning Point: Past and Future of the
European Community's Relations with Eastern Europe", Rivista
di Studi Politici Internazionali, no. 4, 1988, p. 560.
571n 1970, a three-year, non-preferential trade agreement
went into effect between the EC and Yugoslavia, in which each
granted the other MFN status. In 1971, Yugoslavia was granted
the GSP. A second, five-year agreement was signed in 1973
which liberalized trade and allowed freer access for
Yugoslavia's exports. A trade and cooperation agreement was
concluded in 1980, providing further concessions for Yugoslav
exports and European Investment Bank finance. The EC thus
hoped to limit Yugoslavia's economic dependence on MEA member
states. See Patrick F.R. Artisien and Stephen Holt,
"Yugoslavia and the E.E.C. in the 1970s", Journal of Common
Market Studies, vol. 28, no. 4, June 1980.
Pinder 1991, p. 11.
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nothing as the respective positions could not be reconciled.
Only after Gorbachev launched a more open Soviet foreign
policy could an agreement be realized. The EC-cHEA standoff
meant in practice that the EC member states had greater
freedom to pursue their own economic policies in Eastern
Europe.
In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union began to promote the
MEA as an equal negotiating partner of the EC. During this
period, the EC's increased power was evident at the CSCE
negotiations, where it played an active role (see section
3.2). The Community was having a 'demonstration effect': as
the EC consolidated its powers over those of its member states
in trade, economic, and apparently even foreign policy,
likewise the Soviet Union sought to strengthen the eMEA'S
internal and external dimensions. 59 The Soviet Union was
interested in bolstering the cMEA for other reasons as well.
As noted above, EC sectoral integration led some East European
states to approach the EC to ask for concessions for their
exports. The Soviet Union was anxious to keep these economic
relations with the West under control. But after the 1968
intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union also hoped
that increased economic integration in Eastern Europe would
stimulate growth and help maintain stability.60
The Soviet Union thus offered to work to improve economic
and political relations with the West in exchange for greater
cohesion among the East European states and for strengthening
59Marsh 1978, p. 27.
60Pinder 1977b, p. 4.
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their relationship with the USSR, largely through the cMEA.'1
The East European states favored enhancing the cNEA because as
the CCP was extended, they wanted to compensate for their
weaker bargaining position vis-a-vis the EC.
In 1972, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signaled a
softening in traditional hostility to the EC, when he declared
that Soviet relations with the Community would depend on the
EC recognizing realities in the socialist part of Europe.'3
John Pinder suggests that the Soviet price asked in exchange
for de facto recognition of the EC was greater Soviet control
over the external trade of its allies. This would be achieved
through the cMEA, which the Soviet Union dominated. The
Soviets sought an overarching agreement between the EC and the
CMEA which would strengthen institutional - and therefore
Soviet - control over the foreign trade policies of the MEA
member states. M The East Europeans, for their part, hoped
only for an agreement on general principles; they wanted to
continue negotiating sectoral agreements with the EC and
61Marsh 1978, pp. 31-32.
62Arie Bloed, The External Relations of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1988), pp. 73-74. In 1971, the MEA approved a "complex
program of socialist economic integration" which was to
facilitate direct links between different national enterprises
and encourage more joint planning. It did not increase the
cMEA's powers over its members' external trade and commercial
policies; some MEA members, especially Romania, opposed such
a move. The MEA operated on the basis of unanimity. Bloed
1988, pp. 9-10.
'3Maslen 1983, p. 325.
64John Pinder, "The Community and the State-Trading
Countries" in Kenneth J. Twitchett, ed., Euro pe and the World:
The External Relations of the Common Market, London: Europa
Publications, 1976, p. 63.
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cooperation agreements with the EC member states.65
The cXEA first contacted the Community in 1973. In
August, cMEA Secretary Faddeyev approached the Foreign
Minister of Denmark, which held the EC Presidency, to propose
talks between the two organizations. (By approaching the EC
President rather than the Commission, the CMEA could keep up
the facade of not recognizing the Community.)M
The cMEA's initiative forced the EC to formulate a
response, in another instance of externalization. In both the
EPC and EC frameworks, the issue of an agreement with the CMEA
was considered. In the course of coordinating the Community's
position in the CSCE, the EPC Political Committee examined the
relationship between the Community and the •67 The 1972
EPC document, drafted by the TJK45 , pointed to the cMEA's lack
of powers in areas where the EC did have control.
The Commission's view on negotiations with the eMEA,
elaborated in September 1974, was that the MEA could not be
considered a parallel organization since it did not possess
supranational powers over the external commercial and trade
policies of its member states. Relations with the MEA
could only complement separate relations with its members;
talks between the two organizations should only discuss
65Pinder 1977b, p. 5.
The Klepsch Report, pp. 21-22.
6TThe Commission had been excluded from the work, much to
its dismay. See Nuttall 1992, p. 61.
The UK participated in EPC before it formally acceded
to the Community in 1973.
Marsh 1978, pp. 54-55.
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questions such as environmental problems. In 1974, the cMEA's
statute had been revised to allow it to stipulate trade
agreements with third parties, but these would not bind the
CMEA members unless they each so agreed.7°
In response to the cMEA, the EC thus firstly maintained
that it - and not the member states - was responsible for
trade policy. To Faddeyev's proposal, the EC Council replied
in September 1974 that the appropriate body for the cMEA
Secretary to contact was the Commission. 71 The Community also
insisted that it would only negotiate with the MEA member
states individually. In November 1974, the Commission tried
to establish trade links with the separate MEA member states,
but was rebuffed (see section 3 • 1.1). The Community's stance
was steadfastly maintained in all dealings with the cMEA,
right up to the cMEA's demise.
Relations with each MEA member state would have allowed
the Community to take into account that state's specific
characteristics (the principle of "specificity"), such as its
level of economic development and whether it was a member of
GATT. The Seeler report to the EP pointed to another reason
for dealing with the MEA states individually:
while one superpower, the United States, does not
belong to the European Community, the Soviet Union,
the other superpower, is the leading member of the
cMEA. It is both a European and an Asiatic
state...(F]or this reason alone the European
Community must make a clear distinction between
trade, economic, cultural and other relations with
T0Bloed 1988, p. 92 and pp. 110-113.
71The Klepsch Report, pp. 21-22. It should be reiterated
that only in May 1974 had the member states accepted that the
EC was to handle trade agreements with East European
countries.
106
the Eastern European CMEA countries on the one hand
and with the Soviet Union on the other.72
The CXEA's lack of supranationality was not the primary
reason why the EC refused to negotiate a trade agreement with
it; the EC has concluded agreements with other blocs, such as
ASEAN and the Andean Pact, which are not as integrated as the
Community. More importantly, the EC sought to weaken the
Soviet Union's domination of Eastern Europe. By minimizing
the cMEA's potential role in trade negotiations, the EC hoped
to prevent the Soviet Union from limiting the autonomy of the
East European countries. 7'3 The EC wanted to ensure that the
East European states conducted their external economic
relations freely, even though the cMEA's unanimity rule would
have made it difficult for the Soviet Union to restrict the
foreign trade practices of the other members.74
T2European Parliament (PE Doc A2-187/86), Re port drawn u
on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations on
member states of the CMEA (the Seeler Report), 19 December
1986, p. 17.
73Pinder 1977b, p. 6. Susan Senior Nello notes that the
Community's stance could have led the Soviet Union to increase
the cMEA's supranational powers, and therefore its own, the
opposite effect intended. Susan Senior Nello, Recent
Developments in Relations between the EC and Eastern Europe,
EUI Working Paper no. 89/381 (Florence: European University
Institute, 1989), pp. 5-6.
T4cutler 1987, p. 267. Margaret Thatcher maintains that
her visit to Hungary in early February 1984 "was the first
foray in what became a distinctive British diplomacy towards
the captive nations of eastern Europe. The first step was to
open greater economic and commercial links with the existing
regimes, making them less dependent upon the closed COMECON
system." Margaret Thatcher, The DownincT Street Years (London:
HarperCollins, 1993), p. 457. But well before then, the UK
had agreed to the Community stance on the CMEA, whose
objective was the same; as noted above, it had even drafted
the EPC report on the matter in 1972.
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Over and above the EC's politically motivated reticence
to negotiate a trade agreement with the eMEA, John Pinder has
pointed to another obstacle to an EC-cMEA agreement: neither
the Soviet Union nor the EC had much economic interest in
trade negotiations)' The EC was running big surpluses in its
trade with the MEA and, given the nature of state-trading
economies, could not be assured that concessions made in trade
talks would be fully reciprocated. Soviet exports to the EC
(mostly raw materials) were not subject to tariffs or quotas.
Only the East Europeans, with the exception of East Germany,
encountered protectionism in exporting to the EC and needed to
negotiate concessions, as discussed above. Trade with the EC,
as a percentage of total foreign trade, was also more
significant for the East European states than vice versa.
Not surprisingly then, EC-CMEA talks during the 1970s did
not proceed smoothly. In September 1974, Faddeyev wrote to
Commission President Ortoli (in accordance with the EC
Council's demands) to invite him to Moscow to discuss EC-MEA
relations. In response, Ortoli proposed beginning preparatory
talks, which then took place in February 1975 between
Commission and MEA representatives. They only resulted in an
EC invitation to further talks in Brussels.76
Shortly after the CSCE Helsinki summit conference, in
February 1976, the MEA wrote to the President of the EC
Council to propose EC-cMEA negotiations on trade issues,
75John Pinder (1977a), "The Community and Comecon: What
Could Negotiations Achieve?", The World Today, May 1977, pp.
176-185.
7 iarsh 1978, pp. 54-55.
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including MFN status and tariff preferences. The agreement
would lay down the principles governing trade between cMEA and
EC countries; these principles would also apply to any
agreements concluded between the EC and individual c.MEA member
states. A joint committee would oversee the implementation of
the principles in both the EC-CMEA agreement and agreements
between the EC and cMEA states, thus giving the CMEA powers
over the external trade policies of its member states.77
Carl Ehrhardt surmises that the Soviet Union sought to
accelerate the drafting of the EC-cMEA agreement because the
EC's status had been enhanced at the CSCE Helsinki final
conference. The MEA tacitly allowed Italian Prime Minister
Aldo Moro to sign the Helsinki Final Act in his capacity as EC
Council President, but did not achieve similar recognition in
return. Th The CSCE outcome probably also prompted the Soviet
move because Basket Two on economic cooperation did not
contain the measures asked for by the MEA member states.
In November 1976, the Community replied to the cMEA,
reiterating once again that the EC sought trade agreements
with the individual MEA member states and an agreement on
areas outside trade policy with the	 MEA itself.
7TJohn Maslen, "The European Community's Relations with
the State-Trading Countries of Europe 1984-1986", Yearbook of
European Law, no. 6, 1986, pp. 336-337.
T8Ehrhardt 1977, pp. 170-171.
The Inner Report, p 40. A skirmish had taken place
between the EC and EPC over this response. The Political
Committee attempted to guide discussions within Coreper
regarding the cMEA's draft agreement, although the Commission
opposed EPC involvement in this area. In March 1976, the
Political Committee asked the East European Working Group to
examine the political aspects of the draft agreement; the
Group's report was forwarded to Coreper. In any event, the
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Negotiations between the EC and the MEA were held from 1977
to 1980, without success, given the incompatibility of the
respective positions on the trade issue. In 1981, after an
exchange of letters in which each side accused the other of
blocking progress, the negotiations petered out80. The tense
international political atmosphere of the early 1980s then
precluded the resumption of talks.
A change in the eMEA's stance began to occur in 1983-84.
Hungary and Czechoslovakia started talks with the Commission
in 1983 about the possibility of expanding their sectoral
trade arrangements with the EC (see next chapter). Then the
June 1984 CMEA summit meeting affirmed that the CMEA members
were ready to conclude an appropriate agreement with the
Community, to promote trade and economic relations between the
members of both organizations. An October 1984 message to the
EC repeated the cXEA's readiness to resume negotiations.81
Only when Prime Minister Craxi of Italy, then President
of the EC, visited Moscow in May 1985, did it become clear
that hostility to the Community was in sharp decline and that
the MEA's position was edging closer to the EC's. On that
occasion, the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, declared
that it was time "to organise mutually advantageous relations
between (the MEA and the EEC) in economic matters. To the
extent that EEC countries act as a 'political entity' we are
ready to seek a common language with it, too, over
report was very general and reflected Coreper's own political
analysis. Nuttall 1992, p. 118.
80Maslen 1983, p. 337.
81Maslen 1986, p. 338.
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international problems. "
In June 1985, the CMEA Secretary Sychev wrote to
Commission President Delors proposing to establish official
relations between the two organizations. The European
Council, meeting in Milan the same month, gave the Commission
a mandate to explore the proposal. The Commission replied to
the CMEA that it was willing to resume dialogue, but that the
normalization of relations between the two organizations
should occur alongside normalization of relations between the
EC and the cMEA member states. 	 It asked for further
details. M In September, Sychev sent a draft EC-cHEA
declaration: in it, the two organizations would establish
official relations and state that the form of those relations
would be decided in subsequent meetings. The cMEA had thus
abandoned its attempt to conclude a trade agreement with the
EC. 85 However, relations were to be established between the
two organizations - creating a 'favorable climate' - before
they were developed with the MEA states.
The reasons for the cHEA's change of attitude stem
82AS quoted in Maslen 1986, p. 338.
Normalization being defined as a situation where each
party is willing to deal on an official basis with the other.
Thus, East European countries would accredit diplomatic
missions to the EC and drop their objections to EC
participation in international organizations. Maslen 1986, p.
340.
EC Bulletin no. 6, 1985, pts. 2.3.37-38 and pt. 1.2.9,
and no. 7/8, 1985, pt. 2.3.38.
Barbara Lippert, "ECcHEA Relations: Normalisation and
Beyond", in Geoffrey Edwards and Elfriede Regelsberger, eds.,
The European Community and Inter-regional Cooperation (London:
Pinter, 1990), p. 123.
The Seeler Report, p. 15.
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primarily from Gorbachev's ascendence to the top of the Soviet
leadership and his more open and flexible foreign policy,
although the change predates his election as Secretary-General
of the Soviet Union's Communist Party in March 1985. The
Soviet Union's economic interest in developing relations with
the EC now outweighed its previous reluctance to deal with it
at all. Trade relations were being redirected to the more
lucrative developed countries, which could offer technology
and know-how. A more secure environment would allow military
expenditures to decrease. The economic situation in Eastern
Europe was also declining rapidly; several countries, most
notably Poland, were heavily in debt to the West and oil
prices had fallen, worsening the Soviet Union's trade balance.
An improvement in relations with the EC might bring economic
advantages. 87 The transatlantic tensions over the gas
pipeline in the early 1980s (see below) helped ease Soviet
hostility towards the EC. Concern over access to the single
European market spurred MEA member states to make
compromises. They probably also took into account the EC's
increased economic weight after the 1986 accession of Spain
and Portugal.90
8TMaslen 1986, p. 344.
88Senior Nello 1989, p. 9.
Commission of the European Communities, External
Relations Information no. 1/89, The Euroe pn Community's
Relations with Coinecon and its East European Members, January
1989, p. 3, and Dan Rorovitz, "EC-Central/East European
Relations: New Principles for a New Era", Common Market Law
Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Summer 1990, p. 262.
90Steven J. Dryden, "Soviet Bloc, EC to Renew Talks on
Recognition", The Washinaton Post, 17 August 1986.
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The EC's position on resuming negotiations was to pursue
its usual parallel approach: the Community would seek to
develop normal relations with the separate MEA countries at
the same time as it developed relations with the CMEA itself.
In January and February 1986, External Relations Commissioner
Willy De Clercq wrote to the CHEA Secretary and to the East
European members of the CXEA, setting out the Community's
position. In their replies, the East European states and the
MEA accepted it; Sychev indicated that each CNEA member would
decide whether to reach an agreement with the EC. By mid-
198 6, talks on separate agreements were beginning with
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, so the
EC felt it could proceed with discussions with the cHEA. East
Germany and the Soviet Union made normalization of relations
conditional upon the adoption of a joint EC-CHEA
declaration.91
Talks on the CHEA's proposal began in September 1986 and
continued through 1988. The principal contention arose over
the EC's insistence on including a territorial clause
regarding the application of the Rome Treaty to West Berlin.
The MEA objected to its inclusion in a joint declaration. It
maintained that since the declaration only set out general
provisions on cooperation, not regulations on economic
relations, the exact boundaries of EC competences were
irrelevant. Territorial clauses had been included in the
sectoral agreements and the 1980 agreements with Romania, and
had not been included in EC agreements with international
91Maslen 1986, pp. 339-342.
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organizations. The cMEA also did not want to be seen as
agreeing to any eventual extension of the Community's
political powers over West Berlin. The EC, however, refused
to budge from its position; West Berlin had to be acknowledged
as being part of the Community.
Only in May 1988 was the question settled in the EC's
favor. West Germany, which held the EC Presidency during the
first half of 1988, pushed quite hard for a solution so that
the declaration could be signed by the end of its Presidency.
Martin Bangemann, the West German Minister for Economic
Affairs, met with Gorbachev and Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai
Ryzkhov in mid-May and apparently hammered out a new
formulation of the Berlin clause. The 'Hungarian formula'
(so named because it was used in the 1978 EEC-Hungary textiles
agreement) would be adopted: without explicitly mentioning
West Berlin, the declaration would state that it applied in
all areas where the EEC Treaty was valid. Later it was
agreed that the MEA would add a statement stressing that the
declaration did not affect the four-power supervision of
92Wojciech Morawiecki, "Actors and Interests in the
Process of Negotiations Between the XEA and the EEC", Legal
Issues of European Inteciration, no. 2, 1989, pp. 26-27.
Aaence Eurooe no. 4784, 18 May 1988. The Soviet
compromise was probably encouraged by the West German
announcement the week before that credits worth DX 3.5 billion
would be made available to the Soviet Union by a West German-
led bank consortium. Quentin Peel, "Comecon and EC Close to
Recognition", The Financial Times, 17 May 1988.
Pinder 1991, p. 24. The Declaration states that it
"shall apply to the territories in which the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community is applied."
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Berlin by France, the Soviet Union, the US and the UK.
The Joint EEC-cMEA Declaration was initialed on 9 June in
Moscow and signed on 25 June in Luxembourg, after Council and
EP approval. In it the EEC and the CMEA establish official
relations and undertake to cooperate "in areas which fall
within their respective spheres of competence and where there
is a common interest." No institutions are provided for and
even the cooperation element is vague, the parties agreeing
that they "will, if necessary, examine the possibility of
determining new areas, forms and methods of cooperation."
The limited substance of the declaration is a result of
the EC's attitude towards relations with the cMEA. "The EC
accepted the Joint Declaration with the CMEA as the entrance
ticket to bilateral agreements with individual countries, not
as a framework agreement that fixed an agenda for further
bilateral cooperation."7 The MEA had been forced to reverse
its original position and accept the Community's demands,
recognizing "the Community's identity both in terms of its
territory and of its competences."' The Community could thus
be quite satisfied, although its tenacity really paid of f only
with the extraordinary changes in Eastern Europe.
Within a few months of the signing of the Joint
Agence Europe no. 4786, 20 May 1988 and David Buchan,
"Trade Blocs to Recognise Each Other", The Financial Times, 25
May 1988.
96Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Official
Relations between the European Economic Community and the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, in OJ L 157, 24 June
1988.
'TLippert 1990, p. 124.
Maslen 1988, p. 564.
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Declaration, the Community established diplomatic relations
with almost all of the East European states that had
stubbornly refused to recognize it formally for over 30
years. The stage was set for the conclusion of trade and
cooperation agreements with the MEA member states, discussed
in the next chapter. From then on, the Community would play
a significant role in Eastern Europe.
3.2 THE COMMUNITY AND THE CSCE
Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union had periodically
floated proposals for a pan-European conference on security
and economic cooperation. The West rejected them as attempts
to legitimize the unsatisfactory status quo in Europe and
reinforce Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. With detente
in the late 1960s, the Soviet proposal received a more
positive response; NATO agreed to it provided that talks on
force reductions in Europe started at the same time.1°°
Along with 33 European states, the US and Canada also took
part.
The convening of the CSCE prompted the EC member states
to work out a common stand on issues relating to cooperation
with the East:
Maslen 1988, p. 565. Paradoxically, Romania, the first
MEA member to negotiate a formal trade agreement with the EC
back in 1980, did not establish diplomatic ties with the EC
until March 1990 (see chapter 4). The small, informal
"advisers' group", composed of Commission and member state
officials, handled the very political decisions regarding the
opening of East European embassies in Brussels. Interview
with DG IA official, 12 March 1996.
100Alf red Pijpers, "European Political Cooperation and the
CSCE Process", Legal Issues of European Integration, vol. 10,
no. 1, 1984, pp. 135-136. In 1967, NATO had approved the
Harmel Report, which emphasized the importance of pursuing
detente and strengthening defense.
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More than anything else, perhaps, the experience of
the European Security Conference persuaded the
member states of the immediate advantages of
collective action and in doing so gave a strong
internal boost to the process of forming a common
West European policy towards the MEA states.101
The CSCE provided an ideal opportunity to inaugurate the
new EPC machinery. The perceived need to speak with one voice
in international affairs, especially East-West relations, was
one of the initial catalysts to the creation of EPC. At the
December 1969 summit in The Hague, France agreed to a number
of concessions, including UK accession to the EC, in return
for the setting up of a separate intergovernmental structure
to coordinate a distinct European foreign policy. All the
member states, though, felt foreign policies towards non-
member states needed to be coordinated, particularly those
towards Eastern Europe.'°2
At the first EPC meeting of the foreign ministers in
November 1970, it was agreed that two issues would be handled
within EPC: the Middle East and the CSCE. In several ways,
cooperation on CSCE was an obvious choice. It would allow the
Community to evolve a separate European policy, so important
to France. West Germany strongly favored coordinating the
Community's position in the CSCE forum, as a way of garnering
EC support for OstDolitik. As Simon Nuttall noted, "Germany's
return to the international community of nations was still too
recent for it to be able to take the risk of a raPDrochement
with Eastern Europe without the comforting presence of its
101Marsh 1978, p. 45.
102willi	 Wallace (1983a), "Political Cooperation:
Integration through Intergovernmentalism", in Wallace,
Wallace, and Webb, eds. 1983, pp. 375-376.
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European partners in a similar policy enterprise. p103
The US, preoccupied with the Vietnam War and skeptical
about the benefits of conference diplomacy, demonstrated a
striking lack of interest in the CSCE and was willing to let
the EC take the lead. An atmosphere of detente also "created
more room for manoeuvre for the non-military powers and
blocs." 1°' The 'civilian' character of the CSCE appealed to
a 'civilian' Community: military issues did not figure
prominently in the early negotiations and in the discussions
that were held, on confidence building measures, coordination
of the Western position took place within NATO.105
The looming transfer of national powers over trade
policies towards Eastern Europe to the Community (from May
1974) was an added incentive to cooperate in forming a common
position towards the East. By coordinating their policies on
political relations with the Eastern bloc, the EC member
states could ensure that they set the political guidelines by
which the CCP would operate.10'
Then of course, East-West relations and European security
and cooperation are clearly a common concern of West European
states. Policy coordination was possible, according to Alfred
Pijpers, because "there are no fundamental differences among
the EC countries about such matters as the free flow of
information, human rights, human contacts, or economic co-
'°3Nuttall 1992, p. 57.
' °4Pijpers 1984, p. 143.
' 05Pijpers 1984, p. 138.
10'Nuttall 1992, p. 60.
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operation. Hence it is not very difficult to formulate common
viewpoints on these issues." 107 True, but getting down to
the nitty-gritty detailed work might have threatened the
consensus, yet it did not.
A common EC approach was considered necessary to oppose
more effectively the Soviet Union's attempts to control the
agenda and purpose of the CSCE. The USSR sought a treaty-
based pan-European security system which would legitimate the
division of Europe and Germany into two blocs. In the 1970
FRG-USSR bilateral treaty, West Germany agreed to respect
existing borders; the Soviet Union now wanted wider
confirmation of the status quo. 108 Accordingly, the CSCE
would declare the immutability of frontiers and non-
interference in internal affairs. The EC sought to block such
an outcome: the immutability principle could be used to freeze
the status quo in Europe and as grounds for the Soviets to
oppose further West European integration.'° 9 The EC also
resisted the Soviet proposal to institute a permanent, legal
machinery for the CSCE, since it could have helped maintain
the status quo.
The West, led by the EC, also wanted to stress human
rights and contacts. "It was regarded as essential in this
area to maintain a demand for improvements concerning visits
of relations, emigration with the aim of reuniting families
'°TPijpers 1984, p. 147.
'°8Karl E. Birnbaum and Ingo Peters, "The CSCE: a
Reassessment of its Role in the 1980s", Review of
International Studies, vol. 16, no. 4, October 1990, p. 307.
109Pijpers 1984, pp. 136-137.
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and enabling marriages across borders, facilitation of travel
and youth and sporting exchanges."11°
Coordination of the EC member states' positions began
soon after the November 1970 foreign ministers' meeting, to
prepare for the 1972-1973 preparatory talks. Coordination
took place mainly in two committees set up by the EPC
Political Committee in the spring of 1971: the CSCE
Subcommittee dealt with the political aspects of the
negotiations and contained only member state representatives,
while the ad hoc Group handled economic issues and included
representatives from the member states and the Commission.11'
The Commission's role at the CSCE was controversial.
France resisted EC participation, on the grounds that the CSCE
mainly dealt with security issues and was intended to be a
conference among states, not blocs. 112 The Commission had to
insist on participating in the talks on economic cooperation.
During the second phase of the conference, from September 1973
to June 1975, the Commission received the sole mandate to
°Gotz von Groll, "The Nine at the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe", in David Allen, Reirihardt Rummel,
and Wolfgang Wessels, eds., Euro pean Political CooDeration:
Towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe (London:
Butterworth Scientific, 1982), p. 61.
mxichael Clarke, "Britain and European Political
Cooperation in the CSCE", in Kenneth Dyson, ed., European
Detente: Case Studies of the Politics of East-West Relations
(London: Frances Pinter, 1986), p. 241. Initially the ad hoc
Group was to have been subordinate to the Subcommittee;
however in practice it reported directly to the Political
Committee and cooperated closely with the Subcommittee.
Nuttall 1992, pp. 62-64. The Commission thus participated in
the preparations via the EPC machinery, a way of keeping its
input within limits acceptable, above all, to France.
2Nuttall 1992, p. 58.
120
negotiate for the member states on trade matters 113 ; it then
took part in talks on matters of its competence in the CSCE
Committee on Basket Two (economic cooperation), as the
representative of the EC member states.114
That the CSCE's agenda was divided into separate baskets
allowed the EC member states to maintain the Community's own
division between economic and political policy-making
mechanisms. France in particular insisted on maintaining the
distinction, so as to keep "high" political issues under
national control. Yet the Commission's participation in the
CSCE underlined how difficult it would be to keep the
mechanisms separate in practice. As EPC evolved, the
Commission became more closely associated with it, reflecting
the CSCE experience.
There was to be no separate Community delegation at the
CSCE, however. Given that the Soviet Union did not recognize
the EC, if the Community itself had asked to participate in
the CSCE, the USSR might have insisted that the MEA take part
as well. The absence of a formal Commission delegation suited
France, reluctant to boost the Commission's stature.
Commission representatives joined the delegation of the member
state which held the Presidency of the EC, although the
Commission felt it should speak for the Community." 5 The
Helsinki Final Act was signed by the Italian Prime Minister,
then EC President, on behalf of the Community. That the CMEA
3von Groll 1982, p. 61. See also EC Bulletin no. 6,
1973, pt. 1501 and no. 9, 1973, pt. 1203; and section 3.1.1.
"EC Bulletin no. 7/8, 1975, pt. 1201.
15Nuttall 1992, pp. 110-112.
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accepted this indicated it. tacit recognition of the EC'.
jurisdiction over member states' trade arrangements.116
Community coordination at the CSCE is widely considered
to have been successful. In July 1975, the European Council
declared that the negotiations had "afforded the Nine the
opportunity to take up a common task which became a shining
example of constructive cooperation." 117 The Community
emerged as the most coherent group at the CSCE: it led the
West, which in turn set the agenda for the East. The neutral
and non-aligned states, and often the smaller eastern bloc
states, supported Community positions." 8 The intense
cooperation among the member states also spurred the
development of the EPC machinery." 9 The nine member states
formulated a common concept for the CSCE agenda and mandate,
and a draft Final Act. The Conference's agenda and Final Act
reflected the preparatory work done by the EC and EPC.120
The Helsinki Final Act was a political statement, rather
than a legally binding treaty, as the West had insisted. In
Basket One, the Soviets had to accept that borders were
inviolable, not immutable, and that they can be peacefully
changed; in return, the principle of non-interference in
domestic affairs was declared.	 Basket Two on economic
6Ehrhardt 1977, p. 170.
117EC Bulletin no. 7/8, 1975, pt. 1204.
8Birnbaum and Peters 1990, p. 310. Michael Clarke
points out, however, that a well-coordinated diplomatic group
like EPC could play a leading role in the negotiations because
the stakes were not really high. Clarke 1986, pp. 237-240.
"9Wallace 1983a, p. 380.
120Nuttall 1992, p. 110.
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cooperation was a disappointment for the East European states:
the commitments to liberalize trade are vague (due to Western
doubts about achieving mutual reciprocity), while more
detailed measures call for better operating conditions for
Western businesses. 12' In Basket Three, there are general
and specific commitments favoring freer movement and contact
among people, as the Community in particular had vanted.
The Soviet Union and its allies accepted the provisions on
human rights and contacts in exchange for confirmation of the
territorial status quo in the principles.'
After Helsinki, the EC member states continued to
coordinate their positions, particularly on economic aspects,
at the review conferences (such as Belgrade 1977-78) •124 But
by the time of the Madrid Review Conference in 1980-83, East-
West relations had deteriorated. NATO began to play a more
important role in coordinating Western policy as the follow-up
and related conferences (such as the Conference on Disarmament
in Europe, 1984-1986) dealt more with the military aspects of
security.125
A more moralistic American foreign policy, beginning with
the Carter Administration, emphasized the human rights
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and used the CSCE forum
121Helsinki Review Group, Helsinki - Belgrade - Madrid,
David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies,
1980, pp. 27-33.
Helsinki Review Group 1980, pp. 42-51.
Birnbaum and Peters 1990, pp. 307-308.
124Clarke 1986, p. 243.
'Pijpers 1984, pp. 143-146.
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to accuse the Soviet Union of human rights violations. West
European countries were uncomfortable with the US policy of
"differentiation", but increasingly they too stressed
human rights, at least rhetorically. 127	The emphasis,
however, was on positive encouragement for liberalization,
rather than negative sanctions.'
EPC was sidelined as detente deteriorated. 	 The
deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles after 1979 was
not formally touched upon in EPC, given its controversial and
military nature, but neither were other issues of East-West
relations. The EPC Eastern European Working Group was not
allowed to conduct any activities other than academic studies,
because France, supported by Denmark, wanted to maintain
national bilateral policies towards the region.
By the early 1980s, however, the Community was faced with
the emergence of clear differences of opinion between it and
the US, over American policy towards the Soviet bloc. The
Nine tried to protect European detente from Soviet-American
'Timothy Garton Ash argues this was the US policy from
the 1960s. In the US view, "East European states were to be
rewarded for good behaviour and punished for bad, and this in
the short to medium term. Good behaviour was defined mainly
politically, in terms of independence from Moscow in foreign
policy and/or relative 'liberalism' and respect for human
rights in domestic policy." Garton Ash 1993, p. 178.
'27See Thatcher 1993, p. 457, and Dominique Molsi, "French
Policy Toward Central and Eastern Europe", in William
Griffith, ed., Central and Eastern EuroDe: The Oenina
Curtain? (Boulder: Westview, 1989), pp. 359-362.
Yet, as Jean-Christophe Romer and Thomas Schreiber
point out, Mitterrand considered Ceausescu "plus fréquentable"
than Jaruzelski, even though Romania was systematically
violating human rights. In "La France et l'Europe Centrale",
Politiciue Etranczère, no. 4/95, Winter 1995/96, pp. 919-920.
Nuttall 1992, p. 118.
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tensions, and saw East-West trade relations as an important
aspect of detente:
the Western Europeans, especially the Germans,
continued to insist on the value of maintaining the
economic bases of detente - particularly as a lever
for change and as a means to build up a web of
cooperation in order to enhance security.'30
On precisely these trade issues, Community member states BOOfl
found themselves in conflict with the US, and drew together to
resist US pressures.
3.3 TRADE AND SECURITY
Trade between Western and Eastern Europe was directly
affected by the Cold War. Pre-World War II trade flows were
interrupted by the division of Europe into two separate,
exclusive blocs. The US objected to attempts by West
Europeans to resume trading with the East after the war, on
security grounds. It sought to deny the USSR the benefits of
trading with the West and tried to ensure its allies complied
with the policy. Trade and economic cooperation with the
Soviet bloc were seen as harmful to American and international
security since it would augment the USSR's economic, and
therefore military, capability. The 1949 US Export Control
Act imposed controls on trade with the Soviet bloc; the same
year, those controls were extended on a multilateral basis in
the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(CoCom). 131 Under the 1951 US Mutual Defence Assistance Act,
130Kenneth Dyson, "The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Europe Before and After the Helsinki
Final Act", in Dyson, ed. 1986, p. 108.
131 Stephen Woolcock, Western Policies on East-West Trade
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 8. CoCom, an
informal, non-treaty organization, consisted of all the NATO
member countries except Iceland, plus Japan. The Community
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the US could deny aid to its allies if they exported certain
goods to a communist country.1
In contrast to the US, West European states (and Germany
above all) felt that "(p]ositive incentives like trade could
draw the Soviet Union into a web of interdependent
relationships with the West, and the ties created could reduce
the military threat in Europe."' Trade sanctions would not
help create a secure environment in Europe; rather, trade
helped to stabilize political relations and could in the long
term open up the East European states.IM West European
states also had much stronger economic interests in trade with
the East, for obvious geographic and cultural reasons. The
problem of the East European states' indebtedness to Western
banks and governments - and their consequent need to earn
export revenues - made manifest growing (though still
relatively insignificant) economic interdependence between
Eastern and Western Europe.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the
December 1981 declaration of martial law in Poland, and the
ensuing tense international political climate, effectively
was not even an observer. Members agreed not to sell products
on three sets of lists to the communist bloc. The lists - for
munitions, atomic energy, and industrial-commercial goods -
were reviewed every few years.
132Woolcock 1982, p. 8.
'33Beverly Crawford, "The Roots of European Self-Assertion
in East-West Trade", in Beverly Crawford and Peter W. Schulze,
eds., The New EuroDe Asserts Itself: A Chan ging Role in
International Relations (Berkeley: University of California,
1990), p. 256.
134Friedemann Muller, "Economic Sanctions in the East-West
Conflict", AussenDolitik, vol. 35, no. 1, 1984, pp. 69-70.
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hampered the development of relations between Eastern and
Western Europe. These events also caused disagreements
between the US and Western Europe at a time when transatlantic
relations were already strained as a result of trade disputes,
the deployment of cruise missiles, and President Reagan's
anti-communist foreign policy. The Community attempted to
isolate trade relations with Eastern Europe from the
deterioration in political relations between the superpowers.
An assertive American government, however, linked trade with
security issues (in a negative way), and pressed the West
European states to do likewise. Community member states were
skeptical of the utility and efficacy of export controls and
sanctions and uneasy with the US position on the security
implications of East-West trade. Interests with the US were
diverging as they converged among the EC member states; it was
increasingly felt that the European view had to be expressed.
Much of the activity regarding East-West relations in
this period took place on a bilateral or multilateral basis
within the EC. Impatience with the obstinacy of smaller EC
member states and with the time needed to build a consensus in
EPC encouraged the three large member states to use other
channels to coordinate their positions. France, West Germany,
and the UK consulted with each other frequently, outside the
EPC framework. The four-power Berlin Group allowed the three
EC member states to discuss contentious issues alone with the
US. As William Wallace points out, however, EC member states
still managed to act jointly:
It mattered little, in the immediate aftermath, that
much of the crucial consensus-building between
Paris, London, and Bonn had taken place within a
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smaller caucus. Such behaviour was, after all,
familiar to other areas of European collaboration -
and to political bargaining among similar groups in
general.135
3.3.1 Afghanistan
After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the US
restricted exports to the USSR and imposed a grain embargo;
American allies were then pressed to take similar actions.
The initial EPC response to the invasion is notorious for the
length of time - nearly three weeks - which it took to be
formulated. The different national interpretations of the
Soviet move added to the appearance of an uncoordinated,
confused Community response. No consensus could be
reached on boycotting the summer 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow.
The Council did agree in January 1980 not to make up for the
grain shortfall with its own imports and pledged not to
undercut American sanctions, but also expressed its desire to
maintain 'traditional' trade f lows. 137	The decision
demonstrated that
the Community was united in its reluctance to
endorse an aggressive 'linkage' approach to East-
West relations by the United States, which sought to
make trade and technology transfer conditional upon
changes in Soviet and Eastern European domestic and
foreign
135Wallace 1983a, p. 396.
Wallace 1983a, p. 393. In the 1981 London Report, the
member states attempted to remedy the weaknesses of EPC
exposed by the reaction to the Afghan crisis, notably by
allowing any three member states to call an emergency meeting
within 48 hours.
137Maslen 1983, p. 338. When the US lifted the grain
embargo in April 1981, the Commission declared the Council's
decision to be a "dead letter."
Marsh 1984, pp. 7-8.
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American dismay with the EC member states' response to
the invasion of Afghanistan caused tensions between the NATO
allies; further disagreements then arose over the appropriate
response to the events in Poland.
3.3.2 Poland
After Solidarnosc emerged in Poland in August 1980, the
West feared a repeat of Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Hungary in
1956. 139 Warnings against Soviet intervention in Poland were
coordinated within NATO. 1"0 The European Council also issued
two warnings to the Soviet Union in December 1980 and March
1981. 141 When martial law was declared in December 1981
without Soviet military intervention, the allies were caught
unprepared. The US imposed economic sanctions on both Poland
and the Soviet Union, considered to be responsible for the
crisis, and then put heavy pressure on the West Europeans to
follow suit. CoCom controls were to be tightened. The US
sanctions were also aimed at impeding the construction of a
natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe,
which depended on Western credits and technology. The Reagan
Administration objected to the project, on the grounds that
the West Europeans would be providing sensitive technology to
139The EC responded favorably to Poland's requests for
food aid, to try to help stabilize the economy. The Council
granted food at prices subsidized by the EC budget and member
states then provided credits so Poland could make the
purchase; the action was poorly coordinated, however, and
decisions on credits were delayed. Nuttall 1992, p. 199.
140Miles Kahler, "The United States and Western Europe:
The Diplomatic Consequences of Mr. Reagan", in Kenneth Oye,
Robert Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., Ea gle Defiant:
United States Foreian Policy in the 1980s (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1983), p. 279.
141Nuttall 1992, pp. 199-200.
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the Soviets, who would then control a large percentage of
Western Europe's gas supply. US firms could not supply
equipment for the pipeline; General Electric could not supply
components to its licensees in West Germany, Italy, and
Britain. But the pipeline project continued; a recently
nationalized French firm supplied the components.'
The Community formulated a common response to the
American demands for sanctions. As Peter Marsh noted:
Because the question of economic sanctions was
linked to commercial policy in general, the
Community had a clear mandate to respond on behalf
of its members to the Polish events themselves and
to the economic diplomacy of the Reagan
Administration. Moreover, the member states
undoubtedly found it advantageous to use the
Community framework to develop a common resistance
to American attempts to orchestrate a Western
sanctions policy against Poland and the Soviet
Union, on the grounds that such a policy threatened
the Community's interests in East-West economic
relations.143
In December 1981 and January 1982, EC foreign ministers,
meeting in EPC, called for an end to martial law. At the
January meeting, they agreed to consider taking measures on
credit and economic assistance to Poland and on commercial
policy towards the USSR. No economic sanctions were actually
imposed against Poland, although some EC member states decided
in NATO to limit new credits to Poland and not to reschedule
Poland's official debts.1M The Commission and Council also
decided that remaining shipments of food aid, as well as
emergency medical aid, would be delivered through non-
"2Kahler 1983, p. 293.
43Marsh 1984, p. 8.
11'4Marsh 1984, p. 8.
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governmental organizations."5
Given the absence of Community export control
mechanisms1 , the Council decided, upon a proposal by the
Commission, that the only measure against the USSR which could
be taken would be to restrict Soviet imports. A March 1982
Council regulation reduced the 1982 quotas of 60 Soviet
products by 50% or 25% (amounting to 1.4% of imports)
The regulation was renewed once in December 1982.148
At the March 1982 European Council summit, the heads of
state or government "recognized the role which economic and
commercial contacts and cooperation have played in the
stabilization and the development of East-West relations as a
whole and which they wish to see continue on the basis of a
'45Maslen 1983, p. 339.
14kinder EC rules, exports were not subject to
quantitative restrictions at the EC level, although member
states could restrict exports for reasons of public morality,
public security, and so on. The rules were: Regulation
2603/69 in 03 L 324, 27 December 1969, amended by Regulation
1934/82 in OJ L 211, 20 July 1982.
14TRegu].ation 596/82 in 03 L 72, 16 March 1982. The
regulation contained only a vague reference to the political
reasons behind it ("Whereas the interests of the Community
require that imports from the USSR be reduced"), so it could
be based on Article 113. This is because Greece objected to
the measure, preventing an EPC consensus. Since EC
regulations could be differentiated, Greece could be exempted
from it. Nuttall 1992, pp. 203-204.
148Maslen 1983, pp. 340-341. Denmark's parliament voted
against the renewal because it was a recourse to Article 113
for political purposes; the government suspended its
application in Denmark (and the Commission then initiated
proceedings against Denmark for breaching the CCP). To
counter Denmark's objections, subsequent EC regulations
implementing sanctions refer to 'discussions in the context of
EPC'. This implies that the EPC deliberations are sufficient
grounds for an EC decision. Nuttall 1992, pp. 262-263.
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genuine mutual interest."' 49 Differences with the US over
East-West trade were thus made quite clear.
For the US, the EC's response was inadequate and proof
that EC member states were dangerously dependent on trade with
Eastern Europe. The matter was discussed at the Versailles G-
7 economic summit in early June 1982. Agreement was
supposedly reached on improving export controls on strategic
goods and on limiting export credits to the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. 15° The US then forced the issue: on 18 June,
it extended the December sanctions to all subsidiaries and
licensees of US companies. They were forbidden to export any
oil and gas equipment made with American technology or
components to the Soviet Union. The sanctions directly
affected several West European firms involved in the
construction of the gas pipeline.151
All of the EC member states immediately protested at this
interference in their commercial affairs. In late June, both
the Council of Foreign Ministers and the European Council
objected to the US decision as an illegal extraterritorial
extension of US law. 152 France and the UK ordered their
companies to carry out contracts with the Soviet Union; Italy
149General Secretariat of the Council of the European
Communities, Thirtieth Review of the Council's Work, 1 January
- 31 December 1982, p. 118.
150Kahler 1983, p. 297.
'51julie E. Katzman, "The Euro-Siberian Gas Pipeline Row:
A Study in Community Development", Millennium, vol. 17, no. 1,
Spring 1988, p. 26.
152Maslen 1983, pp. 341-342. The EP also expressed its
concern.
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and West Germany strongly encouraged theirs to do the
same.153
Julie Katzman noted that in the dispute with the US, the
EC member states relied on the Community framework, much more
so than EPC. EPC declarations usually express disapproval;
member states resisted discussing tensions with the US in that
framework as it could send too political a message (there was
Atlantic alliance solidarity to consider as well). The
pipeline dispute involved issues of trade and commerce which
were within the Community's competence, even though they had
political implications, and member states tended to keep
matters with Community implications within the EC.1'
The Community thus became involved in the dispute,
alongside the major EC member states. Rather than treat the
dispute as part of the raging transatlantic controversy over
East-West trade, the Community handled it as an aspect of EC-
US trade relations. 155 The EC's protests to the Americans
centered on the economic, trade, and legal implications of the
US move, not its political ramifications.
The Commission provided the technical reports and helped
to work out common positions on the technical issues. In July
and August, two aide-memoires were sent to the State
'53Katzman 1988, p. 27. As Thatcher points out, the US
decision to resume grain sales to the Soviet Union also
irritated Europe; the US was unwilling to take measures that
would hurt its economy, yet expected the Europeans to make
economic sacrifices. Thatcher 1993, p. 256.
Katzman 1988, pp. 28-31.
155Katzman 1988, pp. 32-33.
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Department listing the arguments against the US sanctions.1
In early November, the Commission took part in the
negotiations with the US, after initial hesitation by some
member states to permit it. Denmark and the Netherlands
called for EC involvement so they could play a role instead of
being dwarfed by a directorate of the major powers. Italy and
West Germany did not want to be in direct conflict with the
US. Similarly, France, technologically dependent on the US,
accepted a mediating role for the EC. After UK Prime Minister
Thatcher failed to win favors for domestic firms, she too
tolerated EC involvement. For the US, the pipeline dispute
was primarily a political one and so the Community should not
become involved; however, when the US saw it would need to
back down, it welcomed the EC as a less confrontational
negotiating partner.157
In November 1982, the US lifted its sanctions, claiming
the allies had agreed on stronger measures regarding trade
with the Soviet Union. This view was immediately rejected by
French President Mitterrand, but in July 1984, CoCom rules
were tightened. 1 A number of studies were also carried out
on aspects of East-West economic relations by the OECD, EC,
International Energy Agency and NATO; generally they concluded
that trade and credit should flow according to market
indicators and that governments should not grant preferential
' 56Maslen 1983, p. 342.
157Katzinan 1988, pp. 32-37.
Nuttall 1992, p. 192.
134
treatment to the state-trading countries.'59
EC sanctions against the Soviet Union were not renewed in
1983, since martial law had been lifted in July 1983 and
political prisoners had been released. Some humanitarian aid
was given to the Polish people, but a scheme to give EC aid to
a foundation set up by the Polish Church fell through when the
Church abandoned the project in 1986 because of the Polish
authorities' opposition.
Transatlantic tensions subsided, although the US remained
wary of close ties between Western and Eastern Europe until
after the 1989 upheavals. It greeted the EC-cMEA talks that
led to mutual recognition in 1988 with caution. The US warned
the EC that the deal would be more economically beneficial to
the MEA than to the EC and that it would cause a rift between
the EC and the US.16'
The disputes over the Polish crisis and the pipeline
accelerated the formulation of a distinct EC position on
economic relations in Europe: they "appeared to reaffirm the
predominance of commercial criteria in the Community's
approach to East-West economic relations." The EC member
states banded together to counter the US emphasis on the link
between trade and military security and to protect their
interests in East-West trade. In doing so, they contributed
to the Community's development: "A classic example of an
'59Maslen 1983, p. 343.
160Nuttall 1992, pp. 205-206.
161Robert J. McCartney, "W. Europe Considers Formal Trade
Ties with Soviet Bloc", The Washinaton Post, 5 August 1987.
Marsh 1984, p. 10.
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external threat promoting internal solidarity, the pipeline
row served, in the final analysis, to strengthen the Community
and to increase the credibility of the Commission.""3
Stephen George uses a world systems approach to explain
why the Community was able to reach a common position on East-
West trade, contrasting with the US stance (see chapter 2).
Economic relations with Eastern Europe were much more
important to Western Europe than they were to the US. The
capitalist, wealthy West European countries in the "core" had
to maintain their markets in Eastern Europe and guarantee
their supplies of raw materials in particular, even if it
meant clashing with the US." This approach does seem to
fit, but not completely. There were other concerns: economic
relations were considered important to pry open the regimes
and hopefully engender liberalization.
CONCLUS ION
By 1988, the Community was playing a larger role in
Eastern Europe. But the gamut of instruments available to the
Community was incomplete, some still being held by member
states, and that this limited what the EC could do in the
region. The EC could not have pursued an ambitious, proactive
policy in Eastern Europe anyway - not only would member states
have objected to the preempting of their own prerogatives, but
Cold War realities impeded such an independent move on the
part of the Community. As the Cold War ended, it was not
clear that the member states would agree to an active common
1'3Katzman 1988, p. 39.
"'George 1991, pp. 63-64.
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policy towards Eastern Europe.
The member states had, however, clarified their common
interests in maintaining political and economic ties with
Eastern Europe, especially in times of tension between the
superpowers, and had increasingly asserted those interests.
They had agreed that such ties (particularly trade) were
important for engendering liberalization and encouraging
independence from Moscow. CSCE principles later formed the
basis of conditionality in the policy towards Eastern Europe,
which in turn was based on the specificity of relations with
the separate MEA states. The member states had recognized
(albeit reluctantly) that functional spillover meant that
collaboration between the separate policy-making mechanisms
(in external economic relations and foreign policy) had to
occur. The Community had established its jurisdiction over
trade policy, and the East European states had already turned
to it for trade concessions. EC trade agreements (with
Romania and Yugoslavia) had been used to reward independence
in foreign policy. With the EC-cMEA agreement, the Commission
was in a prime position to increase its involvement in
relations with Eastern Europe, as it negotiated trade and
cooperation agreements with the separate MEA members. By
1988, then, the Community had established a legacy - albeit
limited - of cooperation on relations with Eastern Europe and
had set precedents which could be expanded upon as communism
collapsed.
CHAPTER 4
THE COMXUNITY'S POLICY: TRADE AGREEI(PWTS AND AID
With the end of the Cold War, the Community became the
leading organization in Europe. The collapse of communism
coincided with a very dynamic period in the Community's
history, and the East European countries naturally looked to
it for help. The Community possessed the appropriate
instruments to match the East European states' priorities of
economic restructuring, trade with the West, and inclusion in
'Europe'. Aware that they could not deal with the momentous
developments in Eastern Europe alone, the member states were
willing to let the Community take the lead. One observer
noted: "the enormity and immediacy of the problems in the East
has meant that there has been few of the hesitations, second
thoughts and indecision that often marks the European
Community's relations with its other neighbours."'
In 1988-1989, the Community developed a common policy
towards Eastern Europe, based on the principle of
conditionality. It began to use its economic leverage to back
up the long-standing importance it had placed on fulfillment
of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act, especially the human rights
provisions. Conditionality seems to be a reverse of the
Community's position during the Cold War, when trade with
communist Europe was seen as a way to stabilize political
relations: trade could be used as a "carrot", but the
Community hesitated before using it as a "stick".
'David Buchan, Europe: The Strange Suerower (Aldershot:
Dartmouth, 1993), p. 96.
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At the end of the Cold War, the Community modified its
stance. Manifesting a new-found confidence and assertiveness,
the Community used its economic power to support economic and
political reforms in Eastern Europe. By making trade
concessions and aid conditional on progress towards democracy
and capitalism, the Community hoped to encourage reforms. The
success of the reforms was considered crucial for ensuring
long-term stability and security in Europe, in the belief that
capitalist, free-trading, democratic countries make better
neighbors because they do not pose a threat to security.
Conditionality would also allow the Community to cut of f
relations with East European countries if they backtracked and
reinstated Communist or authoritarian regimes.2
In the first section of this chapter, the development of
a general framework for relations with Eastern Europe will be
traced. The framework, with objectives and principles for the
Community's policy towards Eastern Europe, was basically
agreed by the member states by mid-1989. The next two
sections will discuss two policy instruments which the
Community initially used to support reform in Eastern Europe.
In section 4.2, the trade and cooperation agreements will be
discussed. After the conclusion of the EEC-cMEA Joint
Declaration, the Community concluded agreements with the
separate MEA members, as they implemented reforms. The trade
and cooperation agreements became the first stage in the EC's
relations with East European countries; in "pre-revolutionary"
1988-1989, however, they were really the EC's only policy
2This point was made by a Commission official,
interviewed on 22 June 1994.
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instruments. The Community was applying the principle of
conditionality in 1988 and early 1989, but the principle was
not fully articulated first - either in EPC or in the General
Affairs Council.
By mid-1989, it was clear that Poland and Hungary were
serious about reforming. Reflecting this, aid became a policy
instrument in the West's approach to Eastern Europe. At the
same time, the Community was "catapulted" into a leadership
role in Europe. 3 As communism then collapsed in one country
after another, the Community led the West's aid initiatives in
Eastern Europe. The Commission has been coordinating the G-
24's aid program (section 4 • 3.1). The Community also set up
its own aid program, PHARE (section 4.3.2), extended loans
(section 4.3.3), and helped establish the European Bank forj
Reconstruction and Development, or EBRD (section 4.3.4).
4.1 TOWARDS A COMMUNITY OSTPOLITIX
The new climate of international relations in the late
1980s was clearly more conducive to the exercise of 'civilian'
leadership. The fast-approaching end of the Cold War freed the
Community and its member states of the limitations imposed by
the highly politicized and militarized bipolar confrontation:
the Community could - and was increasingly expected to - play
a substantial, active role in fostering East-West cooperation.
The EC, as a rich trading bloc, had always exerted an enormous
pull on the East European countries. The EC's dynamism in the
late 1980s - with the drive to complete the single European
market, plans for an economic and monetary union, and southern
3See Pelkmans and Murphy 1991, "Catapulted into
Leadership".
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enlargement - increased its magnetism even further.
Logically, the reforming governments in Eastern Europe turned
to the Community for trade concessions, financial help, and
assistance with economic and political reforms.
Belgium and the Commission were the first to push for a
common, consistent policy on Eastern Europe. Belgium,
traditionally a strong proponent of "Communautaire" policies,
advocated a Community stance on East-West relations. 4 Belgian
Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans called on the Community to
comply fully with Title III of the SEA: member states should
try to act jointly; they should avoid impairing Community
cohesiveness; and EC and EPC policies should be consistent.5
The Commission, now much more involved in relations with
Eastern Europe as it negotiated trade agreements with MEA
members, was eager for the Community to take on a more
prominent role.
The Belgians were particularly alarmed by the
proliferation of national initiatives towards the Soviet
Union: several member states visited Moscow in the fall of
1988, to strengthen industrial, trade and financial
cooperation and offer credits to the Soviet Union.' The
smaller states feared that the large member states would
4Belgium has long been concerned that a directorate of
the large member states could dominate policy-making, and has
therefore supported a stronger role for the Community, and
particularly for the Commission (considered the promoter of
the general interest). See Christian Franck, "Belgium:
Committed Multilateralism", in Hill, ed. 1983, pp. 86-87.
1989.
5See, for example, Aaence Europe no. 4948, 4 February
6Acience Europe no. 4957, 17 February 1989.
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forego Community solidarity in favor of their own policies.
In the single month of October, the United Kingdom, West
Germany, France and Italy had approved or signed commercial
loan packages of £1 billion, £940 million, £300 million, and
£400 million respectively, to the Soviet Union. 7 Schmitter's
negative externalization hypothesis seemed to be coming true:
the large member states were reacting to the new opportunities
by trying to secure benefits for themselves, using policy
instruments they had refused to let the EC control.
On 18 July 1988, the EC foreign ministers decided that
their October Gymnich meeting would be devoted to a reflection
on the future of relations with Eastern Europe and the
formulation of a coherent reaction to the changes in Eastern
Europe. 8 At the Gymnich meeting, they asked for two documents
to be submitted to the Rhodes European Council on 2 and 3
December 1988. The first, to be drafted by the Political
Directors and the EPC Secretariat, would be a general document
on the political guidelines that the Community should follow
in relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The
Commission would draft the second, on economic relations with
the East European states. These requests appear to be an
attempt to ensure consistency in EC and EPC policies.
The October Gymnich meeting, however, also exposed
TDavid Usborne, "EC must act together on East Europe,
says Debra", The Independent, 17 November 1988. Apparently,
Gorbachev's Soviet Union was a more attractive investment
opportunity than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Government-
backed loans to East European states were not much of an
issue; East European states were also either not reforming or
burdened by debt.
8Agence Europe no. 4827, 18/19 July 1988.
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divisions over Community relations with Eastern Europe. At
this point, developments in Eastern Europe depended on the
success of Gorbachev's reforms, and the divisions reflected
optimism or pessimism about that prospect. One group,
including the UK and Portugal, considered the developments in
the Soviet bloc to be positive, but wanted to wait and see how
Gorbachev's reforms turned out. UK Foreign Secretary Sir
Geoffrey Howe warned, "Recent developments in Moscow are not
at all irreversible."9 West Germany and Italy led the other
group, arguing that the Community should not wait to support
Gorbachev. Uncertainty about the course of developments
impeded a common analysis of them.
In a speech before the EP on 16 November 1988, Commission
President Jacques Delors called for a united EC approach to
Eastern Europe. He wanted the Rhodes European Council to
agree on a common analysis of East-West relations and on the
role to be played by the Community. He also pressed the
member states to agree to common rules on export credits, to
stem competition over trade credits to the Soviet Union.10
Before the Rhodes summit, Delors called on the Twelve to speak
with one voice regarding relations with Eastern Europe. The
Commission needed an idea of the framework within which the
EC's economic relations with the East should develop."
9Andriana Ierodiaconou, "Foreign Ministers Split Over
Response to East Bloc Reform", The Financial Times, 17 October
1988.
10Usborne, "EC Must Act Together on East Europe".
11Agence Europe no. 4902, 28/29 November 1988. The
Community was concluding trade and cooperation agreements with
the fastest reformers (Hungary and Poland, at that stage);
this was conditionality applied in practice, but the principle
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Delors and the Belgian government in particular wanted
the European Council to adopt a separate declaration on East-
West relations. 12 In the end, the European Council only
included a paragraph on East-West relations in its statement
on the Community's international role. As Simon Nuttall
noted, "no more prescient than others, the Heads of State and
Government had not yet realized the changes in store and the
need for a fresh policy..."13
The statement on the Community's international role was
aimed primarily at reassuring third countries that the single
European market would not create a "Fortress Europe". It
acknowledged that economic and security policies are
inseparable, especially in Europe, and that the external
policies of the EC and EPC should be closely linked. 14 The
leaders welcomed the development of relations with the CMEA
members, and vowed to achieve full respect for the Helsinki
Final Act. They would develop a political dialogue with their
East European neighbors. "The European Council reaffirms its
determination to act with renewed hope to overcome the
division of our continent and to promote the Western values
and principles which Member States have in common."15
had not yet been articulated.
2Actence EuroDe no. 4903, 30 November 1988.
Nuttall 1992, P. 275.
14The statement was finalized in joint meetings of the
Political Directors and the Permanent Representatives, an
example of EPC-EC collaboration. Nuttall 1992, p. 275.
15Document no. 88/490, 3 December 1988, EPC Documentation
Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 2, 1988. Initial contacts for bilateral
political dialogue with the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary
were made in 1989. Nuttall 1992, p. 276 and p. 292.
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The two documents on economic and political relations
prepared for the Rhodes summit, however, remained on the
table, to the dismay of the Commission and Tindemans. 16 On
17 January 1989, Delors told the EP that at the Rhodes summit
he had
expressed his personal regret that political co-
operation was making less headway than economic co-
operation and that the Twelve were reluctant to
agree on common positions or to take joint
initiatives in the East-West dialogue.'7
Tindemans urged his colleagues to discuss the formulation of
a coherent general EC policy on relations with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe at the 20 February 1989 meeting of
the General Affairs Council. Belgium wanted the EC to define
common orientations to guide the member states' national
policies towards Eastern Europe.'8
The debate at the General Affairs Council, however, did
not satisfy either Belgium or the Commission. The Council
could only agree that coordination of economic and political
relations with Eastern Europe was desirable. The UK and
France were reluctant to establish Community procedures that
could limit their freedom of action in the region; other
16The Commission's document urged the EC to respond
positively, coherently, and efficiently to the economic
reforms in Eastern Europe because it would help consolidate
the reforms and would be in the EC's best interests. The EC
would also thereby have an instrument to make the East
European states respect CSCE commitments. The Twelve should
outline a global position on relations with Eastern Europe and
take a number of concrete measures, including harmonizing
export aid policy and using the consultation procedure for
national cooperation agreements. Aaence Europe no. 4957, 17
February 1989.
"Jacques Delors, "Statement on the Broad Lines of
Commission Policy" in EC Bulletin Sut plement 1/89, p. 12.
18Acience Europe no. 4948, 4 February 1989.
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member states hesitated to support Belgium and the
Commission. 19 The Council did approve the Commission's
mandate for negotiating trade and cooperation agreements with
Poland and Bulgaria, a measure loaded with political
significance (see section 4.2.2).
By spring 1989, however, the pace of events in Eastern
Europe was influencing the member states' attitudes towards
cooperation on a common policy. In Poland, the Round Table
talks were initiated and concluded; Solidarity was legalized;
and open, multiparty legislative elections were to be held in
June. In Hungary, laws allowing the freedom of association
and the formation of independent political parties were
approved in January and February 1989; in May, the government
began dismantling the barbed-wire fence on the Austrian
border. These were NrefolutionsN, in Timothy Garton Ash's
words: a mixture of reform led from above, and popular
pressure from below20 ; though the revolutions were yet to
come, the changes were still remarkable in context.
After a Gymnich meeting in mid-April, the Spanish foreign
minister and Council president, Francisco Fernandes Ordofiez,
said that the Twelve would adopt a 'common strategy' in their
relations with Eastern Europe. Delors welcomed the debate as
the start of deeper reflection on the issue.21
At the General Affairs Council meeting on 24 April, a
19Agence Europe no. 4960, 22 February 1989.
20Timothy Garton Ash, The Manic Lantern: The Revolution
of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw. Budapest. Berlin and Praaue (New
York: Random House, 1990), p. 14.
21Agence Europe no. 4997, 17/18 April 1989.
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significant step towards a common policy was taken. The
Council largely agreed to proposals put forward by Belgium and
the Commission. It emphasized the need to follow a more
comprehensive, consistent and dynamic approach to Eastern
Europe. It insisted on the necessary coherence of the various
Community actions and indicated that it would be up to the
General Affairs Council to guarantee that coherence.
Coherence must be assured at two levels. First, cooperation
between the Community and Eastern Europe must complement that
of member states. Better coordination between these policies
was needed, and the Commission was to prepare a report on
this. Second, greater consistency must also be established
between Community and EPC policies. Communication between the
EC and EPC should be improved and intensified, and both should
adopt, under the responsibility of the Commission and the
Presidency, a summary document indicating the initiatives
taken at both levels.
Thus after months of quibbling, the Council had finally
agreed that there should be a consistent policy towards
Eastern Europe. According to one journalist,
rapid political developments have evidently
persuaded countries such as the UK and France of the
need for better co-ordination, even if that means
some Commission encroachment into the area of East-
West political relations that member states have so
far jealously guarded for themselves.
_EuroDe no. 5002, 24/25 April 1989 and EC Bulletin
no. 4, 1989, pt. 2.2.11. Although Belgium and the Commission
had also called for Community coordination of export credit
policy, the Council only reiterated the importance of
transparency regarding export credits to East European
countries; no further action was taken.
David Buchan, "EC Moves to Coordinate Policy on Eastern
Europe", The Financial Times, 25 April 1989.
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Consistency between EC and EPC policies could be achieved
by applying the principle of conditionality, although this was
not yet articulated clearly, in either or the Council. Yet,
with respect to the Community's economic relations with East
European countries, conditionality had been applied since the
EC-CMEA agreement was signed (in June 1988). The opening of
negotiations for, and the specific provisions of, the trade
and cooperation agreements depended on the fulfillment of
economic and political criteria, namely, the implementation of
free market reforms and democratization. on 24 April,
however, the Council only reaffirmed that agreements with the
East European states were to be differentiated according to
each state's specific characteristics. Not mentioned in the
Council's conclusions was that the "specificity" of agreements
allows the principle of conditionality to be applied. 2' But
conditionality was applied: at the same meeting, the Council
suspended negotiations with Romania because of its internal
political repression, and called for the rapid conclusion of
a generous trade and cooperation agreement with Poland
(section 4.2.2). Conditionality would eventually become much
more explicit.
Coreper and the Political Committee jointly prepared a
report on the Community's economic and political relations
with Eastern Europe for the European Council summit, held in
Madrid, 26 and 27 June 1989.	 At the summit, the 12 leaders
26At this point, an explicit statement of conditionality
might have appeared too similar to the US policy of
"differentiation" (see chapter 3).
Aence Europe no. 5044, 26/27 June 1989.
148
"reaffirmed the full validity of the comprehensive approach
integrating political, economic and cooperation aspects which
the European Community and its Member States follow in their
relations with the USSR and with Central and Eastern European
countries." They regretted the violations of human rights
still occurring in some East European countries. They
"reaffirmed the determination of the Community and its Member
States to play an active role in supporting and encouraging
positive changes and ref orm."26
A few days later, at the summit of the leaders of the
seven most advanced industrial countries (plus the EC
Commission), held in Paris 14-16 July, the Community emerged
as the leading actor in the West's relations with the
reforming Eastern Europe. The G-7 agreed to work together,
along with other countries and international institutions, to
support the reforms in Poland and Hungary. To manage this
undertaking, they asked the Commission "to take the necessary
initiatives in agreement with the other Member States of the
Community, and to associate, besides the Summit participants,
all interested countries."27
The G-7 decision is significant in several respects.
Firstly, it signalled a change in the West's attitude towards
the reforming East European countries. Aid was now considered
an appropriate instrument of policy towards Eastern Europe
Document no. 89/178 in EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol.
5, no. 1, 1989.
27"Political Declaration concerning East-West relations,
released at the Paris meeting of industrialized countries,
held on 14 to 16 July 1989", Document no. 89/184, EPC
Documentation Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 2, 1989.
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because the magnitude of developments was becoming clearer:
Poland and Hungary were serious about reforming and needed the
West's help. Jeanne Kirk Laux maintains that the West's
policy towards Eastern Europe from then on had three aims:
reform, reintegration, and regional security. Economic
assistance was intended to facilitate reforms; reforms would
help reintegrate each country into the world economy; and this
would help create a new European regional security order.
Secondly, the EC was considered to have a special
responsibility for its East European neighbors:
The practical demonstration of the relevance of the
Community to the reconstruction of Europe as a whole
facilitated the emergence of a consensus inside the
Community, and indeed outside it, that the EC as
such was ideally placed to become a cornerstone of
the new European construction.
The Community was expected, by its member states and by
outsiders, to lead in the region.
Thirdly, the Commission had been thrust into a highly
visible leadership role, not only by third states, but also by
the four largest EC member states; undoubtedly, this would
have implications for the Community, both for external policy
and for internal developments. At the end of 1989, a
Commission spokesman argued that the G-7 mandate had boosted
Jeanne Kirk Laux, Reform. Reintecirat jon and Reciional
Insecurity in Central and Eastern EuroDe, Working Paper no.
37, Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and
Security, 1991, p. 5.
Peter Ludlow, "The Politics and Policies of the European
Community in 1989", in Centre for European Policy Studies,
Annual Review of European Community Affairs 1990 (London:
Brassey's, 1990), p. XLVII.
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the Commission's role in formulating foreign policy.30
After the G-7 summit, history "accelerated"; in the fall
of 1989, the communist regimes crumbled under the weight of
people power. No one anticipated these extraordinary events,
but the Community was well-placed to try to respond to them,
having already assumed a leadership role in helping the
reformist regimes. The Community's principles (specificity,
conditionality) and objectives (support for reform) basically
remained the same, but further initiatives were launched to
try to match the momentous challenges arising from the
revolutions in Eastern Europe.
Immediate help was needed with economic reforms (although
by making assistance conditional on political reform, the
Community hoped to foster democratization as well). Many of
the policy instruments used to support economic reforms (aid,
trade concessions) were either already under EC jurisdiction
or had been wielded at the EC level in other circumstances.
In a sense, then, the Community was relying on "standard
operating procedures", but at a much faster speed than usual
and in a region where previously its role had been limited.
As discussed in section 4.3, however, the Community also
extended its jurisdiction and designed new initiatives.
The Community generated initiatives for Community and
Western action to boost the reform process (see sections 4.2.3
and 4 • 3 in particular). The member states agreed that the
Community should lead; collective action would be far more
effective than separate national responses to the events in
30Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, "Aid for Poland and Hungary,
First Assessment", European Affairs, no. 4, 1989, p. 26-27.
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Eastern Europe (the "politics of scale" 31 ). As will be
discussed further in chapter 7, all of the member states
strongly supported collective action: Germany because it
could not act alone in Eastern Europe (for primarily political
reasons); France because an active Community OstDolitik would
balance a potentially dominating German role in Eastern
Europe; Italy and the UK partly because of the "politics of
scale", the smaller member states even more so. Pelkmans and
Murphy argue that thus the "EC overcame its handicap of being
constrained in taking foreign policy initiatives. The
existence of a strong political consensus amongst the member
states enabled it to act quickly and effectively."32
In the buzz of activity, the Commission played a crucial
role. Nuttall notes: "Everything had to be done by everybody,
all at once. The intrinsically economic nature of the problem
gave the lead role to the Commission, which did not muff its
lines, and was backed up in its rapid and integrated action by
the Member States."33
The line between EPC and EC was fading quickly, under the
pressure of events. In November 1989, Delors reiterated that
relations with Eastern Europe could not be artificially
separated into economic and political spheres.M As Francoise
de La Serre contends:
En effet, s'il était possible, dans un passé recent,
de séparer dans l'Ostpolitik des Douze, les aspects
31Ginsberg's phrase (1989).
32Pelkmans and Murphy 1991, p. 150.
Nuttall 1992, pp. 280-281.
34Agence Eurote no. 5141, 29 November 1989.
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"cooperation politique" des aspects proprement
communautaires, l'accêlération des événements en
Europe Centrale et orientale a rapidement remis en
question cette distinction entre les deux piliers de
l'Union européenne formalisés par l'Acte unique.35
EPC and EC business was coordinated in a new procedure.
The chairs of the relevant working groups of EPC and the
Council attended each other's groups meetings. Closer
coordination was evident higher up as well. On 19 September,
External Relations Commissioner Frans Andriessen and French
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas visited Warsaw to discuss the
changes in Poland and sign the trade and cooperation
agreement. 37 From 16 to 18 November, Delors and Duinas visited
Warsaw and Budapest to survey the economic and political
situation there.	 The extent of EC-EPC collaboration
highlights the "uniqueness" of the Community's policy towards
35de La Serre 199lb, p. 593.
Nuttall 1992, p. 277. After Maastricht, the working
groups were merged.
3TEC Bulletin no. 9, 1989, pt. 2.2.10 and 2.2.11.
EC Bulletin no. 11, 1989, pt. 2.2.19. Immediately after
the violent fall of the Ceausescu regime in December 1989, the
Commission and the French Presidency sent a delegation to
Romania to assess the country's recovery needs. Aence Europe
no. 5162, 29 December 1989. Such impromptu Presidency-
Commission joint visits were the product of cooperation
between the French presidency and the Commission; they were
not repeated, although the Commission and the Presidency,
troika, or Council have met formally with ministers and
leaders from the East European countries on numerous
occasions, particularly in the context of political dialogue
(see chapter 5). The French Presidency-Commission tandem
probably reflects France's desire to ensure that the Community
(and France) played a highly visible role in Eastern Europe to
balance Germany's potential dominance there; collaboration
with the Commission was also a way of keeping the Commission
in check.
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Eastern Europe in the pre-Maastricht Treaty era. 39 It also
reflects the pressing need for 'everyone to act all at once'.
On 9 November, perhaps the most symbolic event of the
revolutions of 1989 occurred: the Berlin Wall fell. France,
as EC President, then called a special European Council summit
in Paris on 18 November 1989 to discuss the EC's stance on the
developments in Eastern Europe. The leaders only discussed
the EC's relations with Eastern Europe, not East Germany.'°
The events in East Germany, however, certainly rammed home the
magnitude of the changes in Eastern Europe. The Community
summit convened a couple of weeks before the Bush-Gorbachev
summit of f the coast of Malta, and was thus the first high-
level exchange of views on events in Eastern Europe."
The EC Bulletin noted that the 12 leaders "were struck by
the convergence of views and the shared concern that there
should be a joint reaction from the Twelve."'2 The summit
represented an important step in the Community's development:
political cooperation and Community activities were
integrated, and guidelines for Community action were drawn up
on the basis of a common analysis. The leaders wanted to
39Simon Nuttall argues that the East European policy is
a "unique case", in the way the EC and EPC worked together on
it. Nuttall 1992, pp. 274-281. Françoise de La Serre
considers another indication of the Commission's growing role
in EPC to be the more frequent usage of "the Community and its
member states" in declarations on Eastern Europe (de La Serre
1991, p. 595).
'0German unification will be discussed in section 5.1.1.
'1As urged by former French president Valery Giscard
d'Estaing. Ian Davidson, Tim Dickson, and Leslie Colitt, "EC
to Discuss East Europe", The Financial Times, 14 November
1989.
'2EC Bulletin no. 11, 1989, pt. 2.2.15.
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encourage democratic change, and respond to East European
requests for a more open EC market. The European Council gave
high-level political backing to the Community's initiatives,
endorsing a number of French and Commission proposals to aid
Eastern Europe, including a loan to Hungary, two training
programs, and the EBRD.
The regular European Council summit, held in Strasbourg
on 8 and 9 December 1989, was primarily devoted to a
discussion of the Community's internal development, namely
Economic and Monetary Union. The summit adopted two texts on
Eastern Europe, one from EPC on the broad political framework,
and the other from the EC on concrete activities. The two
documents were consistent in substance, but had not been
prepared by a joint drafting body, as had happened at the
Rhodes summit." In the "EC" document, the leaders reflected
on the Community's role in Europe:
The Community's dynamism and influence make it the
European entity to which the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe now refer, seeking to establish
close links. The Community has taken and will take
the necessary decision to strengthen its cooperation
with peoples aspiring to freedom, democracy and
progress and with States which intend their founding
principles to be democracy, pluralism and the rule
of law.65
Strengthening cooperation also entailed association (see
chapter 5); already in the fall of 1989, the Community had
""Statement Concerning the Events in Central and Eastern
Europe", 22 November 1989, Document no. 89/301, EPC
Documentation Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 2, 1989.
"Nuttall 1992, p. 278. The European Council also
approved a statement on German unification (see section
5.1.2).
45EC Bulletin no. 12, 1989, pt. 1.1.14.
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begun to consider a longer-term strategy to support the
transformation in Eastern Europe.
In the "EPC" document, the Twelve declared that the
Community was "fully conscious of the common responsibility
which devolves on them in this decisive phase in the history
of Europe."46 They called for closer political relations with
the Soviet Union and East European states, in so far as they
were committed to reform. They hoped that the division of
Europe would be overcome "in accordance with the aims of the
Helsinki Final Act...." Cooperation with the Community was
thus emphatically linked to the democratization of its
aspiring partners. 47 A common, consistent policy directed at
the fulfillment of specific objectives had emerged.
In the rest of this chapter, two policy instruments will
be examined: the trade and cooperation agreements, which have
been supplanted by association agreements since 1991, and the
aid measures, which have been adjusted as the Community's
objectives have evolved and with changing circumstances in
Eastern Europe. The Commission has played a highly visible
role in implementing the Community's policy, and the East
European countries have responded to this (thus reinforcing
the Commission's position even further). Virtually every
month, an East European president, prime minister, or foreign
minister has visited the Commission to discuss relations
46"Statement Concerning Central and Eastern Europe",
Document no. 89/314, EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol. 5, no.
2, 1989.
'7conditionality was made even more explicit in February
1990, with respect to financial assistance (see section
4.3.1).
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(economic and political) with the Community; Commissioners
have also frequently visited Eastern Europe to hold talks with
leaders.	 As discussed below, the member states have not
been entirely comfortable with the Commission's role.
4 • 2 TRADE AND COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
From the signing of the Joint Declaration through
November 1989, the EC and the CYP met three times, to discuss
cooperation. By the fall of 1989, the MEA had identif led
several areas for cooperation, including environment, energy,
transport, and technology. 49 The EC, however, felt that
cooperation could take place in more appropriate, pan-European
fora, such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe.5°
EC-cMEA negotiations had proceeded slowly: the Commission
wanted to ensure that the agreements with the separate MEA
members were concluded first. 51 The Community was certainly
not enthusiastic about cooperating with such a Cold War relic,
nor did the East European countries encourage it. The
Commission noted in January 1990 that the East European states
"look to the Community to take a prudent position, avoiding
action which might reinforce outmoded structures while
'Commission officials visiting Eastern Europe have often
been treated as though they represented a state. Interview
with DG IA official, 12 March 1996.
49Acience EuroDe no. 5112, 16/17 November 1989.
50A CSCE conference on economic cooperation was also held
in Bonn in March and April 1990, which set out guidelines for
cooperation between CSCE members in areas such as industry,
environment, and energy. See Dominic McGoldrick, "A New
International Economic Order for Europe?", Yearbook of
European Law, no. 12, 1992, pp. 441-444.
51Aczence Eurooe no. 5129, 10 November 1989.
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strengthening bilateral links with Comecon members."52
By late 1989, EC-eMEA relations were lost in the
Community's intense activity to aid the separate MEA members.
Even before the CMEA was formally dissolved on 28 June 1991,
the sticky problem of bloc-to-bloc cooperation had been
overcome by basically ignoring it. The cMEA's demise,
however, meant that the former Comecon 'partners' were no
longer linked in an institutional framework. This had
economic implications, as the East European states had to
divert the direction of their trade, and potential political
implications. The Community began to encourage the East
European states to cooperate and form a free trade area (see
chapter 6).
From June 1988 to July 1989, the EC was primarily
concerned with expanding trade and cooperation with the
separate MEA members. The General Affairs Council on 25 July
1988 "confirmed the importance the Community attaches to
developing these relations on the basis of a pragmatic and
flexible approach, taking account of the special features of
each individual case..." 53 Member states ruled out granting
aid to Eastern Europe; in October 1988, Sir Geoffrey Howe said
the Community agreed on "credits, yes; charity, no". 5' To a
great extent, this was because reforms had not progressed far
52Cominunication from the Commission to the Council:
Implications of Recent Chanoes in Central and Eastern Europe
for the Community's Relations with the Countries Concerned,
SEC (90) 111 final, 23 January 1990, p. 3.
53External Relations Information 1/89, p. 4.
54David Usborne, "Howe Moves to Head Of f EC Split",
Independent, 25 October 1988.
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enough to assuage concerns about the security implications of
aiding Warsaw Pact members. Yet at the same time member
states were competing to provide export credits to the Soviet
Union, and had their own cooperation agreements with East
European states. Member states' reluctance to permit greater
EC involvement at this stage also indicates lingering
resistance to any infringement by the EC on their prerogatives
in relations with Eastern Europe.
The Community hoped that closer trading relations with
East European states would not only create opportunities for
EC business, but also contribute to overall security (the
classic liberal position). As German Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher noted, "(e]conoinic cooperation creates
trust, common interests and stability. "
The trade and cooperation agreements are significant in
several respects. Firstly, in negotiating these agreements,
the Community developed the conditionality principle. During
the Cold War, the West Europeans had disagreed with the
assertive US policy linking political conditions with trade
and closer relations. Until 1988, specificity did not entail
conditionality; the opening of exploratory talks with the MEA
member states in the mid-1980s had not been made conditional
on political reform. In 1988, however, the sense that things
were changing in some MEA states (notably the Soviet Union)
and the Community's growing assertiveness seem to have led the
Community to use conditionality to encourage reform. If a
55"Statement on the Period of the German Presidency -
Abstracts", 16 June 1988, Document no. 88/168, EPC
Documentation Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 1, 1988.
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country contravened CSCE human rights provisions, the EC would
withhold the prospect of a trade and cooperation agreement.
Countries that were further ahead in the reform process would
be accorded more beneficial treatment. Only at the end of
1989, however, was the conditionality principle articulated,
although it clearly lay behind the EC's "philosophy" before
then. In 1988-1989 the EC was leading and developing a policy
towards Eastern Europe without any explicit political
direction from EPC.
Secondly, the agreements represent an extension of the
EC's competences in an area where the member states had
previously tried to limit the Community's actions. As
discussed in chapter 3, the member states had restricted the
EC's competence to negotiating trade provisions with East
European countries, while they concluded far-reaching
"economic cooperation" agreements which promoted their
industries and firms. They would not even allow EC
coordination of these cooperation agreements. In the late
1980s, however, the member states allowed the EC to conclude
cooperation agreements with the XEA members.
Thirdly, the member states agreed, at first reluctantly,
to eliminate eventually their national quantitative
restrictions (QR8) on East European imports. Even before
autumn 1989 (when all restrictions were lifted immediately),
they had agreed to drop their restrictions in stages.
In section 4.2.1 below, the general features of the trade
and cooperation agreements will be outlined; in section 4.2.2,
the separate negotiations on the agreements, will be discussed
to illustrate the application of the conditionality principle.
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Section 4.2.3 will cover the extraordinary measures that the
Community took, from the fall of 1989, to improve market
access for the reforming East European countries, even as the
agreements were being negotiated.
4.2.1 Provisions of th. Agr.em.nts
Between 1988 and 1991, the Community negotiated and
concluded agreements with Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, the GDR56 , and Roniania. 57 Table 4.1 summarizes
some of the salient features of the agreements.
The agreements do not cover coal and steel products,
textiles, and certain agricultural products, which are covered
by sectoral voluntary restraint agreements. They all provide
for reciprocal MFN treatment. The agreements contain a
territorial clause, the object of so much controversy during
the negotiations on the EEC-MEA declaration.
The agreements altered the EC's "autonomous policy" (see
section 3.1.1), the "EC label" applied to the member states'
specific quantitative restrictions on East European imports.58
5 e1ations with the GDR will be discussed in section 5.1.
57A ten-year trade and cooperation agreement was signed
with the Soviet Union on 18 December 1989; it entered into
force on 1 April 1990 (OJ L 68, 15 March 1990). All EC
quantitative restrictions were to be eliminated by 31 December
1995. Trade and cooperation agreements - the first stage in
relations with the Community - were later concluded with other
East European countries as they implemented reforms: an
agreement with Albania entered into force on 1 December 1992
(OJ L 343, 25 November 1992); agreements with Latvia and
Lithuania entered into force on 1 February 1993, and with
Estonia on 1 March 1993 (OJ L 403, 31 December 1992); and an
agreement with Slovenia entered into force on 1 September 1993
(OJ L 189, 29 July 1993).
Specific quantitative restrictions apply only to goods
originating from particular countries. Regulation no. 3420/83
(OJ L 346, 8 December 1983) listed the products from state-
trading countries that were subject to QRs in one or more
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TABLE 4.1
Trad. and coopsration agr..ments, 1988-1991
date	 date of duration deadline 	 OJ
signed	 entry	 for	 refer.
into	 removal of
__________	 force	 __________ QRs	 __________
Hungary 26/9/88 1/12/88 10 years 31/12/95 	 L327
__________ __________ __________ __________ ____________ 30/11/ 88
Poland	 19/9/89	 1/12/89	 5 years	 31/12/94	 L339
__________ __________ __________ __________ ____________ 22/11/89
Czecho- 7/5/90	 1/11/90	 10 years 31/12/94	 L291
slovakia_________ _________ _________ ____________ 23/10/90
Bulgaria 8/5/90	 1/11/90 10 years 31/12/95	 L291
__________ __________ __________ __________ _____________ 23/10/90
GDR	 8/5/90	 ---	 10 years 31/12/95	 __________
Romania 22/10/90 1/5/91 	 10 years 31/12/95	 L79
__________ __________ __________ __________ _____________ 26/3/91
Sources: EC Bulletin and Official Journal
The EC maintained more specific quantitative restrictions on
goods from state-trading countries than on those from other
countries. Although only 3-5% of EC-East European trade was
affected, the restrictions covered goods that are significant
for the East European economies such as textiles, glassware,
footwear, chemical products, and certain agricultural goods.
Many quotas went unfilled, however, prompting the Commission
member states. Regulation no. 1765/82 (OJ L 195, 5 July 1982)
listed the products that were not subject to QRs in any member
state, but could be subject to protective measures.
The agreement never entered into force and thus was not
published in the Official Journal. See EC Bulletin no. 5,
1990, pt. 1.3.10 for a summary of it.
Senior Nello 1989, p. 16. The East European countries
frequently contested the legality of the QRs under GATT rules.
Restrictions could be imposed against imports from state-
trading countries, but were to be progressively reduced - a
sufficiently vague enough undertaking to justify their
continued use. Senior Nello 1991, pp. 29-31.
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to assert that East European exports to the Community were not
stymied by the restrictions but by their shoddy quality.6'
These national restrictions on imports were clearly
incompatible with the single European market: controls at
intra-EC frontiers were to be abolished by 1 January 1993,
making it impossible to keep out goods that had been imported
into the EC via another member state. Because of the
sensitivity of the issue, however, restrictions on imports
from third countries were to be eliminated gradually, on a
case-by-case basis.
In their negotiations with the Commission on the trade
and cooperation agreements, all of the East European states
sought the complete elimination of the restrictions. The
extent to which the Commission could fulfill these
wishes reflects how far national objections could be overcome
in the name of a Community endeavor. Discussions on the
removal of the quantitative restrictions were the most heated
for the first two trade and cooperation agreements, with
Hungary and Poland. The Community eventually agreed to lift
specific quantitative restrictions in stages, leaving until
61 Senior Nello 1991, PP. 33-34. During the first meeting
of the Hungarian-EEC joint committee, Commissioner Willy De
Clercq maintained that to increase its exports to the EC,
Hungary needed to improve the quality of its goods, not demand
the removal of quantitative restrictions. Acience EuroDe no.
4914, 14 December 1988.
Many countries feared that they would be excluded from
the Community altogether because restrictions existing in only
a few member states would be extended to the entire EC,
creating a "Fortress Europe".
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1994 or 1995 the restrictions on highly sensitive products.'3
The agreements encourage economic cooperation in a
variety of areas, such as industry, mining, agriculture,
energy, transport, and environmental protection, according to
the requests of each East European country. TM They maintain,
however, the practice of "mixed competence" between member
states and the Community. The EC has concluded cooperation
agreements with third countries before, but this always raised
the thorny problem of respective competences between the
Community and the member states. 65 In the East European
agreements, the problem was resolved as per usual: member
states must substitute the provisions of the agreements for
incompatible or identical provisions in any agreements they
have concluded with the East European state, but they can
still pursue economic cooperation programs and conclude new
bilateral cooperation agreements.
'3For Bulgaria and Romania, restrictions on a few highly
sensitive products would remain after 1995. Al]. of the
agreements contain a safeguard clause allowing the parties to
take protective measures if their economies are endangered by
a flood of imports.
64The agreements with Czechoslovakia and Romania are
concluded with Euratom, because the areas of cooperation
include nuclear energy and safety. Because the economic
cooperation measures exceed Rome Treaty provisions, all the
agreements were concluded on the basis of both articles 113
and 235, and were ratified by the EP. Had the agreements been
limited to "commercial" cooperation (however that may differ
from the economic kind), they could have been based only on
article 113. Christian Lequesne, "Leg Accords de Commerce et
de Cooperation: Communauté Européenne - Pays d'Europe de
l'Est" in Gautron, ed. 1991, p. 362. The Maastricht Treaty
later codified the practice of obtaining EP assent.
65Maslen 1988, p. 571.
'6The Commission has never fully accepted this restricted
definition of its competences. Senior Nello 1989, p. 30.
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The very inclusion of "economic cooperation" in these
agreements, however, represents a significant extension of the
Community's powers, as previously the member states wanted the
sole right to negotiate cooperation accords with the East
European states. No provisions were made to finance economic
cooperation, although that would not have been unprecedented:
the EC's 1976 and 1977 cooperation agreements with the Xaghreb
and Mashreq countries provided for EC grants and European
Investment Bank (EIB) loans. That the member states could
provide significant funds for economic cooperation with East
European states meant they could upstage the EC. It also
meant that the trade and cooperation agreements with East
European countries, while providing a rudimentary framework
for cooperation, proved inadequate once the Community began
actively to support reform.
A joint committee of representatives from both parties
was to oversee the functioning of the agreement; it could also
discuss eventual concessions on agricultural goods. This
would be another occasion for the Community to extend its
control over external economic policy: member states would
have to coordinate their positions within the committee, and
the Commission would increase its contacts with the East
European country. 61 The joint committees met yearly until the
trade and cooperation agreements were replaced with
association agreements.
4.2.2 Conditionality in Practic.
The agreements with each of the East European states
61Senior Nello 1989, pp. 30-31.
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reflect the development of political and economic reform in
those states. The state of reform in each country also
affected the progress of negotiations. 	 Obviously,
conditionality did not cause the "revolutions of 1989", but it
did provide a guide for reforms once they had been initiated.
The new regimes seemed eager to prove they were fulfilling the
EC's conditions. Later, conditionality would be less welcome.
The EC-Hungary agreement, signed in September 1988, was
the Community's most extensive agreement with any state-
trading country at that time, reflecting the more advanced
state of Hungary's reforms. After partially abandoning the
1968 New Economic Mechanism, the regime had introduced further
reforms in the early 1980s; in May 1988, reform-minded Karoly
Grosz became Communist Party leader. The Commission publicly
stressed that the agreement did not set a precedent, but
effectively it did serve as an example of what other East
European states could gain from the EC if they too implemented
far-reaching reforms.
Hungary had approached the EC in 1983/1984, to discuss
extending the sectoral agreements. M Hungary demanded several
concessions, which the Community refused to grant, because
Hungary was not yet a market economy. The talks faltered, and
did not revive until mid-1986, after the CMEA and its members
had accepted the EC's parallel approach. In April 1987, the
Péter Balázs, "Trade Relations between Hungary and the
European Community", in Marc Maresceau, ed., The Political and
Leaal Framework of Trade Relations between the European
Community and Eastern Europe (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1989), p. 65.
Maslen 1988, p. 562.
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Council granted the Commission a mandate to negotiate a trade
and cooperation agreement; negotiations began that June.7°
Disagreements immediately arose over the timetable for
the elimination of quantitative restrictions on Hungarian
imports. 7' Most EC member states were willing to drop their
quantitative restrictions, eventually, as a sign of goodwill
towards the fastest reformer in the Eastern bloc. Some, like
Italy (which had a high number of quotas), were not so
ready.'2 Hungary wanted the final deadline for eliminating
all quotas to be 1992; the EC first pushed for an indefinite
obligation and then tried for l998. A deal was eventually
struck whereby protection against a surge of sensitive
Hungarian imports could be implemented until 1998, in exchange
for dismantling quantitative restrictions by 1995. The
foreign ministers apparently - and improbably - promised the
Commission that the extension of their quotas until 1995 would
not prejudice the single European market. 74 The Commission
and the German Presidency pushed hard to conclude the
agreement before the summer of 1988; on 1 July, it was
initialled by the negotiators. The agreement was signed on 26
September and went into force on 1 December.
°Thirtv-fifth Review of the Council's Work. 1 JanuarY -
31 December 1987, p. 106.
71Acience Europe no. 4749, 23 March 1988.
'2David Buchan, "Hopes Rise for Trade Deal with Hungary",
The Financial Times, 23 March 1988.
73Agence Europe no. 4765, 16 April 1988 and Senior Nello
1989, p. 28.
74David Buchan, "Outlook for EC-Hungary Accord Brightens",
Th F1nncial Times, 14 June 1988
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The first exploratory talks on an agreement with Poland
were held in July and November 1986•7S In successive rounds
of informal talks, Poland made it clear that it wanted to
conclude a trade and economic cooperation agreement. In
December 1988, the Commission asked for a mandate to negotiate
an agreement based only on article 113, which would cover
industrial and agricultural products and encourage cooperation
in some areas, but would not set a deadline for the
elimination of all quantitative restrictions.76
The Council, however, was prepared to go even further, to
reflect the unfolding political developments in Poland. In
early February 1989, representatives from the Polish
government, Solidarity, and the Catholic Church began to
discuss political and economic reforms at the Round Table
talks. The Council's negotiating mandate to the Commission,
approved on 20 February along with the mandate for talks with
Bulgaria, authorized the Commission to discuss a five-year
agreement that would set dates for the removal of quantitative
restrictions and cover all areas of economic cooperation.
Negotiations opened in March.Th
The successful conclusion of the Round Table discussions
in April 1989, which legalized political parties and set a
June date for parliamentary elections, was welcomed in
7 Maslen 1988, p. 562.
76Aaence EuroDe no. 4915, 15 December 1988.
7 Aczence EuroDe no. 4960, 22 February 1990.
78EC Bulletin no. 3, 1989, pt. 2.2.8.
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Commission and EPC declarations. 7' At its 24 April meeting,
the General Affairs Council noted that the events in Poland
required a more favorable, flexible stance in negotiations.'°
On 22 May, Andriessen suggested three ways in which the
agreement could be extended to reflect the EC's approval of
the political changes in Poland: a deadline could be set for
the final removal of all quantitative restrictions; some
agricultural products could be included; and EIB loans could
be provided. The Council broadly supported the first two
proposals, but hesitated over the last. 81 The UK, backed by
France and the Netherlands, opposed lending to heavily-
indebted Poland: dealing with third countries' debts did not
fall under the EC's competence.
Unquestionably, though, Poland hoped the Community would
address its massive debt problem. During a visit to Brussels
in May, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa appealed to Delors for
support. Delors then promised that the EC would launch an
initiative in favor of the middle-income indebted countries at
the G-7 summit in July.'3
Negotiations on the trade and cooperation agreement ended
7'Acience EuroDe no. 4990, 7 April 1989, and no. 4991, 8
April 1989.
'°Agence Europe no. 5017, 19 May 1989.
"Agence Europe no. 5019, 22/23 May 1989.
'3David Buchan, "EC Cool on Loans for Poland to Encourage
Reform", The Financial Times, 23 May 1989.
'3Acience Europe no. 5017, 19 May 1989. In the event, the
G-7 announced they would support the rescheduling of Poland's
debt in the Paris Club, provided Poland met IMF conditions.
Document no. 89/194, EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol. 5, no.
2, 1989.
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on 25 July 1989, and it was signed on 19 September. In the
end, the EC only noted a Polish declaration expressing its
desire for access to EIB financing. TM Unlike the agreement
with Hungary, in which concessions on agricultural products
are to be discussed in the joint committee, Poland and the EC
agreed to lower levies and/or duties on about 10 agricultural
products. The willingness of EC member states to grant such
concessions reflected the new attitude towards aiding Eastern
Europe and the fact that Poland's economy was in worse shape
than Hungary's and was experiencing food shortages.0 The
final deadline for removing all quantitative restrictions is
1994, and Poland did not have to agree to an additional super-
safeguard clause, indications of the EC's more benevolent
approach to reforming East European countries, and Poland's
less threatening export capacity.
In 1983, talks between Czechoslovakia and the Commission
began regarding additional sectoral agreements. The Community
suggested instead an agreement on industrial goods, like the
1980 agreement with Romania." In November 1986, the Council
gave the Commission a mandate to negotiate an agreement on
trade in industrial products. In mid-1988, the conclusion of
the negotiations was delayed because Czechoslovakia, aware of
the EC-Hungarian agreement, asked for a final deadline for the
lifting of EC quantitative restrictions. Such a clause would
have exceeded the Commission's mandate, however, and
"Acience Eurooe no. 5065, 27 July 1989.
'5David Buchan, "Poles and EC Agree Economic Cooperation
and Trade Pact", The Financial Times, 26 July 1989.
"Senior Nello 1989, p. 31.
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Czechoslovakia had to retract its request. The Commission
reiterated that the EC-Ilungary agreement did not set a
precedent for other agreements.' 7 In 1988, the process of
political and economic reform in Czechoslovakia was not nearly
as advanced as it was in Hungary."
The four-year agreement on trade in industrial products
was signed on 19 December 1988 and went into effect on 1 April
1989.' Some quantitative restrictions on Czech goods were to
be lifted as soon as the agreement went into effect, but no
provisions for removing other restrictions were set. Although
the agreement does not include economic cooperation and was
based on article 113 only, the EP ratified it because it was
considered to be a politically important one.9°
In December 1989, the 'velvet revolution' swept through
Czechoslovakia. Within days of its formation on 8 December,
the new government headed by Prime Minister Marian Calfa asked
the Commission to begin negotiations on a trade and
cooperation agreement. 91 Informal talks began, and Andriessen
visited the country in January l99O. On 5 March, the
Council approved a negotiating mandate for a trade and
'7Actence Europe no. 4829 of 21 July 1988 and no. 4853 of
16 September 1988.
"In August, for example, the police used force to break
up demonstrations on the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact
invasion.
'9OJ L 88, 31 March 1989.
Senior Nello 1989, p. 31.
9tAaence Eurot,e no. 5157, 20 December 1989.
'2Aclence Euroie no. 5172, 15/16 January 1990.
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cooperation agreement. Negotiations went very quickly: the
agreement was signed on 7 May and went into force on 1
November. The final deadline for removing quantitative
restrictions was 31 December 1994, reflecting the EC's
approval of the pace of reform.
By the time the agreement had been concluded, however, it
was out of date. Extension of aid to Czechoslovakia was soon
to come, along with the accelerated removal of quantitative
restrictions (see section 4.2.3). Already in March 1990,
Foreign Minister Jiri Dientsbier stated that Czechoslovakia
wanted to conclude an association agreement and eventually
join the EC.
The first exploratory talks between the Commission and
Bulgaria were held in October 1986. Bulgaria wanted a trade
and economic cooperation agreement; the Commission wanted to
limit the agreement to trade, with only general principles
established on cooperation.' In December 1988, the
Commission asked the Council for a negotiating mandate for
agreements, based on article 113, with Bulgaria and Poland.
The Council wanted to go further and on 20 February 1989
approved a wider negotiating mandate for both agreements.
Although Poland's reforms were progressing much faster than
Bulgaria's, the agreement with Bulgaria would be part of the
Aaence Europe no. 5209, 8 March 1990.
"AcTence EuroTe no. 5206, 3 March 1990. Dientsbier was
reacting to the EC debate on association (see chapter 5).
'5Maslen 1988, p. 562.
'6Aaence EuroDe no. 4736, 4 March 1988.
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same normalization process.' 7 In negotiations in April and
May, Bulgaria demanded immediate trade liberalization measures
and a final deadline for the elimination of all quantitative
restrictions. The EC was not willing to go that far because
Bulgaria was not implementing market economic reforms.
Concerns over the treatment of the Turkish minority in
Bulgaria were also increasingly voiced. In June 1989, Belgium
invoked the CSCE mechanism on human rights against Bulgaria,
asking for information on the Turkish minority. In October,
France, EC president, requested information on 7 dissidents,
on behalf of the 12 and other Western countries.'
In June 1989, the negotiating session between Commission
and Bulgarian officials that was to be held at the end of July
was postponed, and negotiations were suspended. No official
reason was given, although later it was acknowledged that the
political situation, particularly the treatment of minorities,
in Bulgaria had occasioned the rupture.'°'
In December 1989, the velvet revolution began to sweep
through Bulgaria, though it did not leave behind such radical
changes as elsewhere. The Bulgarian prime minister wrote to
Delors on 1 December to inform him of the government's
intention to hold free elections and ensure the rights of the
'7EC Bulletin no. 2, 1989, pt. 2.2.25.
Acence EuroDe no. 5028, 3 June 1989.
AcTence Eurooe no. 5047, 30 June 1989.
1 Acience Europe no. 5123, 1 November 1989.
'°1See Thirty-seventh Review of the Council's Work. 1
January - 31 December 1989 and Aence Europe no. 5166, 6
January 1990.
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Turkish minority and to ask for the resumption of
negotiations.'° A new cabinet was appointed in February
1990, though still composed entirely of Communists.
Negotiations with the EC resumed in March 1990. The trade and
cooperation agreement was signed on 8 May 1990, and came into
force on 1 November 1990.
Just as the Community's relations improved with the other
MEA members, those with Roania, once the West's privileged
partner behind the Iron Curtain, deteriorated. In June 1986,
the Commission asked for a mandate to negotiate a cooperation
agreement with Romania, which was approved in December. The
1980 agreement would be extended to cover agricultural
products and economic cooperation. During negotiations in
1987, Romania insisted that the 1980 trade provisions be
revised in its favor, but the EC maintained that they were not
up for reconsideration.'°3
The EC was concerned with the decline in its trade
balance with Romania; in the 1980 accord, Romania had agreed
to expand and diversify its imports from the Community, but
the EC's exports to Romania were falling (see appendix 1).
More significantly, Romania was showing blatant disregard for
the CSCE provisions on human rights. By 1988, Romania's
violations of human rights, mistreatment of minorities, and
planned destruction of thousands of villages (many of which
were inhabited by ethnic Hungarians) in a "systemization"
program, had sparked outrage in the Community. The Community
'°2Agence Europe no. 5204, 1 March 1990.
1 Thirtv-fifth Review of the Council's Work. 1 Januar y -
31 December 1987, p. 106.
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and the Twelve criticized Romania in EPC declarations and at
the CSCE follow-up conference in Vienna. On 7 September 1988,
the Greek Presidency expressed concern to the Romanian
authorities over the systemization program. 1 In February
1989, after a request by the EP's Political Affairs Committee,
the Romanian ambassador in Madrid (Spain held the EC
Presidency) was summoned to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Spanish ambassador in Bucharest met with a
Romanian foreign ministry official, requesting information
about 24 Romanians who had protested the destruction of
villages.'° Romania refused to reply to the request and on
28 March, the Presidency issued a press statement requesting
Romania to comply with CSCE commitments.1'
Romania, alone among its MEA 'partners', refused to
establish formal diplomatic ties with the Community after the
EC-cMEA agreement. 1 Negotiations on extending the 1980
agreement were blocked at the beginning of 1989.' In March
1989, the EP demanded that the Community reexamine relations
with Romania.	 During the EP debate on the resolution,
Andriessen affirmed that given the conditions in Romania,
104Twentv-second General Report on the Activities of the
European Communities 1988, p. 412.
1 As outlined in a reply to 2 questions by MEPs, in
Document no. 89/112, EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol. 5, no.
1, 1989.
106Docuinent no. 89/102, EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol.
5, no. 1, 1989.
1°Maslen 1988, p. 566.
'Acience EuroDe no. 4937, 20 January 1989.
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there could be no question of continuing negotiations.' 0' On
24 April, the Council and Commission suspended the talks,
because of Romania's failure to honor CSCE human rights
obligations. They declared further: "Any resumption of the
negotiations will take place only if clear evidence emerges of
a significant improvement in Romania's respect for human
rights and its observance of the commitments it has entered
into through the Helsinki process."°
Unrest broke out in Romania in December 1989, which the
government attempted to put down with force. An EPC statement
on 19 December condemned the regime and its brutal repression
of the demonstrations. 11' The 1980 trade agreement was also
frozen."2 On 22 December, violence in Bucharest forced the
dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena to flee, though
they were captured the same day and executed on 25 December.
The "Council of National Salvation", consisting of many former
Communists, assumed power, and announced its desire to
normalize relations with the EC.1U
In January 1990, Andriessen visited Romania, emphasizing
the need to strengthen democracy and hold elections, and
affirming that negotiations on a trade and cooperation
agreement could begin soon."4 The conclusion of an agreement
'0'Aczence Eurooe no. 4977, 16 March 1989.
"°EC Bulletin no. 4, 1989, pt. 2.2.16.
"Statement concerning Romania", Document no. 89/343, EPC
Documentation Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 2, 1989.
112Acience EuroDe no. 5159, 22 December 1989.
3Aaence Eurooe no. 5167, 8/9 January 1990.
4Aaence Eurote no. 5172, 15/16 January 1990.
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was still a long way of f, as a result of the new government's
dubious commitment to political liberty. The Commission
postponed the resumption of talks until the end of March 1990,
because the new government's reform programs were not very
detailed and contacts were difficult. 115 The Romanian
authorities then got their act together, and provided the
Commission with information on political and economic reforms.
Diplomatic relations were established in March."6
The Council approved the negotiating mandate for a trade
and cooperation agreement in May and the agreement was
initialled on 8 June 1990." That same month, however, the
government allegedly trucked in several thousand miners to
battle student protesters in Bucharest. The Commission
announced that as a result it would not proceed to the
conclusion of the agreement.' An EPC statement deplored the
indiscriminate use of force against peaceful demonstrators and
reiterated that the Community would only support countries
committed to pluralist democracy.119
The General Affairs Council, meeting in mid-June, stated
it could not set a date for the signing of the agreement.'
The decision was not, however, without controversy. At the
July Council meeting, some members states (including France
"Agence EuroDe no. 5209, 8 March 1990.
116Acience Eurooe no. 5218, 21 March 1990.
117Agence Europe no. 5272, 11/12 June 1990.
"Aaence Eurooe no. 5276, 16 June 1990.
119"Statement by the Twelve on Romania", EPC Press Release
P. 44/90, 18 June 1990.
120EC Bulletin no. 6, 1990, pt. 1.4.5.
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and Italy) argued that marginalizing Romania could jeopardize
the democratization process, rather than encourage it; others
(the UK and Netherlands) disagreed and the matter was left
unresolved. 12' On 22 October, though, the Council signed the
agreement.'	 The EP then delayed ratification, until 22
February l99l.	 The Council concluded the agreement on 4
March and it entered into force on 1 May.
The difficult process of transformation in Bulgaria and
Romania would place those countries in the slow lane in terms
of progress towards closer relations with the Community. The
wisdom of such a policy would eventually be increasingly
doubted. Could a policy of strict conditionality backfire?
Was the Community - by insisting on the fulfillment of
economic and political criteria as a condition of closer
relations - generating isolation, economic hardship, and the
creation of another "Iron Curtain" in Europe? On the other
hand, the attempts to align policy towards Romania and
Bulgaria with the policy towards countries such as the Czech
republic and Poland seem incongruous given the state of reform
in the first two countries (see chapter 5).
4.2.3 Further Trad. Concessions
The G-7 decision to extend aid to Poland and Hungary in
July 1989, and the accelerating collapse of communism
throughout Eastern Europe, prompted the Community to
reconsider the extent to which it had agreed to open its
121Aaence Europe no. 5297, 16/17 July 1990, and no. 5298,
18 July 1990.
1 EC Bulletin no. 10, 1990, pt. 1.4.9.
1 EC Bulletin no. 1/2, 1991, pt. 1.3.19.
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markets to East European imports. In an action plan for
Western and Community aid drawn up in September 1989 126, the
Commission maintained that the trade and cooperation
agreements did not remove trade restrictions fast enough. It
proposed four measures to improve market access for Poland and
Hungary: the accelerated removal of quantitative restrictions;
concessions on agricultural imports; tariff concessions; and
extension of GSP benefits. The initial reaction of the
General Affairs Council on 2 October was favorable; Italian
Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis even proposed that as of
1 January 1990, Italy would eliminate those quantitative
restrictions scheduled for removal in 1994 or 1995.1
On 6 November 1989, the Council abolished specific
quantitative restrictions as of 1 January 1990 for Poland and
Hungary.'2' It also asked the Commission to submit a proposal
that went even further, by suspending non-specific
quantitative restrictions (i.e. those restrictions on goods
that are imported from any country) on goods from Poland and
Hungary)	 On 4 December, the Council did just that.'2'
'2'Commission of the European Communities, Action Plan for
Coordinated Aid to Poland and Hungary, COM (89) 470 final, 27
September 1989, and EC Bulletin no. 10, 1989, pts. 1.1.1 and
1.1.2.
'2'As Italy had the most quantitative restrictions on goods
from Eastern Europe of all the member states, this was a
significant gesture. See Senior Nello 1991, p. 33. Some
member states were apparently not enthused about extending the
GSP, as it was supposed to be for developing countries. Aaence
Eurote no. 5103, 4 October 1989.
'2'Regulation no. 3381/89, in OJ L 326, 11 November 1989,
later replaced by Regulation 2727/90.
'DEC Bulletin no. 10, 1989, pt. 1.1.5.
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Thus, the member states agreed to do away with the very
restrictions that they had been so obdurate about during the
negotiations on the trade and cooperation agreements, one of
which had just been signed with Poland in September. The
quantitative restrictions lifted were those on non-sensitive
goods only; steel, textiles and agricultural goods were not
included. Nonetheless, the measures are significant and
reflect the political interests of the Community and its
member states in supporting reform in Eastern Europe. As
other East European countries launched reforms, the same
benefits were extended: as of 1 October 1990 to Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia and as of 1 May 1991 to Romania (the day the
trade and cooperation agreement entered into force) .
Tariff preferences under the GSP were granted to Hungary
and Poland as of 1 January 1990. The benefits were extended
to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia in January 1991. Romania had
obtained some preferences under the GSP in 1974, but from
January 1991, those preferences were expanded.'3°
While concessions on agricultural products remained
blocked131 , textile and clothing quotas were increased: in
1990 and 1991 for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and in
'Regulation no. 3691/89, in OJ L 362, 12 December 1989,
later replaced by Regulation no. 2727/90. The restrictions
were not lifted by Spain or Portugal, still in their
transition period.
'Regulation 2727/90, in OJ L 262, 26 September 1990.
130Lequesne 1991, p. 366.
'311n February 1990, six member states - including France,
Spain, and Italy - blocked a Commission proposal to eliminate
levies on sheep and goat meat imports. Aence Europe no. 5193,
14 February 1990.
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1991 and 1992 for Bulgaria and Romania.W Agreements on ECSC
products were signed with Poland and Hungary in October 1991
and with Czechoslovakia in February 19g2U3
Even with these additional measures, the Community's
openness to East European goods was considered inadequate by
EC free traders and the East European countries. Thus new
agreements, providing for better market access and a framework
for closer relations, were concluded with the fastest
reforming East European states (see chapter 5).
The trade and cooperation agreements could also not be
fully exploited as long as CoCom restrictions on exports to
Eastern Europe were still in place. The rules now seemed
absurd: how could industry in Eastern Europe be modernized if
technology could not be exported there? After the European
Council met in November 1989, French European Affairs Minister
Edith Cresson revealed that the leaders agreed to try to
introduce flexibility into CoCom rules.1M But in February
1990, the US stalled on Community proposals to loosen some
restrictions: Eastern Europe would have to guarantee that
goods would not be adapted for military use, or reexported to
the Soviet Union.'35 At a CoCom meeting in June 1990,
however, restrictions on one-third of the products on the
'32"The Economic Interpenetration between the European
Union and Eastern Europe", in Commission, European Economy,
no. 6, 1994, p. 161.
WCommission of the European Communities, EuroDean
Community Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, Background Brief BB17, June 1993.
134Agence EuroDe no. 5135, 20/21 November 1989.
'35crawford 1990, p. 276.
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restricted list were dropped (including computers, machine
tools, and telecommunications) and other restrictions were
relaxed.'3' Further restrictions were lifted in 1992. In
November 1993, the members agreed to dissolve CoCom.
4.3 AID
In July 1989, aid became an instrument of Western policy
towards Eastern Europe. The Commission's coordination of the
G-24 aid program will be discussed in section 4.3.1. The
Community's own initiatives, including the PHARE program, will
be examined in sections 4.3.2 through 4.3.4.
4.3.1 The Commission's Rol. in Coordinating G-24 Aid
The G-7 decision to entrust the Commission with the task
of coordinating the West's program to assist the economic
reform process in Poland and Hungary, though unprecedented,
makes sense.1M Delors (and the Belgians) had been asking the
Twelve for months to coordinate their relations with Eastern
Europe, and the Commission was in the midst of negotiating
trade and cooperation agreements with the East European
'3'Acieflce Eurooe no. 5270, 8 June 1990.
'37Aaence EuroDe no. 5742, 3 June 1992, and "Cold War
Group's Successor Set for October Launch", Reuter, 30 March
1994. CoCom is to be replaced by a forum to control high-
technology exports that would include the former Soviet bloc
countries.
'38Accounts differ regarding who first proposed the idea.
Kirk Laux (p. 7) maintains that Kohl proposed it. Others have
said that Kohl took up Debra' suggestion to confide this task
to the Commission. See Acience Europe no. 5059, 17/18 July 1989
and Ehlermann, p. 23. A Commission official maintains that
Kohl and Mitterrand suggested it (interview, 22 June 1994).
Gibes Merritt and Charles Grant assert that Bush proposed it:
this would illustrate outside pressure on the Community to
take the lead. See Giles Merritt, Eastern Euro pe and the USSR:
The Challencie of Freedom (London: Kogan Page, 1991), p. 21,
and Charles Grant, Debra: Inside the House that Jacaues Built
(London: Nicholas Brealey, 1994), pp. 165-166.
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states. In talks with Bush in June, Delors set out his ideas
on how reforms in Poland and Hungary could be supported. Bush
urged coordination of Western aid, since the US clearly could
not provide all the resources itself. Kohl approved of the
idea, needing an acceptable international framework for a
national effort to aid Eastern Europe, which could have caused
a1arm.' France would not have been averse to Commission
leadership, given the close ties between French President
Mitterrand and Delors, and France's desire for the EC to
counterbalance German influence in the region.
What caused the most excitement was that the Commission
had never been called upon formally to coordinate the actions
of non-member states; no provisions in the Rome Treaty provide
for such a development. The Commission did not hesitate to
seize the opportunity to expand its influence. It reacted
quickly, although it had to scramble to find the personnel to
do so.'4° A G-24 Coordination Unit was set up within
Directorate-General (DG) I for External Economic Relations.
At the General Affairs Council held one day after the G-7
summit, the Commission presented its guidelines and plans for
the aid program, which were approved by the ministers. 14' It
Ehlermann 1989, pp. 23-24.
'°The Commission could act quickly because Debra
mobilized his personal network, rather than the director
generals. Grant, 1994, p. 105. G-24 coordination is carried
out by detached national officials (from EC and non-EC
states), and by personnel shifted from DG VIII (Development).
The unit remains short-staffed. Interview with Commission
official, 22 June 1994.
'41The Council's conclusions did not mention the G-7: those
member states not in the G-7 were apparently touchy about
'submitting' themselves to the G-7's will. Aence Europe no.
5060, 19 July 1989.
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also convened a meeting on 1 August, to discuss aid
coordination. Invited to the meeting were representatives
from the 24 members of the OECD.'42 The program is thus known
as the G-24 aid program, although international organizations
(IMF, World Bank, Paris Club, OECD, and later EBRD) also
participate. The G-24 hold regular meetings at senior
official and working group levels, and occasionally at
ministerial level, to ensure that policy and aims are
coherent, discuss possible joint actions, and assess the
progress of reforms in each recipient country.'43
At the 1 August 1989 meeting, the Commission presented
its plans and proposals, which the G-24 endorsed. The
Commission identified five priority areas for aid:
agricultural supplies and restructuring; access to markets;
investment promotion; vocational training; and environmental
protection. Working groups were set up in each area to
coordinate actions and make proposals. 1 Additional working
groups were set up in other areas later. On 4 May 1993, G-24
senior officials decided that the working groups would
continue in the areas of nuclear safety, macroeconomic
assistance, and environmental protection, but groups would
'42i.e. the 12 EC member states, the 6 members of EFTA
(Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland),
the US, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey.
Aence Eurooe no. 5063, 24/25 July 1989.
in 1993 (hereinafter PHARE Annual Reoort 1993), in COIl (95) 13
final, 20 February 1995, p. 71.
14'Agence Eurooe no. 5069, 2 August 1989, and no. 5070, 3
August 1989. The debt problem was to be handled by more
appropriate institutions, namely the Paris Club and the IMP.
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discuss other sectors on a country-by-country basis. This
would ensure that the recipient countries were more integrated
into the decision-making process.
The Commission's coordination role includes acting as a
clearing-house: the G-24 are supposed to inform the Commission
about their aid programs, so as to avoid taking 24 separate
but overlapping and therefore inefficient bilateral actions to
aid the East European countries. Most G-24 initiatives
originate in the Commission. The Commission tries to bring
donors together to appraise possible projects and finances
some joint projects. 1 ' Joint actions have been difficult to
put together because donors place constraints on bilateral aid
and they compete to fund visible, prestigious projects.1'7
They also favor certain countries, because of geographic
proximity and traditional ties. German aid to Poland, for
example, is very substantial; Finland and Sweden emphasize aid
to the Baltic states; Italy is the largest single donor to
Albania, while Greece gives more aid to Albania than to any
other recipient (see appendix 2). According to a Commission
145"G-24 Takes Stock of Assistance to Central and Eastern
Europe", Commission of the European Communities Press Release
IP (93) 341, 5 May 1993.
1 First Annual Ret,ort from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament on the Inmiementation of Economic
Aid to the Countries of East and Central Euro pe as of 31
December 1990, SEC (91) 1354 final, 24 July 1991, (hereinafter
PHARE Annual Report 1990), pp. 14-16.
in 1991, COM (93) 172 final, 10 May 1993 (hereinafter PHARE
Annual Report 1991), p. 16, and UN Economic Commission for
Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1991-1992, Chapter 5,
"International Support for Eastern Transformation".
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official, coordination among the EC member states works less
well than that among the other G-24 donors. The member states
compete for PHARE contracts to send consultants to Eastern
Europe (see below), but non-member states, particularly the
US, want to be involved in a forum in which they can monitor
and perhaps influence the Community's policy.
It has been much easier for the Commission to attract
donors to projects under PHARE, the Community's own
program. 149 According to one official, PHARE (with its large
resources) has become the "25th member" of the G-24 and its
officials have great influence on G-24 activities.'50
Since 1993, international financial institutions have
been more integrated within the G-24 process, with each
institution concentrating on its own area of interest.'5'
There is a great deal of coordination between the Commission,
IMF, World Bank and EBRD. PHARE, for example, finances
technical assistance and feasibility studies, which permit the
EIB and EBRD to make loans for investment projects.'52
1 Interview, 22 June 1994.
149Initially, there was some semantic confusion and the G-
24 program was referred to as Operation PHARE. But the two
are separate programs, and PHARE now refers exclusively to the
EC's program, as is made crystal clear in Commission, PHARE.
Assistance for Economic Restructurin g in the Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe: An Oierational Guide (Luxembourg:
OOPEC, 1992), p. 6.
15°Interview, 22 June 1994.
'51"G24: 37.8 billion ECU5 for Reforms in East Welcomed",
European Report no. 1857, 8 May 1993.
W1fl 1992, the Community and the EBRD signed the "Bangkok
Agreement", providing for closer cooperation. PHARE Annual
Report 1993, pp. 51 and 71. In June 1995, the Commission and
EBRD signed an agreement on financing joint ventures in
Eastern Europe. Aclence Europe no. 6508, 24 June 1995.
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The charts in Appendix 2 illustrate G-24 assistance to
Eastern Europe between 1990 and 1994. The EU (through PHARE)
and its member states accounted for 45% of total G-24 aid
(including the international financial institutions). Germany
was the largest single donor, with just over 15% of the total.
The EU and its member states provided almost 60% of the grant
aid. G-24 assistance includes debt relief and export credits,
neither of which the Community itself provides.
The G-24 have also coordinated their views regarding
which countries should receive aid, based on the principle of
conditionality. These common positions have been cited as one
of the successes of G-24 coordination.' 53 After the events of
late 1989, the G-24 considered extending the program. The
Community's policy on conditionality became G-24 policy, and
in this the Commission played a significant role.
In February 1990, the Commission proposed to the Council
that potential aid recipients must fulfill five conditions:
they must be committed to the rule of law, respect for human
rights, the establishment of multiparty systems, the holding
of free elections in 1990, and economic liberalization. The
countries concerned would not have to demonstrate success in
implementing such reforms, but would have to be committed to
achieving them.IM The General Affairs Council on 5 February
approved the Commission's report: "This co-ordinated
assistance should be provided on the basis of commitments from
'53lnterview with Commission official, 22 June 1994.
'5 The DeveloDment of the Community's Relations with the
Countries of Central and Eastern EuroDe, SEC (90) 196 final,
1 February 1990.
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the countries concerned to political and economic reform. In
addition, the programme of assistance should be adapted to
each country's own situation, specific requirements and
absorption capacity. "
At the December 1989 G-24 ministerial meeting, four
countries were considered for aid (in addition to Poland and
Hungary): Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, and Yugoslavia;
Romania was added to the list in February 1990. Several
Commission missions were sent to the candidate countries,
including one in January 1990 by Commissioner Andriessen to
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, to gather information
on their economic and political reforms. 1 As Nuttall notes,
"The pre-eminently political task of establishing and
verifying conditionality was thus carried out on the Community
side."'	 The Commission was clearly playing a much more
o1itical role, in close contact, though, with the member
states. On G-24 conditionality ( and other political issues),
the Commission and national officials worked together in the
informal advisers' group, which met weekly in Brussels.1
'55Council of the European Communities, General
Secretariat, Press Release 4300/90 (Presse 9), 5 February
1990.
'BOne indication of the difficulties the over-stretched
Commission could encounter: Andriessen was late for a talk
with the Bulgarian foreign minister because planners had not
taken account of time zone differences. David Buchan, "Flying
Dutchman Plans Aid for East Europe", The Financial Times, 16
January 1990 and Commission of the European Communities,
Action Plan: Coordinated Assistance from the GrouD of 24 to
Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia. the German Democratic Republic.
Romania and Yugoslavia, SEC (90) 843 final, 2 May 1990.
1 Nuttall 1992, p. 279.
'5 lnterview with DG IA official, 12 March 1996.
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Once the Commission determined progress had been made,
the European Council in April 1990 agreed that G-24 aid should
be extended to the five countries. 1 In June, however, the
situation in Romania had deteriorated. The Council and
Commission expressed doubts about extending aid, and the
Commission did not invite Romanian representatives to a G-24
ministerial meeting in July."°
On 4 July, G-24 ministers decided to extend aid to
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Yugoslavia. The G-24
determined that Romania did not qualify for assistance, but
stated that aid could be extended once Romania met the five
conditions." G-24 aid was not extended to that country
until 30 January 1991.162
4.3.2 PHARE
Pablo Benavidès Salas, PHARE's first director, classified
the Community's initiatives to aid economic reform into three
Pre5idency Conclusions: Special Meeting of the European
Council, Dublin, 28 April 1990", in Annex, Aaence Euroie no.
5245, 30 April/i May 1990.
'AcTence Europe no. 5278, 20 June 1990, and no. 5279, 21
June 1990. Just before the meeting, the Council sent the
Troika of the foreign ministry directors to Romania, to gather
information on the situation there. Acierice Euro pe no. 5288,
4 July 1990.
161EC Office of Press and Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.,
"Declaration of Ministers of the 'Group of 24' Engaged in
Economic Assistance to Central and East European Countries",
European Community News no. 29/90, 5 July 1990.
1'EC Bulletin no. 1/2, 1991, pt. 1.3.9. In September 1991,
the G-24 decided to extend aid to Albania, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania (Preamble to Regulation no. 3800/91 in OJ L 357, 28
December 1991). Aid to Yugoslavia was suspended on 8 November
1991 (EPC Press Release P. 109/91, 8 November 1991); it was
extended to Slovenia in October 1992 (European Commission,
Press Release IP (93) 341, 5 May 1993), and Macedonia in July
1993 (Twenty-seventh General Report on the Activities of the
European Communities 1993, p. 236).
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groups. In the short run, the EC tried to manage crises, by
supplying emergency food and medical aid and providing balance
of payments assistance. For the medium term, it supported
reforms by increasing market access and helping to restructure
the agricultural, banking and financial sectors. For the long
term, the Community tried to create the basis for self-
sufficient development in Eastern Europe, by building
infrastructure, cleaning up environmental damage, and
establishing training programs.1
Most of these initiatives have been taken within the
framework of PHARE.1U While the Community had prior
experience in development aid programs, what was significant
was that now the Community was acting - and leading - in a
region from where it had previously been excluded, and for
predominately political reasons. PHARE's size and importance
have placed the Community - and especially the Commission - in
an extraordinary position of influence. As a result, the
member states have tried to set limits on PHARE and ensure
that it served their own interests.
While PHARE primarily supports the transformation to
market economies in Eastern Europe, its objective is, in the
end, political: in doing so, it will "help to establish
democratic societies based on individual rights."' 	 PHARE
1'Pablo Benavidès Salas, "Les Mécanismes Communautaires
de la Cooperation Est-Ouest", in Gautron, ed. 1991, pp. 338-
342.
164The acronym is officially French but can be translated
into English (Poland/Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring
Economies).
1 European Commission, PHARE: A Performance Review 1990-
1993, April 1994, p. i.
, p. 322.
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"supports the development of a larger democratic family of
nations within a prosperous and stable Europe.""
The legal framework for PHARE was first set out in
December 1989." PHARE became operational at the start of
1990 for Poland and Hungary; the program was extended as the
G-24 extended aid to other East European states, on the basis
of conditionality. On 17 September 1990, five more
beneficiaries were added: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR,
Romania, and Yugoslavia. 1" The Council, however, only
approved extension of PHARE aid to Romania at the end of
January 1991, after the G-24 had decided that the political
and economic situation in the country was satisfactory.1'9
The Commission had originally envisioned a 1990 budget
for PHARE of ECU 20Dm; the EP, however, requested that the
amount be increased to ECU 30Dm. In December, the Budget
1"This objective is repeated at the beginning of each
PHARE: Infocontract, published several times a year by DG I.
"Regulation no. 3906/89, in OJ L 375, 23 December 1989.
A second regulation, no. 2698/ 90 (OJ L 257, 21 September
1990), amends the first, and does not refer to a specific
budget or time scale (as the earlier regulation did). The
legal basis for PHARE is article 235 of the Rome Treaty, as it
goes beyond the Community's competences.
"SUnder Regulation 2698/90. In July 1993, Czechoslovakia
was removed from the list of beneficiaries and the Czech
republic and Slovakia added. Aid to Yugoslavia was suspended
in November 1991. In August 1992, PHARE was extended to
Slovenia. In December 1991, PHARE was extended to Albania,
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Third Annual Re port from the
Commission to the Council and the Euro pean Parliament on the
Implementation of Community Assistance to the Countries of
East and Central Europe (PHARE) in 1992 (hereinafter PHARE
Annual Report 1992) in COM (95) 13 final, 20 February 1995.
PHARE was extended to the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia in October 1995 (having been blocked by Greece until
then). Twenty-ninth General Report on the Activities of the
"9PIIARE Annual Reoort 1991 p. 4.
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Council accepted this.'7° With the extension of the program
to other East European countries, the Commission requested and
received an additional ECU 200m for 1990. Since then, PHARE's
budget has doubled and it has become the largest single source
of grant financing for the East European countries (see table
4 • 2 and appendix 2, table 1). Appendix 3 lists the










Source: European Commission, PHARE 1994 Annual Report, COM
(95) 366 final, 20 July 1995, p. 3.
The Commission set up a PHARE Operation Service (PHOS),
within DG I, in January 1990 to run PHARE.'7' PHOS is short-
staffed, and has had to rely on personnel on short-term
contracts, an indication of the Council's unwillingness to
'70Acience Europe no. 5099 (28 September 1989), no. 5120 (27
October 1989), no. 5131 (15 November 1989), and no. 5153 (14
December 1989).
'71Other DG5 help plan PHARE programs. The 'sectoral' DG5
would prefer that DG I liaise more with them; DG I is seen as
an 'island', with all of the resources and personnel, and
somewhat impervious to advice and input from elsewhere in the
Commission. Interview with Commission official, 24 June 1994.
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budget extra funds for permanent staff."2 Staff in the
Commission's delegations in the recipient countries help
administer PHARE.'
PHARE is demand-driven. The recipient countries reach
agreement on annual indicative programs with the Commission;
within the areas indicated, specific projects are identified
by the recipient country and funded. Consultants are then
hired to manage or carry out each project.
Funding decisions must be approved by a management
committee, consisting of EC member states' representatives and
chaired by the Commission.' 74 The Commission proposes
measures and the committee approves them by a qualified
majority vote: one way in which member states have tried to
limit the Commission's influence within PHARE.17S
'PHOS staff grew from 24 in January 1990 to 125 at the
end of 1993. PHARE Annual Report 1990, pp. 17-18; PHARE Annual
Report 1993, p. 60; interviews with Commission officials, 20
and 22 June 1994. The Economist points out, however, that the
Commission's personnel policy is inflexible, so that staff are
not easily transferred where needed. Decentralization of
project management would relieve the pressure on PHOS. "EC
Aid to the East: Good Intentions, Poor Performance", 10 April
1993.
'73European Commission, What is PHARE?, May 1994, p. 15.
Since 1990, Commission delegations have opened throughout
Eastern Europe. There were over 100 people posted in the
delegations in 1992. As Buchan points out, these delegations
are seen by Euro-enthusiasts as the nucleus of an eventual EU
foreign ministry. Buchan 1993, pp. 55-65.
'74The member states' representatives come from the
permanent representations in Brussels and national expert
offices in the member states. Communication with Emma
Chamberlain from the PHARE Information Office, 22 February
1995.
'751f the committee rejects a measure, the Commission can
turn to the Council for a decision. From 1990 to 1993, the
committee approved all but one of the Commission's proposals,
an import support guarantee program for Albania. PHARE Annual
Report 1992, p. 8.
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Aid is directed to several priority sectors, including
privatization, humanitarian and food aid' 76 , agricultural
restructuring, environment and nuclear safety, and
infrastructure. Aid is given to provide essential imports of
equipment and inputs'", but most aid has been concentrated on
providing know-how, or technical assistance, to help the
recipients draft legislation, design policy, and build
institutions. Under the PHARE 'umbrella', several framework
programs have been established, including the Trans-European
mobility scheme for university studies (Tempus)', and the
Joint Venture PHARE Programme (JOPP), which helps EC firms set
up joint ventures in the recipient countries.'79
The member states have tried to increase their control
over PHARE by specifying that aid must be used for specific
programs. According to a Commission official, the member
'76The first PHARE regulation contained no provisions for
humanitarian aid, although food and medicines were donated to
Poland and Romania in 1989/1990. A ceiling of 5% of the
budget for such aid was then set, but a series of disasters in
1991, including the Yugoslav war, meant that sum was not
enough. The 1992 ceiling was raised exceptionally to 15%, but
the 1993-1997 Guidelines specify that 10% of the PHARE budget
will be devoted to humanitarian aid. EC Bulletin no. 11, 1992,
pt. 1.4.5 and PI-LARE Annual ReDort 1991, p. 10.
'"Counterpart funds have been set up, in which funds are
generated from the sale of products (usually food or medicine)
that are supplied by PHARE import programs and are then used
to finance further projects.
178Tempus (along with a vocational training foundation) was
launched by the extraordinary EC summit in Paris in November
1989. It encourages cooperation between EC and East European
universities on initiatives to develop curricula and teaching
materials, and provides grants for exchanges of teachers,
trainers, and administrators. Temus PHARE Annual ReDort 1
Aucnist 1992-31 July 1993, COM (94) 142 final, 20 April 1994.
' 7 DG XVIII (Credit and Investments) manages it.
Commission, PHARE Information Office, "JOPP: The Joint Venture
PHARE Programme", April 1994.
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states have been 'jealous' of PRARE, because its resources and
importance dwarf their own aid programs, with the exception of
Germany's (see appendix 2), and have thus tried to reduce
PIIARE's effective budget."° For example, PHARE has provided
humanitarian aid for refugees in the former Yugoslavia; up to
ECU .5m was even contributed to the EC's monitoring
mission. 18' PHARE funds are being used to develop the regions
along the East European states' borders with the Community, an
initiative backed by Germany, which was seeking help for its
own similar projects. In 1994, a special budget line (ECU
150m) was created for cross-border cooperation, and PHARE's
budget was correspondingly reduced.
PHARE has had problems. One of the immediately obvious
ones was that funds had to be committed within the year.
As early as January 1990, the Commission urged the Council to
allow "adequate multiannual budgetary provisions".1M 	 In
November 1992, the Council agreed that there should be a
'80lnterview with Commission official, 22 June 1994. An
off icial in the PHARE Information Service noted that Spain is
always ready to support measures that weaken PHARE, as PHARE
is seen as a drain on resources that should be directed to the
Mediterranean or Latin America. Interview took place on 23
June 1994.
'8tSee PHARE Annual Reoort 1991, p. 10; PHARE Annual Report
1992, p. 12; PHARE Annual Report 1993, p. 54.
'European Commission, "PHARE General Guidelines 1994-
1997", 1 June 1994. The program resulted from a December 1992
Commission proposal and a 1993 EP request; a pilot PHARE
program began in 1993.
Funds committed but not spent could be disbursed in the
following year. PHARE Annual Ret,ort 1990, pp. 4-5.
'84SEC (90) 111 final, p. 8.
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multiannual approach to progrannning. In 1993, the
Commission began adopting a multiannual approach in several
indicative programs.11'
The demand-led approach has meant that sometimes
resources were not efficiently used. Bulgaria and Romania in
particular have often left PHARE aid unused, reflecting
governmental confusion and internal conflicts over reform.
Some Commission officials think conditionality should be
introduced at the disbursement level: if a recipient country
has not used funds by a given date, the money could be
redirected to another sector or even another country."
PHARE has been criticized for not disbursing enough
funds, cumbersome and slow bureaucratic procedures,
centralized management, and a reliance on expensive EC
consultants who did not know local conditions.' 1' PHARE
beneficiaries have called for more investment, rather than
technical assistance."9
In July 1993, Sir Leon Brittan, the Commissioner for
External Economic Relations (1993-1994), announced that PHARE
"SEC Bulletin no. 11, 1992, pt. 1.4.6.
186PHARE Annual Retort 1993, p. 48.
117lnterviews with two Commission officials, 20 and 22 June
1994. In 1994, a program involving the Romanian Ministry of
Health was terminated on the ground of non-performance. PHARE
1994 Annual Report, p. 27.
11'The criticisms have come from the recipients, observers,
MEP5, and the Court of Auditors. "European Parliament Hearing
on PHARE and TACIS Programmes", Eurooean Report no. 1863, 2
June 1993, and Lionel Barber, "Brussels Misjudgments Have Cost
Millions, Watchdog Says", The Financial Times, 27 November
1992.
"9"EC Aid to the East: Good Intentions, Poor Performance",
The Economist, 10 April 1993.
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would be decentralized and streamlined.' 90 The 1993-1997
PHARE guidelines state that projects would be more
differentiated between the beneficiary countries. Special
fast-track decision-making procedures for small projects were
introduced. A decentralized implementation system has been
increasingly used, whereby an agency in the recipient country
is responsible for executing individual PHARE programs.19'
PHARE has evolved since its establishment to reflect the
changes in Eastern Europe and changes in the EC's priorities.
Aid, for example, has been increasingly channeled to regional
cooperation projects and to projects to aid democratization
(see chapter 6).
The 1993-1997 guidelines state that PHARE would move from
technical assistance to investment support measures in sectors
such as environment, energy, job creation, research and
infrastructure, although several member states were not
enthusiastic about this. 	 This was to reflect the
progression of the economic transformation. 	 Initially,
countries need help establishing the regulatory and
institutional framework for a market economy and devising a
Andrew Hill, "Brittan Admits Flaws in Aid",
Financial Times, 10 June 1993.
'91See Commission, "PHARE General Guidelines 1993-1997",
5 July 1993, and PHARE Annual Reiort 1993, p. 56. The 1993
Court of Auditors report charged that PHARE procedures were
too heavy, the recipient countries were not involved enough,
and programs started very slowly. The Commission reacted
quite angrily to the report, noting that much had been done to
counter those charges. "Commission Answers Allegations over
Eastern Europe/CIS Aid", European Commission Press Release
Memo/94/69, 16 November 1994.
'"'New Look' PHARE Programme Under Spotlight", European
Report no. 1798, 26 September 1992.
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reform program. Later, they need direct support for long-term
restructuring, in the form of investment and financing."
At a General Affairs Council meeting in May 1993,
however, the UK contested a Commission proposal to finance
infrastructure projects. 19' At another meeting a month later,
the UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands tried to limit the funds
allocated for infrastructure development to 10% of the PHARE
budget; the Commission and other member states pushed for a
limit of 15%.' The European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22
June 1993, agreed on 15%, to be used to facilitate
infrastructure improvements in recipient countries.'9'
In July 1994, the Commission suggested that the limit on
infrastructure spending be lifted."7 Some member states were
concerned that this confused the roles of PHARE and the
EBRD.'9' The European Council in Essen, 9-10 December 1994,
though, did raise the limit: 25% of PHARE financing could be
used to help develop infrastructure, including building links
"PHARE Annual Report 1993, p. 47, and PHARE: A
Performance Review 1990-1993, pp. 2-4.
'9'Aaence EuroDe no. 5978, 12 May 1993.
'"Copenhagen Summit Set to Endorse Substantial Package
on East", EuroDean ReDort no. 1866, 12 June 1993.
"Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in
Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, SN 180/93, Annex II, paragraph
iii.
"7coinmunication from the Commission to the Council: Follow
u to Commission Communication on "The Euroie Areements and
Beyond: A Stratev to Prepare the Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe for Accession", COM (94) 361 final, 27 July
1994, p. 16.
'9'Aaence Eurooe no. 6346, 28 October 1994.
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with the Eu's trans-European networks.1
The Copenhagen European Council agreed that the East
European associates could join the EU once certain conditions
were met; the Essen European Council launched a pre-accession
strategy (see chapter 5). PHARE would help the associates
meet the conditions and prepare them for eventual accession,
by helping them to approximate their legislation to that of
the Community, for example. 20° To enable PHARE to carry out
these new tasks, the Commission suggested in July 1994 that
ECU 7.072b be allocated to PHARE for 1995_1999.20 But some
southern member states were concerned that aid to Eastern
Europe was draining resources from Mediterranean countries.202
The European Council in Essen could only agree that the 1995
PHARE budget (ECU 1.lb) would be the minimum budget for each
year until 1999 (ECU 5.5b for 1995_1999).203 At Cannes in
June 1996, however, the European Council agreed to provide ECU
6.693b for PHARE for 1995-1999. The amount allocated would
increase yearly, to ECU 1.634b in 1999.204
4.3.3 The Community's Aid Measure.: Loans
In addition to PHARE, the Community has extended loans to
the East European countries. In September 1989, the Commission
'Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting on 9
and 10 December 1994 in Essen, SN 300/94, Annex IV, part XI.
200PHARE Annual Rei,ort 1993, pp. 46-47.
201C0M (94) 361 final, Annex IV.
"Essence of Essen", The Economist, 3 December 1994.
Presidency Conclusions, SN 300/94, Annex IV, part XI.
Presidency Conclusions, European Council - Cannes, 26-27














proposed making Poland and Hungary eligible for EIB loans.
In a change from the reluctance of EC member states to
contemplate EIB loans to Poland the preceding summer, the
finance ministers approved the proposal on 9 October 1989. On
29 November, the EIB's Board of Governors authorized loans of
up to ECU lb to Poland and Hungary. 206 EIB loans have since
been extended to other East European countries, as they
implemented reforms (see table 4.3).207 On 13 December 1993,
the Council decided that the EIB could lend up to ECU 3b for
TABLE 4.3















Source: European Commission, info Phare, no. 8, July 1995, p.
11.
COM (89) 470 final, p. 4.
EIB Information no. 62, December 1989, p. 3. Yugoslavia
and the GDR were already eligible for loans, Yugoslavia under
the terms of its 1980 trade and cooperation agreement, and the
GDR because it would soon be unified with the rest of Germany.
Spain has repeatedly objected to EIB loans to Eastern
Europe because Latin America was not eligible for EIB loans.
See, for example, Aaence Europe no. 5418, 26 January 1991.
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1994-1996 to 10 East European countries.20S The loans help
renew and develop basic infrastructure, contribute to energy,
telecommunications, and environment projects, and support
small- and medium-sized enterprises.
On 7 May 1990, the Council agreed to a Commission
proposal to extend ECSC loans of up to ECU 200m to Poland and
Hungary. The funds could be used to improve the environment
and work safety record of coal mines and to increase steel
consumption, but not production (given the "sensitivity" of
steel imports in the Community) p209 In November 1991, the
Council approved a Commission proposal to extend ECSC loans to
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. 21° In addition, in
March 1994, the Council decided that Euratom could lend up to
ECU 1.115b to East European countries (and Russia and Ukraine
as well), to help improve nuclear safety.211
The EC has also granted medium-term loans for macro-
economic stabilization for the reforming East European states,
basically to cover balance of payments deficits (see table
4.4). The first loan, ECU 870m for Hungary (agreed by the
EC Bulletin no. 12, December 1993, pt. 1.7.46. Since
July 1993, the EIB can also lend up to ECU 150m to Slovenia.
See info Phare no. 8, July 1995, p. 11.
Aence Eurote no. 5256, 17 May 1990. The Commission had
first proposed this in November 1989. AcTence Europe no. 5139,
25 November 1989.
210EC Bulletin no. 11, 1991, pt. 1.3.12. The first loan
was not granted until September 1994, because of a lack of
appropriate projects. It helped to modernize a steel works in
Poland. Acience Eurooe no. 6309, 7 September 1994.
2"Acience EuroDe no. 6197, 24 March 1994. One of the first
proposed loans, to help complete the Mochovce nuclear power
station in Slovakia, generated enormous controversy and had to
be shelved. Acience Europe, 6 April 1995.
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Council in February 1990), was the first time the Community
had approved a macro-financial operation for a third
country. 212 Since then, loans have been extended to several
other East European countries. They all fall within the
context of the G-24 program, and the other G-24 donors are
TABLE 4.4
EC Macro-financial Assistance
to East European Countries
1990-1994
(in million ECU)
(date on which maximum amount was































Source: European Commission, "Report on the Implementation of
Macro-Financial Assistance to Third Countries in 1994",
European Economy, no. 2, 1995.
2125ee European Commission, "Report on the Implementation
of Macro-Financial Assistance to Third Countries in 1994",
European Economy, no. 2, 1995. The EC has since also extended
such assistance to Israel, Algeria, Moldova, and Ukraine. One
of the G-24's first actions, in December 1989, was the
establishment of a Sib stabilization fund for the Polish
currency. Five member states contributed over half of the
amount, but the Community itself did not participate. Aence
Euroie no. 5153, 14 December 1989.
2t3The loan to Bulgaria was approved in October 1992, but
was not released until May 1994 because of the slow progress
of reform there. Aaence Euroie no. 6232, 18 May 1994.
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supposed to contribute to them, but they have provided less
than half of the loan amounts for Bulgaria, Romania, Albania,
and Slovakia, 214 EU assistance was to be discontinued when
the recipient could fully rely on financing from international
financial institutions and private capital. 215 Disbursement
of the loans depended on IMP approval of the recipient's
structural reforms and fulfillment of economic criteria set by
the Commission.
In providing macro-financial assistance, the Commission
has extended its competence. It has been too successful for
some member states, who have complained that the EC is doing
the work of the IMF and World Bank. 216 Economic and finance
ministers began to ask whether it was more appropriate for the
international financial institutions to provide funds for
balance of payments support. 217 The EU, however, has
continued to provide such assistance.
Member states have resolutely retained competence in the
area of export credits. As discussed in chapter 3 and section
4.1, the Commission has repeatedly proposed setting up
Community export credit instruments. In July 1994, the
Commission proposed a directive establishing common principles
214"Report on Macro-Financial Assistance in 1994", p. 305.
See also Commission, Report on the Implementation of Medium-
Term Financial Assistance to the Balances of Payments of
Central and Eastern Eurooean Countries, COM (92) 400 final, 16
September 1992.
215The IMP and World Bank have been lending much more to
the East European countries: the EU'S share in total macro-
financial relief declined from 54% in 1990 to 17% in 1994.
"Report on Macro-Financial Assistance in 1994", pp. 5-7.
216lnterview with Commission official, 22 June 1994.
217Agence EuroDe no. 6205, 7 April 1994.
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for credit guarantees to promote national exports. 211 Even
though the proposal was very modest, it sparked opposition.219
Export credits are a major part of the member states'
assistance to Eastern Europe (see appendix 2).
4.3.4 The Community'. Role in Establishing the EBRD
The EBRD has often been touted as an EC project: "The
creation of the EBRD is the Community's main multilateral
initiative for Central and Eastern Europe."° The reality is
a bit different, although the Community - a multilateral
organization - did play a major role in getting up another
multilateral organization. The initiative forms part of the
effort to promote private investment in Eastern Europe.
French President Mitterrand launched the idea of creating
a development bank for Europe in October 1989, without
consulting his EC partners beforehand. 1 Many have claimed
intellectual ownership of the EBRD idea, and a number of
2t1Agence Europe, no. 6273, 14 July 1994. The proposal was
based on two reports issued by a group of experts in March
1992 and June 1993. In May 1991, the expert group had been
instructed by the Policy Coordination for Credits, Insurance,
Credit Guarantees and Financial Credits (a group which the
Council had established back in 1960) to study ways of
harmonizing export credit insurance. The member states had
evidently overcome some but not all of their reluctance to
consider EC measures because the differences between national
systems threatened to distort competition and the single
European market. Acience EuroDe no. 6310, 8 September 1994.
219Acrence Euroøe no. 6348, 31 October/i November 1994.
Commission of the European Communities, The European
Community and its Eastern Neiahbours (Luxembourg: OOPEC,
1990), p. 18.
1 "Statement concerning the European Council to the EP",
25 October 1989, Document no. 89/245, EPC Documentation
Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 2, 1989.
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related proposals were made public before Nitterrand's
speech. tm Nonetheless, France held the EC presidency, and so
was in a prime position to propel the idea forward. In fact,
France's possessive hold on the project sparked opposition
from other member states.
Not all of the member states were as enthusiastic; for
example, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, and West Germany did
not see the need to create a new institution.tm The EIB
could just as well lend to investment projects in Eastern
Europe. Mitterrand, however, dismissed these objections.
The EIB should stick to financing projects primarily within
the Community. 225 There were several reasons for this
position. The Soviet Union was not a member of the IMP or
World Bank, and many states felt Soviet financial needs far
outstripped available resources and would detract from aid to
Eastern Europe. The EBRD would be a way to help Eastern
Europe and Gorbachev's Soviet Union. Perhaps more
importantly, France wanted to lead a high-profile initiative,
and therefore counter West Germany's influence in the region.
There were other advantages to the EBRD as opposed to the
tm7ong those who also suggested a similar idea are Alfred
Herrhausen, the late president of Deutsche Bank, and Giscard
d'Estaing. Paul Menkveld, Ori gin and Role of the EuroDean
Bank for Reconstruction and Develo pment (London: Graham and
Trotman, 1991), pp. 25-26, and Aence Europe no. 5105, 6
October 1989.
22 Menkveld 1991, p. 32. See also Thatcher 1993, p. 759.
724And, as seen above, the member states had agreed that
the EIB could lend to Poland and Hungary in October 1989.
225Agence Europe no. 5138, 24 November 1989. The EIB lends
far more to member states than to non-members: in 1988-1989,
the EIB lent ECU 1.3b outside the EC and ECU 21.lb inside.
Menkveld 1991, p. 32.
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EIB. The EBRD could lend more because more states would
provide more capital. The EIB would be able to continue
lending to the ACP states without sparking fears that its
funds would be diverted to Eastern Europe.
France put the EBRD proposal on the agenda for the
informal European Council summit in Paris in November 1989,
where the 12 leaders asked the Commission and Troika to study
it. On 29 November, senior officials from the member
states and Commission agreed that the Community plus the
twelve member states would hold the majority of share, but
other states would join too. West Germany successfully pushed
for participation to be open to the US, although France had
originally wanted to limit membership to European states.m
The Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 then called
for negotiations to begin in January 1990.
France convened the constitutive conference. On 15 and 16
January, the first meeting was held in Paris (not in Dublin,
even though Ireland was EC president) and was chaired by
Jacques Attali, an advisor to Mitterrand. Those attending
were all the G-24 countries, 7 East European states and the
Soviet Union, Cyprus and Malta.° France had drafted a
Menkveld 1991, p. 46.
2Zlll Statement Concerning the Events in Central and Eastern
Europe", Document no. 89/301, EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol.
5, no. 2, 1989.
mAcence EuroDe no. 5143, 1 December 1989.
EC Bulletin no. 12, 1989, pt. 1.1.14.
°Several other states joined later, including South
Korea, Israel, Egypt and Mexico. Menkveld 1991, pp. 49-50.
The EBRD, however, only lends to eligible countries in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union.
206
statute (which was based on the Community's proposals) and
circulated it to non-EC members before an EC position had been
reached. Arguably it seemed more a French than an EC project,
and several member states accordingly objected.'
Throughout the negotiations, frequently no agreement
could be reached to present a common EC position. Some member
states, including Italy and the smaller states, pushed for a
common EC stand; others, including the UK, felt the G-24
should coordinate their position. 2 The most controversial
decisions were those on the location of the headquarters and
the appointment of the president. The G-7 apparently decided
among themselves that the headquarters would be in London and
the president would be Attali (the large member states thus
winning the two biggest prizes). 3 France, as conference
president, then put the matter to a vote among the 42 founding
EBRD members, instead of trying to define a Community position
first. On 19 May, the founding members chose London and
Attali. The Netherlands and Belgium protested the apparent
emergence of a "directorate" of the major powers. 5 At the
signing of the EBRD agreements on 29 May, the Benelux
countries objected to the fact "that certain decisions on
fundamental questions were taken or strongly influenced
through the use of arbitration in non-Community fora, and
'Acience Eurooe no. 5170, 12 January 1990.
2Agence Europe no. 5181, 27 January 1990.
3Agence EuroDe no. 5257, 18 May 1990.
Aence Europe no. 5258, 19 May 1990.
fl5gfl Europe no. 5260, 23 May 1990. The Commission and
EIB representatives abstained from the vote.
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without taking account of Community procedures...."'
The member states also disagreed over the extent of the
EC's participation as a shareholder. Most member states
favored an EC share equal to that of the larger states; the
UK, West Germany and the Netherlands did not. In the end,
the Community and the member states together were the main
shareholders, with 51% of the capital of ECU lOb: the
Commission and the EIB had 3% each; the four large member
states 8.5% each.'
In July 1994, the Commission suggested that all EU
directors in the EBRD uphold a previously agreed common
position. The proposal has not been approved, an
indication of the limits placed by the member states on common
EU action and their attempts to retain some freedom of
maneuver in relations with Eastern Europe.
236Acrence Eurooe no. 526, 1 June 1990. Attali's resignation
on 25 June 1993, over revelations of financial impropriety,
set off another round of electioneering among the member
states. The smaller states nominated former Danish finance
minister Henning Christophersen. "After Attali", The
Economist, 3 July 1993. France, however, successfully pushed
for the job to remain in French hands, and Jacques de
Larosière, head of the central bank, was elected president.
"Now the Deluge", The Economist, 24 July 1993.
237Actence EuroDe no. 5186, 3 February 1990.
23'The US had 10%, Japan 8.5%, and the Soviet Union 6%. The
EIB's participation was controversial: in March 1990, the US,
Japan and EFTAn members opposed full membership for the EIB,
since it was not a state. Aence Euro pe no. 5212, 12/13 March
1990. United Germany retained the same share as West Germany.
With the breakup of the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Soviet
federations, the EBRD's membership grew to include all the
resulting republics (except Serbia and Montenegro). See EBRD,
Annual ReDort 1992, pp. 2-3. In April 1996, EBRD finance
ministers agreed to double the bank's capital to ECU 20b, from
1998.
COM (94) 361 final, p. 17.
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The EBRD is the first multilateral organization obliaed
to link loans to political conditionality.° Only countries
that are committed to and applying the principles of
multiparty democracy, pluralism, and market economics are
eligible for loans. To determine whether reforms are being
effected, the EBRD will assess progress towards free
elections, representative government, separation between state
and political parties, an independent judiciary, free speech,
and equal protection under the law for minorities. 2" The
EBRD's loans mostly finance private sector investment (while
other regional banks lend mostly to the state sector).
CONCLUS ION
To a remarkable degree, the member states have agreed on
a common, consistent policy towards Eastern Europe. They made
compromises in the name of a Community endeavor; they allowed
the EC to extend its competence to areas (cooperation
agreements; loans; aid) where its role had previously been
limited or non-existent; they allowed the Community, and
Commission, to take the lead in relations with Eastern Europe;
and they used conditionality in an attempt to encourage and
support the reform process.
The principles (specificity, conditionality) and basic
objectives (support for economic and political reform) of the
°Menkveld 1991, p. 52 and Peter Urin, "'Do As I Say, Not
As I Do': The Limits of Political Conditionality", in Georg
Sorensen, Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, 1993),
p. 67.
'Political Aspects of the Mandate of the Euro pean Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD publication (no
date). The principle that loan recipients must be
implementing reforms was pushed by the US and Japan. Xenkveld
1991, pp. 52-53.
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Community's policy had already been made fairly clear before
the revolutions swept through Eastern Europe. But while the
trade and cooperation agreements may have been appropriate
instruments in a "pre-revolutionary" era, they were clearly
inadequate in late 1989. The Community tried to rise to the
occasion, rapidly setting up aid programs and other
initiatives, and eliminating many trade barriers.
The member states realized that they could not possibly
face the challenge posed by the collapse of communism
separately. The most appropriate policy instruments with
which they could respond to the events in Eastern Europe were
either under the Community's jurisdiction (trade) or more
efficiently and effectively wielded by it (a large aid
program). In a confusing, fast-moving period, the member
states allowed the Commission to lead, although they
subsequently tried to rein it in.
Externalization seems to fit here. The Community was the
entity to which the reforming East European states turned for
assistance, and to a great extent, the Community responded
collectively to the East European requests. But there is also
a case for the self-styled logic: by applying conditionality,
the Community was using its instruments to encourage the East
European countries to undertake reforms.
As the revolutionary dust settled in Eastern Europe,
however, the Community was forced to rethink its policy: the
myriad initiatives launched in late 1989 were still not going
to be enough. Europe had changed fundamentally, and its
institutional architecture would have to adapt. Enlargement
of the Community became a key issue.
ChAPTER 5
THE COMMUNITY'S POLICYs ASSOCIATION AND INTEGRATION
It rapidly became apparent that the policy instruments
discussed in chapter 4 - the trade arrangements and the aid
program - would be insufficient for reaching the Community's
objectives in Eastern Europe. The East European countries
were demanding closer relations and most of all, eventual
Community membership. Many in Western and Eastern Europe
argued that the reform efforts would continue, even as they
caused hardship, only if the Community promised that the East
European states could eventually become members and
established closer, more formal ties with them. The Community
thus had to decide to tighten its links with countries whose
democratic and capitalist credentials were still uncertain,
yet the success of the reforms was perceived to depend on such
a decision.
Within the Community, there was a consensus in favor of
concluding association agreements with the reforming East
European states. But a debate revolved around whether, and
when, the East European states should join the EU. As the
East Europeans' primary objective was Community membership,
the member states had to devise a collective response, in what
could almost be a textbook case of externalization. In June
1993, the member states agreed that the East European
associates could join. Yet here too, the self-styled logic
seems to fit: the EU stipulated membership conditions and then
set up an innovative and extensive 'structured relationship'
to integrate gradually the associates into the EU.
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The first section of this chapter will discuss the
incorporation of East Germany into the Community. East
European demands for Community membership had particular
resonance because East Germany had been swept quickly into the
Community as part of unified Germany: why then couldn't the
other East European countries join the Community? Section
5.2 will introduce the widening vs. deepening debate, which
was initially resolved by deciding to conclude association
agreements with the East European countries. In section 5.3,
the negotiations with the East European states on association
agreements will be discussed. The agreements did not fully
answer East European demands for better market access and a
clear perspective on enlargement; in section 5.4, the
Community's debate over how to answer those demands will be
covered. Section 5.5 will discuss the pre-accession strategy
to prepare the associates for EU membership.
5.1 EAST GERXMY'8 INCORPORATION INTO THE EC
The Community had little or no influence over the process
of German unification. The external dimension of German unity
was handled in the 2+4 framework, consisting of the four World
War II allies and the two Germanies. EPC was not involved at
all. It was in the 2+4 forum that crucial Soviet acceptance
of German unification and German membership of NATO was
obtained.' But early on, the Community accepted the prospect
'Barbara Lippert and Rosalind Stevens-Ströhmann, German
Unification and EC Inteqration: German and British
Perstectives (London: Pinter, 1993), pp. 17-24. The Treaty on
the Final Settlement with respect to Germany was signed in
Moscow on 12 September 1990 by both Germanies, the Soviet
Union, the US, France and the UK. It came into force on 15
March 1991.
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of German unification, thus sending an important signal that
the GDR would be welcome in the Community.
The full story of German unification has been covered
elsewhere; the process will only be briefly reviewed here.
Section 5.1.1 will discuss the Community's policy towards East
Germany and section 5.1.2 will review the GDR's incorporation
into the EC. This had a significant impact on the Community's
relations with the other East European states.
5.1.1 Community Policy Toward. The GDR
The GDR had always been a "special case" in the
Community's relations with third states. Of the MEA states,
it had been one of the most antagonistic towards the
Community, yet its goods could be exported to West Germany
without being subject to EC customs regulations. But in June
1988 (when the EC-eMEA agreement was signed), the GDR
expressed interest in reaching a trade agreement with the
Community that would not interfere with the protocol on inter-
German trade. 2 By the time the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November
1989, the Commission had not even asked for a negotiating
mandate.
Immediately after the Wall fell, the Community
concentrated on concluding an agreement with the GDR and
extending PHARE aid, just as it was doing with the other East
European states. On 17 November, the GDR requested that
negotiations begin on a trade and cooperation agreement; on 21
December, the Council gave the Commission a mandate to
2See Aaence Europe no. 4814, 30 June 1988.
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negotiate an agreement. 3 It was similar to the other East
European agreements: a ten-year agreement providing for the
lifting of all quantitative restrictions by 1995 and
cooperation in several areas. Negotiations went quickly: the
agreement was initialled on 13 March 1990. The Council
concluded it on 8 May, but it never entered into effect
because in the meantime, Germany was unified.
In July 1990, the G-24 voted to extend aid to the GDR,
and in September, PHARE aid was also extended. 	 Upon
unification, the former GDR became ineligible for PHARE and G-
24 assistance.5
5.1.2 Widening The Community
The fall of the Berlin Wall posed a particular challenge
because it immediately raised the question of German
unification and therefore the inclusion of the East German
lander in the Community. After long proclaiming its desire to
overcome the division of Europe, the Community could hardly
oppose unification. Several member states, however, were less
than enthusiastic about the prospect. But the Commission very
early on realized unification was likely, and acted to control
the implications for the Community.
Less than a month before the Wall came down, Delors had
argued that the right of self-determination applied to
3Aaence Eurot,e no. 5134, 18 November 1989 and EC Bulletin
no. 12, 1989, pt. 2.2.32.
4Acience Europe no. 5213, 14 March 1990.
5Regulation 3800/91 (OJ L 357, 28 December 1991) takes the
GDR off the list of PHARE beneficiaries. The eastern lander
became eligible for structural funds: an extra ECU 3b in
structural funds was set aside for the former GDR between 1991
and 1993.
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everyone. The 'German question' could be resolved by
strengthening the federalist features of the Community.' In
late 1989 and early 1990, the Commission's stance on
unification remained constant, while several member states
vacillated .7
The Commission reacted quite quickly to the fall of the
Berlin Wall. After a special meeting on 10 and 11 November,
it acknowledged that the GDR was a special case and that there
were essentially two prospects: either the GDR would join the
EC as the 13th member state, or it would join as part of the
Federal Republic. This differed from the position of some
member states; at that time, Thatcher was only envisaging an
association agreement with the GDR. 9 France was also
initially uncertain about the prospect of unification.' 0 The
EP preferred accession of the GDR in its own right, because of
'"Address by Mr Jacques Delors at the College of Europe
in Bruges" in EC Bulletin no. 10, 1989, pt. 3.2.1.
7At Delors' last European Council, in December 1994 in
Essen, Kohl praised him for being "the man who said yes to
German unity without hesitation." Andrew Marshall, "EU Closer
to Letting in Central Europeans", The Independent, 12 December
1994. On the Kohl-Delors friendship, see Grant 1994, pp. 139-
142.
Acence Europe no. 5131, 15 November 1989.
9Thatcher in fact sought to slow down German unification
through 1990 (particularly since it was soon coupled with
deeper European integration), but could not convince the US or
France to support her. Thatcher 1993, pp. 792-799 and pp.
813-815.
'°And Franco-German relations were rocky until January
1990, when Kohl took a stand on the Polish border issue (the
Oder-Neisse line) and called for close Franco-Gernian
cooperation to push for deeper European integration. Lippert
and Stevens-Ströhmann 1993, pp. 16-17.
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the implications for representation."
The extraordinary European Council summit on 18 November
1989 did not discuss German unification. Kohl apparently
reassured the other leaders that West Germany was not being
distracted by events in the east from its commitment to West
European integration.'2 But Kohl then appeared inclined to
act unilaterally: on 28 November, he announced a 10-point
plan, without consulting any of his neighbors or EC partners
first, which envisioned a confederation of the two Germanies
in the medium term.D
Kohl's move dismayed many, but particularly France,
Germany's supposedly closest partner. France, however, took
advantage of the row to push Germany into agreeing to convene
an intergovernmental conference (IGC) on Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), one of France's goals for its EC Presidency. At
the Strasbourg European Council on 8 and 9 December, Germany
agreed that the IGC would begin in December 1990, in exchange
for France's agreement on the principle of German
unification.'4	The European Council then accepted the
"If the balance among the member states within the
institutions remained the same, the extra 16 million citizens
from the GDR would not be represented. Lippert and Stevens-
Ströhmann 1993, p. 14.
'2Ian Davidson, Robert Mauthner and David Buchan, "EC
Heads Pledge Economic Help for Eastern Europe", The Financial
Times, 20 November 1989.
Ten-Point Program for Overcoming the Division of
Germany and Europe", reprinted in Harold James and Marla
Stone, eds., When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German
Unification (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 33-41.
14David Spence, Enlaraement Without Accession: The EC's
Response to German Unification, RIIA Discussion Paper no. 36
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p.
8, and "Deeper, still, and deeper", The Economist, 16 December
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prospect of German unification, under certain conditions,
indicating implicitly that the GDR could be integrated into
the Community. It declared:
We seek the strengthening of the state of peace in
Europe in which the German people will regain its
unity through free self-determination. This process
should take place peacefully and democratically, in
full respect of the relevant agreements and treaties
and of all the principles defined by the Helsinki
Final Act, in a context of dialogue and East/West
cooperation. It also has to be placed in the
perspective of European integration.'3
Explicit acceptance of the GDR's incorporation into the
Community still took some time. In January 1990, Delors
stated that "there is a place for East Germany in the
Community should it so wish", provided the conditions set in
the Strasbourg European Council's declaration were met." But
at an informal foreign ministers meeting on 20 January 1990,
some member states, including the Netherlands and Belgium,
felt that the GDR should be treated like the other East
European states. Even if the GDR's particularity was
acknowledged, there was a general reluctance to contemplate
German unification in the short run.'7 Events, however,
conspired otherwise.
An alliance advocating rapid unification won the East
German elections on 18 March 1990. Both German governments
1989.
'5"Statement Concerning Central and Eastern Europe",
Document no. 89/314, EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol. 5, no.
2, 1989.
"Address to the EP by Delors, in EC Bulletin SuDlement
1/90.
'7Even Genscher argued that if the GDR asked to join the
Community, then the EC should examine the request before 1993.
Aence Eurooe no. 5177, 22/23 January 1990.
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then agreed to achieve German economic and monetary union on
1 July 1990, without consulting the Community first.0 Kohl
then met with the Commission on 23 March to discuss the
implications of unification for the EC and agreed to liaise
with it on the unification negotiations.19
The increasingly dominant view in the Community favored
integrating East Germany via unification with West Germany.
In March, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas noted that it
would be easier to integrate East Germany in that way than to
allow it to join as the 13th member state. 2° "It was
politically more expedient to treat German unification not as
an accession, but as an expansion of the territory of an
existing member state."2'
The Commission's report on the effects of German
unification on the Community, presented on 18 April, reflected
this. It would not be necessary to revise the EC treaties
or to conduct formal membership negotiations under article 237
of the Rome Treaty if East and West Germany were to unite.
The Commission foresaw a three-stage process of integrating
18Lippert and Stevens-Ströhmann 1993, pp. 24-25.
'9Agence EuroDe no. 5214, 15 March 1990 and no. 5221, 24
March 1990. In February 1990, the Commission had formed
several special working groups to study the implications of
German unification and make arrangements for the GDR's
"accession". Lippert and Stevens-Ströhmann 1993, p. 26.
20Françoise de La Serre and Christian Lequesne, "France
and the European Union", in Cafruny and Rosenthal, eds. 1993,
p. 146.
21Spence 1991, p. 9.
"The Community and German Unification" in "The European
Community and Germany Unification", EC Bulletin SuDlement
4/90.
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East Germany into the Community, beginning with German
economic and monetary union on 1 July l99O and ending with
the full application of all EC laws on the former GDR
territory. In the transition period, the East German l&nder
would enjoy a derogation from certain EC laws until the end of
1992 (and the entry into force of the single European market).
The Commission fudged on the issue of how much unification
would cost the EC.
The report was adopted by the extraordinary European
Council in Dublin on 28 April 1990, called specifically to
discuss German unification and relations with Eastern Europe.
The Community thus accepted that no changes would be made to
the EC treaties to incorporate the former GDR.
The two Germanies held negotiations on the unification
treaty from 6 July to 31 August 1990. The head of the
Commission's special task force on unification took part in
On 1 July 1990, the GDR adopted the CCP, including the
Commons Customs Tariff. Goods imported into the GDR became
subject to the same rules as those imported into the FRG. GDR
products could circulate within the Community if they complied
with EC rules. The EIB, ECSC and Euratom could extend loans
to East Germany, according to the same eligibility criteria
applied to other member states. Commission of the European
Communities, London Office, "Background Report: The European
Community and German Unification", 2 October 1990, and Acence
Europe no. 5287, 2/3 July 1990 and no. 5288, 4 July 1990.
'4The summit also discussed a possible intergovernmental
conference on political union. "Statement Concerning the
Dublin European Council Meeting of 28 and 29 April 1990",
Document no. 90/195, EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol 6, 1990.
The EP agreed with the report, although this meant it
relinquished its power of assent on membership applications;
instead, the cooperation procedure was used to approve the
transitional measures. Benno Teschke, "The Incorporation of
the Five New Lander into the European Community: Political,
Legal and Economic Aspects", European Access, no. 2, April
1992, p. 8.
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the talks. Since the 2+4 talks were to end on 12 September,
Bonn decided to accelerate unification, bringing the date
forward from 1 January 1991 to 3 October 1990. As a result,
the EC's legislative process had to be speeded up. On 6
September, the trio of EC presidents - EP President Enrique
Baron Crespo, Delors, and Italian Foreign Minister and Council
President Gianni De Michelis - set the timetable to push
through several extraordinary provisional measures. By 17
September, the special measures were approved by both the EP
and Council. 2' The final legislative package for integrating
the GDR into the Community was adopted on 4 December and
entered into force on 1 January l99l.
German unification had an important implication for the
Community's policy towards Eastern Europe: it represented the
logical end-point of the attempts to encourage reform in
Eastern Europe - enlargement of the Community. Timothy Garton
Ash asked the obvious question: "if East Germany can join,
why, in logic or justice, should not Czechoslovakia?" 2' The
Lippert and Stevens-Ströhmann 1993, p. 25.
2'Spence 1991, pp. 23-24. The cooperative nature of
Cominission-EP relations helped to smooth approval of the legal
provisions. Lippert and Stevens-Ströhmann 1993, pp. 28-30.
Teschke 1992, pp. 8-9. Germany had agreed that the
balance among the member states in the institutions would
remain the same. The EP, however, felt that in the name of
democracy, the 16 million additional citizens had to be
represented in the EP. In July 1990, it decided that the
population of the soon-to-be former GDR would be represented
by 18 non-voting observers (Lippert and Stevens-Ströhmann
1993, pp. 33-36). No final decision on EP representation
could be reached until the December 1992 European Council. In
the June 1994 EP elections, the UK, France and Italy each
elected 87 MEPS, Germany 99.
2'Timothy Garton Ash, "Poor but Clubbable", The
Independent, 19 January 1990.
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former East Germany fulfilled an aspiration repeatedly
expressed by the other East European states, Community
membership, and moreover, did so quickly. "This was a
fascinating example of the Community's ability to act
effectively and rapidly, provided that the political will to
do so exists." In this case, the political will arose to
prevent German unification from wrecking the Community and the
Western security order: the will existed "to provide a
framework of increased European integration that would ensure
limits to Germany's power". 3° But because the event was so
exceptional, it was questionable whether the political will
would be found to integrate the other East European states.
A debate over "widening versus deepening" has since dominated
the formulation of policy towards Eastern Europe.
5.2 WIDENING VS. DEEPENING: ROUND ONE
Article 237 of the Rome Treaty states that any European
state may apply to become a member of the Community. During
the Cold War, eligibility was not such a troublesome issue:
"As long as the Soviet Union drew the line between Eastern and
Western Europe, the question of Europe's institutional limits
was containable." 3' Where the Community's boundaries should
lie in the post-Cold War era has been much more difficult to
establish.
Spence 1991, p. 1.
30Spence 1991, p. 1.
31william Wallace, "From Twelve to Twenty-Four? The
Challenges to the EC Posed by the Revolutions in Eastern
Europe", in Cohn Crouch and David Marquand, eds., Towards
Greater EuroDe? A Continent Without an Iron Curtain (Oxford:
B].ackwehl, 1992), p. 40.
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Soon after they came into power, the new leaders of most
of the East European states declared that their number one
foreign policy priority was to "rejoin Europe", and membership
in the Community was the most sought-after prize. In May
1990, Czechoslovak Prime Minister Marian Calfa said he hoped
that his country would be a full EC member by 2000." Two
months later, Hungary's prime minister, Jozsef Antall,
announced that his country wanted to join by 1995."
The East European countries argued that they should be
allowed to join the European integration process from which
they had been forcefully excluded.M Community membership had
helped to consolidate democracy in Greece, Spain, and
Portugal, so it could be expected to do the same in Eastern
Europe. The prospect of membership would help alleviate
'internal' security threats - particularly the social
pressures stemming from the costs of the economic transition.
Jiri Dienstbier, then Czechoslovak foreign minister, asserted
that "association with and eventual full membership in the EC
of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland is a basic precondition
for stability and security in Central Europe."35
In the near future, however, Community membership for the
32David Usborne, "EC Takes Steps to a New Europe", Thg
Independent, 8 May 1990. He had just signed a trade and
cooperation agreement with the Community.
"John Palmer, "Hungarians Join The Growing Queue for EC
Membership", The Guardian, 18 July 1990.
See Tibor Palankai, The European Community and Central
European Intecration: The Hungarian Case, Occasional Paper
Series no. 21 (New York: Institute for East-West Security
Studies, 1991), pp. 19-20.
35Jiri Dienstbier, "Central Europe's Security", Foreicm
Policy, no. 83, Summer 1991, p. 127.
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East European states could not possibly be an option. Even
the three fastest reformers, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland, would encounter enormous problems. Their economies
were too weak to be able to compete within the EC. In eastern
Germany, economic activity had virtually collapsed after
unification. "The process of German reunification provides
considerable evidence that in their own interests, East
European States require a long transitional period before
acceding to the EC."3'
The former GDR, however, benefitted from substantial help
from western Germany; such resources were not available for
the other East European states. In January 1990, Delors
pointed out that if the East European states were eligible for
EC structural funds, they would receive ECU 14b a year, plus
ECU 5b in EIB loans. This indicated not only the scale of
assistance needed by the East European states (compare this to
the 1990 PHARE budget of ECU 500m) but also the impracticality
of enlargement before their economies were in better shape.
Further enlargement raised much more serious difficulties
than past enlargements. The queue of applicants was growing,
such that the Community could easily double its membership.
The Community's institutions and decision-making procedures
would have to be reformed; the CAP and structural funds would
need to be rehauled if poorer states were to join. Otherwise,
the Community risked ineffectiveness, decreasing legitimacy,
and possible irrelevancy.
Teschke 1992, p. 10.
37Presentation of the Commission's 1990 program, in
Bulletin SuDlement 1/90, pp. 6-8.
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But within the Community, these virtually intractable
'internal' issues were initially pushed aside. Instead, in
1989-1990, the debat. took place between "wideners" and
"deepeners". On one side were those who argued that deepening
must occur before any further widening. The right response to
a more powerful united Germany was further "deepening" and
specifically political union. In addition, without a common
foreign, security, and defense policy, the Community would be
unable to influence the course of events in Eastern Europe.
French and Italian leaders, and Commission officials were
among those making these arguments. France in particular
insisted on deeper integration in response to German
unification.
On the other side were those who argued that deepening
could effectively exclude East European countries for decades,
as they would have to reach higher economic and political
objectives before joining. "Widening" the Community to
include the East European states should occur before further
integration took place. The UK's more enthusiastic reception
of East European membership demands was seen as a strategy for
delaying - or blocking - deepening. West Germany straddled
both positions: it strongly supported further integration, but
also supported eventual membership for the new democracies.4°
Spence 1991, pp. 1-8.
Anna Xichalski and Helen Wallace, The Eurotean
Community: The Challenge of Enlarement (London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1992), pp. 11-12.
40lnterestingly, Genscher may have initially opposed
deepening, because it would delay widening to East European
countries; heavily criticized, he was forced to change his
stance.	 John Eiserthammer, "Weakened for the Strasbourg
224
In 1990, this first round of the widening vs. deepening
debate was resolved by proceeding with deepening and
associating the East European countries to the Community. Two
IGC5 were held during 1991, one on EMU and the other on
political union; they resulted in the Maastricht Treaty.4'
The Community also decided to conclude association
agreements with the reforming East European countries. In the
fall of 1989, Genscher in particular pushed for association.
On 14-15 October 1989, the foreign ministers and the
Commission held a special meeting during which the new
political architecture of Europe was discussed. Genscher
called for new models of association with Eastern Europe to be
devised; Delors suggested that the same kind of close links
being forged with EFTA could be forged with Poland and
Hungary 42
At the Paris summit of Community leaders on 18 November
1989, Delors presented the Commission's proposals for the
Scruin", The Independent, 8 November 1989.
41The East European countries did worry that the
Maastricht Treaty would delay their entry into the Community
because it would take longer for them to prepare for
membership. See, for example, Jolanta Adamiec, East-Central
Europe and the European Community : The Polish Perspective,
RIIA Discussion Paper no. 47 (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1993), pp. 8-11.
42George Graham, "EC Ministers Agree on Urgent Visits to
East Europe", The Financial Times, 16 October 1989 and Aence
Europe no. 5112, 16/17 October 1989. In January 1989, the
realization that enlargement could impede internal dynamics,
and specifically the completion of the single European market,
had prompted Delors to try to 'preempt' membership
applications from EFTA members. He proposed setting up a
European Economic Area, a formal, institutional partnership
between the Community and EFTA. Negotiations began in June
1990; the EEA treaty was signed in May 1992. After the Swiss
rejected it in a referendum in December 1992, the treaty wad
revised. It finally entered into force on 1 January 1994.
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Community's new Ostøolitik.' It would be based on three
concentric circles: the EC, EFTA (linked by the European
Economic Area, or EEA) and Eastern Europe. The EC, at the
center, would be strongly integrated. 	 A new kind of
association agreement should be concluded with the reforming
East European states, even if they remained members of the
Warsaw Pact.d The European Council in Strasbourg the
following month agreed that the association concept should be
David Usborne, "Delors Frames EC 'Ostpolitik'",
Independent, 16 November 1989. On their trip to Warsaw and
Budapest, 16-18 November, Delors and Dumas had raised the
possibility of association with the Polish and Hungarian
governments. See section 4.1.
The Soviet Union had a very different place in the
concentric circles scheme. The Commission argued that the
trade and cooperation agreement, concluded on 18 December
1989, was the appropriate framework for relations, and the
member states agreed. Aaence Euro pe no. 5187, 5/6 February
1990. The Community supported the development of the CSCE,
which would involve the Soviet Union in a pan-European
security structure. In 1991, a technical and financial
assistance program to the CIS, TACIS, with a budget about half
that of PHARE, was set up. After the Soviet Union broke up,
the Council on 2 March 1992 ruled out membership or
association for the former Soviet republics, with the
exception of the three Baltic states. Instead, the Community
would conclude less ambitious "partnership and cooperation"
agreements (which included political dialogue) with them.
Council Secretariat, Press Release 4934/92 (presse 28), 2
March 1992. Negotiations proceeded slowly and erratically,
given the state of confusion in the CIS. Agreements were
signed with Ukraine on 14 June 1994, Russia on 26 June 1994,
Moldova on 28 November 1994, Kazakhstan on 23 January 1995,
Kyrgyzstan on 9 February 1995, and Belarus on 6 March 1995.
An interim trade agreement with Russia was put on ice after
the Chechnya crisis, but the European Council in June 1995
decided to sign it. See The European Commission, London
Office, "Background Report: The European Union and the New
Independent States of the Ex-USSR", ISEC/B20/94. Agreements
with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were signed in April
1996.
4Sme Warsaw Pact existed until spring 1991, although it
was defunct before then.
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studied further.4'
Insights from externalization and the self-styled logic
can be applied to the decision on association. On the one
hand, association agreements were a response to East European
demands for better market access and closer ties with the
Community. On the other, they would add to the Community's
policy instruments, and would place its relations with Eastern
Europe on "a more secure and coherent footing"' 7, which the
trade and cooperation agreements could not do.
More fundamentally, concentric circles would resolve the
widening vs. deepening dilemma, at least in the short run. In
fact, David Allen maintains that Genscher developed the
concentric circle concept "in a bid to meet the demands of
many of his EC partners that Germany pushes ahead with
integration while at the same time not closing the EC of f from
the states in the East." 4' Another group of observers argues
that "Concentric circles is a compromise in the sense that it
includes Eastern Europe in Europe, but it retains a major
difference between the EC as a core actor and those who are
led and helped by it." 49 France and the Commission favored a
strong Community conducting an active Ost politik; Germany
wanted to erase the border between Eastern and Western Europe
as soon as possible.
4'EC Bulletin no. 12, 1989, pt. 1.1.14.
'7pinder 1991, p. 59.
4'David Allen, "West European Responses to Change in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", in Rummel, ed. 1992, p. 122.
49Barry Buzan, et al., The EuroDean Security Order Recast:
Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 1990), p.
209.
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Association could be considered in two ways: as a
stepping-stone to EC membership, or as a long-term solution
for the future architecture of Europe, a way to stem
enlargement. The new associates clearly believed the former
proposition; France clearly supported the latter. 5° Only the
association agreements with Greece and Turkey had mentioned
the possibility of membership5' (and only Greece eventually
became a member), while the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, and
Portugal had not concluded association agreements before they
joined the Community. Genscher, however, had envisaged the
possibility that states could move from one concentric circle
to another, as they met basic conditions for Community
membership 52
One observer has argued that in deciding on association,
the Community was relying on well-established instruments
already used in its relations with other states. 53 But the
association agreements contain novel elements, notably an
institutionalized political dialogue TM, and are to help
50See: de La Serre and Lequesne 1993, p. 156; Josef C.
Brada, "The European Community and Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland", RFE/RL Research Institute, Retort on Eastern
Europe, vol. 2, no. 49, 6 December 1991, p. 29; and Istv&n
Kormendy, "The Hungarian View: An EC Associate's Perspective
from Central Europe", in Rummel, ed. 1992, p. 243.
51This proved embarrassing when Turkey actually applied to
join in 1987; many were thus wary about even promising
eventual membership. See Michaiski and Wallace 1992, pp. 120-
124.
52Allen 1992, pp. 122-123.
53Kramer 1993, p. 234.
34Bilateral political dialogues with Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Poland began in 1990, at their request. Meetings
were held once each presidency in the capital of the
Community's president, between the political director of each
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integrate the associates into the Community. Other observers
have argued that the Community's policy, and particularly the
association instrument, has essentially been aimed at avoiding
the membership question. But association can be seen more
positively than a stance to put of f enlargement, which in
1990-1991, was much too early to consider seriously anyway.
Françoise de La Serre views it as a "model capable of
overcoming the dilemma of broadening versus deepening of the
Community.... (It] is the first step toward a reorganization of
the European space around the EC."' Enlargement in the near
future was not realistic; in the meantime, the Community, had
to draw the East European states closer, to address their
demands for closer ties and ensure their reforms succeeded.
Concentric circles was an innovative way to address the many
internal and external exigencies facing the Community in the
immediate post-Cold War period.
5.3 THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS
In section 5.3.1, the development of the association
proposal will be traced. Section 5.3.2 will cover the
negotiations on the agreements. In section 5.3.3, the content
country concerned and the political directors of the
presidency and the Commission. This was lighter than the
troika machinery, and took place at a relatively low level.
Nuttall 1992, pp. 292-293.
55See Redmond 1993, p. 221, and J.X.C. Rollo and Helen
Wallace, "New Patterns of Partnership", in Gianni Bonvicini,
et al., The Community and the Emerin European Democracies:
A Joint Policy Report (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1991), p. 64.
Françoise de La Serre (1991a), "The EC and Central and
Eastern Europe", in Leon Hurwitz and Christian Lequesne, eds.,
The State of the Eurooean Communit y : Politics. Institutions.
and Debates in the Transition Years 1989-1990 (Harlow:
Longman, 1991), p. 311.
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of the Europe agreements will be reviewed.
5.3.1 D.v.loping the Association Concept
In January 1990, the incoming Irish Presidency gave a
clear statement of the Community's policy towards Eastern
Europe:
the Twelve intend to develop with the countries of
Eastern Europe, in so far as they are committed to
the path of democratic change, closer and more
substantial relations, based upon an intensification
of political dialogue and increased cooperation in
all areas. A major aim of this policy is support
and encouragement for the establishment of free,
open and democratic societies in which the full
enjoyment of human rights is guaranteed by the rule
of law.
The "closer and more substantial relations" entailed
association. In a series of reports in 1990, the Commission
further developed the association idea. It pushed for further
steps to be taken due to the pace of change in Eastern Europe,
the expectations of East Europeans, and "the Community's own
interests in the political and economic future of Europe..."
It advocated moving quickly to association: "Early approval of
the goal of association will contribute to political
stability, encourage the development of new instruments for
Foreign Minister Gerard Collins, "Statement on the
Programme of Activities of the Irish Presidency", Document no.
90/001, EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol. 6, 1990. The Irish
presidency was also keen on ensuring consistency: it organized
two meetings on Eastern Europe in which the foreign ministers
participated in both their Council and EPC capacities, and
were joined by the Permanent Representatives and Political
Directors. They took place on 20 January and 21 April 1990.
Nuttall 1992, p. 278. The Irish presidency also began the
practice of merging the agendas of EPC and EC Council meetings
(see chapter 1).
Coiiuuunication from the Commission to the Council:
Implications of Recent Chanaes in Central and Eastern EuroDe
for the Community's Relations with the Countries Concerned,
SEC (90) 111 final, 23 January 1990, p. 5.
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cooperation and strengthen confidence on the part of economic
operators. "
At its extraordinary summit on 28 April, the European
Council affirmed the Commission's proposal for three stages of
Community policy towards Eastern Europe: the PHARE and G24 aid
programs; the trade and cooperation agreements; and
association.'° Future associates would have to fulfill basic
economic and political conditions: democratization and
transition towards a market economy.6'
In late August 1990, the Commission presented a much more
detailed report on "second-generation" association agreements.
The agreements were to be called Europe agreements, "to mark
the importance of the political initiative which they
represent."'2 The Europe agreements were to be much more
overtly political than previous association agreements. They
were to: create a climate of confidence and stability favoring
reform and allowing the development of close political
"The Development of the CoBununity's Relations with the
Countries of Central and Eastern EuroDe, SEC (90) 196 final,
1 February 1990, p. 6.
60"Statement Concerning the Dublin European Council
Meeting of 28 and 29 April 1990", Document no. 90/195, EPC
Documentation Bulletin, vol. 6, 1990. On the Commission's
proposal, see Aaence Eurote no. 5239, 21 April 1990.
"Presidency Conclusions: Special Meeting of the European
Council, Dublin, 28 April 1990", in Annex, Aence Eurooe no.
5245, 30 April/i May 1990.
62Commission of the European Communities, Association
Agreements with the Countries of Central and Eastern EuroDe:
A General Outline, COIl (90) 398 final, 27 August 1990, p. 1.
The term "Europe agreements" apparently arose out of a dinner
conversation between Delors and the Polish prime minister in
early February 1990; Delors said the EC wanted to put the
"European" flag in each country. Interview with DG IA
official, 12 March 1996.
231
relations; strengthen the foundations of the new European
architecture; improve the climate for trade and investment;
and help the East European countries better manage the
transition process. Membership was not an objective.
Each association agreement would be adjusted for each
country, thus maintaining specificity. An institutional
framework for political dialogue would be set up. A free
trade area would be established, but the Community would open
up first.	 Financial support would be provided on a
multiannual basis, in a mix of grants and loans.
Prospective associates would have to give "practical
evidence of their commitment" to five conditions: the rule of
law, human rights, a multi-party system, free and fair
elections, and a market economy. Only Czechoslovakia, Hungary
and Poland initially met the requirements."
5.3.2 Negotiating th. Europe Agreements
Implementation of the association policy was not a smooth
process, hampered by the member states' protectionism. The
negotiations on Europe agreements all encountered numerous
difficulties. The member states were very reticent to make
concessions, especially on trade; the East European states,
after all, were still developing free market economies.
Domestic economic interest groups seemed to be able to block
An official in DG I said that there had been discussion
within the Commission as to whether one Europe agreement or
three separate ones should be negotiated. But the three East
European countries refused a single agreement. Interview took
place on 21 June 1994 in Brussels.
"COM (90) 398 final, pp. 1-2. These are the five
conditions that had been set for G-24 assistance (see chapter
4), but future associates had to prove they were making
progress in meeting them.
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liberalization. What is significant, however, is that
eventually the member states did give in, after much prodding
by the Commission and free-trade advocates, including of
course, the East European states.
Table 5.1
Europe Agreement., 1991-1993
Europe	 Europe	 In	 Official Interim
agt.	 agt.	 force Journal agt. in
signed	 concluded	 refer,	 force (03
__________ _________ __________ _______ _________ refer.)
Poland	 16/12/91 13/12/93	 1/2/94 L348	 1/3/92
31/12/93 (L1l4
___________ __________ ___________ ________ __________ 30/4/92)
Hungary	 16/12/91 13/12/93	 1/2/94 L347	 1/3/92
31/12/93 (Ll16
___________ __________ ___________ ________ __________ 30/4/92)
CSFR	 16/12/91	 ---	 ---	 ---	 1/3/92
(L115
___________ __________ ___________ ________ __________ 30/4/92)
Czech	 4/10/93	 19/12/94	 1/2/95 L360
republic__________ ___________ ________ 31/12/94 ___________
Slovakia 4/10/93	 19/12/94	 1/2/95 L359
___________ __________ ___________ ________ 3 1/12/94 ____________
Romania	 1/2/93	 19/12/94	 1/2/95 L357	 1/5/93
31/12/94 (L81
___________ __________ ___________ ________ __________ 2/4/93)
Bulgaria 8/3/93	 19/12/94	 1/2/95 L358	 31/12/93
31/12/ 94 (L323
___________ __________ ___________ _______ __________ 23/12/93)
Sources: EC Bulletin, Official Journal
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland
Negotiations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland
opened on 20, 21 and 22 December 1990.66 The Commission
The interim trade agreement with Czechoslovakia
continued to regulate trade relations between the Community
and the Czech republic and Slovakia.
66Acience EuroDe no. 5396, 20 December 1990. The
negotiations were carried out with each country separately.
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negotiated the agreements, even though they were to include a
strong political cooperation element, but the Presidency sat
beside the Commission negotiators. According to a
Commission official, this was not so unusual, because the SEA
specified the need for consistency in the Community's
relations with third countries."
During the protracted negotiations, several problems
arose over market access, especially for the 'sensitive'
products, agricultural, steel, and textile products. The
three East European states maintained that the association
agreements differed little from the trade and cooperation
agreements.'9 The attempt to keep association separate from
membership also blocked agreement. The East Europeans
demanded persistently that a reference be made in the
agreements to future accession to the EC. 7° After three
rounds of talks, the negotiations were deadlocked.
To juinpstart the negotiations, the Commission proposed
revising the negotiating mandates, On 15 April 1991, the
Council agreed, probably because the member states were aware
'Interview with Commission negotiator, 12 March 1996.
The negotiator says the Presidency was there because the
agreements were "mixed", but the Presidency never took the
floor. The talks on the political cooperation element,
however, took place in the Council Secretariat.
"Interview with DG I official, 21 June 1994. Prior to
the SEA, however, the Commission's involvement in negotiating
arrangements for political dialogue would have been limited,
to say the least. See Taylor 1983, pp. 121-132.
"David Buchan, "East Europe Hopes of EC Integration Being
Dashed", The Financial Times, 26 March 1991.
70For example, at the beginning of April, Polish President
Lech Walesa requested that the preamble refer to Poland's
future accession to the EC. EC Bulletin no. 4, 1991, pt.
1.3.3.
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that otherwise the talks could fail, and with them, a pillar
of the Community's policy towards Eastern Europe. The most
important change was that the preamble to the agreements could
mention that the ultimate, but not automatic, goal of the
associated states (not of the Community) is accession to the
Community; Germany and the UK in particular pushed for this.
The Community would offer somewhat better market access for
some agricultural products, textiles, and steel.7'
The Council's concessions were not enough. In mid-May,
the Polish deputy prime minister charged that EC protectionism
was harming Poland's comparative advantage in the sensitive
goods. 72 The sixth round of talks between the EC and Poland,
in July, was particularly contentious. Although the
Commission then indicated that it would probably be necessary
to change the mandate, the General Affairs Council on 29 July
put off a decision on revisions.74
The attempted coup in Moscow of 19-22 August 1991 jolted
the member states. It confirmed the precariousness of the
democratic transformation in the Soviet Union and raised fears
of a return to authoritarianism or nationalism. A more
nationalistic Soviet Union could try to reassert its influence
over Eastern Europe; the Community should thus draw the East
71David Buchan, "Brussels Opens Its Doors to Trade With
Eastern Europe", The Financial Times, 19 April 1991, and
Aence Europe no. 5473, 17 April 1991.
72Martin Delgado, "EC's Deaf Ear to Polish Trade Plea",
The European, 17 May 1991.
Aaence EuroDe no. 5534, 13 July 1991.
Aaence EuroDe no. 5545, 31 July 1991.
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European countries closer.75
An EPC statement condemned the coup attempt, and stated
that the Community and its member states wanted to conclude
the association agreements in the near future." The
Commission took advantage of the widespread shock and urged
the Council to make further trade concessions and strengthen
the political dialogue provisions. 7' The extraordinary
Council meeting on 27 August, however, postponed a decision
until 6 September.'
On 6 September, the Council considered the Commission's
proposals. Portugal objected to liberalizing textile trade,
but would drop its reservations in exchange for Community aid
to its textile producers. France, backed by Ireland and
Portugal, however, would not agree to concessions on meat
products. The meeting broke up abruptly, having reached no
decisions, and with all in a bad mood."
France was in a particularly sensitive position; its
75At this point in time, the Yugoslav war, which broke out
in June 1991, does not seem to have motivated the Community to
strengthen its relations with the East European countries.
But as the situation deteriorated and spread to Bosnia in
1992, concerns for minority rights and 'good neighborliness'
increasingly influenced the Community's policy. See chapter
6.
761n EC Bulletin no. 7/8 1991, pt. 1.4.19.
77EC Bulletin no. 9, 1991, pta. 1.3.13 and 1.3.16. In
August the three prospective associates had asked to be
included in political cooperation. David Buchan and David
Gardner, "A New Wave of Eastern Approaches: Eastern Europe is
Knocking on the EC's Door", The Financial Times, 6 September
1991.
"Agence EuroDe no. 5556, 30 August 1991.
'9Aaence Europe no. 5562, 7 September 1991 and no. 5563,
9/10 September 1991.
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farmers had regularly protested against concessions for East
European imports.'° The bovine meat market was depressed;
France had suffered because it is a big meat producer." But
France's move can best be seen as part of the negotiating
game, allowing it to gain favor with its farmers.'2
France came under much public pressure to back down. At
a press conference afterwards, Hans van den Broek, the Dutch
foreign minister and Council president, complained about the
attitude of one member state. A vital national interest could
not possibly be at stake when the quantity of meat in question
was so small.'3 Further public criticism of the French move
came from the Danish and UK prime ministers, and German
president.'4 Poland announced that negotiations could only
'0Belgian, German, Greek and Dutch farmers had also
demonstrated. Alexandra Frean, "Europe's Farmers Rebel",
EuroDean, 4 October 1991. While on holiday in France in the
summer of 1991, the Czechoslovak prime minister, Marian Calfa,
got caught up in a demonstration by French farmers against
East European imports; fortunately the demonstrators did not
know who he was. Buchan 1993, p. 98.
"Agence Europe no. 5576, 27 September 1991. The EC-level
interest groups, the Committee of Professional Agricultural
Organisations in the EC (COPA) and General Committee for
Agricultural Cooperation in the EC (COGECA), also objected to
the proposed concessions. In July, they suggested that the EC
should encourage the resumption of agricultural trade between
the Soviet Union and the East European countries. Aaence
Europe no. 5544, 29/30 July 1991.
'2Brada, "The EC and Czechoslovakia", p. 28.
'3Aaence Eurooe no. 5563, 9/10 September 1991. The
quantity was an extra 1400 tons of meat in a market where
yearly turnover is 7,000,000 tons. Brada, "The EC and
Czechoslovakia", p. 28.
'4Brada, "The EC and Czechoslovakia", p. 28. Just before
the meeting, Delors had attacked the reluctance to offer
further concessions: "It's no good making fine speeches with
a sob in your voice on Sunday, and then on Monday morning
opposing the trade concessions enabling those countries (in
Eastern Europe) to sell their goods and improve their living
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continue on the basis of an enlarged Commission mandate; the
next session would not be a formal one, but merely an expert-
level working meeting.'5
On 30 September, the Council met again and this time
reached a compromise, which was virtually the same one
discussed at the earlier meeting. Restrictions on textile
imports would be dropped within six years, and Portugal would
get EC aid. Triangular agreements would resolve the problem
of meat exports: any meat exports to the EC over and above a
10% increase per year would be paid for with EC aid but given
to the Soviet Union, Romania and Albania."
But a few final difficulties still plagued the
negotiators: Spain, among others, called for an additional
clause in which the associates undertook voluntary export
restrictions on steel. The Commission opposed this, and in
the end, Coreper worked out a compromise: the Commission would
monitor steel imports and the steel industry in the three
associates to ensure that state aids were not distorting
competition; no additional safeguard clause for steel was
standards." Buchan and Gardner, "A New Wave of Eastern
Approaches".
'5Agence Eurooe no. 5565, 12 September 1991. The meeting
on 19 September was held between the usual negotiators,
although Poland said it did not consider the meeting to be a
formal negotiating session. Acience Eurote no. 5570, 19
September 1991.
"A safeguard clause would also allow the EC to stop meat
imports if they seriously disrupted the market and EC health
provisions would be rigorously applied. Lucy Walker, "EC Opens
Trade Doors to the East", The Euroiean, 4 October 1991, and
Acience Europe no. 5578, 30 September/i October, 1991.
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included in the agreements."
The three Europe agreements were signed on 16 December
1991. Because they are "mixed" agreements, containing
provisions which do not fall under the Community's competence,
each member state had to approve them.'8 Pending this,
interim trade arrangements - consisting of the trade
provisions only and based on article 113 - entered into force
on 1 March 1992."
On 16 September 1992, the EP gave its assent to the
agreements with Hungary and Poland.'° The member states did
not, however, approve the agreements quickly. Only on 13
December 1993 did the Council conclude the two agreements;
they entered into force on 1 February 1994 (see table 5.1).
The breakup of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993
complicated matters. In September 1992, the EP refused to
assent to the agreement with Czechoslovakia due to the
country's impending division. 9' In April 1993, negotiations
on separate Europe agreements with both countries began. The
'7Acience Eurooe no. 5627, 11 December 1991. It should be
noted that Spain and Germany (generally known as an advocate
for free trade) were allowed to protect their coal industry
for four years, under the terms of the agreements.
UThe member states had to be parties to the agreements,
along with the Council on the Community side, because the
Council probably cannot conclude agreements providing for
political dialogue with third countries in its own capacity or
on behalf of the member states. See Horovitz 1990, pp. 278-
279, and footnote no. 78.
'9mese agreements needed only the Council's approval and
a favorable EP opinion.
'°EC Bulletin no. 9, 1992, pt. 1.3.11.
""MEPs Endorse Hungarian and Polish Association
Agreements", European Reoort no. 1796, 19 September 1992.
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agreements were signed on 4 October 1993, and the EP assented
to both on 27 October. They entered into force on 1
February 1995.
Bulgaria and Romania
Bulgaria and Romania had again been left in the slow
lane, because they did not meet the conditions for closer
relations with the Community. The EPC statement during the
attempted coup in the Soviet Union, however, declared that the
Commission would explore ways to expand cooperation with
Bulgaria and Romania. The Commission proposed negotiating
Europe agreements with Romania and Bulgaria. 9' Geopolitical
concerns seem more important in this' decision than a positive
appraisal of Bulgaria's and Romania's fulfillment of the
criteria for concluding Europe agreements.
On 30 September 1991, the Council agreed that exploratory
talks with Bulgaria could begin, but that talks with Romania
could begin once the political situation was "normalized".9'
In late September, however, violent demonstrations broke out
in Romania, provoking an EPC statement that condemned the
violence and reiterated that economic and political reforms
'SEC Bulletin no. 10, 1993, pt. 1.3.14. See section 6.2.1
on the breakup of Czechoslovakia.
In EC Bulletin no. 7/8, 1991, pt. 1.4.19.
9'The Commission also proposed to negotiate a trade
agreement with Albania and formulate a policy towards the
newly recognized Baltic republics. EC Bulletin no. 9, 1991,
pts. 1.3.13, 1.3.17, and 1.3.18.
Though in April 1991, Andriessen had told the Bulgarian
prime minister that an agreement could be signed within a few
months. Aaence Europe no. 5482, 29/30 April 1991.
9'EC Bulletin no. 9, 1991, pt. 1.3.17.
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were indispensable for the full development of relations with
EC.'7 On 16 December, the foreign ministers agreed that
initial talks could begin with Romania.'
In April 1992, the Commission asked the Council to
approve the negotiating mandates. It wanted to the agreements
to refer to human rights and democracy, because the Maastricht
Treaty (though not yet in force) specifies that the EU will
respect fundamental rights and that one of the CFSP's
objectives is to develop and consolidate democracy and respect
for human rights. The first three Europe agreements did not
contain such a clause, and Bulgaria and Romania objected to
their different treatment, considering it a sign that the
Community did not 'trust' them. 10° They were probably right:
while the proposed clause crowns a policy already based on
conditionality and conforms to the Xaastricht Treaty, it could
also indicate that Bulgaria and Romania did not fully meet the
established criteria for Europe agreements and thus the
Community had to retain some leverage to encourage political
and economic reforms. It also reflects a widespread
conclusion that the Yugoslav crisis had resulted partly
because human rights, and specifically minority rights, had
not been respected.
'7"Statement on Romania", EPC Press Release P. 95/91, 3
October 1991.
'In the Portuguese Presidency's answer to "Question No.
H-1233/91 by Ms Banotti on EC/Romania relations", Document no.
92/014 in EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol. 8, 1992.
Title I, article F, and Title V, article J.1, paragraph
3.
1Aaence EuroDe no. 5704, 4 April 1992.
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At its meetings on 7 and 21 April 1992, the Council could
not agree on the Commission's proposals, mostly because of
concerns about offending Bulgaria and Romania. 101 Finally, on
11 May, the General Affairs Council approved the mandates. It
decided that the two Europe agreements were to be conditional
on respect for human rights and democratic principles. 102 The
Council also extended this 'super-conditionality' to future
agreements: "respect for democratic principles and human
rights...and the principles of the market economy are
essential components of cooperation or association agreements
between the Community and its CSCE partners."'°3 All the
Europe agreements signed after May 1992 - including with the
Czech Republic and Slovakia - contain a clause permitting the
suspension of the agreements if human rights are not
respected.
The mandates were restrictive with respect to steel,
envisaging quantitative restrictions, a result of successful
lobbying by Spain and a reflection of growing concern about
East European steel imports. 10'	 The Commission also
101Acience EuroDe no. 5706, 8 April 1992, and no. 5714, 22
April 1992.
102EC Bulletin no. 5, 1992, pt. 1.2.12. The clause is also
article 1 of the interim trade agreements with Romania and
Bulgaria.
'°3The Council's statement is reproduced in EC Bulletin no.
5, 1992, pt. 1.2.13. Thus Bulgaria and Romania should not
feel that they had been singled out on the issue of human
rights. On 29 May 1995, the Council decided that agreements
with all third countries will contain a clause allowing
suspension of the agreement if the country violates human
rights. Aaence EuroDe no. 6508, 30 May 1995.
10'Agence Europe no. 5728, 13 May 1992. This affected the
first three associates too: in November 1992, after receiving
complaints from several member states, including France,
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unsuccessfully argued for further concessions in textiles and
agricultural trade: Commissioner Andriessen even publicly
chastised the Council for making inadequate concessions.'
Bulgaria in particular was unhappy with the Community's
protectionism.1
The negotiations ended with Romania in November, and with
Bulgaria, in December 1992.'°' The Europe agreement with
Romania was signed on 1 February 1993, and with Bulgaria on 8
March 1993.'°' A lengthy ratification process and internal
disagreements over the Community's trade protection measures
followed. Both agreements entered into force on 1 February
1995 (see table 5.1).
Interim trade agreements were signed at the same time as
the Europe agreements and were supposed to enter into force
quickly. Romania's interim trade measures applied from 1 May
Germany, and Italy, and the EC-level interest group, Eurofer,
the Commission imposed safeguard measures on steel tube
imports from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Acience EuroDe
no. 5860, 19 November 1992.
'Aaence Europe no. 5831, 8 October 1992.
106"Textiles and Agriculture Stunt Association Accord
Progress", European ReDort no. 1805, 21 October 1992.
'°7Aaence EuroDe no. 5859, 18 November 1992 and no. 5885,
23 December 1992. Greek-Bulgarian relations in 1992 were
strained, over Bulgaria's recognition of Macedonia in January
1992; although it had hinted that Bulgaria's relations with
the EC could be disrupted, Greece did not block the Europe
agreement. Kjell Engelbrekt, "Greek-Bulgarian Relations: A
Disharmonious Friendship", RFE/RL Research Retort, vol. 2, no.
28, 9 July 1993, p. 30.
1 General Secretariat, Council of the European
Communities, Press Release 4011/93 (Presse 10), 5 February
1993 and Press Release 5015/93 (Presse 28) of 8 March 1993.
Both agreements contain an extra safeguard clause for steel
products, permitting either party to impose quantitative
restrictions during a restructuring period of 5 years.
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1993. Conclusion of the interim agreement with Bulgaria,
however, was delayed by the Council because of a prolonged
dispute about the Community's decision-making procedures for
trade protection measures.'° The interim agreement remained
blocked until December 1993, even after the June 1993 European
Council had approved further concessions, the EP had condemned
the Council, and Bulgaria had demanded compensation.' 10 It
finally entered into force on 31 December.
5.3.3 Content of the Europe Agreements
All six Europe agreements are broadly similar." The
preambles note that the agreements are important for building
a stable Europe, of which the Community is a "cornerstone".
They stress a commitment to pluralist democracy, based on the
rule of law, human rights, a multiparty system and free and
'°91n July 1992, the Commission proposed changing the
procedure for taking protective measures: it, rather then the
Council, would take the final decision, which could be
overturned by a qualified majority vote in the Council by a
certain deadline. France, Italy and Spain supported the
proposal; the northern member states worried that it would
increase protectionism. Aaence Europe no. 5888, 30 December
1992. In February 1994, the Council decided that it would
retain the power to take final decisions, but that it would
decide by simple majority, rather than qualified majority.
Aence EuroDe no. 6166, 9 February 1994.
"°See EC Bulletin no. 10, 1993, pt. 1.3.13, and Aaence
Europe no. 6105, 10 November 1993. Italy has been blamed for
holding up the agreement. Aence Euro pe no. 6025, 19/20 July
1993 and interview with DG I official, 22 June 1994. A
participant maintains, however, that the member states did not
want to create a precedent for future decision-making on anti-
dumping measures and so they forced the issue in the Bulgarian
case. Bulgaria had relatively few 'friends' in the Community.
Interview took place on 28 July 1995.
"1For a review of the Europe agreements with Hungary,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia, see Claude-Pierre Lucron, "Contenu
et Portée des Accords entre la Communauté et la Hongrie, la
Pologne et la Tchécoslovaguie", Revue du Marché Conunun, no.
357, April 1992.
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democratic elections, and to the CSCE. The agreements with
Bulgaria, the Czech republic, Romania and Slovakia also
mention respect for the rights of minorities, indicating the
Community's growing concern about minority rights. 112 Each
preamble mentions that the associate's final objective is
Community membership and that the Europe agreement will help
achieve that objective. The aims of the association (in
article 1) are notably political: the association is to
provide a framework for political relations, promote trade,
economic and cultural cooperation, and assist the integration
of the associate into the Community.
As is the case in other association agreements, an
Association Council, consisting of the members of the EC
Council, Commission, and the associate's government, will meet
at least once a year to examine any major issues arising
within the framework of the agreement. It is assisted by an
Association Committee, composed of senior civil servants. In
addition, members of the EP and the associate's parliament can
exchange views in an Association Parliamentary Committee.
The agreements include for the first time provisions
concerning political dialogue.' 13 The dialogue, regarding
international issues of mutual interest, is intended to
facilitate the associate's integration into "the community of
democratic nations" and rapprochement with the Community, and
"2This is in addition to the human rights clause.
'EEC Bulletin no. 12, 1991, pt. 1.3.2. Marc Maresceau
notes that this is the first time that the notion of political
dialogue has been included in an agreement based on article
238. Marc Maresceau, "Les Accords Européens: Analyse
Générale", Revue du Marché Conunun et de l'Union Eurot,éenne,
no. 369, June 1993, p. 509.
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to enhance security and stability throughout Europe. It is to
take place "as appropriate" at the highest level between the
presidents of the European Council and the Commission, and the
associate's president. At ministerial level, the dialogue
takes place within the Association Council. Senior officials
from the associate, Council presidency and the Commission are
to meet regularly. These provisions establish a formal
bilateral political dialogue which is more intense than most
other bilateral dialogues and the multilateral dialogues with
regional groupings, but not as intense as the framework for
consultations between the Community and the US provided for in
the November 1990 transatlantic declaration.114
The agreements provide a framework for integrating the
associates into the Community. The four freedoms of movement,
for goods, capital, services, and labor, are to be extended
gradually between the Community and the associate. A free
trade area will be established over a period of 10 years: the
Community will open its markets sooner, while the associates
will not open their markets until the end of this period. The
main provisions for the associates' goods are listed in table
5.2 (p. 289). National treatment will be extended for the
establishment and operation of all firms and professions.
Workers from the associates who are legally employed in the
Community are to be ensured non-discriminatory treatment, but
'14Political matters are discussed informally in meetings
with the Community's associates; many other bilateral
dialogues are based on troika, rather than full Council,
meetings. The dialogues with other regional groupings take
place yearly or every eighteen months, with all ministers;
meetings with the ministerial troika are also held. The
transatlantic declaration provides for more regular
consultations at all levels. Nuttall 1992, pp. 282-293.
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further measure. on the free movement of workers are only to
be discussed in the Association Council.
Furthermore, the associates' legislation is to be
progressively approximated to the acciuis conununautaire.
Provisions for economic cooperation are spelled out in a wide
variety of areas, including industry, science and technology,
education and training, energy, and environment. Associates
would be able to participate in some Community programs in
those areas, as well as in cultural programs.' 15 The
agreements state that the associates are eligible for PHARE
funds, EIB loans, and eventual balance of payments or currency
stabilization assistance."
5 • 4 TOWARDS COPENHAGEN
The Europe agreements provide the associate. with a
framework for political and economic cooperation, gradual
integration into the Community, and greater access to the EC
market. But the associates have made two criticisms about the
"51n May 1993 and May 1994, the Commission proposed
opening EU programs to participation by the associates. SEC
(93) 648 final, p. 15, and EC Bulletin no. 5, 1994, pt.
1.3.28. But only in April 1995 did the Council sign protocols
which permit participation in Community framework programs,
specific programs, and projects, in fields such as research
and technological development, information services, the
environment, education, energy, and transport. Aczence Europe
no. 6462, 14 April 1995. The member states had evidently been
reticent to allow the associates access to the EU in sensitive
areas such as research and development.
116Poland, for one, wanted a financial protocol attached
to the agreement, as is the case with the EC'. other
association accords, but the Community resisted giving
specific figures for assistance. See Aence Europe no. 5545,
31 July 1991. Pinder notes that there are good reasons for
keeping PHARE aid separate from the Europe agreements: it
would give PHARE the flexibility to allocate aid among the
beneficiaries as conditions require, rather than having to
provide a certain fixed amount. Pinder 1991, p. 70.
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agreements: the trade concessions were not enough and no dates
or conditions for eventual EC membership were set.
The Community did not immediately answer their
criticisms. From early 1992 to the June 1993 Copenhagen
European Council, the Community skirted round the enlargement
issue and put off decisions on improving market access. In
general, it was not a propitious period for Community-East
European relations. The Community was distracted by numerous
other dilemmas: salvaging the Maastricht Treaty after the
Danish 'no' in the June 1992 referendum; concluding the GATT
Uruguay Round; dampening volatility in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism; trying to resolve the Yugoslav crisis; and
enlarging to the EFTAns. Germany, a key player in Community-
East European relations, was preoccupied with unification"7
and might have been shying away from major foreign policy
initiatives after the debacle of the recognition of Slovenia
and Croatia in December 1991. Nonetheless, at Copenhagen, the
European Council reached several important decisions, on
trade, enlargement, and closer ties with the East European
associates. The next two sections will discuss the run-up to
Copenhagen: section 5.4.1 will cover trade and section 5.4.2
will review the enlargement issue and the political dialogue
with the associates.
5.4.1 Improving Iarkst Aoc.s.
The trade provisions of the Europe agreements, reproduced
in the interim agreements, entered into force much earlier
"7See Craig Whitney, "3 Months After Maastricht, Europe
Finds Itself Bogged in a Slump", International Herald Tribune,
30 March 1992.
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than the Europe agreements themselves, so the associates
benefitted from the gradual liberalization of trade almost
immediately. But since 1990, the EC has been running a trade
surplus with its Eastern neighbors (see appendix 1). To some
extent this was to be expected given the need for Western
technology in the East, and the recession in Western Europe,
which stemmed demand for East European exports. Eastern
Europe, however, has suffered a much worse economic slow-down,
raising serious questions about the Community's growing
surplus. EC-East European trade is also much more important
for the East European countries than for the Community (see
appendix 1). Thus the extent to which the Community market is
open to East European products is important, and the
associates have been far from satisfied with the market access
provided by the Europe agreements.
The Commission generally agreed with the associates, and
continuously urged the member states to offer further trade
concessions. In two reports on relations with Eastern Europe,
one to the Lisbon European Council of June 1992119 and the
other to the Edinburgh European Council of December 1992120,
it argued strongly in favor of improving the trade provisions
'In September 1992, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland
requested further trade concessions. Michaiski and Wallace
1992, p. 114. In May 1993, Polish Prime Minister Hanna
Suchocka denounced the Community's trade policy towards
Eastern Europe as restrictive and unbalanced. "Polish Prime
Minister Accuses EC of 'Protectionism'", Euro pean Report no.
1859, 15 May 1993.
9Commission of the European Communities, "Europe and the
Challenge of Enlargement", EC Bulletin Sulement 3/92.
120Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Closer
Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
SEC (92) 2301 final, 2 December 1992.
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in the Europe agreements.
Neither European Council, however, took any decisions on
the Commission's proposals. The southern member states in
particular objected to them.'2' The Edinburgh European
Council asked the Commission to prepare another report on
relations with Eastern Europe, and promised to reach decisions
on it at its Copenhagen meeting.' The member states,
however, then warned the Commission not to propose any
substantial trade liberalization measures.'"
In May 1993, the Commission presented its report to the
Copenhagen European Council detailing how relations with the
East European associates could be strengthened. 12' The
proposals for improving access to the EC market went much
further than some member states had expected, and reflected an
alliance between External Economic Relations Commissioner Sir
Leon Brittan (a very strong proponent of free trade) and
External Political Relations Commissioner Hans van den Broek,
who had dropped their rivalry to push for freer trade.'" The
12tPaul Ames, "EC Nations Welcome Closer Links with Eastern
Europe, Edgy About Membership", Associated Press, 8 December
1992.
'Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in
Edinburgh 11-12 December, 1992, SN 456/92, Part D.
1""Poor Relations", The Economist, 1 May 1993.
'2'Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Closer
Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern EuroDe,
SEC (93) 648 final, 18 May 1993.
'"Lionel Barber, "Commission Opens Doors for Eastern
Europe", The Financial Times, 6 May 1993. The rivalry stemmed
from the fact that, from January 1993, both were in charge of
different aspects of relations with Eastern Europe, as a
result of the division of DG I. See "Uncivil War in the
European Community", The Economist, 30 January 1993.
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Commission proposed speeding up the timetable in the Europe
agreements for increasing quotas and cutting tariffs on
industrial and sensitive products.
The Commission's report included several other proposals
on dialogue with the associates and enlargement (see section
5.4.2), as well as on PHARE. The Danish presidency was
determined to keep all of the proposals together in one
package, to be decided on by the foreign ministers, who had
the larger policy picture in mind; this would prevent trade
ministers from blocking the trade concessions.'2' The growing
trade surplus with Eastern Europe also helped curb member
states' protectionism.
On 10 May, the foreign ministers welcomed the proposals
in a preliminary discussion on them, although the French
foreign minister called for a study to be done on the impact
of the market access proposa1s. At a foreign ministers'
meeting on 8 June, a free-trade coalition including the UK,
Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark ensured acceptance of
the Commission's proposals. 12' The European Council in
Copenhagen on 21-22 June 1993 endorsed the proposals (see
table 5.2).'	 The Commission and Danish Presidency had
'2'Interview, 12 March 1996.
"Council Gives Thumbs Up to Quicker Trade Access for
East", EuroTean Reoort no. 1858, 12 May 1993.
12'Lionel Barber, "EC and E Europe Progress", The Financial
Tines, 9 June 1993. Greece and Portugal had been the least
enthusiastic, Portugal because of the textiles concessions.
"EC Welcomes Plan for Closer East Europe Ties", Reuter, 10 May
1993 and Aaence Eurooe no. 5997, 10 June 1993.
European Council Conclusions, SN 180/93, pp. 30-31. The
Commission then negotiated additional protocols with the six
associates incorporating the concessions. On 19 July 1993,
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succeeded in "upgrading th. common interest".
5.4.2 Widening vi. D..p.ning: Round Two
The Europe agreements did not acknowledge that the
Community's objective was enlargement to the associates. For
Michaiski and Wallace, this is because the member states did
not want "to repeat mistakes of the past in giving promises
which have proved difficult to honour." 13° But the associates
persistently demanded that the Community set out a timetable
and conditions for enlargement.
The demands for a clear stance on enlargement became ever
more compelling as turmoil spread throughout the former
Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. The popularity of nationalist
movements in Russia and a more assertive Russian policy
towards the former Soviet republics also sparked fears that
Russia might try to re-establish a sphere of influence in
Eastern Europe.'3' The disappearance of the old bloc system
left the East Europeans feeling exposed. 132 They needed a
framework for integration into Western security organizations.
the Council provisionally approved the protocols with Hungary,
Poland, the Czech republic, and Slovakia. On 20 December, the
Council definitively concluded all six (OJ L 25, 29 January
1994).
°Michalski and Wallace 1992, p. 139. This refers to the
case of Thrkey.
'3tFrom 1992, Russian "peacekeepers" had been deployed in
several hotspots throughout the former Soviet Union, and
Russia was exerting strong pressure on recalcitrant republics
to join the Commonwealth of Independent States.
As noted by Commissioner van den Broek in "Speech by
Hans van den Broek at the Tilburg University Seminar 'Europe
Revisited': The New Europe and the Lessons of History -
Tilburg, 4 June 1993", Speech/93/68, 4 June 1993. In 1992-
1993, the East European states began to demand NATO
membership.
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Integration would also reduce internal security threats: "For
the stabilization of democracies and the reduction of social
and national tensions, Central and Eastern Europe also needs
external help, and these conflicts can be dissolved in the
process of European unification.' 1 There was thus much
pressure on the member states to respond positively to the
membership demands, if the transformation in Eastern Europe
was to be consolidated and security ensured in all of Europe.
To a certain extent the internal Community debate on
enlargement took place on the same terms, between wideners and
deepeners.'TM But that debate (first one, then maybe the
other) was increasingly out of date, Widening and deepening
would have to occur simultaneously. Most member states
accepted the potential security benefits of enlarging to
Eastern Europe, both for the East Europeans and for the
Community, because enlargement could ensure a stable, secure
and prosperous Eastern Europe, which was in the Community's
own interests. In addition, the "European identity" of the
East European states could not be disputed, especially as they
implemented political and economic reforms in line with
Western standards. The option of denying membership to the
East European countries was never really considered seriously
'33palankai 1991, p. 74.
'34For example, in mid-September 1991, UK Prime Minister
Major called on the EC to offer membership for the East
European and Baltic states as soon as they were ready. A few
days later, Mitterrand argued that the Community should be
reinforced before it grew larger. Ian Davidson and Ivo Dawnay,
"Major Urges EC to Admit East European States", The Financial
Times, 13 September 1991, and Quentin Peel, "Mitterrand Plea




Enlargement, however, posed many problems. Even if
several rich EFTA members joined, the Community could not
afford to extend CAP and the structural funds to the East
European countries.' Yet CAP reform faced opposition from
farmers and especially France, and the poorer member states
were concerned about losing EC funds. The 1996 IGC would have
to alter decision-making mechanisms to permit a successful
enlargement to twenty or more states. Yet the European public
did not seem enthusiastic about further integration (the
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was not proceeding
smoothly), and several member states, especially the UK, would
oppose a reduction in the use of the national veto.
Formulating a response to the East European demands for
concrete decisions on enlargement was therefore extremely
difficult. In an attempt to address the demands for widening
and reduce the need for internal institutional and policy
reform, several alternatives were advanced. Some of these
ideas have since been incorporated into the Community's policy
towards Eastern Europe.
In a 1990 New Year's address, Mitterrand had proposed
setting up a European confederation. 1 The Community should
'EOn one estimate, admitting the Visegrad countries could
boost EU spending by 60-75%. "Next, the Baltic States?",
Economist, 22 October 1994. CAP spending could double. "Farm
Follies", The Economist, 29 July 1995.
'"Les Voeux de M.François Mitterrand", Le Monde, 2
January 1990. Ole Waever argues that the proposal was "an
attempt to give the EC a different purpose, a larger
meaning. . . and France is to lead the Ostpolitik of the European
Community." In "Three Competing Europes: German, French,
Russian", International Affairs, vol. 66, no. 3, July 1990, p.
484.
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first reinforce its structures; then a confederation linking
all European states should be built. In June 1991, Mitterrand
suggested that the East European states would be in no
condition to join the Community for decades. Instead, the
confederation would launch trans-European cooperation in areas
such as environmental protection and telecommunications.W
This was a more inflexible approach to concentric circles.
Mitterrand reproposed the idea on various occasions.' It
was not welcomed by "Atlanticists" in Eastern and Western
Europe, who saw it as an attempt to exclude the US from the
European security architecture.'	 Nor did it please many
East Europeans: Czech President Havel said,
I believe it would not be right, and perhaps even
harmful to European stability, if the creation of
the confederation curbs in any way the rapprochement
between the democracies of central and eastern
Europe and the European Communities, or if it
perpetuates their position as second-class
countries 140
"Mitterrand: Confederazione Tra Est e Cee", Ii Sole 24
Q g, 13 June 1991. Pan-European cooperation was actually
already in course. Since 1990, several meetings of the
environment ministers from across Europe have been held. In
June 1990, the Community decided to let the East European
countries participate in the European Environment Agency
(which was not set up until January 1994). In June 1990,
Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers proposed establishing a
Europe-wide energy community. A European Energy Charter
Treaty was signed in June 1994 by almost 50 countries,
including the US and Russia.
For example, at a summit of the Council of Europe in
October 1993, Mitterrand suggested that the Council of Europe
itself could become the confederation, with annual summits,
regular ministerial meetings, and a permanent secretariat.
Marcel Scotto and Claire Tréan, "M. Mitterrand relance l'idée
d'une confédération européenne", Le Monde, 10/11 October 1993.
Jan Zielonka, Security in Central Euroi,e, Adelphi Paper
no. 272 (London: Brassey's, 1992), p. 45.
"°Vaclav Havel, "Don't Make Us Europe's Second-Class
Citizens", The Eurooean, 14 June 1991.
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It has also been suggested that the East European states
first join EFTA or the EEA.'4' This of course would still be
economically difficult, and the East Europeans suspect that
joining EFTA or the EEA would delay Community membership.
This option also does not allow for the associates'
integration into Western security and defense frameworks.
That integration could be eased by participation in
EPC/CFSP. In 1991, Volker RUhe, then Secretary-General of the
German Christian Democrat Party, advocated involving the East
European countries in EPC before they acceded to the
Community. 142 In May 1992, the EP Committee on Institutional
Affairs suggested that the East European states participate in
the CFSP and in discussions on internal affairs and
.
Under the above proposals, the associates would not fully
participate in decision-making; they would not be allowed to
vote. Another proposal, however, would give the associates
much greater say in decision-making. On 19 April 1991,
Commissioner Andriessen suggested that the Community create an
'affiliate membership' category. The Community had to plan
for a time when it would have "to open its doors to create a
141Holger Schinieding, "The EFTA Option for Eastern Europe:
Comecon and the Community", The Financial Times, 2 August
1989. See also Palankai 1991, pp. 20-22. Richard Baldwin
noted that there have been three stages in European
integration: the common market, the Single European Act, and
the Maastricht Treaty. Prospective EU members were being
asked to jump right to the third stage. Baldwin instead
suggested the East European countries first join the single
market. Baldwin 1994, especially chapter 9.
'42Quoted in Xörmendy 1992, pp. 251-252.
'The report is noted in SEC (92) 2301 final, p. 8.
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climate of confidence and security in a continent subject to
uncertainty and external shocks."' Affiliate membership
would allow the Community to offer the benefits of membership,
and therefore stability, to those European countries that
wanted to participate in European integration but were not
ready to accept all of the commitments of full membership.
Deepening and widening could proceed simultaneously.
Affiliate members would have "a seat at the Council table on
a par with full members in specified areas, together with
appropriate representation in other institutions, such as the
Parliament."	 The areas included foreign policy, monetary
affairs, transport, environment, research and energy.
Andriessen's idea was greeted skeptically within the
Community: affiliate membership would complicate Community
procedures and be very difficult to realize. 14' If they were
allowed to vote, the associates could block proposals in an
attempt to influence policies in which they were not included
(such as CAP). Partial membership in the Community would be
unworkable in practice."
This reception is somewhat curious given the rash of
proposals to create a "hard core" or "two-speed Europe" which
'Frans Andriessen, "Towards a Community of Twenty-Four",
Speech to the 69th Plenary Assembly of Eurochambers, Brussels,
19 April 1991, Rapid Database Speech/91/41.
'Andriessen, "Towards a Community of Twenty-Four".
'4'Acience Europe no. 5482, 29/30 April 1991.
"As one official in DG IA told me, 21 June 1994. Another
observer argued that partial membership "would cause the Union
to unravel as an entity and would only further institutional
proliferation with all its negative effects." Mathias Jopp,
The Strateaic ImDlications of European Intecration, Adeiphi
Paper no. 290 (London: Brassey's, 1994), p. 70.
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followed the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in a Danish
referendum in June 1992 and the UK's reluctance to proceed
with ratification.'4 In these proposals, a select group of
member states would create a federation, leaving unwilling (or
unprepared) member states and associates in a series of less-
integrated concentric circles surrounding the core.
There are already precedents for 'variable geometry': the
UK and Danish opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty; optional
participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS; and
the long 'grace' periods allowed Spain and Portugal before
they had to comply with all Community laws. The WEU, the Eu's
defense arm, had limited membership, and then introduced
various levels of membership beginning in 1992. The Eurocorps
and the Schengen agreement on open borders signalled further
moves towards variable geometry.'49
But the hard core proposals were shelved once they were
no longer needed to threaten to leave the UK behind unless it
ratified the Maastricht Treaty. The Community even seemed to
rule out further opt-outs, in insisting that future members
accept the entire acauis coinmunautaire. John Redmond charges
that the unwillingness to consider drastically reforming an
enlarged Community meant that the Community could not
'4See, for example, Andrew Marshall, "UK Faces Life on the
Outside Looking In", The Independent, 26 September 1992;
"Pressing On", The Economist, 3 October 1992; and the
interview with François Mitterrand in The Financial Times, 9
December 1992.
'49This issue is not new by any means. See Helen Wallace
with Adam Ridley, Europe: The ChallencTe of Diversity (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), written at a time when the
Community was contemplating institutional reform and moving
towards enlargement to Spain and Portugal.
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formulate a coherent policy towards aspiring member states.°
That is too harsh, particularly given that nothing less than
the reinvention of the Community was at issue, when it was not
even certain that the limited reforms in the Naastricht Treaty
would go ahead. It took time, but by mid-1993, the Community
had laid out its position on enlargement and had indicated how
relations with the associates should develop until then.
In 1992 and 1993, the Community gradually developed a
framework for multilateral political relations with the
associates. The agreements provided for a bilateral political
dialogue with each associate, but this did not begin until
they entered into force. Instead of further developing
bilateral relations with each associate, however, the
"Community and its member states" (in EPC) developed an ad hoc
multilateral political dialogue with the associates.'
The multilateral dialogue met both internal and external
exigencies. As the number of associates rose, all of whom
demanded closer relations, it was the most practical way to
strengthen political ties with them. It was also a step
towards East European participation in EPC/CFSP, important as
turmoil spread in several parts of Eastern Europe and the
'50Redmond 1993, p. 221.
'51Political dialogue is traditionally an EPC "instrument",
although the Commission also takes part; in the case of
Eastern Europe, the dialogue inevitably covered EC issues,
such as economic relations and enlargement. Likewise, during
the Commission's meetings with East European politicians,
political issues were discussed: during his visit to Bulgaria
and Romania in April 1993, for example, Hans van den Broek
discussed the situation in the former Yugoslavia with both
governments. EC Bulletin no. 4, 1993, pt. 1.3.12 and pt.
1.3.15. This highlights once again the "blurring" of the EC-
EPC dividing line.
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former Soviet Union. The dialogue would help build a common
European approach to international issues, the situation in
Russia in particular.'52 It would 'train' the associates in
EPC's mode of operation, thus aiding their gradual integration
into the Community. It would also encourage the East
Europeans to cooperate, a Community objective that was not so
popular in Eastern Europe (see chapter 6). The member states
(through EPC) were thus trying to shape relations with the
associates according to their collective interests and
objectives, as well as respond to East European demands.
The dialogue began in May 1992 with a meeting between the
troika and the Visegrad group (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland)'53 , at the joint request of the Visegrad countries.'5
(Bulgaria and Romania were not included in the dialogue until
later in 1993, because they had not yet concluded Europe
agreements.)	 Development of the dialogue, however, was
closely connected to the enlargement issue. 	 Until the
'52At the first meeting in May 1992, the Visegrad foreign
ministers and the troika discussed the Yugoslav crisis and
relations with the former Soviet republics. EC Bulletin no. 5,
1992, pt. 1.2.17. The member states were especially interested
in East European views on events in Russia. Interview with
Council Secretariat official, 23 June 1994.
'530n 9 April 1990 the leaders of the three countries held
a summit, at which they discussed their "return to Europe".
They agreed to work out a plan of action for integration into
West European organisations such as the EC. In February 1991,
they established the Visegrad group, to press for integration
into the EC and other organisations. Patricia Clough,
"Linking Arms on the March to Europe", The IndeDendent, 15
February 1991.
'54lnterview with Commission official, 21 June 1994. The
Commission had, however, suggested in September 1991 that a
multilateral political dialogue be initiated with the
associates, in response to their desire to be involved in
political cooperation. EC Bulletin no. 9, 1991, pt. 1.3.13.
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Copenhagen European Council, the enlargement question impeded
the institutionalization of the dialogue; relations developed
instead on an ad hoc basis.
In June 1992, the Lisbon European Council discussed a
Commission report on enlargement. The report suggested
several membership conditions, in addition to the three basic
ones set out in the Xaastricht Treaty (European identity,
democratic status, and respect of human rights)
Applicants must accept the rights • and obligations of the
entire acauis coinmunautaire and the CFSP, and they must be
able to fulfill all the necessary obligations. In addition,
the Community would have to ensure that enlargement did not
reduce its effectiveness, by reforming its institutions and
decision-making procedures." Some countries (the EFTAns)
were already veil-prepared for membership, others (including
the East European states) were not.
Because the East European countries wanted to strengthen
their political links with Western Europe, the Commission
suggested creating a European Political Area. European
leaders could meet regularly within the framework of a
confederation or in a conference convened by the European
Council (a clear echo of Mitterrand's confederation proposal).
'55"Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement". The report
was requested by the December 1991 European Council in
response to the growing interest of non-members in joining the
Community.
'56Article 0 states that any European state could become
a member of the European Union, while article F proclaims that
the governments of member states are founded on the principle
of democracy and the Union is to respect fundamental human
rights.
Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement", pp. 11-16.
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East European countries could be associated with specific EC
policies and participate in certain EC meetings on subjects of
trans-European interest (a fainter echo of Andriessen's
affiliate membership idea).
The Lisbon European Council, 26-27 June 1992, did not
take up the proposals. France, Italy, Spain and Portugal
stressed the difficulties the East European states would
experience if they joined the Community, and viewed the Europe
agreements as a framework for preparing the associates for
accession. Germany and the UK, however, wanted the
associates, and particularly the Visegrad group, to be more
closely integrated with the Community sooner rather than
later. As a compromise, the European Council insisted that
relations with the East European countries would develop
within the framework of the Europe agreements. This was the
path of least resistance, already cleared. The multilateral
political dialogue would be intensified and extended to
include meetings at the highest political level.'
The reluctance of the Lisbon European Council to go
beyond the Europe agreement framework is clearly connected to
the enlargement question. On the same occasion, the European
Council approved a report by the foreign ministers on possible
areas for CFSP Joint Actions. The foreign ministers suggested
that with respect to Eastern Europe, the EU should promote
political stability and regional cooperation, and encourage
Michalski and Wallace 1992, p. 54.
'"Conclusions of the Presidency at the European Council
in Lisbon, 26 and 27 June 1992", in EC Bulletin SuDDlement
3/92, pp. 23-24.
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the full implementation of CSCE commitments, especially on
human and minority rights and conflict prevention. To that
end, the EU could take Joint Action to establish political
frameworks to foster cooperation in Eastern Europe, reinforce
EU-East European relations, and develop links between the East
European states and other European organizations."°
Granted, the Maastricht Treaty was not yet in force, so
a Joint Action to reinforce relations with East European
countries could not be taken. The need to do so was
nonetheless clearly recognized. But the member states had not
yet decided how to respond to the continuing demands from the
associates for a clear perspective on membership; this
uncertainty affected the development of closer relations with
the associates. 16' To go so far as to create a European
Political Area could propel the Community towards enlargement,
which would mean difficult reforms would have to be tackled,
when some member states and their electorates were calling
even the Maastricht Treaty a step too far. By strengthening
relations within the Europe agreement framework and continuing
the ad hoc multilateral political dialogue, the associates
could be kept in the "association circle", which might or
might not be eventually included in the Community itself. The
Community's options were left open.
The incoming British presidency sought to implement the
'60Annex I, Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council,
Bulletin no. 6, 1992, p. 20.
"Enlargement to the EFTAns was also in doubt: the Lisbon
European Council decided that enlargement to the EFTAnS could
not proceed until the I4aastricht Treaty was ratified (the
Danes had just rejected it in a referendum) and the Delors-Il
budget package was approved.
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Lisbon conclusions on the political dialogue with the Visegrad
group. It announced that it would hold two meetings with
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, one at ministerial level
on 5 October 1992 and the other at head-of-state level on 28
October. The exclusion of Bulgaria and Romania did not please
several member states, including France, nor Commissioner
Andriessen. The Council did agree, however, that relations
with Romania and Bulgaria had not yet progressed enough to
include them.' This debate again reflects the tension
between conditionality and the view that stability is best
ensured by integration into Western institutions.
Prior to the meetings, on 11 September 1992, the Visegrad
countries submitted a memorandum to the Commission and British
Presidency on strengthening their integration with the
Community. They wanted above all a statement on membership:
We call upon the Communities and the member states
to respond to our efforts by clearly stating the
integration of our economies and societies, leading
to membership of the Communities, is the aim of the
Communities themselves. This simple, but historic
statement would provide the anchor we need.1
The member states, however, could not reach agreement on
the membership issue.1M So on 5 October, when the twelve
foreign ministers and Andriessen met the Visegrad foreign
ministers, no timetable for membership negotiations was drawn
up, nor were any conditions set. Instead, they all reaffirmed
'David Buchan, "EC To Meet East Europe Leaders",
Financial Times, 21 July 1992. France also wanted all the EC
leaders to attend the summit meeting, an indication perhaps of
its resentment of the British initiative in an area where
France wanted to lead.
'Quoted in Michalski and Wallace 1992, p. 114.
"4Agence Eurooe no. 5827, 2 October 1992.
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that the Europe agreements would help the Visegrad countries
achieve their final objective of membership. Political
dialogue would be strengthened because it fosters "political
convergence, a better mutual understanding and enhanced
security and stability throughout Europe".'
On 28 October, UK Prime Minister John Major and Delors
held a summit in London with the four Visegrad prime ministers
(Czechoslovakia - soon to be no longer - was represented by
both the Czech and Slovak prime ministers) . ' The Visegrad
leaders again pressed for better access to EC markets, closer
political ties, and a timetable for entry into the EC. Both
Delors and Major declared that they favored enlarging the
Community to include the Visegrad group, but that a timetable
for membership could not be set. They promised that the
Community would draw up a list of membership criteria before
the Edinburgh European Council in December.1
The leaders agreed to establish a regular political
dialogue. Consultations "as appropriate" would take place at
the highest level between the Visegrad group and the
presidents of the Council and Commission. Meetings "as
appropriate" would be held between the Visegrad ministers and
'"Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
European Community and the Visegrad Countries - Joint
Statement", Council of the European Communities Press Release
9033/92 (Presse 170), Luxembourg, 5 October 1992, p. 3. The
Community promised to help the Visegrad countries with the
approximation of their laws to the acauis comniunautaire, and
to develop joint infrastructure projects.
'The Gabcikovo dam dispute dominated behind the scenes
at the summit; see chapter 6.
'Andrew Marshall, "EC to Improve Links with East Europe",
The Independent, 29 October 1992.
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either all twelve EC foreign ministers, the EC troika, or the
EC presidency (in all cases, the Commission would be
represented). Senior officials from the Visegrad group and
the troika would also meet regularly. 1' As a schedule of
meetings was not specified, the multilateral political
dialogue still seemed more ad hoc than institutionalized.
In early December 1992, the Commission added its voice to
those pressing for a statement on membership. In a report on
relations with Eastern Europe, it urged the Edinburgh European
Council to accept the East European countries' objective of EU
membership, once they could meet the necessary conditions:
By offering this perspective, the Community will
provide encouragement to those pursuing reform and
make the short term economic and social consequences
of adjustment easier to bear. This perspective will
also provide a stimulus to investment and discourage
excessive nationalism.1
To be eligible for membership, candidates must: be able to
assume membership obligations (the acciuis coinmunautaire); have
stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for minorities; have a functioning
market economy; endorse the objectives of political, economic
and monetary union; and be able to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the Union. In addition, the
Community would have to be able to absorb new members while
maintaining the momentum of European integration.
The Commission suggested that the associates could be
1 "Joint Declaration of the EC Community and its Member
States and the Visegrad Group of Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia on Political Dialogu&', European Union Press
Release, 29 October 1992.
'SEC (92) 2301 final, p. 3.
266
more closely involved in EPC: they could, for example, sit in
on certain expert meetings. This would "help overcome
political barriers and pave the way for the involvement of
partner countries in political cooperation".' 7° The Community
could also move beyond the Europe agreements and establish a
European Political Area. 	 A structured multilateral
relationship could be established, which would still preserve
"the Community's own autonomous development". 17' Regular
enlarged Council meetings with the associates could be held in
areas of trans-European interest (such as foreign affairs,
energy, and the environment). These proposals clearly reflect
the earlier ideas on East European participation in Community
discussions and pan-European cooperation.
On 8 December the EC foreign ministers discussed the
Commission's proposals. Disagreements among the ministers
made it impossible for them to pass the report on to the
Edinburgh summit. Germany, the UK, and Denmark favored a
formal statement confirming the aim of enlargement; the
majority, however, thought the Commission's guidelines still
needed to be analyzed.'7 The Edinburgh European Council only
encouraged the full implementation of the Europe agreements
and the extension of the political dialogue. tm Other
difficult issues dominated the Edinburgh summit: agreements
enabling Denmark and the UK to ratify the Maastricht Treaty,
170SEC (92) 2301 final, p. 4.
171SEC (92) 2301 final, p. 8.
' T2Aaence Eurooe no. 5876, 11 December 1992.
173Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 456/92, Part D:
External Relations.
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increasing funds for the poorer member states, and launching
accession negotiations with the EFTAnS. These decisions had
to be taken before the Community could consider enlargement to
Eastern Europe.
The Community's reluctance to indicate a possible date
and conditions for accession was fueling much discontent in
Eastern Europe. A Czech official complained: "We fought hard
to have the possibility of membership included in the (Europe]
Agreement and now it appears that the Community is reneging on
its commitment in this domain."' 74 Polish Prime Minister
Hanna Suchocka called on the Copenhagen European Council to
confirm "the will of the Community to see Poland and the other
associated states as future members of the European Union."'75
Nor were the Visegrad countries happy with the political
dialogue. They charged that meetings were not well prepared,
they were not consulted on the agendas, and they were not
treated as equal partners.'7' At a meeting of the Visegrad
foreign ministers and the EC troika (plus Commissioners
Brittan and van den Broek) on 8 March 1993, the four
associates called for an institutionalized political dialogue.
But because the member states had not yet agreed on the
Commission's report on relations with Eastern Europe, the
174w Copenhagen Strikes Disappointing Chord Among East
Europeans", European Report no. 1851, 17 April 1993.
'75"Ec/Poland - Suchocka Chastises Community Inaction",
European ReDort no. 1864, 5 June 1993.
176"Poor Relations", The Economist, 1 May 1993. The
Visegrad associates wanted too much at this stage: "in
appropriate forms to be agreed upon they intend to contribute,
individually and jointly, to shaping common positions."
Körmendy 1992, p. 246.
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troika could not respond to the request.'
In May 1993, the Commission presented another report
detailing how relations with the East European associates
could be strengthened, which was very similar to its December
1992 report. It argued that "the European Council should
confirm, in a clear political message, its commitment to
membership of the Union for Europe agreements signatories when
they are able to satisfy the conditions required."' (The
conditions were those noted in the earlier report.) The East
European countries needed a clear perspective of their
membership prospects because it would strengthen their
peoples' determination to continue with reforms, regardless of
the hardship involved, provide an element of stability against
the background of turbulence in the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, and "diminish tension in a region where confidence
and stability are suffering from the absence of a viable
security structure" 179
The Commission once again pushed for institutionalized
relations. To prepare the associates for future membership,
and try to provide a security structure in Eastern Europe, a
European Political Area should be developed, though an
intensive multilateral political dialogue. Regular joint
meetings should be held at all levels, down to working group
level. These closer links would foster a "greater sense of
belonging to the process of European integration" which would
mAczence EuroDe no. 5936, 10 March 1993.
1 'SEC (93) 648 final, p. 3.
'79SEC (93) 648 final, p. 2.
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"reduce feelings of insecurity and consequent tensions in the
region, with gains for overall security and cooperation in
Europe.""° In addition, there should be enlarged meetings of
the European Council, Council, and subordinate bodies, on
specific issues, including justice and home affairs.11'
on 8 June, the foreign ministers approved the package,
although they dropped the term "European Political Area"."2
Just before the Copenhagen European Council, in a clear
attempt to put of f enlargement, France submitted its own set
of stricter membership criteria, which included GNP-per-capita
level, degree of privatization, level of social protection,
inflation levels, and public deficit size. Several member
states objected, pointing out that it would be unfair to
demand that some applicants, but not others (the EFTAns),
fulfill such conditions. 1' France also presented a proposal
for a Pact on Stability in Europe (see section 6.3.4), which
some suspected was an attempt to set obstacles in the way of
enlargement. In the event, however, France did not block the
enlargement decision; under pressure from both Germany and the
UK, France would have had to go along with the decision, or
180SEC (93) 648 final, p. 2. Commissioner van den Broek
had pushed heavily for the creation of a European Political
Area. See interview with him in Lionel Barber and David
Gardner, "A Brief to Build Bridges", The Financial Times, 8
March 1993.
"1SEC (93) 648 final, pp. 4-5 and annex I, p. 17.
"2As discussed above, the package included trade
concessions and PHARE reform. "Copenhagen Summit Set to
Endorse Substantial Package on East", European Re port no.
1866, 12 June 1993.
"3"Political Dialogue Remains Only Obstacle to Copenhagen
Conclusion on East", European ReDort no. 1868, 19 June 1993.
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risk losing influence.
The European Council in Copenhagen on 2 1-22 June 1993
finally agreed on a membership perspective for the associated
East European countries: "Accession will take place as soon as
an associated country is able to assume the obligations of
membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions
required." Candidate countries must:
- have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for
and protection of minorities;
- have a functioning market economy;
- be able to cope with competitive pressure and market
forces within the Union; and
- be able to take on the obligations of membership
including adherence to the aims of political, economic
and monetary union.
The EU would have to be able to absorb new members, while
maintaining the momentum of European integration. 1M This
last condition could be the most difficult to fulfill, as it
is ambiguous and subjective. No timetable for membership was
set out; that would depend on progress in meeting the
conditions. The EU has used the conditionality of membership
(a very powerful lever) to try to influence the reform process
and prevent conflicts in Eastern Europe (see chapter 6).
The European Council also agreed to set up a structured
relationship between the Community and the East European
associates, thus formalizing the ad hoc arrangements for
political dialogue and extending them further (but stopping
well short of affiliate membership). In addition to regular
meetings between the presidents of the European Council and
luConclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/93, p. 13.
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Commission and the associates' presidents, joint meetings of
all the heads of state and government would be held to discuss
specific issues, where appropriate. Advisory meetings would
be held between the Council and all associated countries on
matters of common interest (energy, environment, transport,
and so on), the CFSP, and judicial affairs. No decisions
would be taken at the meetings. A more intense dialogue on
CFSP matters was also set out. There would be:
- one troika meeting at foreign minister level and one
meeting at the level of political directors during each
presidency;
- briefings at secretariat level after each General
Affairs Council meeting and each political directors
meeting;
- one troika meeting at working group level per
presidency;
- regular troika consultations with the associates ahead
of important UN General Assembly and CSCE meetings.
Thus in June 1993, the Community accepted the prospect of
enlargement and agreed to intensify its relations with the
associates, to integrate them gradually into the Community.
This would further the Community's support of the reform
process, on which "peace and security in Europe" depended.1U
To reach these decisions, the member states had made
significant compromises. Several factors made this possible:
the Danish 'yes' to the Maastricht Treaty (and the prior
decision to allow Denmark to opt out of some parts of the
Treaty), which meant that at least some institutional reform
could go through; the agreement to proceed with enlargement to
the EFTAns (which logically had to precede any agreement to
'Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/93, p. 12.
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enlarge to Eastern Europe); and the growing realization that
East European demands for membership and closer relations had
to be answered, in the Community's own interest. To ensure
Europe's security, the EU would have to enlarge. It also
helped that the transformation in several East European
countries had proceeded so rapidly that the prospect of
enlargement seemed more 'natural'.
Once again, elements of externalization and self-styled
logic seem to apply. The decision on enlargement was taken
after much pressure from the East European countries, yet the
Community also set conditions which reflect the Community's
own identity and experiences. There was also strong pressure
within the Community (namely Germany, the UK, and the
Commission) for enlargement. Likewise, although the
associates demanded closer political ties with the Community,
the structured relationship sets out a unique path for
integration, with the emphasis on multilateralism and
cooperation.
5.5 PREPARING FOR ACCESSION
Even with the acceptance of the associates' eventual
membership, their demands did not diminish; in fact, pressures
to provide a prospective timeframe were growing. On 1 April
1994, Hungary applied to join; Poland did likewise on 8
April.'TM The associates applied partly to force the issue
onto the agenda of the 1996 IGC, but also to make sure the EU
16Later, Romania applied on 22 June 1995, Slovakia on 27
June 1995, Bulgaria on 16 December 1995, and the Czech
republic on 23 January 1996. The Baltic republics also
applied in 1995: Latvia on 27 October, Estonia on 28 November,
and Lithuania on 8 December.
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would have to deal with the applications before the mythical
date, 2OOO."
A priority of Germany's presidency from July to December
1994 was bringing the East European countries "into the
fold"."3 To a certain extent, the rest of the EU agreed, the
UK in particular. John Major argued:
Through Community membership we can consolidate
democracy and prosperity across our continent.
Without it, we risk turmoil among neighbours in
Eastern and Central Europe and endanger our own
long-term prosperity and stability."9
The British and German foreign ministers, Douglas Hurd and
Klaus Kinkel, cited three reasons why EU (and NATO) should
enlarge: "security, prosperity and shared There
were widespread concerns that failure to give a concrete
perspective on membership might intensify economic and
political problems in Eastern Europe and spark a return to
nationalism or authoritarianism, particularly with the
continuing disarray in Russia.'9'
But as Germany continued to insist, others, France in
particular, increasingly voiced their concerns about the
187A Polish request to participate in the IGC was rebuffed:
Commission President Jacques Santer said only EU member states
can take part. AcTence Euro pe no. 6457, 7 April 1995. There is
overwhelming public support for joining the EU in all of the
associates, from 73% in Bulgaria to 88% in Romania.
Eurobarometer no. 42, Spring 1995, p. 50.
1'3Andrew Marshall, "Germany Pushes Cause of Eastern
Neighbours", The Indeoendent, 19 July 1994.
"John Major, "Raise Your Eyes, There is a Land Beyond",
The Economist, 25 September 1993.
"°Douglas Hurd and Klaus Kinkel, "Welcome to our Eastern
Cousins", The Times, 26 April 1994.
'9'Andrew Marshall, "EU Drives East Towards a 'Greater
Europe'", The Independent, 29 January 1994.
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implications of enlargement. France, and the Commission,
reiterated that before enlargement could occur, the EU would
have to carry out sweeping institutional reforms.1
Enlargement could not dilute the EU (already a condition of
enlargement). France and several other Mediterranean member
states were also worried about an eastward shift in the Eu's
center of gravity.' All were concerned about the probable
cost of enlargement.
Ideas for a hard core Europe again appeared. In the fall
of 1993, Italian Foreign Minister Beniamino Andreatta proposed
that enlargement to Eastern Europe take place as soon as
possible, but that a hard federal core should also be created
at the heart of Europe to counter the inevitable slowing down
of integration. 1 In late August and early September 1994,
both French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur and the German CDU
parliamentary group proposed a hard core Europe. On 7
September, John Major proposed a Europe & la carte, allowing
member states to pick and choose the policies they wanted to
192Andrew Marshall, "Germany Pushes Cause of Eastern
Neighbours", The Indeendent, 19 July 1994.
1 Andrew Marshall, "Central Europe Lines up to Board the
Brussels Bandwagon", The Indei,endent, 21 March 1994, and
"Southward Swing", The Economist, 14 January 1995. The EFTAn
enlargement heightened these concerns. This is partly why
Greece was also pushing for enlargement to Cyprus.
1 In July 1995, a Spanish official warned that several
member states could block EU treaty amendments if they were
going to lose EU subsidies to Eastern Europe. Tom Buerkle,
"For Spain, The EU is All About Money", International Herald
Tribune, 10 July 1995.
'Nino Andreatta, "Una Politica Estera per l'Italia", fl
Mulino, no. 5, September/October 1993, p. 888.
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take part in. 196 Major's proposal was largely ignored; the
hard-core proposals were harshly criticized, particularly in
those countries excluded from the core.1'7
Such ideas were not accepted because "people have become
more conscious of the risks of splitting the Union or
weakening the acauis communauta ire. • "'s' The Corfu European
Council, 24-25 June 1994, stated that the institutional
conditions for ensuring the proper functioning of the EU must
be created at the 1996 IGC, which must therefore take place
before any accession negotiations begin.' While the debate
over institutional reform continued, the EU concentrated in
the meantime on preparing the associates for membership.
In section 5.5.1, the pre-accession strategy will be
discussed. One of the most important elements of the
strategy, the structured relationship, will be examined in
section 5.5.2.
5.5.1 Th. Strat.gy
Beginning in the spring of 1994, the Commission put
together a "pre-accession" strategy, to help the associates
satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. 200 The Commission's reports
'96See "Back to the Drawing-Board", The Economist, 10
September 1994.
1'7stephen Kinzer, "German Plan for Phased Union of Europe
Provokes Controversy", The New York Times, 4 September 1994.
196Lionel Barber, "Opportunity for Fine-Tuning",
Financial Times, 10 May 1995.
'Conclusions of the Presidency, in EC Bulletin no. 6,
1994, pt. 1.13. The leaders also agreed that Cyprus and Malta
would be included in the next phase of enlargement.
Acence EuroDe no. 6194, 19 March 1994.
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were released in July 1994.201 The strategy was based on
initiatives in five areas: strengthening the structured
relationship; creating the legal environment for integration
(approximation of laws); enhancing trade opportunities;
promoting cooperation in areas such as energy, transport, and
the environment; and assistance for integration and reform
(with PHARE and EU loans; see chapter 4). The pre-accession
strategy is unique; no previous membership applicants had the
path to membership so clearly indicated.
The Essen European Council, 9-10 December 1994, approved
the strategy, and declared that by preparing for the accession
of the associates, the EU would help ensure "the lasting peace
and stability of the European continent and neighbouring
regions". This meant that regardless of the acknowledged
difficulties of enlargement, the EU was prepared to take
significant steps to "implement" the Copenhagen decision: the
acceptance of enlargement was not merely a symbolic decision.
Furthermore, Europe agreements were to be concluded with the
Baltic States and Slovenia so that they could be included in
the pre-accession strategy.	 The pre-accession strategy is
20tConuuission documents: The Eurooe Acireements and Beyond:
A Strateciv to Prepare the Countries of Central and Eastern
Europe for Accession, CON (94) 320 final, 13 July 1994, and
Follow Uo to Commission Communication on "The Europe
Aareements and Beyond: A Strateciv to Prepare the Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe for Accession, CON (94) 361 final,
27 July 1994.
Presidency Conclusions, SN 300/94, p. 3. The European
Council also decided that to balance its relations with
Eastern Europe, the EU would develop a program for a Euro-
Mediterranean partnership.
203The Copenhagen European Council had called for free
trade agreements with the Baltic states, to replace the trade
and cooperation agreements. The agreements were signed on 18
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an important watershed: EU-East European relations would from
then on be focused on preparing for enlargement.
Trade was not such an important part of the strategy,
even though the Copenhagen trade concessions did not stem the
associates' disappointment. One Polish official complained,
"The EC's concessions are rather modest and far short of
expectations."°' But the Union was reluctant to go further.
As the Commission argued, in a vigorous defence of trade
policy towards Eastern Europe, by 1993, 60% of the Visegrad
countries' total exports entered the EC free of duties and
quantitative restrictions; by 1998, the percentage would be
85%, the remainder being agricultural products.20'
In July 1994, the Commission noted, "it does not appear
that further trade measures affecting tariffs or quotas are
necessary over the medium term." 20' The Essen summit did
July 1994; they entered into force on 1 January 1995. Q
Bulletin no. 12, 1994, pts. 1.3.37-1.3.43. Negotiations on
Europe agreements with the Baltic states began in December
1994; the agreements were signed on 12 June 1995. The Europe
agreement with Slovenia was held up by Italian objections over
the rights of ethnic Italians in Slovenia, and the property
rights of Italians who had left Yugoslavia after World War II.
In March 1995, the Council agreed that talks with Slovenia
could begin. Sarah Helm, "EU Stalls on Russia Trade Deal", 1j
Independent, 7 March 1995. The agreement was initialled on 15
June 1995. Aence Europe no. 6502, 16 June 1995.
'Boris Johnson, "Eastern Recruits Cool Over EC Status",
The Daily Teleqraph, 2 February 1994.
0'European Commission, "Trade and Aid in Relations Between
the European Union, the Countries • of Central and Eastern
Europe and the Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States", MG/PRH/FW/vf, 9 June 1994. Commissioner Hans van den
Broek also argued that tariff quotas have not been fully used
up by East European exporters. Interview in The Philip Morris
Institute for Public Policy Research, Is the West Doina Enouah
for Eastern Europe?, November 1994, p. 45.
COM (94) 361 final, p. 7.
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agree, however, to align the timetables for trade
liberalization in the Europe agreements with Bulgaria and
Romania with those of the other associates, since the
Copenhagen European Council had accepted the possibility of
membership for all the associates.
A variety of measures to help the associates integrate
their economies into the EU and meet the Copenhagen criteria
were instead agreed. The Commission suggested that the EU
help the associates implement competition and state aid
policies that were compatible with EU policies, so that
safeguard measures would not be needed. 207 The Essen European
Council stated that once adequate competition rules were
implemented, the EU would 'consider refraining from using
commercial defense instruments for industrial products' (not
exactly a firm promise).
At Essen, the leaders agreed some measures to encourage
regional economic cooperation.20S The EU would help the
associates to promote their exports. But the European Council
COM (94) 361 final, 27 July 1994, pp. 6-7. France, Spain
and Portugal initially opposed the initiative. Lionel Barber,
"EU to Tackle Blueprint for Enlargement", The Financial Times,
28 November 1994. The Commission noted in 1994 that since the
interim Europe agreements entered into force, the Community
had initiated only two anti-dumping cases (on steel products),
and activated the safeguard clauses twice (on steel and
cherries). "The Economic Interpenetration between the
European Union and Eastern Europe", Eurooean Economy, no. 6,
1994, pp. 163-170.
Baldwin notes that the Europe agreements set up a "hub-
and-spoke bilateralism" which marginalizes the "spoke" (East
European) economies. Because trade between the East European
countries is not as liberalized as that with the "hub" (the
Community), East-East trade is hindered, and investment thus
discouraged. The East European countries should offer each
other the same market access as offered under the Europe
agreements. Baldwin 1994, pp. 133-136, pp. 206-209.
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hesitated over a Commission proposal to introduce full
cumulation of origin in EU-East European trade; the
consequences would first have to be studied.
In addition, as part of the pre-accession strategy, EU
programs were opened to participation by the associates (see
footnote 115). PHARE assistance has been given to further
cooperation across EU-East European borders (see chapter 4).
The Essen European Council also asked the Commission to
produce a White Paper of all the internal market legislation
that needed to be adopted by the associates, and to report
annually on its implementation. 21° PHARE will provide
technical and legal assistance to help the associates adopt
the acauis conununautaire.
5.5.2 Consolidating the Structured Relationship
An important part of the pre-accession strategy has been
the 'structured relationship' with the associates, which
builds on the Copenhagen framework and the earlier proposals
for East European participation in EU affairs. But as Hans
van den Broek pointed out, there were worries about the legal
implications of allowing the associates in on Council
meetings; the EU had to be firm about maintaining its
This would mean that goods made or assembled in several
associated countries would still benefit from preferential
trade access. Such a proposal had also been made back in
1992. French and Portuguese manufacturers were concerned that
such moves would lead to job losses. Lionel Barber, "EU to
Amend Origin Rules", The Financial Times, 2 December 1994.
The associates were not thrilled with the proposal either (see
chapter 6).
210The White Paper was published in May 1995. Preparation
of the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe for
inteqration into the internal market of the Union, COM (95)
163 final, 3 May 1995.
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autonomous decision-making capacity. 21' The associates have
also been less than pleased by the multilateral approach (see
chapter 6).
But by the end of 1994, the EU had set up remarkable and
unprecedented mechanisms for dialogue with all the associates,
in all three pillars, before there is even a firm date for
beginning accession negotiations. All of the associates, even
those whose membership prospects are doubtful in the medium
term, have been included. The EU has thus apparently played
down the importance of conditionality to try to spread the
"Community method" of inter-state relations, hopefully
contributing to stability and security in Europe.212
The Copenhagen framework for an institutionalized
dialogue was not fully implemented f or some time. Over the
following year, only two informal meetings were held between
the Council and the associates on 'sectoral' matters:
transport (30 November 1993) and economic development (5 June
1994) •213 No summits were held until December 1994. The
first ministerial meeting within the framework for
multilateral political dialogue took place on 21 September
1993, when the troika and a Commission representative met with
211 fl Is the West Doina !noucth For Eastern Europe?, p. 43.
212The structured relationship, however, only involves
those countries that have concluded Europe agreements and the
EU retains conditionality in its membership conditions. The
three Baltic states took part in many meetings under the
structured relationship before they had signed Europe
agreements, but Slovenia did not. While the Baltic states
have 'friends' in Germany and the Scandinavian countries,
Slovenia's dispute with Italy delayed its integration into the
EU.
213Acience Europe no. 6119, 2 December 1993 and no. 6246,
8 June 1994.
281
all the foreign ministers of all six associates (including
Bulgaria and Romania) ."
To take the Copenhagen conclusions further, Italy and the
UK launched an initiative to link the associates with the two
intergovernmental pillars of the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP
and cooperation in home and justice affairs. In November
1993, Italian Foreign Minister Andreatta proposed the joint
Anglo-Italian initiative. 215 Andreatta felt that the East
Europeans needed to be included in political dialogue, not
least because it would be a visible sign of their
participation in the EU and could thus increase the legitimacy
of the governments in the eyes of their electorates. 216 The
initiative would involve the UK in a European project, boost
Italy's role, balance the Franco-German axis, and respond to
East European requests for greater security. 217 In early
December, Douglas Hurd agreed with the initiative.21'
Andreatta and Hurd wrote to Willy Claes, Belgian foreign
minister and Council president, to propose developing new
2MThey discussed the proposed Pact for Stability (see
chapter 6), relations with Russia, the situation in the former
Yugoslavia, and minority rights issues. EC Bulletin no. 9,
1993, pt. 1.3.7 and AcTence EuroDe no. 6069, 22 September 1993.
215Cominunication with Italian foreign ministry official,
4 August 1995.
216lnterview, 28 July 1995.
217Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Elementi per la Stampa:
Iniziativa Italo-Britannica di Associazione dei Paesi
dell'Europa Centrale ed Orientale all'Area Politica
dell'Unione Europea", Rome, 23 December 1993. The initiative
follows closely on a Franco-German proposal to offer the
associates some form of association with the WEU (see chapter
6).
21'Interviews with Italian and UK foreign ministry
officials.
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links between the six associates and the EU on the two
intergovernmental pillars. They argued that such links were
necessary because relations with the associates tended to be
dominated by economic issues. The associates desired a closer
political relationship which would allow them "to anchor their
societies and institutions to well-established democracies and
to a common system of values." 219 Closer links in foreign
policy areas and home affairs would help prepare the six
associates for eventual EU membership.
The joint proposal was presented to the General Affairs
Council on 20 December 1993. Claes noted it was timely, given
the political turmoil in Russia and Ukraine, and the
consequent growing anxiety in Eastern Europe.° France was
not so enthusiastic, because Italy and the UK had taken the
initiative in a region which was supposed to be one where
France traditionally exercised more influence. 1 Delors
supported it, as did the associates: they wanted to take part
in CFSP meetings.tm
219Text of the Letter from the UK and Italian foreign
ministers (Coreu).
rhe far right had just done well in Russian
parliamentary elections, while there were worries that Ukraine
would not dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Stephen Nisbet,
"Britain, Italy Urge Closer EC-East Europe Links", Reuter, 20
December 1993.
'Interview, 28 July 1995. The idea had been initially
mentioned to German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, but he was
more interested in pursuing initiatives with France, such as
pushing for WEU associate partnership status for the
associates (see section 6.3.2).
271Andrew Marshall, "East Pushes for Tighter Integration
with EU", The IndeDendent, 3 March 1994, and "Delors Returns
to Notion of Political Initiative", Euro pean Retort no. 1926,
16 February 1994.
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Less than three months later, on 7 March 1994, the
Council agreed to reinforce the political dialogue with the
six associated countries.
provisions for:
The Council would make
- an annual summit of the European Council president, the
Commission president and the heads of state or government
of the associated countries; in addition, the presidency
would brief the associates' ambassadors after each
European Council;
- special joint Councils on CFSP matters during each
presidency with the associates' foreign ministers; the
presidency could also organize troika meetings of the
foreign ministers;
- political directors' meetings during each presidency;
troika meetings could be held to discuss urgent matters;
- meetings of experts, in the form of working parties on
security, terrorism and human rights, based on the troika
or participation by all partners.
The associates could also back Troika demarches and EU
statements, participate in certain Joint Actions, and could be
invited to coordinate their positions with the EU's position
in international organizations and conferences.'
The Council decision clearly implements the early
proposals for East European participation in CFSP, and even
moves closer to a form of affiliate membership. Undoubtedly,
many member states agreed to do so because they felt it was
3EC Bulletin no. 3, 1994, pt. 1.3.37 and Aaence Europe
no. 6186, 9 March 1994. The decision was taken within the
CFSP context, prepared in Political Committee meetings on 17-
18 January and again on 28 February-i March 1994, but was not
a Joint Action. Links with the third pillar were held up
because cooperation within the EU on home and justice affairs
was proving to be a sensitive matter. Ministero degli Affari
Esteri, Direzione Generale degli Affari Politici, "Appunto per
ii Segretario Generale", Rome, 26 January 1994.
Member state and Council officials note that cooperation
in international organizations has been working particularly
well. There have also been several joint statements, and the
associates have participated in demarches.
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necessary to include the associates in a security framework,
as the situation in Russia and turmoil elsewhere in the former
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia provoked so much concern.
In two July 1994 reports, however, the Commission noted
that neither the structured relationship agreed at Copenhagen
nor the 7 March Council decisions had been fully implemented.
The political dialogue, which had so far taken place mainly in
troika formatm, did not sufficiently address key foreign
policy and security issues; yet development of this part of
the structured relationship was "especially important as a
means for overcoming the widespread sense of insecurity in
central and eastern Europe."' The Commission suggested that
joint meetings of the EU and associates replace the troika
format (as the Council had already decided in March) 22
further proposed that the structured relationship apply to all
three EU pillars. Joint meetings of the associates and
sectoral Councils should be held on matters of common
interest, including environment, transport, internal market
and social policy.22'
Germany then weighed in with its strong support for the
structured relationship. It put forward a paper on the
2250n 19 April, the troika of foreign ministers, plus van
den Broek, held talks with the foreign ministers of the six
associates. EC Bulletin no. 4, 1994, pt. 1.3.21. There was
supposed to have been a meeting with the full Council the
previous month, but the EFTAn membership negotiations were
still in progress and the meeting had to be postponed. Aaence
EuroDe no. 6187, 10 March 1994.
COM (94) 320 final, p. 3.
7COM (94) 320 final, p. 4.
221C0M (94) 361 final, pp. 1-2.
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arrangements for joint meetings between the EU ministers and
their counterparts from the six associates. The meetings
would parallel those of the Council, and be held once or twice
a year, on foreign affairs, internal affairs, the environment,
economy, agriculture, and transport. The proposals were
intended to be "practical guidelines" for implementing the
Copenhagen European Council decisions. The German input was
crucial in moving implementation forward.
At a Council meeting on 4 October, the German plan was
basically approved, although five members states, including
France, Spain and Belgium, objected to regular meetings and
insisted that no decisions could be made at them.° French
Foreign Minister Alain Juppé argued that there should not be
a proliferation of meetings and that the EU's independence of
decision must be respected.1
On 28 November 1994, the EU foreign ministers approved
the Commission's report on a structured dialogue (which
'Under the German presidency, a few sectoral joint
Council-associates meetings were held, including one on
organized trans-border crime on 8 September 1994 and one on
the environment on 5 October. Aaence Europe no. 6312, 10
September 1994, and EC Bulletin no. 10, 1994, pt. 1.3.20. The
political dialogue provisions were also more fully
implemented. On 31 October, the foreign ministers from the EU,
associates, and four EFTAn5, met, along with Delors, Brittan,
and van den Broek, to discuss the pre-accession strategy,
regional cooperation, and closer links. The framework of the
meeting was more official and formal than previous meetings,
and was extensively prepared in Coreper. Aence Eurote no.
6346, 28 October 1994.
°Andrew Marshall, "German Plan to Reach Out to Central
Europe Triggers Row with EU Partners", The Independent, 5
October 1994.
'Acience Eurooe no. 6329, 5 October 1994.
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reflected the German, Italian and British proposal.). tm The
Essen European Council then endorsed it. Each year the heads
of state would meet on the margins of the European Council.
The foreign ministers would meet semi-annually, to discuss the
full scope of relations with associates. Ministers
responsible for internal market development, transport,
telecommunications, research, environment, cultural affairs,
and education would meet once a year, in connection with
regular Council meetings. Justice and home affairs ministers
would meet twice a year. 3 These meetings are additional to
the "enhanced" political dialogue, as set out in the 7 March
1994 Council decision, which is much more intense.
Each presidency should arrange meetings for that year
according to the above schedule, and identify priority themes
at the beginning of the presidency. The associates will n
participate in decision-making. Launching the structured
relationship, the East European leaders were invited to the
Essen European Council meeting. 	 The French and Spanish
2"Essence of Essen", The Economist, 3 December 1994.
3coreper will prepare the sectoral meetings. Preparation
of foreign ministers meetings could be done in form of joint
preparatory meetings at ambassadorial level. Coreper is to
ensure the horizontal coherence of the dialogue. Presidency
Conclusions, SN 300/94, Annex IV, pp. 9-10.
The invitation was late in reaching the associates,
however. Some observers say that reservations from London and
Paris caused the uncertainty. Others point out that the
southern member states were complaining about the neglect of
Mediterranean economic and security issues. Acience Eurooe no.
6364, 25 November 1994, and Tony Barber, "Norway Shows the Way
for EU Doubters", The Independent, 30 November 1994. The
leaders from the six associates and the three Baltic states
also met with the EU leaders after the Cannes European Council
in June 1995, and after the Madrid European Council in
December 1995. Twenty-ninth General Report on the Activities
of the Eurooean Union 1995, p. 318.
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presidencies drew up a schedule of meetings in l995.2
Numerous problems with the structured relationship have
become evident. Some associates are still 'putting their
houses in order': finding interlocutors on the associates'
side can be difficult. The associates want to extend the
political dialogue provisions to other areas, but the EU
refuses to do so: that would increase the burden on officials
and let the associates in on too much EU business.' The
associates would also prefer to develop their bilateral links
with the EU.
The structured relationship (and particularly the
enhanced political dialogue) is burdensome; one official has
said the EU is "drowning in political dialogue". tm Often
ministers send their deputies to ministerial meetings. The
large meetings, with 27 parties present, vividly illustrate
the problems the EU will face when it enlarges.
But the structured relationship should help integrate the
associates into the EU, particularly by socializing the
associates into the process of consensus-building in the EU,
and acquainting them with EU procedures and dossiers.
Integration into the CFSP should also help the associates to
develop a coordination reflex. This might avoid some of the
dangers that enlargement poses for foreign policy cooperation,
notably the disruption of discipline.tm
5See Aence Europe no. 6415, 8 February 1995.
236lnterviews with member state and Council Secretariat
officials.
wInteiew took place on 12 March 1996.
WAs Nuttall warns, in Nuttall 1992, p. 321.
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CONCLUSION
The Community/Union has set up a remarkable structure for
the gradual integration of the East European associates into
the EU, based on the Europe agreements, the pre-accession
strategy and, in particular, the structured relationship.
Several member states and the Commission pushed through
initiatives, successfully upgrading the common interest.
Again and again, reticent member states made concessions, on
trade, on the structured relationship, and, above all, on
enlargement. Externalization certainly seems to apply: the
constant East European demands for action at the
Community/Union level with regards to trade, dialogue, and
enlargement forced the member states to respond jointly. But
the collective response (conditionality of membership,
structured relationship) has also been unique, reflecting the
Community/Union's principles, goals, and experiences.
The most significant decision was that on enlargement.
The Europe agreement framework, initially considered at least
a medium-term strategy to help reform efforts and draw the
associates closer to the Community, soon appeared inadequate.
No doubt several member states would have preferred to
postpone a decision on enlargement, but the demands of the
East European states (supported by Germany, the UK, Denmark,
and the Commission, in particular), combined with security
concerns and an awareness of the EU's role as a stabilizing
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'The Economic Interpenetration between the European Union and Eastern Europe, Eurooe
Economy, no. 6, 1994, pp. 35-38.
CHAPTER 6
TUE COJDLVNITY'S POLICY: CONYLICT PREVENTION
The end of the Cold War was supposed to bring peace to
Europe. At their Paris summit on 19-21 November 1990, CSCE
leaders declared optimistically that their relations from then
on would be "founded on respect and cooperation".' The
euphoria did not last long. War erupted in the former
Yugoslavia in mid-1991. Then conflicts and civil war broke
out in the disintegrating Soviet Union. Tensions developed
between other states in Eastern Europe, often over the
treatment of ethnic minorities. The declaration of the CSCE
leaders at their next summit in Helsinki in July 1992 has a
much different tone:
This is a time of promise but also a time of
instability and insecurity. Economic decline,
social tension, aggressive nationalism, intolerance,
xenophobia, and ethnic conflicts threaten stability
in the CSCE area....For the first time in decades we
are facing warfare in the CSCE region. New armed
conflicts and massive use of force to achieve
hegemony and territorial expansion continue to
occur.2
The evolution of the Community's policy towards Eastern
Europe reflects these changing circumstances. In 1988-1990,
the Community had concentrated on aiding economic reforms.
Democracy's roots would not spread if economic reforms failed,
so supporting economic reform was considered necessary for the
democratic transition. In addition, by extending aid and
'"Charter of Paris for a New Europe", in EC Bulletin no.
11, 1990, p. 126.
2"CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of cthange",
in Alexis Heraclides, Helsinki-Il and its Aftermath: The
Makinci of the CSCE into an International Oraanization (London:
Pinter, 1993), p. 211.
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trade concessions on a conditional basis, the Community hoped
to encourage political reform. By 1990, many within the
Community agreed that more had to be done to consolidate the
economic and political transformation, and the policy's
instruments expanded to include association and integration.
Eventual integration with the Community is widely believed to
be the best way to spread security and stability in Eastern
Europe, but in a longer-term perspective. In the shorter
term, however, the Community would have to take other measures
to ensure the success of the transformation, given the
worrisome developments in Eastern Europe. The strengthening
of ties with the associates and the acceptance of their
eventual membership also meant that the Union would be that
much 'closer' to instability. This made it more imperative to
focus attention on preventing conflicts. Conflict prevention
measures, which "aim at preventing disputes from arising and
preventing existing disputes from deteriorating into armed
conflict" 3 , would have to be implemented.
Until the end of the Cold War, the Community was better
known for preventing conflicts between its own member states.
The EU's involvement in conflict prevention has since
expanded, as a result of its increasing foreign policy
responsibilities and external exigencies. The Yugoslav war
made manifest the EU's severe shortcomings in dealing with
violent conflicts; the EU is much better equipped to try to
prevent conflicts from erupting in the first place. In using
3Gabriel Munuera, Preventing Armed Conflict in EuroDe:
Lessons from Recent ExDerience, Chaillot Paper 15/16 (Paris:
Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, 1994),
p. 3.
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its instruments to try to prevent conflicts, the EU has also
been evidently more pro-active than reactive.
Conflict prevention is one of those areas where spillover
between foreign economic relations, foreign policy, and
security policy is quite evident. Consistent with this, the
Commission has been very involved in implementing conflict
prevention measures.
In section 6.1, the perceived threats to security in
Eastern Europe will be discussed. Section 6.2 will examine
the measures that the Community has taken to try to reduce
"internal" threats to security. Section 6.3 will then survey
the measures taken to address "external" threats to security.
6 • 1 THREATS TO BECURITY IN EASTERN EUROPE
In this chapter, the sources of insecurity in Eastern
Europe will be divided into "internal" and "external" sources,
although such a division is fairly arbitrary, since intra-
state ethnic conflicts or internal instability can spread
across borders, or can be exacerbated or even fomented by
groups or governments in other states. Internal sources of
insecurity, arising within states, include: economic and
political instability resulting from a failure of reforms; the
risk that a population disillusioned with reforms could elect
authoritarian and/or nationalist rulers; and disputes between
ethnic groups. Jan Zielonka has argued that the most acute
source of instability in the region emerges "from the possible
failure of economic reforms and democracy-building in the
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region. " Such a failure could produce economic chaos and
political anarchy, which could result in aggressive populism,
hyper-nationalism, militarism and economic demagoguery, or
even foreign intervention. 5 Ethnic disputes are another
internal source of insecurity. In a joint declaration in
November 1991, the Community and the U.S. proclaimed that one
of the greatest challenges to democracy and prosperity in the
East was "dealing with ethnic diversity and the rights of
persons belonging to national minorities."
External sources of insecurity include concerns about
Soviet (then Russian) foreign policy intentions: Russia could
try to re-establish a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
At the very least, this would destabilize the region, and
could potentially inflame existing disputes between East
European countries in different "spheres". Other external
sources are inter-state disputes over ethnic minorities and
boundaries. Jenonne Walker has warned that the most likely
source of conflicts between states in Eastern Europe stems
from one state's concern over the treatment of ethnic
minorities in a neighboring state. Disputes over territory
also arise in part from minority grievances - states might
4Zielonka 1992, p. 5. This was also the view of the
former Czechoslovak foreign minister. See Dienstbier 1991,
especially p. 126.
5A report by several research institutes asserted that "it
is economic success or failure that will determine the fate of
the new democracies." Falk Bomsdorf, et al., Confrontina
Insecurity in Eastern Europe: Challenes for the European
Community (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1992), p. 21.
'"EC-US Statement on Peaceful and Democratic
Transformation in the East", EPC press release P.111/91, 9
November 1991.
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want to change their boundaries to include more of their
dominant ethnic group within their state.7
Clearly, conflicts in Eastern Europe could adversely
affect the EU's security.' There are several kinds of
measures that outsiders can take to try to prevent violent
conflicts arising from these internal and external sources.
One observer noted: "as many conflicts and tensions are rooted
in political, social and economic instabilities, the Union is
much better equipped than any other international organisation
to address related problems."9 At a 1993 conference,
Commission President Delors asserted that
(t]he European Community has a special
responsibility not only because of its importance as
a pole of stability and prosperity, but also because
it has an armory of instruments to deal with the
most pressing problems in the East and in the South.
Never has the link between economic stability and
security been so obvious.'0
PHARE, the Europe agreements, the structured relationship, all
support the political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe,
and thus help engender security. Delors stated, however, that
7jenonne Walker (1993a), "European Regional Organizations
and Ethnic Conflict", in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Central and
Eastern Europe: The Challenae of Transition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993), p. 45.
'For a more detailed discussion of possible threats to the
West stemming from the collapse of communism, see Bomsdorf, et
al. 1992, pp. 60-81, and Edward Mortimer, European Security
After the Cold War, Adelphi Paper no. 271 (London: Brassey's,
1992), pp. 5-18. One could add that the negative "public
relations" effects of not dealing successfully with conflicts,
as in the former Yugoslavia, could reduce public support for
European integration.
9Jopp 1994, p. 67.
'°Jacques Delors, "European Unification and European
Security", in European Security after the Cold War Part I,
Adeiphi Paper no. 284 (London: Brassey's, 1994), p. 11.
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the EU'S priority would be "to promote stability on the
eastern and southern borders by paying more attention to
preventive diplomacy."1'
This chapter will examine how the Community, then Union,
has tried to prevent conflicts in Eastern Europe, particularly
since 1991, when the issue became more pressing. "Conflict
prevention" will be interpreted fairly widely, to include not
only mediation or economic and diplomatic pressure on
disputants, but also attempts to reduce the internal and
external sources of insecurity (beyond integrating the
associates in the EU and providing aid for economic reforms).
The Community/Union has used conditionality to foster
democratization, respect for human and minority rights, and
friendly relations with neighbors; provided aid specifically
for democratization; encouraged regional cooperation; and
integrated the associates into the WEU. These measures are
not specifically and solely aimed at preventing conflict, but
are expected to achieve that objective, and so will be covered
in this chapter. The Community has also, however, stepped in
directly to mediate a dispute between Slovakia and Hungary,
using conditionality to prod the parties to compromise, and
devised the Pact on Stability in Europe. The Pact is clearly
the EU'S foremost effort to prevent conflict, and has been
developed specifically for that aim.
The Community's efforts to eradicate or mitigate the
perceived causes of instability and insecurity in Europe have
taken place alongside similar efforts by other organizations,
"Delors 1994, p. 9.
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namely, the CSCE, Council of Europe, and NATO. Those efforts
cannot be discussed here, except insofar as they have been
linked to the Community's measures.
6.2 THE COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO INTERNAL THREATS
The measures taken by the Community to address the
internal sources of conflict reflect very "liberal" ideas.
Democracy, respect for human and minority rights, economic
growth, and integration would lead to stability and peace.
The June 1991 Luxembourg European Council declared that
respect for human rights was necessary for peace and lasting
security.'2 The Community and the US jointly declared, in
November 1991:
The potential for inter-ethnic tensions and
aggressive nationalism to destabilize the emerging
democracies of the region can best be addressed
through adherence to the principles and commitments
enunciated through the CSCE process, including as
reaffirmed at the recent Geneva meeting of experts
on national minorities.'3
Reinhardt Rummel has noted that the EU is applying its
own experiences with regards to Eastern Europe. Democracy and
integration had created peace in Western Europe; "(d]eveloping
democracy within the states of Eastern Central Europe and the
CIS as well as integration among these states is therefore
regarded as a road to peace in this region as well."4
'2Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg European Council, 28-
29 June 1991, Annex V 1 EC Bulletin no. 6, 1991, p. 18.
'3EPC press release P.111/91.
14Reinhardt Rummel (1995b), "CFSP's Conflict Prevention
Policy", Paper prepared for the ECPR Second Pan-European
Conference in International Relations, Paris, 13-16 September
1995, p. 4. A debate about whether democracy actually
engenders peace is currently raging among international
relations theorists, but not, it seems, among policy-makers
who appear to be convinced that it does.
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Several observers have warned, however, that
democratization could exacerbate ethnic tension. After all,
violent ethnic conflicts have broken out during the process of
democratization. 0	But in their November 1991 joint
declaration, the Community and the US stated: "We specifically
want to underline that political freedom is not the cause of
such problems (ethnic tensions and nationalism] but is the
necessary pre-condition for achieving durable solutions in the
spirit of compromise and mutual tolerance." 16 Nunuera agrees:
"Ultimately, the basis for stability is well-known: democracy
and socio-economic development provide the greatest hope for
managing the problems of Central and Eastern Europe,
particularly inter-ethnic relations."'7
To encourage democratization and respect for human and
minority rights, the Community adopted two main approaches: it
set political conditions for closer relations and eventual
membership, and it extended aid and technical assistance to
help build democracy. In section 6.2.1, the application of
the conditionality principle will be examined in more detail;
00n this issue, see Renée de Nevers, "Democratization and
Ethnic Conflict", Survival, vol. 35, no. 2, Summer 1993. De
Nevers notes that whether or not ethnic conflict erupts during
democratization depends on several factors: the speed with
which ethnic issues are recognized, the level of ethnic
tension when democratization begins, the size and power of
different ethnic groups within the state, the ethnic
composition of the previous regime and its opposition, the
political positions of the leaders of the main ethnic groups,
the presence or absence of external ethnic allies, and the
ethnic composition of the military (pp. 31-32). She suggests
that, to try to prevent ethnic conflict during
democratization, the international community should emphasize
the need to protect group rights (p.' 46).
'6EPC press release P.111/91.
'7Nunuera 1994, p. 104.
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section 6.2.2 will review the Community's direct attempts to
help the transition to democracy.
6.2.1 Conditionality
Conditionality has been the guiding principle of
Community policy since 1988, when negotiation and conclusion
of the trade and cooperation agreements depended on the
progress of reforms and respect for CSCE principles. In this
section, the principle of conditionality (and the problems
with it) will first be examined in greater detail; then its
application will be discussed.
The Community's conditions have been explicitly stated.
The preambles to all the Europe agreements stress commitment
to pluralist democracy, based on the rule of law, human
rights, a multiparty system, and free and democratic
elections. The agreements with Bulgaria, the Czech republic,
Romania and Slovakia (concluded as the risks of ethnic
conflict became clearer) also mention respect for minority
rights, and contain a clause stipulating that continued
association depends on respect for human rights and
democracy. 1$
With the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia in June
1991, the Community increasingly emphasized respect for human
and minority rights and the peaceful resolution of border
disputes." A consensus has developed that the East European
'See also the Commission's Communication, On the
Inclusion of Res pect for Democratic Princi ples and Human
Riahts in Aareements between the Community and Third
Countries, CON (95) 216, final, 23 May 1995.
'9The Community had not insisted so much on minority
rights before. The June 1991 Luxembourg European Council
stated: "The protection of minorities is ensured in the first
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states (but not necessarily the EC member states) must
guarantee minority rights. 20 For example, in a Joint
declaration in November 1991 (as var raged in Croatia), the EC
and US asserted that "the full observance and implementation
of all CSCE principles and commitments and the respect for the
diversity of minorities in a spirit of tolerance are essential
to the development of close, cooperative and mutually
beneficial relations in the new Europe." 2' The Pact for
Stability in Europe (see section 6.3.4) in particular
emphasizes minority rights guarantees as a way to reduce
disputes between neighbors.
Conditionality extended to the recognition of new states
emerging with the disintegration of communist federations. On
16 December 1991, the Community and the member states adopted
criteria for recognizing new states in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, or more correctly, for establishing diplomatic
relations with new states. The criteria were at this point
place by the effective establishment of democracy. The
European Council recalls the fundamental nature of the
principle of non-discrimination. It stresses the need to
protect human rights whether or not the persons concerned
belong to minorities." Presidency Conclusions, Annex V,
Bulletin no. 6, 1991, p. 17.
201n June 1992, the CSCE set up the post of High
Commissioner on National Minorities. In November 1994, the
Council of Europe adopted a Framework Convention on the
Protection of National Minorities.
21EPC press release P.111/91.
Marc Weller points out that these criteria go far beyond
the traditional standards, under international law, for
recognizing statehood. They were "not meant to be criteria of
statehood as such, but rather introduced political criteria
concerning the possibility of establishing diplomatic
relations." Marc Weller, "The International Response to the
Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia",
American Journal of International Law, vol. 86, no. 3, July
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familiar principles of the Community's policy towards Eastern
Europe, including: respect for CSCE principles of the rule of
law, democracy and human rights; guarantees for the rights of
ethnic and national groups and minorities; respect for the
inviolability of frontiers which could only be changed by
peaceful means and common agreement; and commitment to settle
questions of state succession and regional disputes by
agreement. Such conditions were novel in international law;
as Margaret Doxey notes, the "EC conditions were collectively
set and far-reaching, reflecting security and welfare norms of
an international public-policy nature. Of course, such
conditions are really powerful only prior to recognition, but
they reiterate the principles of good governance and friendly
inter-state relations that the Community has tried to promote
in Eastern Europe.
The Copenhagen European Council's declaration on
membership conditions could certainly prove to be the Eu's
most powerful instrument for influencing the transformation of
Eastern Europe. Mathias Jopp has argued that "conditions for
accession, together with a realistic perspective for
membership, are the most effective lever for the Union to
influence developments in Central and Eastern Europe."
1992, p. 588.
"Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition of
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union'", EPC
Press Release P.128/91, 16 December 1991.
Xargaret Doxey, "'Something Old, Something New': The
Politics of Recognition in Post-Cold-War Europe", Dii,lomacv
and Statecraft, vol. 6, no. 2, July 1995, pp. 312-313.
Jopp 1994, pp. 58-59.
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Munuera maintains that the appeal of EU membership contribute.
to conflict prevention in two ways. It imposes self-restraint
on countries that want to show their good intentions and
readiness for membership and its appeal provides the EU with
important external leverage over the behavior of potential
candidates. 2' No dates have been indicated for enlargement,
as this depends on fulfillment of the conditions; providing a
date could be counterproductive.
To what extent applying conditionality will allow the EU
to influence the development of democracy - and therefore, in
the liberal view, the potential for conflicts - is still an
open question. Some of the associates have been irritated by
conditionality: Hungary once described it as "patronizing",
while Poland argued it was not necessary since it had already
demonstrated its commitment to democracy. The success of
democratization in a particular state may have more to do with
domestic factors, including a general consensus favoring
democratization, than with the EU's insistence that the state
fulfill certain conditions. But where democratic reforms are
more contested, the EU'S conditions could be influential.
Georg Sorensen argues that political conditionality could help
to dissuade governments from human rights abuse, or to
discourage a return to authoritarian rule, but needs to be
backed up by positive measures to strengthen civil society.2'
Peter Urin, however, counters that it would be difficult to
2'Munuera 1994, pp. 91-92.
Merritt 1991, pp. 23-24.
2'Georg Sorensen, "Introduction" in Sorensen 1993, p. 4.
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impose democracy or human rights protection against a
government's
The leverage provided by membership conditions did
support the democratization process in three Southern European
countries, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, which had been
excluded from the Community because they were not liberal
democracies. Several observers agree that this had a crucial
effect in encouraging democratization in those three countries
from the 197O g .° The new political elites saw the "European
option" as a way to strengthen the new democracies, acquire
international respectability, overcome isolation, and receive
financial aid. The prospect of EC entry provided a powerful
incentive for democratization. 3' As democratization was
launched in the three countries, the EC responded by
expressing solidarity, holding out the prospect of membership,
and promising tighter trade links and modest amounts of aid.
But Geoffrey Pridhain argues that domestic developments were
still the primary influence on democratization, because the
Community could not have prevented a disruption or reversal of
the transition process.
There are several problems with conditionality. How is
Urin 1993, p. 68.
30See Lawrence Whitehead, "Democracy by Convergence and
Southern Europe: A Comparative Perspective", and Geoffrey
Pridham, "The Politics of the European Community,
Transnational Networks and Democratic Transition in Southern
Europe", in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Encouraain Democracy: The
International Context of Reaime Transition in Southern Eurooe
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991).
31Pridham 1991, pp. 225-226.
Pridham 1991, p. 243.
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it to be applied? As Peter Tirin asks: What is the minimum
degree of democratization required? Which human rights are to
be respected as a matter of priority?" How would the EU
determine whether associates are fulfilling conditions for
association or membership?TM What would be considered
violations of the conditions? Any such judgment is bound to
be highly subjective, and therefore influenced by politics."
Several members states have argued that it is more
important for the EU to strengthen relations with the East
European states than to apply conditionality. A strict
application of conditionality would only isolate those states
that most needed aid and ties with the Community, and generate
instability. There is still a reluctance (as there was during
the Cold War) to use trade and relations with Eastern Europe
as a "stick", rather than as a "carrot". This was evident,
for example, in the discussions about relations with Bulgaria
and Romania in 1992 and early 1993 (see chapter 5). The
extension of the structured relationship to all the
associates, irrespective of their progress in political and
economic reforms, reflects the view that integration is
crucial for maintaining stability. The tensions between these
two views are manifest in several other instances, discussed
further below.
"Urin 1993, p. 70.
34A Commission official noted that the governments of some
associates believe constitutional provisions on human rights
are enough; in daily practice, however, those provisions may
be violated. Interview, 19 April 1996.
"Relations with Slovenia, for example, have been subject
to the vagaries of changing Italian governments.
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There is also the risk that applying conditionality could
turn the "targeted" state back to Moscow; the EU has become
increasingly aware of this. Geopolitical considerations more
than a positive appraisal of the progress of reforms, for
example, affected the decision to negotiate Europe agreements
with Bulgaria and Romania (see section 5 • 3.2) M
There are problems with insisting on the protection of
minority rights. States could fear that by granting
substantial autonomy to minorities, they create a precedent
for separation. By granting rights on the basis of ethnic or
other exclusionary criteria, states perpetuate divisions.
Minority rights and individual human rights may not be
compatible. Community member states themselves are divided
over the concept of minority rights, with France and the UK in
particular more inclined to emphasize individual rights. One
observer argues that insisting on guarantees for minority
rights is only one conflict prevention measure, and should be
emphasized along with democratic practices and economic
stability. The progressive reduction in the importance of
borders, by cross-border cooperation and regional integration,
would also help prevent disputes over minorities.V The EU
has in fact combined these sorts of measures.
The conditionality of membership, while a powerful
'Relations with the Baltic states have been strengthened
for similar reasons - to prevent Russia from re-establishing
a sphere of influence including those countries. There are
concerns that Russia may pressure Bulgaria, unlikely to accede
to the EU and NATO any time soon, to join a "counter-
alliance". Adrian Bridge, "Bulgaria Torn by Row Over Kremlin
Alliance", The Independent, 1 April 1996.
Munuera 1994, pp. 79-83.
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instrument now, may prove troublesome in the future. Munuera
warns that unless membership is likely to be granted in the
near future, frustration could result.M If enlargement
occurs gradually, to some East European states before others,
then stability could be undermined if it appears that Europe
is being divided again. Should all of the associates thus be
integrated at the same time, irrespective of their performance
in economic and political fields? This would be highly
impractical, and undesirable, from the EU's point of view.
Why should governments not wholly committed to democracy and
the market economy be granted membership in a "club" based on
those foundations? But there is a risk that those associates
that join the EU could veto further enlargements or take an
aggressive attitude towards non-members over minority issues.
Encouraging regional cooperation (see section 6.3.1) is one
way to try to avoid this, but the risks remain. In addition,
the promise of membership is a "consumable power resource";
once fulfilled, the EU's leverage would have been exhausted.
The application of conditionality in practice makes
manifest these various problems. Elections in several
associates have returned former communists to power: Lithuania
in November 1992, Poland in September 1993, Hungary in May
1994, and Bulgaria in December 1994. The hardship resulting
from the transition from communism and the mistakes made by
the first, inexperienced post-communist governments have been
Munuera 1994, pp. 91-93.
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cited as reasons for the popularity of the "pink"
communists. 3' At one level, the election of such governments
in Eastern Europe has not affected relations with the EU (or
even caused much concern within the EU) - as all the countries
are still democratizing, the governments have pledged that
reforms will continue (more slowly), and all remain committed
to seeking EU membership. The EU has pressed ahead with the
pre-accession strategy and the structured relationship. But
eventual membership in the EU depends on the associates
meeting the conditions, and for some associates, that may not
happen for quite a while if the pace of reforms slows.
The Community's response to the Czechoslovak split
illustrates a subtle use of conditionality. While the risk of
a conflict between the two successor states was very unlikely,
here was an opportunity to demonstrate that disputes could be
handled peacefully.
The immediate reactions of several EC officials to the
prospect of a division of Czechoslovakia were not positive.
The EC tried to indicate that the reasons for a division of
the country were by no means clear to outsiders. On 21 June
1992, EC Council President Joao de Deus Pinheiro said that the
division of the CSFR was a mistake, and would make things more
difficult for them.	 Delors publicly agreed with him.
3"A Return, but not a Rerun", The Economist, 16 April
1994. Some, however, blamed the Community: "Neglect by the
West Europeans may even be partly responsible for the
emergence of Europe's new east-west divide. With the EC
beacon shining too feebly, some East Europeans are being drawn
to more familiar lights." "The Nightmare Continent",
Economist, 13 June 1992. But even in eastern Germany, where
the German government has poured massive amounts of aid,
former Communists have done well in elections.
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Andriessen indicated that the Europe agreement would have to
be reexamined in the event of a split. 40 The Lisbon European
Council a few days later stated:
In light of the results of the 5 and 6 June
elections in Czechoslovakia and the joint public
declaration of Mr Klaus and Mr Meciar after their
talks of 19 and 20 June, the European Council
expressed the hope that the ongoing talks between
the different political forces will continue in a
peaceful and constructive manner and that the
important steps in regional and international
cooperation already achieved may be further
developed without any major difficulty.4'
Once the decision to divide Czechoslovakia had been
taken, the EC strengthened its message. The two successor
states were told that unless they established a customs union,
a number of serious technical problems could hinder their
trade with the EC. The need to reopen negotiations on
Europe agreements thus gave the Community some leverage.
The division of Czechoslovakia, as of 1 January 1993,
went relatively smoothly, and the question of recognizing the
successor states, the Czech republic and Slovakia, did not
even arise (regardless of the list of conditions for
recognition) . The Czech republic was pressing for the two
40Aaence EuroDe no. 5755, 22/23 June 1992.
41presidency Conclusions, EC Bulletin no. 6, 1992, p. 14.
42lnterview with DG IA official, 12 March 1996.
"Jenonne Walker (1993b) contends that the EC made a
Czech-Slovak customs union a precondition for continued
association. In "International Mediation of Ethnic
Conflicts", Survival, vol. 35, no. i, spring 1993, p. 110. On
25 and 26 October 1992, Czech and Slovak leaders signed
several agreements including one establishing a customs union.
Sharon Fisher, "Czech-Slovak Relations Two Years After the
Elections", RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 27, 8 July
1994, p. 11.
44lnterviews with two Commission officials.
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new countries to be treated on the same terms. Slovakia was
basically included in the unofficial " first tier" - those
associates most likely to become EU members first. Both new
countries signed Europe agreements at the same time (October
1993), even though reform in Slovakia was much less advanced
and Slovak-Hungarian relations were still strained.'
Events in Slovakia, however, have caused considerable
concern. In July 1992, the Community inquired about the
future status of Slovakia's minorities (and especially the
600,000 ethnic Hungarians), but the new prime minister,
Vladimir Meciar, refused to consider legislating minority
rights guarantees. 4' He also refused to consider signing a
treaty with Hungary which included provisions on minority
rights, fearing that the Hungarian minority would try to
secede from Slovakia and reunite with Hungary.'7
'The Gabcikovo dam dispute had been defused (see section
6.3.3), but the issue of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia
was still problematic. Czech pressure, and support from EC
member states, also helped overcome Hungarian objections to
Slovakia's membership in the Council of Europe; both successor
states joined in June 1993. Munuera 1994, pp. 16-17.
4'And relations between Meciar and the ethnic Hungarian
deputies in the Slovak parliament were very strained. Alfred
Reisch, "Meciar and Slovakia's Hungarian Minority", RFE/RL
Research Report, vol. 1, no. 43, 30 October 1992. From
February 1992, the CSCE High Commissioner for National
Minorities sent observers to study conditions in Slovakia (and
in Hungary, where there are an estimated 100,000 ethnic
Slovaks). Munuera 1994, p. 16.
'7See also Alfred Reisch, "The. Difficult Search for a
Hungarian-Slovak Accord", RFE/RL Research Re port, vol. 1, no.
42, 23 October 1992. It should be noted that Hungary's
attitude on the minorities issue has not always been
constructive: it has long argued that it has a special
obligation towards Hungarians living outside Hungary. See
"Minorities: That Other Europe", The Economist, 25 December-7
January 1994, and Edith Oltay, "Minorities as Stumbling Block
in Relations with Neighbors", RFE/RL Research ReDort, vol. 1,
no. 19, 8 May 1992.
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Since autumn 1994, the EU has been very concerned that
the political situation in Slovakia is deteriorating, and
democratization being undermined; because of the Hungarian
minority issue, this has negatively affected Slovak-Hungarian
relations. After expressing concern through less visible
channels of communication, the EU brought out the "heavy
artillery". In less than a year, the EU presented two
demarches to the Slovak government. On 23 November 1994, a
demarche reiterated that the strengthening of relations
between Slovakia and the EU would depend on the new
government's policies. On 25 October 1995, the troika
presented the Slovak prime minister with a demarche
emphasizing that Slovakia must meet democratic norms before it
can join the EU. 5° In November 1995, the EP threatened to
suspend aid to Slovakia because of violations of human and
minority rights, and disregard for the rule of law. 5' The EU
put much pressure on Slovakia and Hungary to sign a good-
neighborly agreement within the framework of the Stability
As one national official called it. Interview took
place on 14 March 1996.
Sharon Fisher, "Turning Back?", Transition, vol. 1, no.
1, 30 January 1995, p. 62. Although no government had been
formed after elections ended on 1 October 1994, Meciar's
party, in conjunction with two small parties, formed a voting
bloc and took over the broadcast media and intelligence
service, and ousted the privatization minister.
50Peter Javurek, "US, EU Formally Express Disquiet on
Slovak Turmoil", Reuter, 25 October 1995. The concerns stemmed
from the suspected involvement of the prime minister in the
kidnapping of one of the president's Sons.
31Aaence EuroDe, 18 November 1995, and "Madness",
Economist, 2 December 1995. The EP was reacting to Meciar's
attempts to expel an opposition party from parliament.
310
Pact (see section 6.3.4); an agreement was signed in March
1995, but Slovakia did not ratify it until one year later.52
Developments in Romania have not prompted as much
concern, although the political situation there is also
worrying, with implications for inter-state relations.
Romania has between 1.6 and 2 million ethnic Hungarians, and
its position on minority rights is similar to Slovakia's. In
August 1994, an extreme anti-Hungarian party, the Romanian
National Unity Party, joined the cabinet. In January 1995,
ruling Social Democrats signed an agreement with the anti-
Semitic and racist Great Romania Party. Western diplomats had
pointed out beforehand that such alliances would not improve
Romania's image and help prepare the way for EU menthership.
Relations with Hungary have consequently been strained.
Within the framework of the Pact for Stability, the EU
unsuccessfully pressed Romania and Hungary to agree on a
friendship treaty, including minority rights provisions.
Romania has stated that it fears that including minority
rights provisions would give ethnic Hungarians too much
autonomy, and fuel demands for self-determination. In
summer 1995, there were signs that the Romanian government was
contributing to anti-Hungarian sentiment, making it unlikely
52At the same time, the Slovak parliament approved a
controversial "anti-subversion" law. Adrian Bridge, "Slovak
Uproar Over Free Speech", The Independent, 27 March 1996.
"Getting Nastier", The Economist, 4 February 1995.
S4l Hungary Calls on Romania To Compromise in Talks",
Reuter, 20 June 1995.
311
a Romanian-Hungarian agreement would be signed soon."
At a trilateral meeting of the French, German, and
Romanian foreign ministers on 17 July 1995, less than a month
after Romania applied to join the EU, Herve de charette and
Klaus Kinkel reminded Teodor Melascanu that economic reform
and democracy were necessary conditions for EU membership.
They again pushed for a rapid agreement between Romania and
Hungary on minority rights. 5' But the EU has not presented
Romania with a demarche; concern has instead been expressed in
the context of the association council (set up under the
Europe agreement) .57
EU and member state officials maintain that the EU has
treated Romania and Slovakia differently because the
situations in both countries are different: in Slovakia there
has been a marked deterioration, whereas in Romania, the
situation is at least not getting worse. Some acknowledge,
however, that because Romania is so much further behind
(economically and politically) and further away
(geographically), expectations for it are lower; it would not
have joined the EU in the first enlargement eastwards anyway.
"The Romanian government distributed a book blaming
Hungarians for atrocities committed during the 1989
revolution, and passed an education bill that limited minority
language rights (which was condemned by the EP in July 1995).
See Adrian Bridge, "Romania Set for New Row with Hungary", The
Inderendent, 26 August 1995, and "Romania Slams EU Over Gypsy
Resolution", Reuter, 18 July 1995.
5'But the French and German foreign ministers also
indicated that military contacts between the three countries
would be increased. "Paris, Bonn Remind Romania of EU Entry
Conditions", Reuter, 18 July 1995.
57lnterview with Council Secretariat official, 12 March
1996.
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Slovakia is Austria's neighbor, and there had been higher
expectations for it.5'
Whether the EU successfully encourages the development of
democracy within Slovakia or Roinania remains to be seen; much
of course depends on the countries themselves. In neither
case has there been any consideration of suspending the Europe
agreements: it is too blunt a weapon. The EU has again shown
a preference for the "carrot" over the "stick". If
developments worsen, however, the EU could suspend some
clauses of the Europe agreements and PHARE aid; the EP in
particular could press for such action.
Romanian-Hungarian and Slovakian-Hungarian relations will
be a crucial test for the Eu's conflict prevention measures.
All three countries have already been included in the
structured relationship and the WEU's associate partnership
scheme (see section 6.3.2), so the conditionality of EU
membership is the EU's primary conflict prevention instrument.
How enlargement is handled will be decisive. The unofficial
"two tiers" of potential EU membership candidates, in which
Hungary is in the top tier and Romania, and perhaps now
Slovakia, in the bottom, could make the situation worse if
Romania and Slovakia feel isolated. 6° The tensions between
conditionality and stability (which could be provided by
closer relations with the EU) are particularly evident in
5'Interviews with UK, German, Belgian, Council
Secretariat, and DG IA officials.
5'Interviews with UK, Belgian, and DG IA officials.
rhe situation would be compounded if the first round of
NATO enlargement left either or both outside.
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these cases. In addition, the risk of alienating both
countries is high; if EU membership appears to be a too-
distant prospect, they could turn instead to Russia for
security and aid."
6.2.2 Aid for D.mocratization
Although conditionality has been the primary way in which
the Community tries to influence the democratization process,
PHARE aid has been increasingly directed to helping the
political transformation. The amount of aid targeted
specifically to support democratic reforms, however, is
dwarfed by that to help the economic transition. The
Commission estimated that in 1992 and 1993, ECU lOOm was
pledged for various programs to help build democratic
institutions.'2 But PHARE committed a total of ECU 2016m in
those two years (see table 4.2). Of course, the prevailing
view was and is that by supporting the transition to a market
economy, the Community helps the transition to democracy.
To develop civil society, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have been involved in PHABE programs. Assistance has
been given to NGOs (including trade unions and professional
associations) so that they act as implementers of reform
policies or organize education activities, for example. This
arose out of the Polish "civic dialogue" program, specifically
requested by the Polish government in its 1991 indicative
program. Programs have since been implemented in the other
'1Since 1993, Slovakia has signed over 70 agreements with
Russia. "The Visegrad Three...", The Economist, 9 March 1996.
62Commission of the European Communities, PHARE
Information Service, "PRARE and TACIS: Democratic Institution
Building and Civic Society", January 1994.
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recipient countries. PHARE provides project grant aid, plus
support for training in management, public relations, fund
raising, and improving the legislative framework for NGOB.'3
In July 1992, a trial PHARE democracy program was
launched, with a budget of ECU 5m, after the EP insisted that
such a sum be allocated for aid for democratization." In
1993, the program was formally adopted and allocated a budget
of ECU lOin. The first 52 projects were to help develop
parliamentary practices, promote and monitor human and
minority rights, establish an independent media, develop NGOs,
encourage local democracy, and educate. The projects involved
partnerships between NGOB based in Eastern Europe and
Community-based NGOS.'5 For 1995, the program was allocated
ECU 8m, for 50 macro-projects and over 100 micro-projects
(which do not need an EU-based partner) ."
In 1993, the PHARE Partnership and Institution Building
Program was launched, and allocated ECU lOin. Funds were given
to support the development of partnerships between non-profit
organizations in the Community and Eastern Europe. PHARE pays
part of the cost of developing cooperation in sectors such as
economic development, local and regional government, community
development, and worker and consumer interests.'7
In addition to PHARE aid, of course, aid to help build
'3PHARE Annual ReDort 1991, pp. 19-20.
"PHARE Annual ReDort 1992, p. 10.
'5"PHARE and TACIS: Democratic Institution Building and
Civic Society".
"Info Phare, no. 5, December 1994, pp. 13-14.
'7PHARE Annual Retort 1993, p. 52.
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democracy has been given by the member states, and national
and trans-national organizations (such as political parties).
The UK's Know How Fund and the Westminster Fund for Democracy
are two such aid programs."
6.3 THE COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL ThREATS
To address the various threats to security that stem from
external sources (a potentially threatening Russia; disputes
with neighbors over minorities and borders), the Community has
taken several measures. It has encouraged regional
cooperation; the WEU has strengthened its ties with the EU'S
associates; the Commission mediated in the Gabcikovo dam
dispute; and the EU launched the Pact on Stability in Europe.
6.3.1 Encouraging R.gional Coop.ration
Encouraging regional cooperation has long been a goal of
Community foreign policy, the 'export' of the Community model
of multilateral, inter-state relations. "(I)ntegration was
not seen as something for Western Europe alone but as a
process which serves as an example for the rest of the world
to build on and emulate."" Elfriede Regelsberger noted:
From a European point of view it is worth supporting
integrationist trends in other parts of the world,
even if such attempts are more modest than the
Community model....Such developments are judged as
stabilising factors in world politics, particularly
where such trends are accompanied by internal
political reforms in third countries centred on
democratic values •70
"See, for example, UK Foreign Office, Know How Fund
Annual Rei,ort 1994, p. 5.
"Bomsdorf, et al. 1992, p. 9.
70Elfriede Regeisberger, "The Twelve's Dialogue with Third
Countries - Progress Towards a Communauté d'action?", in
Holland, ed. 1991, p. 174.
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The exception to the Community's support for regional
cooperation initiatives was, of course, the cMEA. The
Community wanted to limit the Soviet Union's control over the
East European states' foreign economic policies, and so
insisted on concluding trade agreements with the separate cMEA
member countries rather than the CXEA itself (see chapter 3).
After the CMEA had agreed to this, the Community negotiated
trade and cooperation agreements with the East European states
on the basis of "specificity" and conditionality (see chapters
3 and 4). Applying the principle of conditionality, in fact,
required the differentiation of relations with the East
European states. This meant that the development of bilateral
ties between the Community and each CHEA member was privileged
over the development of bloc-to-bloc cooperation. The
conclusion of the Europe agreements with separate East
European countries further developed these bilateral ties, and
responded to the wishes of the East European countries.71
To try to balance this bilateralism, the Community has
encouraged the East European states to replace the CMEA with
a regional organization. Regional cooperation would help
economic growth, but more importantly would contribute to
political stability and the establishment of good-neighborly
relations, thereby reducing the chances of intra-state
71All of the Europe agreements contain a clause, under the
section on economic cooperation, that states: "Special
attention must be devoted to measures capable of fostering
cooperation between the countries of central and eastern
Europe with a view to a harmonious development of the region."
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conflict. 72 	The formation of the Visegrad group was
considered hopeful. The joint statement issued at the
Community and Visegrad foreign ministers meeting in October
1992, for example, noted that "The Community and the Visegrad
countries stressed that regional cooperation represents a
major contribution towards stability in Europe. The Community
therefore welcomed the Visegrad countries' efforts to foster
such cooperation. 73
The Community encouraged the Visegrad group to form a
free trade area. While it did sign a free trade agreement on
21 December 1992, the group's primary purpose still seemed to
be that of pressing for integration into the Community. The
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) aimed to create
a free trade zone by 2000 or 2002, but tariffs among the CEFTA
states remain high and a Czech proposal to cut customs duties
on agricultural goods was ignored at a CEFTA summit in
September 1995. S].ovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic
states are all to join CEFTA by 2000.
The East European states have been reluctant to cooperate
with each other, wary of any attempt to revive the cNEA.
'1A Commission official maintained that before the East
European states can be considered for EU membership, they must
prove that they can cooperate with• their neighbors and are
willing to surrender sovereignty to regional integration
schemes. Interview took place on 21 June 1994. But regional
cooperation has not been made a formal condition for relations
with the EU.
"Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
European Community and the Visegrad Countries - Joint
Statement", Council of the European Communities, General
Secretariat Press Release 9033/92 (Presse 170), 5 October
1992.
"Concrete Heads", The Economist, 16 September 1995.
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Zielonka wrote in 1992 that the Visegrad countries teared that
strengthening trilateral economic cooperation would
provide the West with an excuse to deprive Central
Europe of easy access to its markets....Poland,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia still give unequivocal
priority to their integration with the West, and any
development of trilateral cooperation should be seen
as a means towards this goal, rather than as a goal
in itself.75
Some East European countries have claimed that the
encouragement of regional cooperation is an attempt to block
their accession to the EU because a separate regional grouping
could serve as an alternative to EU membership.7'
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland rejected the Commission's
initial suggestion that the Community conclude only one Europe
agreement with all three countries. 77 Cooperation among the
Visegrad countries has been adversely affected by tensions
over minorities and the Gabcikovo dam (see section 6.3.3), and
by Czech reluctance to bind itself too tightly to countries
whose prospects of joining the EU seem less bright. 7' The
Visegrad four have also hesitated to cooperate with Bulgaria
and Romania (slower reformers) for fear that might delay their
own accession to the EU.79
75Zielonka 1992, p. 43.
76icormendy 1992, p. 248, and Adamiec 1993, pp. 24-25.
interview with Commission official, 21 June 1994.
7'Xilada Anna Vachudova, "The Visegrad Four: No
Alternative to Cooperation?", RFE/RL Research Retort, vol. 2,
no. 34, 27 August 1993. The Czech republic thus believes the
Visegrad membership applications should be evaluated
separately. In 1989-1990, Hungary had been reluctant to form
a Central European grouping, because it was optimistic about
its chances of joining the Community first.
79lnterviews with two Commission officials, 22 June 1994.
One of the officials charged that the associates were blocking
the dossier on cumulation of rules of origin for these
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The multilateral political dialogue, initiated in 1992,
clearly sought to spur regional cooperation, in contrast to
the framework for bilateral economic relations set up by the
Europe agreements (see section 5 • 4.2).	 Commissioner
Andriessen commented in September 1992:
We must also continue to support the efforts of the
reforming countries to cooperate among themselves.
Already a process has begun between the Community
and the three Visegrad countries which points
towards a multilateralisation of relations between
the parties involved. This could provide a valuable
model for other countries in the 	 .
The multilateral dialogue developed into the structured
relationship. As the Commission notes, the structured
relationship "also strengthens intra-regional cooperation
among the CEEC's (Central and East European Countries]
themselves when dealing with the Institutions of the Union.""
The associates are not entirely pleased with the multilateral
approach. The multilateral dialogue "aims to further
regionalism in political dialogue rather than to intensify
bilateralism between individual countries and the EU, as many
Central Europeans wish."'2 At a troika-associates meeting in
April 1994, the troika emphasized the innovative nature of the
multilateral dialogue, while the associates' ministers stated
reasons.
'°Frans Andriessen, Speech at the UK Presidency
Conference, "Europe and the World After 1992", London 7
September 1992.
"Report of the Commission to the Council on the
promotion of intra-regional cooperation and 'bon voisinage",
prepared for the General Affairs Council of 6/7 March 1995, p.
1.
12Jopp 1994, p. 56.
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that they preferred the bilateral approach.'5
The EC tried to encourage the associates to set up a
"rotating presidency", to lead on contacts with the EU in the
structured relationship, but they refused to do so." In
addition, the EU had proposed that the associates participate
as a group in CFSP Joint Actions and common declarations, but
had to drop the proposal when the associates objected. The
associates can sign up individually; this also prevents one
associate from blocking the participation of others.'5
In their June 1992 report on possible CFSP Joint Actions,
the foreign ministers declared that in Central and Eastern
Europe, the EU will "promote political stability and
contribute to the creation of political and/or economic
frameworks that encourage regional cooperation or moves
towards regional or sub-regional integration."" The Pact on
Stability in Europe (a Joint Action) has been by far the EU'S
most important initiative to encourage regional cooperation.
Promoting intra-regional cooperation is also an important part
of the pre-accession strategy, as agreed by the Essen European
Council.' In addition, the EU uses the association councils
'3EC Bulletin no. 4, 1994, p. 1.3.21.
"Interview with UK official, 13 December 1995.
'5Interview with Council Secretariat official, 12 March
1996.
""Report to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely
development of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP)
with a view to identifying areas open to joint action vis-&-
vis particular countries or groups of countries", Annex I,
Presidency Conclusions, in EC Bulletin no. 6, 1992, p. 20.
'7Presidency Conclusions, SN 300/94, Annex IV, pp. 24-25.
Some member states have been particularly active in
encouraging regional cooperation. In 1989, Italy launched what
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to emphasize the importance of regional cooperation.0
PHARE, since 1991, has been increasingly directed to
encouraging regional cooperation and dialogue. The Commission
has boasted that PHARE regional cooperation programs "have
played a major role in stimulating such a dialogue and
promoting cooperation on a wide range of issues of common
concern and interest in the CEECs."
In 1991, in recognition that several projects would be
more effectively implemented on a regional basis, a number of
joint projects were developed within the PHARE framework,
including a regional environmental program, a support project
for research and development infrastructure, and joint TEMPUS
projects. The Commission then decided that the 1991/1992
PHARE general guidelines would specify that 10-15% of PHARE
resources would be reserved for cross-national or regional
projects involving two or more PHARE countries. 90 In December
1991, a regional coordination group was established among the
recipients' national aid coordinators. The group was
responsible for evaluating project proposals and agreeing on
is now called the Central European Initiative, which includes
Austria. Germany and Denmark have promoted the Council of
Baltic Sea States, which includes new members Finland and
Sweden. Greece belongs to the Black Sea Cooperation Council.
Sub-national regional cooperation groups have also been
promoted: Italian, German and Austrian border regions, for
example, have been involved in the Alpe Adria initiative,
which includes regions in Hungary and the former Yugoslavia.
See EBRD, Regional Cop eration: Countries of Central and
Eastern Euroie includina the former Soviet Union, March 1993.
ulnterview with member state official, 13 March 1996.
PHARE Annual Reoort 1993, p. 52.
90PHARE Annual Reoort 1991, p. 5 and p. 9.
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the sectors to which aid should be allocated."
Between 1990 and 1994, over ECU 700m was allocated to
multi-country programs in areas such as education,
environment, and infrastructure.'2 In 1994, programs were
also developed to aid cooperation between border regions in
PHARE countries and in EU member states, and to eliminate
bottlenecks at border crossings between PHARE countries."
Such initiatives are now part of the pre-accession strategy.
PHARE funds are used for regional cooperation projects within
the framework of the Stability Pact (see below).
The Community has also used (directly or more subtly) the
conditionality of Europe agreements and membership to
influence relations between the associates. Thus, it
encouraged a Czech-Slovak customs union, a resolution of the
Gabcikovo dam dispute between Slovakia and Hungary, and
treaties between Slovakia and Hungary, and Romania and
Hungary.
The EU'S efforts to encourage regional cooperation might
be undermined by its emphasis on conditionality. Each
membership application would be judged separately to determine
whether the country has met the EU'S conditions. On the one
hand, this could spark competition among the associates
(although such competition could be 'healthy' if it encourages
reform) and spoil cooperation initiatives. On the other hand,
however, the EU's position should also reassure the associates
"PHARE Annual Reoort 1992, pp. 10-11.
'2p	 1994 Annual ReDort, p. 37. See Appendix 3.
"PHARE 1994 Annual ReDort, pp. 11-12.
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that each country would join on its own merits, and so
cooperation with Nsloweru neighbors would not damage their
chances. W Strong support for regional cooperation will
become even more important once the EU begins to consider
applications from the East European associates. To ensure
that the entrance of some associates does not damage their
relations with associates left outside the EU, ties will have
to be strengthened further • Munuera argues that by
encouraging regional cooperation, the EU could also avoid
frustration among those not chosen for membership.
6.3.2 The WEU's Relations with Eastern Europe
The East European countries - particularly after the
attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 - have been
concerned that Russia may try to reestablish a sphere of
influence in Eastern Europe. They have declared that their
reforms can only succeed if they feel secure. The
Community/Union has shared their concerns; an assertive
Russian foreign policy could destabilize the region, disrupt
the transformation, exacerbate existing intra-state tensions,
and, of course, strain relations with the West. The Europe
agreements and structured relationship have been extended
partly in response to these concerns. Whether any of these
countries is actually threatened militarily by Russia is
doubtful, but the East Europeans certainly perceive such a
threat. Their preferred solution to the threat is membership
'As noted by a Commission official. Interview took place
on 22 June 1994.
Munuera 1994, p. 105.
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in NATO and the WEU.
How to respond to East European demands for a Western
security guarantee has been a problem for Community member
states. The Community has encouraged the development of the
CSCE as a way of including the Soviet Union and later Russia
in a pan-European security structure." The perceived
inadequacies of the CSCE in providing security, however, are
partly why the East European countries have pressed for
integration into Western security organizations. But
including the East European countries in WEU and NATO may not
be the best way to engender security in Europe, as it would
certainly antagonize Russia and recreate a divided Europe.
The WEU's relations with East European countries
developed gradually. On 23 April 1990, the WEU Council of
Ministers decided that the Council president and the
Secretary-General would visit several East European countries.
They visited Hungary in October 1990, Czechoslovakia in
November 1990, Poland in March 1991, Bulgaria in October 1991,
and Romania in November 1991; the Secretary-General visited
There are concerns that Russia should not be isolated or
antagonized. See, for example, the address by Romanian
President Ion Iliescu to the Royal Institute of International
Affairs, "Romania's Approach to Europe", 3 November 1994.
"The CSCE has become progressively 'institutionalized'
and was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) at the December 1994 summit in Budapest.
In a plug for his confederation idea, Mitterrand in
October 1993 asked: "La CSCE c'est tout le monde et personne.
Qui a jamais vu sa sécurité protégée par elle?" Marcel Scotto
and Claire Tréan, "M. Mitterrand Relance L'Idée d'une
Confédération Européenne", Le Monde, 10/11 October 1993.
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the three Baltic states in January l992. One observer
contends that the WETJ was implementing the Community's
principle of conditionality:
It was developing links first with countries which
had started to implement political and economic
reforms; and it was adopting, at least implicitly,
the key element in the EC's foreign policy towards
Central and East European countries, namely the
principle of differentiation.'
In June 1991, the WEU foreign and defence ministers
agreed to strengthen relations with the East European
countries. The WEU would consider organizing ad hoc meetings
at ministerial level with the East European states. Several
countries, including apparently the UK, did not want to
institutionalize the ministerial dialogue because it could
undermine NATO'S role in this area.'°' The NATO summit on 7
and 8 November 1991 agreed to establish a North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC) with the East European countries
and the Soviet Union.1
In the fall of 1991, the relationship of the WEU to the
future EU and to NATO was still uncertain. A compromise
between "Atlanticists" and "Europeanists" was then embodied in
the Maastricht Treaty. The WEU can be asked to elaborate and
implement CFSP decisions which have defense implications
Andrzej Podraza, The Western European Union and Central
Europe: A New Relationship, RIIA Discussion Paper no. 41
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), pp.
2 6-28.
100Podraza 1992, p. 28.
'°1Podraza 1992, pp. 28-29.
'See "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Issued
by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November
1991" in NATO Review, vol. 39, no. 6, December 1991.
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(article J.4, paragraph 2). The WEU was to be built up as the
defense component of the European Union; it would also be
developed as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.'
As the WEU's Secretary-General, Willem Van Eekelen, noted, it
was then quite logical that those East European countries
seeking close ties with the Community would also want close
ties with the WETS.10'
After a WEll Council meeting in Petersberg near Bonn on 19
June 1992, the WETS ministers met with the foreign and defence
ministers of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They agreed to
establish a Forum of Consultation to discuss European security
and stability. The foreign and defence ministers would meet
at least once a year, while the WEU Permanent Council
(composed of ambassadors) and East European ambassadors would
hold twice-yearly consultations, and senior officials from the
East European countries and an ad hoc WETS troika could meet
regularly. 1 The Forum would create mechanisms for
consultation in crises, and consider joint training exercises,
especially for peacekeeping operations.	 Van Eekelen
characterized the Forum as an instrument of preventive
1°"Declaration on Western European Union", appended to Ih.
Treaty on Eurooean Union (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 1992), pp. 242-
246. In an attempt to rationaliz, the membership of the EU,
WETS and NATO after the Maastricht Treaty was signed, three
kinds of WETS membership were created: full membership (Greece
became a member); associate membership, for those NATO members
that are not EU members (Turkey, Iceland, and Norway); and
observers, for those EU members unwilling to become full WETS
members (Ireland, Denmark, Austria, Finland and Sweden).
10'Agence Eurote no. 5755, 22/23 June 1992.
'Podraza 1992, p. 29.
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diplomacy.1°'
The establishment of the Forum of Consultation preceded
the development of the Community's relations with Bulgaria,
Romanja, and the three Baltic states. These states,
particularly the Baltic republics, were included in the Forum
of Consultation to give them a greater sense of external
security (particularly vis-â-vis Russia): this was evidently
considered more important than applying conditionality.'07
The WEU initiative at this stage was also competing with
NACC. Van Eekelen argued that the WEU's Forum was smaller
(NACC included all of the former Soviet republics) and
therefore could host more structured, in-depth discussions on
European security issues.	 NATO was reportedly not happy
that the WEU had created such a forum parallel to NACC.'°9
The WEU's East European partners, however, were not
'°6Willem Van Eekelen, "WEU Prepares the Way for New
Missions", NATO Review, vol. 41, no. 5, October 1993, p. 21.
107Romania, for example, had been admitted to the Forum
even though it was not enforcing sanctions on the former
Yugoslavia, and it had recently been told that its record in
enforcing sanctions would be a factor in its relations with
the West. Walker 1993b, p. 116.
'Acience EuroDe no. 5755, 22/23 June 1992.
1 Jopp 1994, p. 31. There is plenty of evidence of rivalry
between the WEU and NATO. In June 1992, NATO declared it would
support CSCE peacekeeping activities (and in December, it
declared it would also support UN peacekeeping operations). In
June 1992, the WEU agreed it would contribute to UN or CSCE
peacekeeping, humanitarian or peacemaking missions. Both
organizations were monitoring the UN embargo on the former
Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. The rivalry stemmed from the fact
that some states (notably France) preferred to develop the
WEU, while others preferred NATO. Relations improved by the
fall of 1992, when formal mechanisms of cooperation were
agreed. Tom Dodd, "The Maastricht Debate: The Common Foreign
and Security Policy", Research Paper no. 93/27, House of
Commons Library, 9 March 1993, pp. 13-14.
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entirely pleased with the level of cooperation in the Forum,
or in NACC. Nor were they satisfied with the follow-up to
NACC, the Partnership for Peace program, which was launched by
the NATO summit in January 1994 and provided for much closer
military cooperation with all the NACC countries and other
CSCE members."° The East European countries wanted to be
distinguished from Russia, which they still considered their
principle security threat."
At the third annual meeting of the German, French and
Polish foreign ministers (the Weimar triangle) on 12 November
1993, Klaus Kinkel and Alain Juppé declared that the WEU
should offer associate member status to the EU's associates,
and that they would propose this at the 22 November meeting of
the WEU Council."2 At the meeting, France and Germany
proposed the creation of an "enhanced status" for the EU's
associates and prospective associates." 3 This would not
entail a security guarantee, but would involve the associates
in the WEU's structures.
Some members were concerned that the status was being
offered to non-EU members, and, more importantly, to non-NATO
"Partnership for Peace: Invitation", in NATO Review,
vol. 42, no. 1, February 1994, p. 28.
"Jopp 1994, pp. 50-51.
'12"Réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères
d'Allemagne, de Pologne et de France - Declaration commune"
(Warsaw, 12 November 1993), in La Politiaue Etranère de la
France: Textes et Documents, November-December 1993 (Paris:
French Foreign Ministry), pp. 64-65. France's proposal for a
Stability Pact in June 1993 had suggested that the inaugural
conference could consider allowing certain countries to become
WEU associate members.
"3Jopp 1994, pp. 51-52.
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members, with all of the implications that could have for the
WEU and NATO security guarantees. But the WEU ministers
agreed to study the proposal further. 114 Some of the more
"At]anticist" member states considered the plan to be a rival
to NATO's Partnership for Peace program. French Foreign
Minister Juppé, however, pointed to the parallelism between EU
and WETJ links to the East European countries.m
On 9 May 1994, the WEU admitted the six EU associates and
the three Baltic republics as "associate partners", without a
security guarantee. The WEU Council of Ministers declared
that the initiative would help prepare the associate partners
for their integration and eventual accession to the EU. It
was "fully complementary" with NATO'S Partnership for Peace
program and the Stability Pact." The associate partners can
attend every second weekly meeting of the Permanent Council,
send liaison officers to planning groups, and take part in
joint operations to maintain or restore peace and provide
humanitarian assistance. They would be included in
preparations to build up a future joint defense and security
umbrella. The agreement would be officially implemented only
after Greece's membership in the WEU had been ratified by all
members and all the East European states had concluded Europe
'14Turkey, an associate member, reportedly also objected
to the idea. Acience Europe no. 6113, 24 November 1993. It
does certainly complicate even further the variable geometry
of membership in European organizations.
luh1wu Opens up to East Europe", European Report no. 1949,
12 May 1994. Franc, would naturally have supported a WEU
initiative over a NATO one.
Western European Union, "Kirchberg Declaration", 9 May
1994. This was two months after the EU Council had reinforced
the political dialogue with the associates (section 5.5.2).
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agreements with the EU, but in practice, the associate partner
agreement was put into effect immediately.117
Russia was not pleased with the WEU decision. A foreign
ministry spokesman warned that it could cause further division
in Europe and that the WEU should have taken Russia into
account. 111 Russian concern centered on associate partner
status for the Baltic republics; later it voiced concerns that
by concluding Europe agreements with the EU, the three Baltic
republics would be on a fast track to WEU security
guarantees."
Their limited participation in the CFSP (through the
enhanced dialogue) and WEU provides the associates with some
framework for security and defense integration. The associate
partnership with the WEU is essentially symbolic, however, as
the WEU is still undeveloped as a military organization and it
is still unclear whether the EU will formulate a common
defense policy. But it also signals the 'beginning of the
end' of the EU's civilian power image. EU enlargement to
Eastern Europe will now inevitably be bound up with NATO
enlargement. Once the East European states join the EU, they
would certainly want to become full WEU members. As only NATO
and EU members are full WEU members, and the WEU is to
function as NATO'S European pillar, a decision on full WEU
"7Nicholas Doughty, "WEU Admit East Europe States as
Associates, Reuter, 9 May 1994.
118Aaence EuroDe no. 5230, 14 May 1994.
"9There had been talk about requiring the Baltic states
to declare their neutrality as a condition for concluding
Europe agreements, but this was dropped. Andrew Marshall,
"Neutrality Price of Baltic Entry", The Independent, 31
October 1994.
331
membership would have to be taken alongside a decision on NATO
enlargement (if it had not been taken already) • 120 Edward
Mortimer argues that
(t)he further east the EU expands, the more
important its security dimension will become. To
deny its easterrunost members the right to
participate in common security arrangements will
prove an untenable position; and it would be
dangerously incoherent to have a European defence
union with some members allied to the US and others
not • 121
This of course raises the sensitive problems of relations
with Russia and with those EU associates that have not yet
joined the EU: there is a real danger of re-creating a divided
Europe. It is not clear that full membership in a military
alliance (NATO and/or the WEU) will engender security in
Eastern Europe, particularly given the diverse nature of
security threats in Europe.
6.3.3 Mediation in the Danube Dam dispute
The Community's leadership role in Eastern Europe, and
its attempts to negotiate a resolution to the Yugoslav
conflict, meant that parties to other disputes might naturally
turn to it for good offices. In 1992, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia asked the Commission to mediate a dispute over
a hydroelectric project on the Danube. The dispute was
potentially serious because tensions between Hungary and
At an informal meeting on 12 September 1994, EU foreign
ministers discussed three possibilities for integrating the
associates (without deciding on one in particular): all of the
associates join the EU, WEU, and NATO simultaneously;
membership is differentiated according to the associate; or
the associates are gradually integrated into all three
organizations. Aaence EuroDe no. 6313, 12/13 September 1994.
121Edward Mortimer, "Bigger and Better?", The Financial
Times, 23 November 1994.
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Slovakia were already rising as Slovakian nationalism
aggravated relations with the Hungarian minority in
Slovakia.' The Community's involvement demonstrates the
extent to which it was considered a political and diplomatic
actor in Eastern Europe; the Commission's rather remarkable
role in mediating the dispute shows how far its involvement in
foreign policy was accepted by the member states.
In 1977, Hungary and Czechoslovakia agreed to build a
series of dams on the Danube.' The Hungarian democratic
opposition, however, coalesced around opposition to the
project. In 1989, the Hungarian government halted work on the
Nagymáros dam located in its territory (only 10% of the work
had been completed). The Czechoslovak government protested,
and demanded financial compensation (having already completed
90% of the project).' It also proceeded with the
construction of a new diversion dam wholly inside Slovakian
territory, which would channel water from the Danube to the
Gabcikovo dam and power station, also in S].ovakia. In May
1992, Hungary announced it was abrogating the 1977 agreement,
and would turn to the EC or the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) if Czechoslovakia continued work on the project.'
'Munuera 1994, p. 7.
1 For background on the dispute, see Vera Rich, "Central
Europe II: The Battle of the Danube", The World Today, vol.
48, no. 2, December 1992, and "The Murky Politics of the
Danube", The World Today, vol. 49, nos. 8/9, August/September
1993.
12'Sharon Fisher, "The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Controversy
Continues", RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 37, 17
September 1993, p. 8.
'Nicholas Denton and Ariane Genillard, "Hungary Stokes
Bitter Row Over Danube Dam", The Financial Times, 20 May 1992.
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Hungary cited environmental concerns as reasons for halting
the project; it also complained that diverting the Danube to
power the Gabcikovo turbines would effectively redraw the
border to Slovakia's advantage. Czechoslovakia pointed out
that the dam project provided an alternative source of
electricity to coal-fired and nuclear power plants. In an
increasingly tense atmosphere, the project then became a
symbol of Slovakia's new nationhood and sovereignty.''
The dispute had earlier come before the Commission. Back
in January 1991, Hungary and Czechoslovakia asked the
Commission to provide a technical opinion on the environmental
impact of the dam project.' But in May 1992, Commissioner
Andriessen's proposals to set up an independent committee of
technical experts to try to resolve the dispute were rejected.
The two sides would not commit themselves to accept the
committee's final recommendation.''
By the fall of 1992, Germany in particular was
increasingly concerned by developments. Foreign Minister
Klaus Kinkel raised the issue at the special European Council
summit in Birmingham on 19 October 1992. He suggested that a
three-party commission be formed to try to resolve the
dispute. At a meeting with the Czechoslovak foreign minister
1 See Tony Barber, "Danube Dam Splits Nations",
Independent, 9 January 1993, and Nicholas Denton and Anthony
Robinson, "Danube Dam Threatens to Open Floodgates of
Hostility", The Financial Times, 29 October 1992. 	 The
Hungarian minority in Slovakia opposed the dam project,
another source of tension between the Slovak government and
the Hungarian minority. See Reisch, "Meciar and Slovakia's
Hungarian Minority", p. 19.
'Agence Europe no. 5413, 19 January 1991.
'Munuera 1994, p. 10.
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in Bonn four days later, Kinkel - on behalf of the EC -
stressed that a unilateral diversion of the Danube would
violate conditions for negotiations with the Community and the
Community would judge both successor, states to Czechoslovakia
as unreliable partfle9,
During the same period, the Commission became involved.
On 19 October, a Slovakian delegation visited Environmental
Commissioner Karl Van Miert, to ask the EC to mediate the
dispute. Van Miert responded that the Commission would
provide good offices, on the condition that the talks were
technical, not political. By emphasizing much less emotional
technical issues, the Commission attempted to de-politicize
the dispute.'3° The member states were quite willing to let
the Commission take the lead on this rather tricky issue; the
Commission was a neutral, disinterested party and could thus
potentially be an effective mediator.'3' In addition to
providing good offices, Commission officials would participate
in a tripartite committee, along with Czechoslovak and
Hungarian experts, which would examine the economic and
ecological consequences of the project.'32
The Commission delegation was led by Pablo Benavidès
'Karoly Okolicsanyi, "Slovak-Hungarian Tension:
Bratislava Diverts the Danube", RFE/RL Research Re port, vol.
1, no. 49, 11 December 1992, p. 52.
'30Munuera 1994, p. 11.
'3'Interview with Commission official, 15 November 1995.
132Agence Europe no. 5841, 21 October 1992, and "Slovakia
Delays Danube Dam Project", The Financial Times, 21 October
1992.
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Salas, head of the Eastern Europe unit in DG I.'" Benavidès
was given a great deal of freedom to mediate between the
parties; the member states did not interfere with the
Commission's work. He met frequently with the unofficial,
informal "advisers' group", composed of officials from the
Permanent Representations.
Beginning 21 October, the Commission hosted talks with
Czechoslovak and Hungarian negotiators.' TM The talks broke
down the next day, however, and Hungary said it would invoke
CSCE emergency procedures. On 24 October, the Slovak state
construction company blocked the river, prompting an angry
reaction from Hungary, which also questioned the future of
cooperation within the Visegrad group.'35 Two days later,
Kinkel warned against rash decisions, appearing to condemn the
Slovak move. He suggested that the Community's willingness to
provide economic aid would be negatively affected.1TM
The dispute reportedly overshadowed all other issues at
the summit between Delors, Major and the Visegrad group in
London on 28 October.m Commission, Hungarian, and Slovakian
representatives negotiated behind the scenes, apparently
from DG XI (Environment) were also involved
in the mediation. Once DG IA (to which Benavidès moved) was
established in January 1993, it led the mediation. Interview
with DG IA officials, 21 June 1994 and 12 March 1996.
'34Lionel Barber, "Danube Row Hits Plan to Widen EC", Th
Financial Times, 23 October 1992.
'35Acience Europe no. 5844, 24 October 1992, and Nicholas
Denton and Ariane Genillard, "Hungary Backed by Germany Over
Dam", The Financial Times, 27 October 1992.
lTMDenton and Genillard, "Hungary Backed by Germany".
Okolicsanyi, "Slovak-Hungarian Tension", p. 53.
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successfully. Hungary and Czechoslovakia signed a provisional
agreement: work on the dam would stop; Czechoslovakia would
ensure that 95% of the normal flow of water would flow in the
Danube and would not operate the Gabcikovo dam turbines.
A fact-finding mission would investigate the consequences of
the existing structures for navigation, possible flooding and
the environment. A group of experts nominated by the
Commission, Hungary and Czechoslovakia would then examine the
issues. If no agreement could be reached, the dispute would
be submitted to binding international arbitration or the
ICJ. One reason why the London agreement was reached is
that the Community pointed out much more strongly that its
relations with the parties would be endangered if the dispute
escalated.'4°
Czechoslovakia, however, was still diverting water,
leaving the Danube along the Hungarian-Slovak border almost
empty.'4' On 6 November, the working group established by the
Commission to examine navigation, water management and
environmental issues, told Czechoslovakia to halt work on the
dam by 21 November (which it did) •142
The dispute was clearly disturbing relations within the
Anthony Robinson, "End In sight to Danube Darn Row",
Financial Times, 30 October 1992.
'"Tripartite Discussion on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System
of Locks", EC Press Release IP/92/865, 29 October 1992.
Czechoslovakia had not previously acknowledged the ICJ's
jurisdiction.
'40Okolicsanyi, "Slovak-Hungarian Tension", p. 53.
'41Rich 1993, p. 151.
'42"Czechoslovakia Told To Halt Dam", The Financial Times,
7 November 1992.
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Visegrad group. A Polish minister announced that the signing
of the Visegrad fre. trade agreement, scheduled for 30
November, was postponed because of the Czechoslovak split and
the tensions over the dam.'
On 27 November, Benavidès hosted a meeting in Brussels
with the Czechoslovak deputy minister for foreign affairs and
the Hungarian secretary of state for foreign affairs to
discuss the working group's report. Both sides agreed to
apply the London summit agreement and to submit the dispute to
the ICJ. They also agreed to continue discussing a Commission
proposal to resolve the dispute. The Danube by-channel would
be navigable throughout the year and supply the Gabcikovo
power station, which would be brought into service only for
trial purposes.'
In early January 1993, Hungary accused Slovakia - now an
independent country - of operating the Gabcikovo dam turbines
and redirecting only 25%, rather than 95%, of the Danube's
waters back to the Danube. 1' On 5 February, Hungarian-Slovak
talks on water management failed. A meeting with the
Commission was postponed until 16 February. Both sides seemed
to harden their positions. 1 The meeting in Brussels on 16-
17 February 1993 between the Slovakian and Hungarian
secretaries of state for foreign affairs and Commissioner van
'Agence Euroie no. 5868, 30 November/i December 1992.
The agreement was signed on 21 December.
1 "Gabcikovo Dam Talks Continue", European ReDort no.
1817, 2 December 1992.
'Barber, "Danube Dam Splits Nations".
1 Agence EuroDe no. 5916, 10 February 1993.
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den Broek left the dispute unresolved. The two sides did not
agree to take the case to the ICZJ: Slovakia argued that the
question of state succession had to be resolved first.
Quite a lot of pressure was then put on the parties. On
24 and 25 February, Slovak Prime Minister Meciar met with
Delors, Brittan, and van den Broek in Brussels; the darn
dispute was discussed at those meetings. 1" Benavidès went to
S].ovakia and Hungary in early March, but could not secure
agreement on the submission of the dispute to the ICJ or on a
scheme for the temporary management of the Danube's waters.149
The EP, on 12 March, called for the dispute to be referred to
the ICJ and for a rapid solution to the water management
problem.'5° On a visit to the Visegrad countries between 15
and 19 March, van den Broek met with the Hungarian president
and prime minister and the Slovak president and prime
.'
Finally, after another EC-sponsored meeting on 7 April
1993, chaired by van den Broek, the Hungarian and Slovak state
secretaries for foreign affairs agreed to submit the dispute
to the ICJ, although they did not agree on a water management
7"Negotiations on Gabcikovo Dam Fail Again", EuroDean
Reoort 20 February 1993.
'EC Bulletin no. 1/2, 1993, pt. 1.3.13. The Visegrad-
troika political dialogue meeting on 8 March would have
provided another opportunity to pressure the disputants.
149AcTence EuroDe no. 5934, 6 March 1993. The Commission
had suggested that two-thirds of the Danube's waters be kept
in the river, allowing one-third to be directed to the by-
channel supplying the Gabcikovo power station. Aaence Euroce
no. 5922, 18 February 1993.
150EC Bulletin no. 3, 1993, pt. 1.3.14.
'51EC Bulletin no. 3, 1993, pt. 1.3.15.
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system." In July 1993, Hungary and Slovakia referred the
dam dispute to the ICJ. This defused much of the tension, and
both countries agreed to continue working on a water
management scheme, with the Commission's good offices.'"
Munuera argues that "the basic underlying factor imposing
a certain measure of restraint on the parties has been their
shared interest in joining the European Union....(N]either
Bratislava nor Budapest could afford to jeopardize its
privileged position by failing to resolve minority issues and
the dispute over the Gabcikovo-NagymAros project." The
Community could thus exert a considerable amount of leverage
on the parties, as it did at the October 1992 London summit.
Munuera, however, charges that more could have been done
earlier, had the Community realized the potential dangers of
escalation." The Community became involved only at the
insistence of the parties to the dispute, and at the
instigation of Germany (whose concern arose relatively late as
well). The dispute, however, illustrated the potential
dangers of conflicts in Eastern Europe; the Community
subsequently undertook a very active conflict prevention role,
'52Acence Europe no. 5957, 8 April 1993.
'53Acience EuroDe no. 6020, 12/13 July 1993.
'Munuera 1994, p. 22. The Commission never actually
threatened to delay the Europe agreement with Slovakia,
although Hungary had presumptuously asked it to do so.
Instead, it used positive arguments with both countries,
emphasizing that it would be in their own interests to reach
an agreement. Interview, 12 March 1996. The Commission's
mandates to negotiate Europe agreements with the Czech
republic and Slovakia, though, were approved on 5 April 1993,
two days before the agreement to send the dispute to the ICJ.
155Munuera 1994, p. 23.
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launching the Stability Pact.
6.3.4 Th. Pact on Stability
With the Yugoslav crisis serving as a stark reminder of
the enormous problems left after the fall of Communism, the
newly-installed French prime minister, Edouard Balladur, came
up with a proposal to try to prevent such crises from
occurring in the Community's associates. On 15 April 1993,
Balladur proposed a treaty to guarantee stability and peace in
Europe, which he would present to the other EC member
states.' At a Franco-German summit on 2 June, Kohl backed
Balladur's plan, although Germany was concerned it was
intended to keep the East Europeans out of the EU.' The
proposal was made shortly before the Copenhagen summit, when
the European Council agreed on enlargement to Eastern Europe
(see section 5.4.2); it may well have been an attempt to put
off enlargement, but it also addressed legitimate concerns
about conflicts in future member states, and would reiterate
principles and objectives (regional cooperation, protection of
minority rights) already expressed by the Community.
Furthermore, it would provide another opportunity for France
to lead the Community's OstDolitik, as it was becoming clearer
that Germany and the UK were going to "win" the debate on
enlargement.
On 9 June, France outlined the plan, on which Balladur
'"In France, Peace Plan for Europe is Outlined",
International Herald Tribune, 16 April 1993.
David Buchan, "Summit Backs Sovereign Bosnia",
Financial Times, 3 June 1993. Kohl's backing for the proposal
may have been timed to ensure France's support for the
Copenhagen European Council conclusions on enlargement.
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and Mitterrand wer, collaborating closely. The Pact on
Stability in Europe would be an exercise in preventive
diplomacy; it would be more effective than the CSCE because a
smaller group of countries could come up with firmer security
commitments and incentives. Sought-after EU membership would
only be offered to those states that settled problems which
could threaten European security, by concluding good
neighborly agreements. France admitted that the agreements
might entail small frontier changes, which would be endorsed
by the conference.
For Balladur, the initiative would place the Community at
the center of a new political and security arrangement in
Europe, and give the EU something to do under the CFSP.'
But there were initially many criticisms. The possibility of
territorial revisions caused particular concern. Poland, the
Czech Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria cited the potential for
re-opening border and minority disputes as one reason for
their doubts about the idea. Some within the Community saw
the initiative as primarily serving French domestic political
interests.'60 It was a French bid to undermine the CSCE, and
thus US involvement in Europe.' 61 Many East Europeans felt
that the EC member states needed to deal with their own
David Buchan, "New French Pact Aims to Avoid 'Second
Yugoslavia'", The Financial Times, 10 June 1993.
'"Helping Whom?", The Economist, 17 July 1993.
"°Ruinmel 1995b, p. 14. As Balladur and Mitterrand were
from different parties, the Pact proposal was seen as an
attempt by Balladur to try to increase the prime minister's
involvement in foreign policy, thus limiting the socialist
president's role.
""West Meets East", The Economist, 19 June 1993.
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unresolved minority and border problems." 3 Hungary, however,
backed the plan, because of the large numbers of ethnic
Hungarians living in neighboring states."3
The French proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe was
presented to the Copenhagen summit, 21-22 June 1993. It noted
that the Community, in its own interest, had to promote
stability in Europe. The Pact would give the East European
countries a forum in which to settle potential sources of
conflict. The Community should "contemplate new long-term
accessions only on the express condition that those countries
first settle, in the framework of the preparatory conference,
the problems liable to threaten European stability.""
Despite the reservations, the Copenhagen European Council
asked the Council to study the proposal and report back to it
in December."3 According to one foreign ministry official,
the leaders went along with the French plan as an "homage to
French grandeur"." But several EU and member state
officials have also maintained that the Pact was necessary and
useful to put pressure on Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania (in
particular) to reach agreements on minority rights.
At its July meeting, the Council set up a high-level
1'Jopp 1994, p. 53 and Jonathan Eyal, "France's False
Sense of Security", The IndeT,endent, 27 January 1994.
"3Tom Dodd, "Developing the Common Foreign and Security
Policy", Research Paper no. 94/131, House of Commons Library,
19 December 1994, p. 12.
'""French Proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe
(Copenhagen, 22 June 1993)", Statement translated by the Press
Department of the French Embassy in London.
"3Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/93, pp. 16-17.
1"Interview, 28 July 1995.
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working party to prepare the report on the Pact. 1'7 In
October, the foreign ministers approved the working party's
timetable for action and suggested procedures." The special
European Council on 29 October 1993, called to welcome the
Maastricht Treaty's entry into force, declared that the Pact
would be one of the first CFSP Joint Actions."'
On 6 December, the General Affairs Council briefly
discussed the Pact. Some member states wanted all the CSCE
countries to participate; others, including France, favored a
more restricted list.'70 A consensus was developing, however,
to restrict participation to the EU's six associates and the
three Baltic republics.' 7' Slovenia, embroiled in a dispute
with Italy over (paradoxically) minority rights, was to be
excluded. 172 Albania, where the problem of minorities was
"7council of the European Communities, General
Secretariat, Press Release 7714/93 (Presse 128), 19 and 20
July 1993. Coreper (and not the Political Committee) would
submit the working group's proceedings to the Council. The
working group would collaborate with EPC. Acience Euro pe no.
6026, 21 July 1993. Although Coreper "won" this task, the
CFSP machinery would later take over.
"'Council of the European Communities, General
Secretariat, Press Release 8907/93 (Presse 156), 4 October
1993. Third countries were then consulted. The Pact was
discussed during the multilateral political dialogue with the
associates, and with the US, Canadian, and Russian foreign
ministers. Andrew Marshall and Annika Savill, "EC Pact to
Calm Security Fears", The Indeoendent, 6 October 1993.
"'Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels European
Council, 29 October 1993, EC Bulletin no. 10, 1993, pp. 7-8.
'70Acience Eurooe no. 6122, 6/7 December 1993.
Europe no. 6125, 10 December 1993.
'7 The long-established tradition of keeping member states'
disputes off the collective agenda prevailed here. Italy's
dispute with Slovenia (over the rights of ethnic Italians in
Slovenia and property expropriated from ethnic Italians by the
Yugoslav government after World War II) had been aggravated by
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potentially very dangerous (as well as a source of disputes
with Greece), also would not participate, presumably because
it was much further behind in reforms and in its relations
with the EU. This of course meant that the Pact remained
uncontroversial, so that all the member states could go along
with it, more or less enthusiastically.
The Council presented its proposal for the Pact to the
Brussels European Council in December. The objective was
to contribute to stability by preventing tension and
potential conflicts in Europe; it is not concerned
with countries in open conflict; it is intended to
promote good neighborly relations and to encourage
countries to consolidate their borders and to
resolve the problems of national minorities that
arise; to this end it is an exercise in preventive
diplomacy in which the European Union will have an
active role to play as catalyst...'74
The foreign ministers suggested that the project focus on
those East European countries that are prospective members
"vis-ã-vis which the Union had greater opportunities to exert
its influence more effectively...": the six associates and the
three Baltic republics.'75 The inaugural conference would set
up multilateral round tables in addition to the bilateral
discussions. The EU's primary role would be to encourage the
the new government in Italy, led by Silvio Berlusconi, in
office from March 1994. The government blocked Slovenia's
participation in the Pact.
173lnterview with DG IA official, 23 June 1994. Although
Greece is the second largest investor in Albania (after
Italy), their relations have been strained over the ethnic
Greek minority in Albania. "Border Blows", The Economist, 30
April 1994.
'74Annex I, Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels
European Council, 10-11 December 1993, EC Bulletin no. 12,
1993, p. 14.
'75EC Bulletin no. 12, 1993, p. 14.
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parties to conclude good neighbor agreements covering the
problems of national minorities and borders, and to set up
regional cooperation arrangements. A final conference would
ratify all the agreements concluded, and forward the Pact to
the CSCE, which would act as its guardian. In contrast to
France's initial proposals, the Council's report did not
mention the possibility of revising borders, nor state that
participation in the Pact was a condition for EU membership.
The European Council approved the report and called for
the inaugural conference to be held in Paris in April 1994.
It instructed the Council to implement the initiative as a
Joint Action.'7' On 20 December, the Council approved a Joint
Action under which the EU would convene the inaugural
conference.' 77 France, in collaboration with Council
President Greece, would organize the conference, as host
country.'tm The CFSP Secretariat and France then did most of
the work on the Pact.'7'
'76EC Bulletin no. 12, 1993, pt;I.9.
'77Council Decision 93/728/CFSP in OJ L 339, 31 December
1993. The Council did not specify that any further decisions
would be taken by qualified majority.
Europe no. 6139, 31 December 1993. The Joint
Action states that no "operational expenditure" would be
entailed by the decision. The CFSP provides for two types of
expenditure: administrative, met by the EC budget, and
operational, met by either national contributions or the
Council or Commission section of the EC budget. Who pays for
Joint Actions was in 1994 a matter of some dispute, between
member states and between the Council and EP. France, as host
country, eventually agreed to pay for all of the costs of the
inaugural conference. Dodd 1994, p. 7.
'"Other member states and the Commission were involved,
however. The Belgian and Greek presidencies (in 1993 and 1994)
appointed special representatives to discuss the Pact with
third countries and organize the round tables. The German
presidency (1994) appointed a special ambassador to organize
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The inaugural conference convened on 26-27 May 1994, in
Paris. Nine countries were "directly concerned" (the three
Baltic republics and the six associates), but other CSCE
members and international organizations were observers. The
participants declared:
Our aim is to encourage countries which have not yet
concluded cooperation and good neighborliness
agreements and arrangements, extending also to
issues concerning minorities and borders, to do
so. .
The conference agreed to set up two regional round
tables, for the Baltic region (including the Baltic republics
and Poland) and for all the other East European countries
(including Poland), chaired by the EU.'" The round tables
were to identify projects to further good-neighborly
relations, in areas such as regional transborder cooperation,
questions relating to minorities, cultural and economic
cooperation, and the environment.' 	 Neighboring or other
the round tables. Aaence EuroDe no. 6238, 27 May 1994.
Several EU missions (of the troika or presidency and the
Commission) visited the East European countries to discuss the
Pact. Interview with DG IA official, 23 June 1994.
180"Concluding Document from the Inaugural Conference for
a Pact on Stability in Europe", EU Bulletin no. 5, 1994, p.
100.
'"The EU set up an ad hoc group, consisting of member
state representatives, to form the round tables. Acience
Europe no. 6239, 28 May 1994. Some round table meetings were
chaired by the Commission. Interview, 19 April 1996.
1"See the conference documents annexed to Council Decision
94/367/CFSP of 14 June 1994 on the continuation of the Joint
Action, in OJ L 165, 1 July 1994. The decision stipulates
that expenditure relating to meetings convened by the EU, away
from the seats of the EU institutions, would constitute
administrative expenditure (charged to the EU budget, which in
1995 would contain funds for CFSP implementation in 1994 and
1995), in so far as the costs exceeded those usually borne by
host countries.
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countries, as veil as international organizations, could join
the nine countries "directly concerned" at their round tables.
Slovenia was then asked to join the East European round table;
Belarus, Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine also participated.1'
The EU also convinced an initially hesitant Russia to
participate in Baltic round table.lM
The EU Presidency, and sometimes also the Troika, visited
several capitals to promote the Pact and encourage cooperation
and bilateral negotiations.' Quite clearly, attention was
focused on the thorny issues of the Russian minorities in the
Baltic republics and the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and
Romania. The troika visited the Baltic republics in July
1994, and Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia in the fall, to prod
them into reaching agreements.'
The EU increasingly emphasized regional cooperation, in
addition to the bilateral negotiations.' In its June 1994
decision to continue the Joint Action, the Council requested
1 See "Political Declaration adopted at the Conclusion of
the Final Conference on the Pact on Stability in Europe and
List of Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation Agreements and
Arrangements", EU Bulletin no. 3, 1995, p. 113. France had
pushed hard for Slovenia's participation. Aence Euro pe no.
6238, 27 May 1994.
l$4gfl EuroDe no. 6236, 25 May 1994.
185 Jk interim assessment conference was held at the margins
of the December 1994 CSCE summit in Budapest, to spur the
negotiations.
''Aaence EuroDe no. 6439, 3 November 1994. In a meeting
with Romanian President Iliescu in March 1995, shortly before
the Pact was to be concluded, Commission President Santer and
van den Broek said they hoped activities evolving within the
framework of the Stability Pact would help resolve problems
regarding human and minority rights in Romania. Acience Europe
no. 6439, 13/14 March 1995.
"7Jopp 1994, p. 53.
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the Commission to take appropriate economic measures to help
reach the objectives of the Pact. An annex to the Pact
contains a list of specific 'good-neighborly' projects
supported by the EU, such as language training and regional
economic cooperation. The list includes measures already
financed by PHARE (for ECU 200m) and projects still being
studied (ECU 6Oin vorth).0
The Pact, consisting of a declaration and the agreements
included by the participants, was then adopted by the members
of the OSCE (formerly the CSCE) on 20-21 March 1995.' The
final conference was fairly low-key, at least in the media,
perhaps a reflection of the Pact's modest achievements.
The Pact declaration stated:
We undertake to combine our efforts to ensure
stability in Europe. A stable Europe is one in
which peoples democratically express their will, in
which human rights, including those of persons
belonging to national minorities, are respected, in
which equal and sovereign States cooperate across
frontiers and develop among themselves good-
neighborly relations. A stable Europe is necessary
f or peace and international security.'9°
Over 100 agreements were attached to the Pact. Most of
them were concluded before the inaugural conference, including
several significant ones, such as the 1991 agreement on
minorities between Hungary and Ukraine, the 1992 treaty
1 See the Commission's report, requested by the Essen
European Council, on the promotion of regional cooperation and
good neighborly relations in relation to the Pact's
objectives. "Report of the Commission to the Council on the
Promotion of Intra-regional Cooperation and 'Bon Voisinage'",
prepared for General Affairs Council of 6/7 March 1995.
'The final declaration of the Pact and a list of the
agreements are in EU Bulletin no. 3, 1995, pt. 2.2.1.
190EJ Bulletin no. 3, 1995, p. 112.
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confirming the Polish-German border, the 1992 friendship
treaty between the Czech republic and Slovakia, and the
Polish-Lithuanian treaty concluded a month before the
inaugural conference opened (26 April 1994).
A Hungarian-Slovak treaty was agreed on 19 March 1995, a
day before the final conference convened. It includes a
Council of Europe recommendation providing for minorities to
have an autonomous administration where they constitute a
majority, and the principle of the inviolability of borders.
At the conference, however, Slovakian Prime Minister Meciar
stated that he considered the concept of minority rights
destabilizing.'9' Hungary ratified the agreement over the
summer, but Slovakia did not do so until March l996.
Hungary and Romania only promised to continue with
negotiations on an agreement.'" The Pact does not include a
Russ ian-Estonian agreement.
The OSCE is to supervise the Pact's implementation. In
case of disagreements over the implementation of the
agreements and arrangements included in the Pact, the
participants can resort to OSCE procedures for conflict
prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
It is not certain that a large conference was necessary
to meet the EU's objectives. The EU could have instead
encouraged states to cooperate within the framework of the
191Acience Eurooe no. 6445, 22 March 1995.
'Adrian Bridge, "Slovaks Protest as their Freedoms are
Whittled Away", The IndeDendent, 1 April 1996.
1"Marie Jégo and Yves-Michel Riols, "A Paris, 1. Chef de
la Diplomatie Russe S'Oppose & Une Extension 'Précipitêe' de
l'OTAN vers l'Est", Le Monde, 22 March 1995.
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CSCE, for example. In this sense, the Pact seems to have
served more to give the CFSP something to do, potentially
successful, in contrast to its perceived failures in the
former Yugoslavia. The relative lack of agreements concluded
during the Pact could indicate either that the Pact's
objective was not fully met, or that it was not really
necessary - as most of the participants had already concluded
good-neighborly agreements.
This, however, does not diminish the significance of
publicly vowing to respect certain principles and
acknowledging that regional cooperation and good-
neighborliness are legitimate concerns for all European
states. It has also increased the pressure on specific
associates (Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia in particular) to
reach agreements with their neighbors.
The Pact's success will depend above all on the
effectiveness of the conditionality of EU enlargement. The
participants agreed to the plan because they considered it a
prerequisite for EU membership. As France's European affairs
minister, Alain Lamassoure, declared: "No country with
unsettled border or minority conflicts will be allowed to
join. 194
CONCLUSION
The Community, then Union, has become much more active in
conflict prevention, by trying to reduce the sources of
insecurity in Eastern Europe, mediate agreements, and
encourage regional cooperation. 	 Whether conflicts will
194"Whose Stability Pact?", The Economist, 18 March 1995.
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actually be prevented remains to be seen; much depends on the
countries of Eastern Europe themselves. The EU has found it
difficult to convince the associates to cooperate among
themselves, and there are evident problems in encouraging
Slovakia and Romania to democratize and get along with their
neighbors. Enlargement could exacerbate those problems.
The EU's initiatives and attempts to prevent conflict
have arisen less because of specific demands from outsiders to
act (externalization), and more because the EU acknowledged
that it would have to assume more responsibility for conflict
prevention. It is well equipped to address the internal and
external sources of conflicts, and to encourage
democratization and economic development (and much less
equipped to deal with violent conflicts that have already
erupted). The conditionality of EU membership in particular
provides the EU with considerable influence in Eastern Europe.
Recognizing this, the member states have worked through the
Community/Union to try to prevent conflicts and spread
security in Eastern Europe, as the EU can bring much greater
leverage to bear than national policy could.
CHAPTER 7
EXPLAINING COOPERATION ON THE POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE
This thesis has shown that the EU can be an international
actor; it has the capacity to produce collective decisions and
have an impact on events.' With respect to Eastern Europe
since the late 19805, the Community/Union has formulated and
implemented an active, consistent, common policy. The
policy's principal aim has been to support the economic and
political transformation in Eastern Europe; as circumstances
have changed in Eastern Europe, the Community/Union has had to
use different policy instruments to try to fulfill that aim.
In the fall of 1989, the Community responded actively, with a
variety of instruments, to the collapse of communism
throughout the region. As the transformation in Eastern
Europe progressed, the Community agreed that the best way to
consolidate democratization and the market economy was to
integrate the East European countries into the EU. By the end
of 1994, the EU had approved an innovative and unprecedented
pre-accession strategy to facilitate enlargement. The
prospect of enlargement, coupled with increasing concerns
about security and stability in Eastern Europe, made it more
imperative for the EU to emphasize conflict prevention, to
ensure the success of the transformation.
From 1988 to 1995, the EU'S policy has shifted in
emphasis from one directed towards third countries to one
addressed to near-members. The evolution of the policy is
remarkable in and of itself; the speed with which it occurred
'As Hill defines actorness, in Hill 1993, p. 306.
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even more so (although the policy has not evolved quickly
enough for the East Europeans).
To explain further why the member states cooperated on
this policy, this chapter will reconsider the questions raised
in chapter 2, and draw out the theoretical implications of the
responses to these questions. Was there spillover (political,
cultivated, and/or functional) between external economic
relations and foreign policy? Is the policy a case of
externalization or self-styled logic? Were the member states'
positions "Europeanized"? Did the member states compromise?
How important were domestic pressures in determining the
member states' positions? Were decisions made in the
"supranational" style? What role did the Commission play in
the formulation and implementation of the policy?
7.1 WAS THERE SPILLOVER?
As discussed in chapter 2, Stanley Hoffman argued in 1966
that a "logic of diversity" would limit the spillover process
envisaged by neo-functionalists: the member states would block
integration in the political ("high politics") sphere. More
recently, neorealists such as Alfred Pijpers have repeated
this argument, pointing out that the Community has not eroded
national foreign policy competences. Yet in the case of
cooperation on a policy towards Eastern Europe, spillover
between the "external economic relations" and "foreign policy"
sectors did occur.
During the Cold War, the interconnection between economic
relations and security with Eastern Europe had already been
made clear - partly because the US insisted that there was a
negative connection, but also because there was a strong
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belief (especially in West Germany) that trade and increased
contacts would foster political and economic liberalization in
Eastern Europe, and therefore enhance Western Europe's
security (see chapter 3). But because trade relations with
Eastern Europe were politically significant, the member states
sought to retain control over them (no matter how small the
volume of trade actually was). Matters of military security
were dealt with in NATO. The EC and EPC collaborated to a
certain extent, on issues such as the CSCE and the gas
pipeline dispute. But the uneasy connection between economics
and security is precisely what limited the Community's
relations with Eastern Europe during the Cold War.
When communism collapsed, the interconnection became even
more pronounced. As David Buchan noted: "Security and
economic issues had become hopelessly intertwined due to the
fact that the Community's former enemies in Eastern Europe
were now clamouring for aid and trade from Brussels." 2 The
Community had the right instruments to act in the region.
The Community's policy was very much a security policy.
"Security" in the post-Cold War world acquired a much broader
connotation than military security: threats to security could
arise from a variety of sources, including mass migration,
ethnic disputes, violations of human rights, and economic
deprivation. 3 Military instruments would not reduce such
threats; "civilian" instruments would be much more effective.
2Buchan 1993, p. 33.
3Arguably, in much of the world this has always been the
case, but the NATO-Warsaw Pact stand-off during the Cold War -
based on the threat of nuclear annihilation - precluded much
consideration of the non-military sources of insecurity.
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In the case of Eastern Europe, the Community used its civilian
instruments (including trade and aid) in a very political way,
to bolster democratization and economic reforms, in the belief
this would engender stability and security. The
Community/Union's conflict prevention efforts (discussed in
chapter 6) illustrate most directly how it has used civilian
instruments to try to achieve those objectives.
There was, then, certainly functional spillover between
"external economic relations" and "foreign policy", and it was
reflected in extensive EC-EPC/CFSP collaboration. Decisions
on trade concessions and aid were taken in the context of the
overall foreign policy towards Eastern Europe. "The Council"
acted simultaneously as the General Affairs Council and the
Council of foreign ministers (EPC). But spillover was also
cultivated, as the Commission used its external relations
powers to elbow its way into areas that might earlier have
been considered to fall within the domain of EPC. The
Commission was in effect involved in formulating and
implementing foreign policy, rather than simply ensuring
consistency between EC and EPC/CFSP. There was also political
spillover, because for the most part the governing elites in
the member states tacitly or explicitly supported the
Commission's role and the EC-EPC/CFSP overlap. In fact, there
would have been no common foreign policy had the member states
tried to block spillover. The logic of integration proved
stronger than the logic of diversity. Why this was so will be
explored further in the rest of this chapter.
7.2 EXTERNALIZATION OR SELF-STYLED LOGIC?
The external environment obviously influenced the
356
Community's policy towards Eastern Europe: there would have
been no policy to aid the transformation of Eastern Europe if
communism had not collapsed there. But were the Community's
initiatives a (defensive) response to East European demands?
Were the East European countries setting the policy agenda?
Or did the Community act on its own accord, in its own
interests, independent of external pressures to do so? Was
the Community proactive, rather than reactive? In sum, was
the policy towards Eastern Europe a case of externalization or
self-styled logic (in Ginsberg's terms)?
Determining whether the Community's policy is a case of
externalization or self-styled logic is difficult because
there has been a profound synergy between external and
internal developments in the relations between the Community
and its eastern neighbors, ever since the Community was
founded (as discussed in chapter 3). with respect to the
policy in the period 1988-1995, the easy, but correct,
assertion is that the policy has elements of both.
In the late 1980s in particular, external and internal
dynamics were mutually reinforcing. The Community clearly was
a magnet for the "liberalizing" countries of the former Soviet
bloc. When communism crumbled, virtually all of the new
regimes declared that their number one foreign policy goal was
to "rejoin" Europe - and that meant joining the Community.
The Community of the late 1980s was particularly
attractive to the East Europeans: after the so-called
"Eurosclerosis" (stagnant economic growth, institutional
gridlock) of the l970s and early 19808, the Community
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manifested a new assertiveness and self-confidence. 4 The
Single European Act, the single European market, and plans for
economic and monetary union, coupled with accelerated economic
growth, fueled this confidence. Spain and Portugal joined the
Community, hoping to consolidate their young democracies, thus
enlarging the single market and the range of the Community's
external ties. To East European states, the Community
apparently bolstered economic growth, democracy, and
international stature.
By the late 1980s, the Community seemed much more able to
act collectively, and on a wider world stage, than previously.
Increasingly, its member states accepted (or expected) that it
should and could assume a leading role in some aspects of
international affairs, at a time when the change in the
international environment facilitated such a role for a
"civilian" power. In particular, the transformation under way
in Eastern Europe could best be encouraged by a civilian
policy; the Community was considered to be the right
institution for the job. 3 A less confident Community might
4As reflected in the titles of books, such as: Rummel,
ed., The Evolution of an International Actor: Western EuroDe's
New Assertiveness, and Crawford and Schulze, eds., The New
Europe Asserts Itself: A Chanin Role in International
Relations. Had the Berlin Wall fallen 10 years earlier, one
wonders if the East Europeans would have been as keen to join
the Community.
5The CSCE, which had been a main forum for East-West
cooperation, was in effect "bypassed". It has remained
important as a forum for building a sense of collective
responsibility for European security. In the liberal view,
the EU is much more suitable for engendering long-term
security, based on economic growth, democracy, and
integration. But the East European countries want a military
security guarantee, and several member states agree that EU
action must be complemented by NATO enlargement.
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have passed up the opportunity to lead efforts to support
reform in Eastern Europe, regardless of any demands on it to
do so.
There is, however, much evidence to suggest that
externalization played a large part in the Community's
relations with Eastern Europe. Time and again, the East
European countries made ever greater demands on the
Community/Union, for better market access, aid, political
dialogue, and above all, a firm commitment to membership and
a timetable for enlargement. A joint response would have to
be forthcoming, yet the Community's responses seemed to fuel
higher expectations. Furthermore, the East Europeans objected
to certain options, such as a confederation or partial
membership, thus limiting the Community's potential response.
It could be argued that in responding positively to the East
European demands, the Community/Union elaborated a "common
foreign policy where none existed previously."6
In particular, the decision on enlargement taken at the
June 1993 Copenhagen European Council fits externalization
well: it followed months of pressure from the East Europeans
for a declaration on membership, during which the Community
had insisted relations would develop within the framework of
the Europe agreements. Perhaps the decision on membership was
thus taken too soon: the Community should have reflected a
great deal more about the wisdom of enlargement, rather than
allow itself to be "pushed" into a decision.
Seen this way, the Community seems to have taken a series
6As the externalization hypothesis states. Schmitter 1969,
p. 165.
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of incremental, reactive steps: the EC's initial actions did
not entirely satisfy East European demands, so it was forced
to take further steps to try to fulfill those demands. Unable
to meet the ultimate demand for accession in the short term,
the EU tried several intermediate solutions, none of which
fully pleased the East Europeans. External pressures were the
main "cause" of a Community/Union policy.
Importantly, Sciunitter's negative hypothesis was not
fulfilled, although in 1988 it seemed that there was a risk it
would be (see section 4.1). The member states did not react
separately to the challenges (and opportunities) posed by the
revolutions in Eastern Europe, scrambling for "special and
exclusive advantage." Nor did they "remain indifferent or
opposed to joint external policy formation", the null
hypothesis.'
To a varying extent, two other third parties also played
a role in "pushing" the Community/Union to conduct a common
foreign policy towards Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union/Russia
and the US. During the Cold War, the Community tried
(gingerly) to reduce the Soviet Union's dominance in Eastern
Europe, refusing to conclude an overarching agreement with the
MEA (see section 3.1.3) and rewarding the more independently
inclined states Romania and Yugoslavia (section 3.1.2). In
the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the Soviet Union did
not occupy such a prominent place in the Community's policy
towards Eastern Europe; the attempted coup in August 1991,
however, changed that. Europe agreements were concluded with
7schmitter 1969, p. 165.
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Romania and Bulgaria (and trade agreements concluded with
Albania and the Baltic states), to bring them closer to the
Community. As Russian foreign policy seemed to take on a more
nationalistic tone, the East European countries feared it
would try to reestablish its old "sphere of influence". While
the membership decisions, structured relationship, and WEU
associate partnership status were not devised specifically in
opposition to the Russian "threat", it was certainly a
consideration (less in 1993, more so in 1994), along with,
however, several other factors. Concerns have grown that a
strict application of conditionality could drive the
associates into a Russian-led grouping (section 6.2.1).
The influence of another outsider, the US, is less
clear. It greeted the EC-CMEA declaration of June 1988 with
concern: the East European commitment to reforms was, in
American eyes, still uncertain. It stalled on EC proposals to
loosen CoCom restrictions even in early 1990. Yet the US
supported the Commission's role as G-24 aid coordinator, and
the Community's leading role in general. In December 1989,
Secretary of State James Baker declared: "The promotion of
political and economic reforms in the East is a natural
vocation for the European Community."' The US periodically
As discussed in chapter 3, the Community's position
towards Eastern Europe in the early 198 Os may have been
determined by a need to prevent economic ties from being
damaged by US policy, as Stephen George maintains. But with
the end of the Cold War, this approach no longer holds: the US
and the Community largely agreed on policy tbwards the region,
and concern for stability and security had become paramount.
'Secretary Baker, "A New Europe, A New Atlanticism:
Architecture for a New Era", Address to Berlin Press Club, 12
December 1989, US Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Washington, D.C. David Buchan argues that this
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criticized the extent to which the EC/EU opened its markets to
East European goods. But all in all, US encouragement or
pressure did not force the Community/Union to act, although
its willingness to step back allowed the Community to fill a
leadership role. The Community, however, would have been the
focal point for the East Europeans regardless of the US
position, and had its own reasons to be active in the region.
The self-styled logic also seems to apply. With the end
of the Cold War, the Community/Union stepped into a leadership
role in Europe, and tried to shape the new European
"architecture" in line with its own interests and objectives.
As early as October 1989, the Community was considering
possibilities for the shape of the new Europe (see section
5.2). David Allen has argued that in its response to events
in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990,
the EC has demonstrated that it is more than a Cold
War institution, that it is capable of rising to its
greatly enhanced role in the European and Global
international system and that it is capable of
generating ideas at least about its possible future
role in the new European security architecture.'°
The Community/Union did not simply respond defensively
and incrementally to the East European demands for market
access, aid, dialogue and membership. From the trade and
speech was crucial: "Had it not got this push from Washington,
the Community might have been much slower off the mark in
embracing Eastern Europe, with possibly dire consequences
there. At the time, late 1989, many EC leaders were
dithering." Buchan 1993, p. 141. But in late 1989 the
Community was quite active, granting wide-ranging trade
concessions, setting up PHARE, negotiating trade and
cooperation agreements and considering association agreements.
The US was "pushing" against an open door.
'°Allen 1992, p. 134.
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cooperation agreements through to the Pact for Stability, the
Community/Union has fashioned a distinct policy, which can be
seen as more purposive (or proactive) than reactive. With the
end of the Cold War, the Community could hope to overcome the
division of Europe and promote democracy, the protection of
human rights, and the market economy in the region. This
would create the conditions for long-term stability and
security in Eastern Europe, and thus in Western Europe as
well. The instruments which the Community/Union used to
achieve those objectives changed, from trade and aid to
conflict prevention measures, with changing circumstances in
Eastern Europe. Trade and cooperation agreements, for
example, were no longer adequate as the East European
countries implemented far-reaching reforms; preventing
conflicts increasingly became more of a concern from 1991.
The use of different instruments did not arise solely in
response to East Europeans demands: the Community/Union more
often devised the new instruments itself.
Conditionality is the key principle of the Community's
policy, and certainly was not applied in response to East
European demands. Although conditionality was not new in
international relations (an example is the IMF's conditions
for loans), it was a new principle in the Community's
relations with Eastern Europe. 1' Conditionality did not
"Conditionality had played a part in the EC's policy
towards other non-communist European states: EC aid and
membership for Spain and Portugal were made conditional on
democratization. In 1986, the foreign ministers declared that
the Community would promote human rights in its relations with
third countries, but this was far from making those relations
conditional on the protection of human rights. Nuttall 1992,
p. 269. See also the Commission's communication, The EuroDean
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influence the Community's earlier dealings with Eastern
Europe: most member states (West Germany above all) held the
view that trade and closer contacts would be the way to
encourage peaceful change. Yet as some East European states
launched reforms, the Community began to apply conditionality.
Applying conditionality allowed the Community to use its
civilian instruments to try to ensure security and stability
in Europe. Not surprisingly, this , first occurred when the
Community's "assertiveness" was quite high. Although there
are those within the EU who would prefer to use integration as
a tool to engender democracy and capitalism, conditionality
has been extended: the conditionality of membership in
particular gives the EU considerable influence for encouraging
reforms and preventing conflicts in Eastern Europe.12
In responding to East European demands for dialogue and
membership, the EC/EU also imposed its own views. Concentric
circles was a novel response to internal exigencies (deepening
in the wake of German unification) and external demands for
closer ties. The Europe agreements, a new type of association
agreement, were to be the framework for the development of
bilateral relations with the associates. The structured
dialogue refashioned relations as the EU considered necessary,
Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy : From
Rome to Maastricht and Beyond, COM (95) 567 final, 22 November
1995.
'2Both perspectives (stabilizing relations with the East
European countries will lead to liberalization; conditionality
will encourage democracy and market reforms) concentrate on
generating reform "from above". But the revolutions of 1989
are a prime example of a transformation driven "from below".
Timothy Garton Ash makes this point in relation to Germany's
Ostpolitik in Garton Ash 1993, pp. 203-215. The success of
reform will in the end depend more on broad public support.
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while the associates were less than pleased with its
"multilateralism". Although the structured dialogue, and
particularly the enhanced dialogue on CFSP matters, was
partially a response to East European demands for gradual
integration, the associates have rarely come up with ideas to
exploit the possibilities it offers: proposals for joint CFSP
declarations and participation in Joint Actions under the CFSP
have come from the EU.'3 The emphasis placed on regional
cooperation, democratization, and minority rights guarantees
(as manifested most clearly in the Pact for Stability)
reflects EU concerns and a particular EU vision, based on its
own experience, of how to prevent conflicts and ensure
security in the region.
'Internal' support for the East European membership
demands must also be taken into account. Germany long argued
that expanding to the east would stabilize the region and
consolidate the democratic and economic transformation
there.'4 Enlargement in the past • had helped consolidate
democracy in Greece, Spain, and Portugal; this argument was
used by proponents of enlargement to Eastern Europe.
Supporters of enlargement could point to the strength of the
outside demands to persuade doubters, but support for
expansion did not arise solely because of those demands. By
1993, the situation in Eastern Europe had evolved so
13This was made clear in an interview with two member
state officials, 13 December 1995.
14As early as October 1989, Genscher stressed the need for
the Community to reinforce cooperation with East European
countries to facilitate their eventual accession to the EC.
Aence Europe no. 5106, 7 October 1989.
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dramatically that the time seemed right to offer the prospect
of membership, on a conditional basis. Timing here is crucial
in another sense: only once Maastricht Treaty ratification was
assured and the issue of EFTAn membership settled did the
member states agree to offer membership.
The question of whether the policy towards Eastern Europe
is a case of externalization or self-styled logic, then,
cannot be answered definitively in favor of either. The East
Europeans were clearly quite insistent in their demands, and
the Community/Union had to come up with a response, either to
stall or to act positively. But the self-styled logic also
seems to fit: the way in which the Community/Union responded
to the demands and sought to shape its relations with the
region reflects its own interests, principles, and goals. In
both cases, however, the reasons why the member states
cooperated on the policy towards Eastern Europe must still be
explained.
7.3 WERE TEE MEMBER STATES' POSITIONS "EUROPEMTIZED"?
Well before communism began to collapse in Eastern
Europe, the member states had recognized that they shared an
interest in maintaining detente. There was then a limited
legacy of cooperation within the Community on relations with
the region. But Eastern Europe was still considered a
sensitive area of primarily national interest, and as the
communist regimes liberalized, the member states could have
benefitted from strengthening their bilateral economic and
political relations with the states of Eastern Europe. That
there should be a common policy towards the region was by no
means initially accepted by all. The larger member states in
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particular hesitated: it took signs of definite change in
Poland and Hungary, in the spring of 1989, before they
declared that the Community would formulate a common,
consistent policy (see section 4.1).
All of the member states agreed on the primary objectives
of increasing prosperity and security in Eastern Europe, by
ensuring the success of the reforms, and overcoming the
division of Europe, but this alone might not have sparked
cooperation on a common policy.'5 Cooperation became
imperative when all recognized that the "problem" of
increasing prosperity and security in Eastern Europe would be
better solved jointly. National action alone could not cope
with the enormity of the task. The member states could
benefit from the "politics of scale" 16 : they would have a
great deal more influence, and be much more effective, if they
acted jointly rather than separately. The most appropriate
instruments to use to encourage reform and spread stability in
the region were Community instruments (trade, association,
political dialogue, membership) or would best be wielded at
the Community level (aid, conflict prevention).
There was also agreement that the Community should assume
a leading role in relations with Eastern Europe, reflecting
its new-found confidence. The Strasbourg European Council in
December 1989 declared:
The Community and its member states are fully
'51n several interviews, Council and member state
officials have stressed that a common policy towards Eastern
Europe was made possible because the member states shared
common interests in the region.
'6The phrase is Roy Ginsberg's (1989), p. 3.
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conscious of the common responsibility which
devolves on them in this decisive phase in the
history of Europe....At this time of profound and
rapid change, the Community is and must remain a
point of reference and influence. It remains the
cornerstone of a new European architecture.. •17
The member states seemed keenly aware that this was a turning
point in history, and that the Community should play a role in
the transformation of the international system in Europe. The
Community had to support the reform process in Eastern Europe
and help reshape Europe's institutional architecture. In
early 1990, Douglas Hurd said, "It is fitting that it should
be the Community - the most successful expression of our
shared values and objectives as Europeans - which is throwing
a lifeline to the rest of our family of nations."1
A closer examination of the member states' positions
illustrates the extent to which they agreed that the Community
should formulate and implement a common policy to support the
transformation in Eastern Europe. The smaller member states
(the Benelux especially) have consistently advocated
formulating a common policy towards Eastern Europe. In part,
this reflects a concern that a directorate of the large member
states would dominate relations with the region, as was most
evident in the EBRD negotiations (section 4.3.4). The smaller
member states clearly lack the resources to encourage reform.
17"Statement Concerning Central and Eastern Europe",
Document no. 89/314, EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol. 5, no.
2, 1989.
'8Quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, "Poor but Clubbable",
Independent, 19 January 1990. The East European states are
frequently referred to as "family": see p. 190 and p. 273, fn.
190. This seems to indicate that the member states share a
collective "familial" identity and that they had an obligation
to help those "relatives" left on the wrong side of the Iron
Curtain during the Cold War.
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A common Community/Union policy meant that they would be much
more involved in relations with Eastern Europe - and share the
benefits of economic relations - than might otherwise have
been possible.
The large member states, however, have also supported a
common policy towards Eastern Europe. Germany, France and
Italy have to a certain extent acted on their own in Eastern
Europe, but always as a supplement or complement to a common
Community policy. A purely national policy would have been
ineffective anyway. The member states could not escape from
the fact that the Community was the focus of East European
foreign policies; this necessarily overshadowed their
bilateral relations with the countries of the region. The
member states would at least have to work together to respond
to East European demands; they would have to think in
"European" terms. They had limited freedom to go it alone,
even if they had so wanted. Their positions were perforce
"Europeanized". Externalization reinforced the politics of
scale, but both phenomena were accompanied by a feeling that
the Community/Union should lead policy towards Eastern Europe.
Germany is perhaps the central actor in the making of
policy towards Eastern Europe. Its geographical position
alone dictates that it must be concerned with stability and
security in Eastern Europe. Unification has further exposed
it to instability in Eastern Europe, so aiding the
transformation there is a "matter of necessity as veil as of
choice." 19	It wants prosperous, democratic, and stable
'9Bomsdorf, et al. 1992, p. 89.
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neighbors, and certainly does not want to be on the front-line
of a conflict.20
Some observers and policy-makers (in Western and Eastern
Europe) have been concerned that a united Germany would
dominate Eastern Europe and turn away from Western Europe.21
Germany is the primary trading partner for all of the ex-
communist countries, the largest giver of aid, and generally
the biggest foreign investor. "Balancing" a strong German
role in the region has strengthened support for a common
policy in several member states, notably France and Italy.
Germany too has sought to "multilateralize" policy
towards Eastern Europe. It does not want to be left on its
own with a problem which it could never ignore. The
problems of supporting the transformation in Eastern Europe
had to be considered the Community's problems, not just
Germany's, and therefore handled jointly.	 Searching for a
20See "Germany and its Interests: Hearing Secret
Harmonies", The Economist, 20 November 1993.
21See, for example, "Germany's Eastern Question",
Economist, 29 February 1992.
See appendices 1 and 2 for figures on German trade and
aid. Other member states sometimes eclipse German investment:
Italy in Poland by the end of 1993, or France and the UK in
Romania in 1992 and 1993. "The Economic Interpenetration
between the European Union and Eastern Europe", European
Economy, no. 6, 1994, chapter 4. Greece is the largest
foreign investor in Bulgaria. "A Survey of Greece: Last
Chance, Sisyphus", The Economist, 22 May 1993, p. 15.
As Ian Traynor and Martin Kettle argue in "Going
Overboard", The Guardian, 6 February 1996.
Lothar Gutjahr notes that the FDP, in charge of the
foreign ministry, is dominated by "European patriots" who
think of German and Western Europe's interests as one and the
same. Lothar Gutjahr, German Foreicin and Defence Policy After
Unification (London: Pinter, 1994), p. 87.
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multilateral solution conforms to the "politics of
responsibility", articulated by former Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher and continued by his successor Klaus Kinkel,
by which "Germany renounces any hint of nationalism or power
politics, grim reminders of its hegemonistic past, in favour
of	 whole-hearted	 integration	 in	 international
organisations..."	 The end of the Cold War has reinforced
Germany's multilateral tendencies. 2' After all, German
unification could really have taken place only in the context
of strong German support for deepening European integration,
affirmation of its commitment to NATO, and backing for a pan-
European security architecture incorporating Gorbachev's
Soviet Union.
Germany has also needed a "cover" for action in Eastern
Europe because its relations with some of its neighbors are by
no means problem-free - a legacy of World War II in
particular. Disputes over German minorities have soured
relations with Poland and the Czech republic; however much the
East European countries look to Germany for economic
assistance and support for their EU membership demands, there
Quentin Peel, "A Difficult Balancing Act", Financial
Times, 26 October 1992.
2'See in particular: Reinhardt Ruinmel (1995a), "The German
Debate on International Security Institutions", in Marco
Carnovale, ed., EuroDean Security and International
Institutions after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's,
1995); and Jeffrey Anderson and John Goodman, "Mars or
Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe", in
Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffman, eds., After
the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies.
1989-1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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would be limits to Germany'. Ostoolitik. Germany would need
to act within a Community context or risk alienating it.
neighbors, in Eastern and Western Europe.
Confronted with a united Germany, potentially dominant in
relations with Eastern Europe, France has turned to the
Community/Union. To exercise influence in Eastern Europe,
France backed an active Community policy towards the region,
which it would try to lead. Ole Waver has argued, "The French
stress on the Community's Ostpolitik is very logical, because
this is the only way to counterbalance German economic
dominance in Eastern Europe." tm Several observers asserted
that "(o]ne of the curious inversions of 1989 has been that
France became the leader of the (political) Ostpo1itik."
France's proposals for high-profile initiatives such as the
EBRD and the Pact for Stability reflect this desire to lead an
active Community/Union policy towards Eastern Europe. But
France eventually had to give up insisting that Eastern Europe
would be the mission for a more integrated Community (rather
than be included in it) 30, and accept widening, if it was to
retain influence in the EU (see section 7.4).
Both France and Germany sought to strengthen their
partnership, with respect to Eastern Europe and the EU's
See Hans Stark, "L'Est de l'Europe et l'Allemagne: des
rapports complexes", Politiaue Etranère no. 4/91, winter
1991, Adrian Bridge, "Czechs Still Filled with Rage at Munich
Sell-Out", The IndeDendent, 4 May 1996, and "Germany's Eastern
Question".
tmWver 1990, p. 484.
Buzan, et al. 1990, p. 129.
30See Buzan, et al. 1990, p. 151.
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policy there. This would preserve the "acauis of
reconciliation" between the two countries, as well as export
the model to the east. 31 Germany has been concerned to
convince France that enlargement should occur; strengthening
Franco-German cooperation would help Germany reach that goal
(see section 7,4).fl On Genscher's suggestion, for example,
in May 1991 the French and German ambassadors in the East
European countries and the French and German foreign ministers
met in Weimar to reinforce their cooperation in the region.
Chancellor Kohl immediately backed French Prime Minister
Edouard Balladur's plan for a Stability Pact, at a Franco-
German summit in June 1993. In early 1994, Germany proposed
that the two states coordinate their successive EU
presidencies, including collaboration on the shaping of a
joint European OstDolitik.
The "Weimar dialogue" is a further example of Franco-
German collaboration. The Weimar dialogue was formally
launched at a meeting of the foreign ministers of France,
Germany, and Poland in Weimar on 29 August 1991; since then,
the three ministers have met yearly. From 1995, the
trilateral meetings were to be upgraded to the level of heads
31Stark 1991, pp. 869-870.
interview, 14 March 1996.
C1aire Théan, "Paris et Bonn a la recherche d'une
politigue commune A l'Est", Le Monde, 19/20 May 1991.
Cooperation was to occur in the relatively low-key sectors of
culture and training; there was little room left for other
national policy initiatives.
"Froideur, Angst or all in the Mind?", The Economist, 26
March 1994.
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of state or goverrunent. 0 The dialogue was established
because Genscher wanted to strengthen Germany's relations with
Poland and ensure that France was also included. M Hans Stark
notes that it has the triple advantage of associating Poland
with Franco-German discussions on European security and
Community policy, contributing to German-Polish detente, and
guarding against possible tensions between Paris, Bonn and
Warsaw. The first trilateral declaration emphasized the
need to associate rapidly the new democracies to the
Community; other meetings addressed relations between Poland
and the EU, WEU, and NATO, proving once again that member
states' policies towards Eastern Europe are necessarily
"Europeanized" .
In January 1995 then foreign minister Alain Juppé called
the Weimar triangle a success. This success has attracted
other East European states. In September 1994, the Romanian
president proposed the creation of a similar trilatera].
dialogue. 40 The French, German, and Romanian foreign
ministers did meet in July 1995, but that dialogue has not
been institutionalized. Kinkel and de Charette used the
35"Just Do It", The Economist, 15 July 1995.
Interview, 14 March 1996.
Stark 1991, p. 869.
The Franco-German proposal to extend WEU associate
partnership status to the Eu's associates arose out of the
Weimar dialogue (see section 6.3.2).
Alain Juppé, "Quel horizon pour la politique etrangere
de la France?", Politiaue Etran gère, no. 1/95, Spring 1995, p.
246.
40Romer and Schreiber 1995/1996, p. 922.
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meeting to remind Romania that democratization and protection
of human rights were conditions for EU membership, a further
example of the "Europeanization" of member states' policy.
Italy has traditionally favored European integration, and
might be expected to support a common policy towards Eastern
Europe almost reflexively (although it hesitated before
including widening in that policy, as did France). Domestic
politics also dictated strong support for a policy to
encourage reform in Eastern Europe. East-West detente would
reduce internal tensions between the left (represented by the
strong Partito Comunista Italiano) and the governing
coalition. 4' As communism fell, Italy backed an active
Community policy, proposing that trade restrictions on East
European goods be lifted and aid to the region increased.42
Its support for a common policy has remained strong.
The "Quadrangolare", launched by Foreign Minister De
Michelis in late 1989, was an attempt to increase Italy's
presence in Eastern Europe, but through a multilateral
initiative. Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary would
collaborate on industrial and technical issues, transport, and
41sergio Romano, Guida alla Politica Estera Italiana: Dal
Cr0110 del Fascisnio al Cr0110 del Comunisnio (Milario: Rizzoli,
1993), pp. 197-198.
42See the article by the then Italian Foreign Minister:
Gianni De Michelle, "Reaching Out to the East", Foreian
Policy, no. 79, Summer 1990, p. 49.
The initiative echoed the Alpe-Adria grouping (launched
in 1978), which links sub-national regions that were part of
the Austro-Hungarian empire. See R. Craig Nation, "Italy and
Ethnic Strife in Central and Southeastern Europe", in Vojtech
Mastny, ed., Italy and East Central Europe: Dimensions of the
Reiona1 RelationshiD (Boulder: Westview, 1995).
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the environment." After becoming a Pentagonale and then a
Hexagonale (with the addition of Czechoslovakia and Poland),
the initiative was rebaptized the Central European Initiative
(CEI) in 1992 and grew to include Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Ukraine and Belarus.'
De Michelis asserted that the initiative complemented the
Community's policy towards Eastern Europe, and would
supplement resources allocated at the EC level. 4' It would
ease the eventual integration of its members into the
Community, giving them "una sala d'attesa in cui trascorrere
confortevolmente, per quanto possibile, gli anni di
transizione prima dell'ingresso nella Comunità europea." In
addition, as Sergio Romano argues, the undeclared aim was to
prevent those countries from falling completely within a
German sphere of influence." The problem, however, was that
none of the member countries could afford to fund common
projects. Nor could the CEI deal with the region's pressing
problems, such as the conflict in Yugoslavia.
Since 1992, Italy has experienced numerous economic and
political problems. Although Italy is one of their most
important trading partners, the East European countries would
like even more aid and investment (and leadership) from Italy.
'John Wyles, "Italy Aspires to a Bigger Regional Role",
The Financial Times, 10 November 1989.
'5wation 1995, p. 56.
"De Michelis 1990, p. 52.
'Romano 1993, p. 205.
"Romano 1993, p. 205. See also Sergio Romano, "East
Central Europe in Post-World War I Italian Diplomacy", in
Mastny, ed. 1995, pp. 28-30.
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Italy's severe budget problems (whose resolution was made
urgent by the EMU criteria), however, have curtailed the
extent to which it can respond. The political crisis that
has rocked Italy since 1992 has sharply reduced its ability to
carry out an active foreign policy (anywhere).
Given those constraints, the Andreatta-Hurd initiative to
strengthen the Eu's political dialogue with the associates
(section 5.5.2) was a way for Italy to exercise a greater
leadership role in the region and in the EU, relatively
cheaply. The initiative would also 'balance' the Franco-
German partnership and spread responsibility for the EU's
policy towards Eastern Europe. Italy has been keen to
"communitarize" relations with all of the Eu's neighbors (to
the east and south). 50 This may partly reflect its lack of
resources, but also undoubtedly arises from Italy's general
preference for multilateral cooperation and support for EU
common foreign policy-making.
Since the collapse of communism, the UK has been less
active with respect to Eastern Europe than other member states
have been; its trade and aid levels are relatively low
compared to the other large member states. 51 Its policy is
491n 1992, at a conference on Italy and Central-Eastern
Europe (which I attended), several East European ministers
called for greater Italian involvement in the region. Foreign
Minister De Michelis boldly announced that Italy could assume
a balancing role in Eastern Europe. The head of the Partito
Repubblicano Italiano, Giorgio La Malfa, retorted that Italy
did not have the money to finance such a role. See also
"Mancono Soldi Per Gli Aiuti", La Reubblica, 1/2 March 1992.
50lnterview, 28 July 1995.
51Louise Richardson argues that the UK seemed more intent
on sharing the secrets of the British political system and
facilitating private sector investment in Eastern Europe than
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truly a Community/Union one, in the sense that it has worked
almost solely within that framework to implement a civilian
policy in the region. An official from the UK Foreign Office
maintained that the policy towards Eastern Europe is a case in
which the UK's policy has been "Europeanized" because the
major challenges in Eastern Europe are those of enlarging the
EU and NATO, and because working through the EC/EU is an
effective way of addressing issues of collective concern (such
as democratization in Slovakia) •52
The UK was cautious about many of the initiatives pushed
by other member states, including the EBRD and the Stability
Pact, but it then worked to amend the proposals more to its
liking. It has strongly advocated opening the Community to
freer trade with Eastern Europe, and called, forcefully and
repeatedly, for a rapid enlargement to the east; its pressure
undoubtedly contributed to the decisions to ease market access
and promise eventual enlargement. The UK grasped the
opportunity presented by Italy to launch a joint initiative
for strengthening the political dialogue with the East
European associates. Within the structured dialogue, the UK
has pushed for practical results, proposing specific, concrete
instances of cooperation."
Leadership was exercised by a number of different member
on taking the lead in shaping the new European architecture.
In "British State Strategies after the Cold War", in Keohane,
Nye, and Hoffman, eds. 1993, pp. 156-157.
52lnterview took place on 13 December 1995.
"In October 1994, for example, the UK and Italian foreign
ministers, Hurd and Martino, proposed including the associates
in discussions on non-proliferation and the CSCE. Interviews
with UK and Italian officials.
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states, at different times, illustrating the extent to which
the member states shared the view that the EU should formulate
and implement a common foreign policy towards Eastern Europe.
Belgium (in 1988-1989), France, Germany, the UK and Italy
(together and separately) were quite active in pushing
compromises and common initiatives.	 The Presidency was
important in brokering agreements and launching
Community/Union initiatives. Both France and Ireland called
special summits to discuss specifically the events in Eastern
Europe, in November 1989 and April 1990. The Dutch presidency
helped broker the first three Europe agreements. The British
presidency launched a high-profile political dialogue with the
Visegrad group in the fall of 1992. Denmark played a large
part in pushing through the Copenhagen European Council
decisions. Greece helped set up the Pact for Stability. The
German presidency in the fall of 1994 pressed for the
implementation of the structured dialogue.
Another indication of the NEuropeanizationN of member
state positions on Eastern Europe can be found in the
discussions on the CFSP. Early on, Eastern Europe was
considered a prime area for Joint Action. A March 1990
Belgian memorandum suggested that the policy towards Eastern
Europe provide the first opportunity to put into practice an
integrated foreign policy. TM In October of the same year, the
French and German foreign ministers proposed that the 12
member states decide by qualified majority voting on common
54The document is reproduced in Finn Laursen and Sophie
Vanhoonacker, eds., The Intergovernmental Conference on
Political Union (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992).
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policies for parts of the world - such as Eastern Europe -
where they had common interests." In October 1991, the
Netherlands also suggested that foreign policy towards Eastern
Europe be decided by majority vote, since there was already
convergence among national policies and external economic
policy was such an important element of the policy."
The member states did attempt to shape the common policy
to reflect their own "pet" concerns, including their relations
with certain East European states.'7 Germany's desire to
"erase" its border with Poland (with the help of PHARE aid)
stems partly from a desire to ease communications and ties
with ethnic Germans living there. Its emphasis on minority
"Grant 1994, pp. 144-145. A year later, both states
proposed that the Maastricht Treaty state the topics likely to
be the subject of Joint Actions, including relations with
Eastern Europe (the document is in Laursen and Vanhoonacker,
eds. 1992). The UK objected to including such a list in the
Treaty: Foreign Secretary Hurd argued that foreign policy
issues were too variable to be considered permanently suitable
for common action. David Buchan, "A Long March Towards
Euroarmy: Before It Can Have an Army the EC Needs a Closely
Co-ordinated Foreign Policy", The Financial Times, 18 October
1991. The Maastricht European Council agreed, and instead
instructed the foreign ministers to identify areas open to
Joint Actions, which they did in a June 1992 report. Eastern
Europe was one of those areas (see section 5.4.2).
"Pinder 1991, pp. 5-6.
'7There was also the issue of 'balancing' the EU'S
relations with Eastern Europe (naturally a concern of north-
eastern member states), by strengthening the EU's relations
with Mediterranean countries (more of a concern for southern
member states). This was raised particularly by Spain and by
Greece, Italy and France. (Spain has also complained that
Eastern Europe was draining EU resources that should go to
Latin America.) As a result of these concerns, by 1995, the
EU had become much more active in the Mediterranean, and had
promised to include Cyprus and Malta in the next enlargement.
It is unclear whether the EU can provide the resources needed
to help resolve some of the Mediterranean's problems (such as
the Arab-Israeli dispute or the Yugoslav war); a serious
"capability-expectations gap" could emerge. See Hill 1993.
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rights stems from its own concerns with the rights of ethnic
Germans in other East European countries. 5' France's concerns
to maintain its traditional links (and therefore influence)
with Romania could partly explain why it pushed for closer
EC/EU-Romanian ties. Italy's concerns for the rights of
ethnic Italians in Slovenia and Greece's concerns for the
rights of ethnic Greeks in Albania impeded the development of
those countries' relations with the EU.
Germany has been particularly keen on integrating the
Czech republic, Hungary, and Poland (above all) into the EU -
f or reasons of security and simple economics, and perhaps to
atone for the past.'° Germany and Denmark want to integrate
the geographically close Baltic republics into the EU orbit,
an aim backed strongly by new members Finland and Sweden.6'
58Germany's friendship treaties with its neighbors contain
provisions for minorities in line with CSCE norms, but
nonetheless, "one powerful nation-state was making bilateral
arrangements to support, culturally, economically and legally,
a minority of its own nationals (by its own definition) inside
other states." Garton Ash 1993, p. 401. In 1988, West
Germany guaranteed a DX lb credit to Hungary; in return,
Hungary improved the cultural status of its German minority.
Since Poland refused to grant cultural rights to its German
minority, West Germany did not extend credits to it (in that
year). Wolfgang Berner and William Griffith, "West German
Policy Toward Central and Eastern Europe", in Griffith, ed.
1989, p. 346.
Albania looked to Italy, its former colonial power, for
aid; Italy responded fairly generously, also to stop thousands
of Albanians from streaming into southern Italy. Italy has
pushed for multilateral initiatives •(G24 or Phare) in Albania
so that it isn't seen as dominating. Interview, 28 July 1995.
60See "A Survey of Central Europe: The Return of the
Habsburgs", The Economist, pp. 7-11.
"At a conference on conflict prevention and the EU in
London on 8 February 1996, a Swedish representative to the IGC
Reflection Group, Ambassador Sven-Olof Peterason, declared
that the best conflict prevention measure the EU could take in
the Baltic region would be to let the three Baltic republics
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Sweden has expressed opposition to letting the Visegrad
countries join before the Baltic republics, an example of the
"centrifugal" influence of geographical and historical ties.'2
The member states have also tried to limit the extent of
the common policy: export credit policy remained resolutely a
matter for inter-governmental cooperation; good neighbor and
cooperation agreements were still concluded on a bilateral
basis; and some member states complained about the
Commission's influence over balance of payments loans and
tried to limit the Commission's autonomy in allocating PHARE
resources. The member states have competed over PHARE
contracts and the sponsoring of prestigious aid projects.
The efforts to limit or direct the policy, however, pale
when compared to the extent of the common policy agreed by the
member states. They seem rather like a vain attempt to
counter the Eu's importance in Eastern Europe and ensure a
role for the member states. That there should be a common
policy towards Eastern Europe was not at issue; this was
accepted, if not actively advocated.
The member states, then, did view the problem of
supporting the transformation in Eastern Europe and its
solution in collective terms. They took advantage of the
politics of scale; this was reinforced by the effects of
externalization. The common policy "outweighed" national
policies; the member states' positions were necessarily and
join. Germany, Scandinavian countries, the Baltic republics,
and Russia form the Council of Baltic Sea States, another
"bridging" organization linking EU and non-Eu states.
'2Sar	 Helm, "Eastern Expansion Sparks Row", Th
Independent, 16 December 1995.
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voluntarily Europeanized.
7.4 DID THE 1(BER STATES COXPROWISE?
Although the member states may have recognized the need
for and desirability of cooperation on a common policy, they
were divided over several aspects of that policy. This is to
be expected; what is important is that these differences were
overcome. It is important to take the entire period, 1988-
1995, into consideration: agreements reached at one stage were
later 'upgraded' even further.
Agreement on how to achieve the objectives of encouraging
reform and ensuring stability was at times difficult to reach.
Some commentators have argued that the EC was not doing enough
in Eastern Europe; it should have set up a "Marshall Plan" for
Eastern Europe.'3 But it did set up PHARE, whose budget has
increased substantially even after the program was extended.
Excluding Germany, none of the member states has given more
aid than the EU has (see appendix 2). There was no widespread
agreement to grant large amounts of bilateral multilateral
aid to Eastern Europe - partly because of qualms about the
cost but partly because the effectiveness of aid was by no
means assured when the East European economies were still
largely state-controlled.
The prevailing motif was "trade not aid". But trade was
a particularly difficult issue, and the intra-EC wrangling
'3Kramer 1993, p. 234.
"Giles Merritt points out that until social security
systems are reformed or state enterprises are privatized,
Western aid would only subsidize inefficiency. Merritt 1991,
pp. 248-249. Private investment was also expected to help
generate economic growth.
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over concessions, particularly during the negotiations on the
Europe agreements, gave the impression that the member states
were fiddling while Rome burned. The member states tried to
protect specific economic interest groups, by blocking or
delaying trade concessions that were opposed by them.
Relative gains do not seem to have been the motive, as
realists would surmise; the member states instead seemed more
concerned to protect their own farmers or businesses.
There was sympathy from other member states for many of
these concerns: Portuguese objections to free trade in
textiles were considered legitimate enough for an agreement to
be reached to grant extra EC aid to textile producers there.
Spain's concerns about steel imports from Bulgaria and Romania
were not easily dismissed by free trade advocates because of
the crisis in the Community steel industry. Where objections
were not considered legitimate, there was much pressure on the
member state to back down, as in the example of France and
meat imports under the Europe agreements.
What is striking is how often the member states gave in
to pressures to compromise, from the trade and cooperation
agreements and lifting of quantitative restrictions, to the
Europe agreements and the Copenhagen European Council decision
to accelerate trade liberalization. The power of domestic
interest groups to influence the member states' positions on
trade was muted. The political importance of liberalizing
trade with Eastern Europe outweighed the risk of enraging
domestic interest groups or, more importantly, the very real
costs of opening up certain sectors to East European
competition. The fact that the foreign ministers were making
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the decisions is crucial: keenly aware of the political
significance of economic relations with the associates, they
effectively overruled other government ministers who might
have sympathized more with the concerns of interest groups.
An important exception is agriculture, and interest groups are
very well organized domestically and on a European basis in
this sector (although minor concessions on agricultural
products have also been made). The reluctance to liberalize
agricultural trade also reflects, however, a stubborn
reluctance to face the challenge of reforming CAP.
The trade issue also needs to be seen in context: trade
is only one aspect of the overall policy towards Eastern
Europe. The Europe agreements, for example, set up a
framework for intense cooperation between the EU and the
associates.
Of all the decisions made, that on enlargement was the
most controversial; after all, nothing less than the future
shape of the Union was at issue. Agreement was first reached
on a concentric circle vision of Europe, which provided one
solution to the widening vs. deepening debate. As early as
April 1991, the member states could even agree to mention EC
membership in the preambles to the Europe agreements. But
this solution soon proved inadequate, given external demands
for enlargement (and internal support for those demands),
concerns about security in Eastern Europe, and the progress of
the political and economic transformation. Moving to a
statement promising membership was difficult for many reasons,
and the past example of Turkey would not have helped change
minds. The Copenhagen decision to promise enlargement to the
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East European associates may have been taken without enough
prior thought about the implications of such a promise (for
the EU and for Eastern Europe) - but it is nonetheless
remarkable that it was taken at all, given the extent to which
many member states had expressed misgivings about enlargement.
It should also be reiterated that this occurred less than four
years after the Berlin Wall fell; reaching a Community
consensus on enlargement in fact took a remarkably short time.
All of the member states have had to make compromises on
the issues of widening and deepening. Germany has been the
strongest advocate of widening, and has been very concerned to
convince its EU partners of the merits of enlargement. But it
also wants deepening, to tie itself into European institutions
and thus please its neighbors, France in particular. It
accepted, and even advocated, that there must be deepening
before widening, even though it may have good reason to press
for the early accession of the Visegrad group to the EU.'5
France was initially opposed to widening. According to
Heinz Kramer, France wanted to deepen integration and launch
a European confederation because it was concerned with the
repercussions that widening would have for the balance of
power within the Community." Stanley Hoffman agrees that
Nitterrand's opposition even to a statement accepting the
prospect of enlargement was caused by an obsession with German
power. A deepened but not enlarged Community could take the
initiative of aid to the East away from Germany, while an
'5Tony Barber, "Ties that bind the liberated Germany", fl
Independent on Sunday, 17 July 1994.
"Kramer 1993, pp. 221-222.
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enlarged EC would have its center of gravity in Germany and
would strengthen Germany as a role model for the East European
associates.
But after the Maastricht Treaty, France softened its
position on enlargement, although Mitterrand still wanted to
place obstacles in the way of widening, and continued to
insist that a confederation would be the best possible
European architecture." France recognized that with a more
powerful united Germany as a neighbor, it would have to
exercise influence through the EU. And this entailed
accepting enlargement, on which Germany insisted.'9 Resisting
enlargement (in the face of East European demands and growing
internal Community support) could have been counterproductive;
by accepting it, France could hope to influence the process to
a much greater extent and continue to lead an active EU
Ostpolitik. France's concerns with the balance of power were
evidently stifled: realism cannot account for this.
Italy might have had reason to oppose the accession of
the East European associates, as the EU'S budget (and Italy's
contribution) would have to be increased substantially and aid
to poorer regions (the Mezzogiorno) and farmers might be cut.
Enlargement would also shift the center of the EU to the
north-east. 70 On the other hand, Italy is one of Eastern
'Stanley Hoffman, "French Dilemmas and Strategies in the
New Europe", in I(eohane, Nye, and Hoffman, eds. 1993, p. 140.
"de La Serre and Lequesne 1993, pp. 156-157.
'9"A Survey of France: No Escape?", The Economist, 25
November 1995.
70See, for example, Enrico Letta, Passaio a Nord-Est
(Bologna: Ii Mulino, 1994).
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Europe's largest trading partners (a legacy also of economic
ties built up during the Cold War), and its rich northeast in
particular would benefit from closer ties to the EU's
associates. 7' Italy did not initially endorse enlargement,
but went along with the Community's acceptance of the
prospect, and has consistently stated its support for the
policy. 72 It has also, however, urged consideration of
proposals for variable geometry, as long as it is considered
a member of the central core, as a way to widen 	 deepen.
The one issue on which the UK has expressed a very strong
preference is that of widening. In Thatcher's Aspen speech in
August 1990, she urged the Community to "declare unequivocally
that it is ready to accept all the countries of Eastern Europe
as members if they want to join, and when democracy has taken
root and their economies are capable of sustaining
membership." 73 In September 1993, Major wrote: "If we fail to
bring the democratic countries of Eastern and Central Europe
into our Community, we risk recreating division in Europe -
between the haves and the have-note.."74
The UK's support for enlargement has, however, been
71lnterview, 28 July 1995.
T2Andreatta's support for the 'historic challenge and
responsibility' of integrating the Visegrad countries into the
EU is made clear in an interview reprinted in Andreatta,
Anno Per L'Italia: Tra Economia e Politica Estera (Roma: Arel,
1994), p. 52. Romano Prodi, the leader of the progressive
coalition, also stated his support for enlargement, in a
speech at LSE on 26 January 1996.
73The text of the speech is reprinted in The Daily
Telearath, 6 August 1990.
74John Major, "Raise Your Eyes, There is a Land Beyond",
The Economist, 25 September 1993.
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coupled with strong opposition to deepening. In her Aspen
speech, Thatcher declared that the Community should not give
more power to centralized institutions because that would "be
making it harder for the Eastern Europeans to join. They have
not thrown of f central command and control in their own
countries only to find them reincarnated in the European
Community."75 The insistence on widening without deepening
made it virtually impossible for the UK to team up with the
one other member state that strongly supported widening,
Germany. In the end, however, the UK accepted the
Maastricht Treaty (with opt-outs), part of the first solution
to the widening v. deepening debate..
Of the smaller member states, only Denmark clearly
supported the prospect of enlargement to the associates prior
to the Copenhagen summit. But since then, the smaller member
states have in general supported enlargement, if coupled with
deepening integration (even though more majority voting, for
example, could reduce their influence) . Spain, however, has
75Text in The Daily Telerai,h, 6 August 1990.
76matcher's objections to German unification would not
have helped either. See Thatcher 1993, pp. 813-814. In April
1994, though, Hurd and Kinkel jointly wrote an article arguing
for EU and NATO enlargement. Interestingly, they both agreed
that the EU will have to adapt if it is to enlarge: "We must
ensure that at every stage a wider community becomes a
stronger one." Douglas Hurd and Klaus Kinkel, "Welcome to our
Eastern Cousins", The Times, 26 April 1994.
7 See, for example, the then Belgian foreign minister
Willy Claes' speech, "Europe: An Unfinished Symphony", Chatham
House, 2 February 1994. In March 1996, the Belgian foreign
minister, Erik Derycke, declared that "[d]eepening the Union
is therefore a 'conditio sine qua non' for enlargement".
Speech to the Third Ghent Colloquium, "The Relations between
the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe and the
Intergovernmental Conference".
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stated that its approval of enlargement depends on the
continuation of its EU aid, and Greece has been concerned to
combine an eastern enlargement with a southern one (to Cyprus
in particular).
The effects of externalization apart, the decision on
enlargement seems to have been taken because the member states
agreed that it was the best way to spread security in Eastern
Europe, and therefore increase the Union's security as well.
By June 1993, several associates were much more clearly on the
path to democracy and a market economy; that they should join
the EU seemed more 'natural'. Certainly, however, reluctant
member states were pressed to come to this conclusion quickly
because of pressure from the East European countries and from
pro-wideners within the Community (Germany and the UK in
particular). Once the Maastricht Treaty was on its way to
ratification and decisions on the budget and EFTAn enlargement
had been taken, there were few excuses left to put off a
decision. Agreement on enlargement, , however, was followed by
agreement on a pre-accession strategy to ease the associates'
integration into the EU. Steps were thus taken to implement
the decision; it was not a "pseudo" or "symbolic" one.7'
Granted, the hard questions on enlargement remain
unanswered. This does not detract, however, from what has
already been agreed. The very foundations of the EU must be
substantially transformed if the next enlargement is to be
successful. As yet a consensus on the nature of the
710n pseudo and symbolic policies, see Martin Holland,
"Three Approaches for Understanding European Political Co-
operation: A Case Study of EC-South African Policy", Journal
of Common Market Studies, vol. 25, no. 4, June 1987.
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transformation required has not formed.' 9 Reaching an
agreement on institutional and budgetary reform that will
satisfy all of the member states will be difficult, and could
impede enlargement in the near future (providing, of course,
the membership candidates meet the conditions). But it would
be extremely difficult for the EU to renege on its promises to
enlarge in the long term; there is too much support within the
, and momentum building, for enlargement.
The policy towards Eastern Europe is clearly not a series
of decisions made on the basis of the lowest common
denominator of the various national positions. On virtually
every decision, the member states made concessions: trade
barriers were lowered, and then lowered again, several times;
initiatives sponsored by one or more member states were
supported by the others (even if they had not been received
enthusiastically); an active and leading role for the
Commission was generally accepted; PHARE funding was
increased; and the prospect of enlargement was accepted.
7.5 ROW IMPORTMJT WERE DOMESTIC PRESSURES?
As discussed above, the objections of domestic interest
groups to freer trade with Eastern Europe were continuously
overruled, with the exception of trade in the sensitive
sectors (but even there, concessions were made). Contrary to
Some commentators have warned that if the EU does not
integrate eastern Europe, Germany will feel forced to go it
alone. Traynor and Kettle, "Going Overboard". This is probably
unlikely, as Germany's commitment to West European integration
is not really in doubt (concerns about EMU notwithstanding).
Chancellor Kohl continues to argue that German power must be
contained within a strengthened EU - or fears of a dominant
Germany could fuel nationalism among its neighbors. See Sarah
Helm, "Kohl Warns of War if European Union Fails",
Independent, 3 February 1996.
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what the liberal intergovernmentalist approach maintains, such
groups did not hinder cooperation. This is because trade
policy was part of a foreign policy: • "greater" issues were at
stake and required compromises from the member states.
Public opinion in general did not figure much in national
positions on the policy towards Eastern Europe, although EU-
wide polls have shown support (though not enthusiasm) for
enlargement to the Visegrad countries (see appendix 4). The
avowed expression of the general European will, the European
Parliament, did ensure that some issues were addressed,
although its role was fairly limited. It voiced concerns for
human rights (for example, in Romania) and held up agreements
as a result. It also pressed for more funds for PHARE and
launched a few initiatives (scientific cooperation, border
cooperation, the democracy program) within that framework.
But the EP was clearly not a key actor in policy-making,
reflecting its limited powers in external relations.
Governments (and mainly the foreign ministries) have been
primary actors in the decision-making process on the policy
towards Eastern Europe.'° This is still fairly typical of
much foreign policy-making at national or EU level (for better
or for worse). It should be reiterated, however, that
cooperation takes place against a background of
interdependence and the gradual development of a "community"
within the EU.	 Approaches • that focus only on
'°Elites, however, cannot ignore public opinion, as
demonstrated by the Maastricht Treaty ratification process.
Given that a successful enlargement to the East European
associates will depend on institutional reforms, elites will
have to "bring the public along" on further integration.
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intergovernmental bargaining do not adequately account for
this. A decision to increase aid to the Portuguese textile
industry (redistribution of resources) or agreement on
enlargement cannot be fully explained unless this is kept in
mind. Paradoxically, however, enlargement may endanger
exactly the sense of community that underpins EU decision-
making. The structured relationship, which aims to socialize
the associates' elites, has clearly been designed to counter
that risk; building a wider 'community' will, however, take
time.
7.6 WAB DECISION-WING "SUPRANATIONL"?
Insights	 from	 neo-functionalism, 	 neo-liberal
institutionalism, and constructivism help explain the dynamics
of decision-making on the policy towards Eastern Europe. The
process of making policy on Eastern Europe is an example of
the neo-functionalist "supranational" style of decision-making
(section 2 • 2.3). The member states continually made
significant compromises to achieve a common policy; decisions
were not of the lowest-common-denominator variety, but
represented an upgrading of the common interest. Jacques
Delors has called this the "Community method", which involves
progressively creating positive links of
interdependence among countries, which certainly
doesn't prevent each one affirming its personality
and aspirations, and which does not exclude
differences and arguments. But - and that's the
fundamental change - what has been gained is so
precious that the willpower exists, in the last
resort, to find positive compromises."
What is significant is that the supranational decision-making
style functioned in the realm of foreign policy (perhaps
"Quoted in Grant 1994, p. 224.
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because the line between "foreign policy" and "external
economic relations" in this case was virtually invisible).
Policy-making occurred in a situation of empathetic
interdependence: the member states were inclined to work for
collective solutions of larger overall value to the "problem"
of encouraging reform in Eastern Europe, even at the expense
of direct gains to themselves. They shared a collective
interest in ensuring a successful transformation of Eastern
Europe, and believed the Community/Union should formulate and
implement a common policy to achieve that objective; this
required that the member states make compromises.
Furthermore, they did so in the process of interaction at the
EC/EU level. Domestic factors were not such important
determinants of the member states' positions. This supports
the constructivist (and neo-functionalist) view that state
interests can change in the process of cooperation.
In making policy on Eastern Europe, the Council was
acting as a "Euro-organ", in EU interests, rather than as a
forum for bargaining between governments that had their own
separate interests to pursue (as intergovernmental approaches
posit). This is why the self-styled logic can apply to this
case. The policy itself reflects the EU's collective
experience and interests, and a sense of identity that
transcends member state boundaries. The insistence on
conditionality reflects the belief that democratic, free-
trading countries make better neighbors, which post-var West
European history seems to confirm. Likewise, the emphasis on
The phrase is Ole Waever's (1995).
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regional cooperation and integration, as in the structured
relationship or the Stability Pact, stems from the shared
belief that integration in Western Europe has helped ensure
peace and stability there, and will help to do so in Eastern
Europe. The membership conditions can be seen as a sort of
inventory of shared characteristics that form the basis for a
common EU identity. The East European countries have stated
that they want to "rejoin Europe"; the EU'S response defines
what a European identity entails.
Insights from neo-functionalism, constructivism, and even
neo-liberal institutionalism, thus help explain why the member
states cooperated on the policy, but alone they do not
suffice. For the member states were not the only important
actors: attention must also be given to the Commission's role
in making the policy.
7.7 THE ROLE OP THE COMMISSION
The Commission and member states worked closely together
throughout the period 1988-1995. The informal "advisors'
group", in which foreign ministry officials and a Commission
representative met, worked out early decisions such as the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the East European
countries and the extension of G-24 aid; Benavidès reported to
it on his progress in the Gabcikovo dam dispute mediation.'3
After the Maastricht Treaty, this collaboration was
formalized. Such extensive cooperation was clearly needed to
ensure consistency. But the Commission was also active in its
own right, as an initiator and mediator.
'3Interview with DG IA official, 12 March 1996.
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In fact, the Commission was undoubtedly one of the most
important actors in the making of policy towards Eastern
Europe. That the policy has evolved so quickly, from trade
agreements to the pre-accession strategy in six years, is
partly due to the Commission's leadership. There are two
remarkable aspects regarding the Commission's role. The first
is that the Commission was so active in a region where it had
previously been marginalized, and in foreign policy making in
general. The second is that its mediation role was crucial.
On several occasions, it in fact "upgraded the common
interest", mediating solutions that were more than the "lowest
common denominator".
In several interviews, EU and member state officials have
repeatedly noted that the Commission's involvement in the
making of a policy towards Eastern Europe has been unique. It
was given unprecedented leeway to act, even on "political"
issues. As one Council Secretariat official noted in 1996,
the Commission's role in foreign policy - in general and in
relation to Eastern Europe - would simply have been out of the
question even 10 years ago.0 Simon Nuttall has argued that
in the policy towards Eastern Europe,
it was the Commission which held the levers of
power, whether through its control of the
implementation of the Community budget, its
coordination of the international aid effort on
behalf of the countries of East and Central Europe
or its mastery of the process of negotiating
agreements on behalf of the Community. Small wonder
if the Commission seemed to loom large in the
counsels of Political Cooperation and to occupy a
position which would have raised eyebrows at the
time the Single European Act was passed. It would
'Interview took place on 12 March 1996.
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have been deemed rank heresy a decade before that.'5
When communism faltered in Eastern Europe, the Commission
was already a dynamic force and did not hesitate to seize the
opportunity to expand its influence into the making of a
civilian foreign policy. The Commission perforce assumed a
leading role in relations with the cMEA members, as it
negotiated trade and cooperation agreements with the fastest
reformers and applied conditionality in practice. Commission
pressure is not the sole reason why the Council decided in
April 1989 to pursue a consistent and common approach, but
certainly it helped: the Commission ensured that the issue was
on the Community's agenda and argued the case for cooperation
(see section 4.1).
The G-7 decision in July 1989 to entrust the Commission
with the task of coordinating Western aid to Poland and
Hungary arose because the Commission was already in the
forefront of Community efforts to strengthen relations with
Eastern Europe and because of Delors' close relationship with
three main leaders: Kohl, Mitterrand, and Bush. The
Commission immediately responded to the challenge, and
throughout the fall of 1989, was, with France, a primary
source of initiatives to aid Eastern Europe. The expansion of
the Community's activities, to include lending to Eastern
'5Simon Nuttall, "The Commission and Foreign Policy-
Making", in Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence, eds., I1
Eurooean Commission (Harlow: Longman, 1994), p. 294. Under
the CFSP, the Commission acquired the right to propose foreign
policy initiatives. This concession to supranationalism does
not reflect the extent to which the Commission was already
involved in the making of a foreign policy towards Eastern
Europe. Developments "on paper" were surpassed by practice,
once again.
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Europe and establishing PHARE, for example, also thereby
increased the Commission's role. The Commission was in effect
leading the implementation of the Community's policy as well,
through its handling of trade negotiations and the aid
programs. The Commission and Delors then helped to smooth the
former East Germany's incorporation into the EC, filling yet
another very political role.
The Commission consistently came up with ideas on the
shape of the "new Europe". Debra and Genscher pushed the
idea of a Europe of concentric circles extending to Eastern
Europe. In April 1991, Commissioner Andriessen suggested
offering affiliate membership to the East European countries.
From June 1992 to June 1993, in three reports to successive
European Councils, the Commission proposed setting up a
"European Political Area", based on a multilateral dialogue
(section 5.4.2). The European Council eventually agreed to
set up such an area (but called it the structured
relationship), although British, Italian, and German backing
was instrumental in forging that agreement.
The Commission's involvement in the formulation and
implementation of the Europe agreements was a further foray
into the previously off-limits area of political dialogue.
The Commission pushed to include political dialogue in the
agreements, an unusual step. The Commission has since been
very involved in the political dialogue.
The East European states clearly perceived the
Commission's political importance (helping thus to reinforce
its position); perhaps the most foremost example of this is
the Commission's role in mediating the Gabcikovo dam dispute,
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at the request of the parties (see section 6.3.3).
Significantly, the member states allowed the Commission to
assume such a responsibility.
In playing such an active role, the Commission may have
provoked a backlash. The member states now seem more
determined to control the Commission's role in CFSP, for
example, and to block an increase in the Commission's powers
at the 1996 IGC. The new Commission president, Jacques
Santer, may not have the personality, network, or disposition
that enabled Delors to push successfully for a greater role.
But in the policy towards Eastern Europe, the Commission will
continue to play a leading role if only because it has to
prepare the opinions on the new membership applications and
implement the pre-accession strategy.
With respect to the Commission's mediation role, it was
instrumental in improving the Community's trade concessions in
the Europe agreements. Charles Grant notes that Delors
managed to persuade the French to make concessions. In May
1991, for example, he went on French TV to argue for more
trade with Eastern Europe. His constant lobbying eventually
led to an improved EC offer to the East Europeans and allowed
the conclusion of the agreements. The Danish foreign
minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, maintained that "Delors
deserves credit for getting the French on board for the Europe
agreements. 1116
After the conclusion of the Europe agreements, the
Commission supported East European demands for further trade
16Quoted in Grant 1994, p. 158.
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concessions in its reports to the Lisbon, Edinburgh, and
Copenhagen European Councils. By December 1992, the
Commission was also pushing a reluctant European Council to
accept the prospect of eventual membership for the associates,
in the interests of security and stability in Eastern Europe.
In both of these cases, the Commission's line was by and large
approved.
The Commission's proposals were never the most "extreme"
- rather they represented the middle ground between national
positions. Some member states had to compromise to accept
less than they would have preferred; most had to compromise to
accept as much as the Commission proposed. In mediating
decisions that went much further than the most reluctant
member states wanted, the Commission "upgraded the common
interest".
What may surprise is that the Commission (at the very
least an understaffed and somewhat disorganized body) was able
to play such an active role in policy-making. In his
biography of Delors, Charles Grant considers that Delors'
leadership in the late 1980$ and early 1990$ is all the more
remarkable considering that in the EU "(d]ecision making is so
slow and consensual that decisive leadership from the center
is almost impossible." Without doubt, the way Delors ran
the Commission (from the top down as opposed to fostering
collegiate decision-making) helped, as did his reliance on a
network of friends and allies in strategic places (including
'7Grant 1994, p. 278.
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Kohl and Mitterrand) . SI The comparatively brief experiment
(January 1993-January 1995) of dividing up responsibility for
economic and political relations with Eastern Europe between
two directorate-generals might have been expected to generate
a less-than-solid leadership role from the Commission,
especially because of the rivalry between "heavyweights" Sir
Leon Brittan and Hans van den Broek. Yet the period in which
the portfolios were split was also an active one in the Eu's
relations with Eastern Europe: the Copenhagen European Council
conclusions were reached and the structured dialogue set up.
When they worked in tandem, as they soon did on Eastern
Europe, Brittan and van den Broek could wield much influence.
The Commission enjoyed at least tacit support for its
active role, both because it was necessary if the Community
was itself to be active in the region and because it was
performing its role well and so was a useful actor in the
policy-making process.	 The Commission - with its
concentration on the collective interest - could help
translate shared objectives into specific policy options and
argue the case for collective action. But it also shared
leadership with other member states, as discussed above.
The Commission's role in the making of a policy towards
Eastern Europe is thus clearly significant, and seems to
confirm neo-functionalist hypotheses. An institutionalized
mediator, charged with furthering the common interest, not
only contributed to the making of an active, common foreign
U0 the 'Delors revolution', see Peter Ludlow, "The
European Commission", in Keohane and Hoffman, eds. 1991, pp.
116-121.
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policy towards Eastern Europe, but often led the policy.
CONCLUS ION
This thesis has demonstrated that where there is a
general will to act (and to compromise), where there are
recognized common interests, the EU can act in a coherent and
consistent manner. The member states shared common objectives
in Eastern Europe and the EU possessed the right instruments
(or acquired them) for the task of supporting the
transformation of Eastern Europe. The member states were
willing to make compromises in the name of this collective
endeavor, and allow the Commission to play a significant role.
International Relations theories that have been applied
to the EU - particularly neorealism and neoliberal
institutionalism (in the form of intergovernmentalism) -
cannot explain the continual compromising, or the sense of
collective interest and identity, that this thesis has
highlighted. Rationalist theories cannot take into account
the possibility that interaction at the Community/Union level
could transform interests and identities, which thereby
diminishes the force of those theories in the EU context.
Concepts used by some neo-liberal institutionalists, such as
empathetic interdependence, do seem to apply here - but are
best seen from a more "interpretive" standpoint. Theories
about the domestic determinants of cooperation do not help, as
neither domestic interest groups nor public opinion played a
major role in determining the member states' positions.
Neo-functionalism, and constructivism, have been shown to
be much more useful for explaining the making of a common
policy towards Eastern Europe. Neo-functionalist insights
402
into spillover (functional, cultivated and political),
externalization, the Community method (the supranational style
of decision-making), and the Commission's role help illuminate
why the member states cooperated on the policy. The
constructivist emphasis on how the process of interaction can
transform interests and identities helps illuminate the
development of the Community method and helps explain why the
self-styled logic can partly apply in this case.
This does not, however, mean that neo-functionalism and
constructivism are useful in every case of foreign policy
cooperation. This case of foreign policy cooperation is
unique, as is the nature of foreign policy cooperation (and
cooperation in general) within the EU - dependent as it is on
the particular issues at hand. Eastern Europe - being right
next to the EU and on the same continent - had an "immediacy"
that facilitated the formulation of a common policy, and
supporting reform there had an urgency that demanded an
adequate collective response. The EU is considered, by
insiders and outsiders, to have a particular responsibility
for Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe had to be integrated into
democratic, prosperous, and secure Europe; not only was the
Community/Union considered the most appropriate institution
for that task, but, especially in East European eyes, it
epitomized "Europe" (hence the enlargement issue dominated
relations between the Community/Union and Eastern Europe).
That the Community assumed responsibility for supporting
the transformation in Eastern Europe in the late 198 Os is also
due to the happy coincidence that communism collapsed during
a dynamic period in the Community's history. Its member
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states and outsiders expected the Community to lead, and
believed that it could do so. There was an awareness that
this was a turning point in history. With the end of the Cold
War, the Community could and should assume a leadership role,
and try to reshape Europe more in line with its own interests
and principles.
Even though the international system now allows more room
for civilian powers (perhaps backed by peacekeeping
capabilities), and the EU is expected to formulate more
foreign policies, it does not follow that the EU will do so.
There are of course many issues on which the member states
cannot agree, or do not share common interests; the logic of
diversity still prevails. There are also many situations in
which the EU simply does not possess the right instruments,
even for areas geographically closer to it. It has proven
quite unsuited for dealing with violent conflicts, for
example. Even where the EU does possess the right policy
instruments, it may not have as much influence; privileged
ties with the former Soviet republics and several
Mediterranean countries may not be enough for the EU to have
an impact, because it will not hold out the prospect of
enlargement to them - a very powerful instrument in the case
of Eastern Europe. A capability-expectations gap clearly
exists in many areas.
But a point that might be drawn from this thesis is that
the EU member states can develop and recognize their common
interests and formulate a common policy to further those
interests. They can hammer out an agreement on the specifics
of that policy, compromising their original positions in the
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process. The logic of diversity may still prevail in some
cases; CFSP may still produce only symbolic positions. But
the member states are nonetheless engaged in a process in
which their interests and identities are changing, and from
which common foreign policies can emerge. The effects of
enlargement on this process, however, remain to be seen. It
may well be that the logic of integration will stall, having
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Table 1
IC trade with Eastern Europe, 1958-1987
(in million ECU)
Country	 1958	 1960	 1965	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1987
USSR
Exports 386	 604	 563	 1415	 5064	 7808	 12509	 9189
Imports 477	 706	 1066	 1554	 4064	 11382	 20710	 13128
Balance	 -91	 -101	 -503	 -139	 1000	 -3573	 -8201	 -3939
GDR'
Exports	 57	 95	 177	 219	 494	 865	 947	 1086
Imports	 61	 91	 166	 230	 519	 951	 1832	 1390
Balance	 -4	 3	 11	 -10	 -25	 -86	 -884	 -304
Poland
Exports	 197	 209	 315	 604	 2745	 2892	 2733	 2332
Imports 229	 278	 438	 689	 1733	 2805	 3572	 2907
Balance -32	 -69	 -123	 -85	 1013	 87	 -839	 -575
CS?'
Exports	 136	 178	 283	 565	 1068	 1405	 1966	 2078
Imports	 143	 184	 281	 478	 874	 1544	 2272	 2055
Balance	 -7	 -6	 2	 87	 194	 -139	 -306	 23
Hungary
Exports	 72	 134	 195	 416	 980	 1619	 2486	 2373
Imports	 70	 103	 198	 372	 713	 1430	 2014	 1996
Balance	 2	 32	 -4	 44	 267	 189	 473	 376
P,eania
Exports	 56	 105	 256	 500	 1105	 1772	 1157	 651
Imports	 72	 111	 224	 462	 989	 1826	 2910	 2489
Balance	 -16	 -7	 31	 38	 116	 -55	 -1753	 -1178
Bulgaria
Exports	 30	 63	 152	 231	 689	 805	 1639	 1453
Imports	 33	 50	 127	 191	 222	 507	 586	 517
Balance	 -2	 13	 25	 40	 466	 299	 1053	 936
Source: Susan Senior Nello, The New Europe: Chanaina Economic Relations




BC Trads with Baatsrn Europe, 1988-1994
(in billion ECU)
Country	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994
Total 5	 Total
Export.	 9.30	 11.48 13.51 17.54	 21.44	 25.91	 31.01
Import.	 10.43	 12.08 13.28 16.12	 18.89	 20.17	 26.16
Balance	 -1.12	 -.59	 .23 +1.43	 +2.54	 +5.73	 +4.87
Poland
Export.	 2.75	 3.94	 4.93	 7.88	 8.15	 9.97	 10.82
Import.	 3.36	 3.86	 5.28	 6.21	 7.08	 7.58	 9.11
Balance	 -.61	 .08	 -.34	 1.66	 1.07	 2.39	 1.72
CSPR	 Czsch
Export.	 2.17	 2.38	 2.91	 3.82	 6.26	 6.08	 7.93
Import.	 2.21	 2.56	 2.79	 4.06	 5.53	 4.84	 6.37




Balance_______ ______ ______ _______ _______ .06 	 -.08
Hungary
Export.	 2.35	 2.99	 3.22	 3.49	 4.06	 4.97	 6.15
Import.	 2.16	 2.59	 3.00	 3.62	 3.99	 3.95	 4.96
Balance	 .19	 .40	 .22	 -.13	 .07	 1.01	 1.19
Roaania
Export.	 .61	 .69 1.41 1.33	 1.85	 2.32	 2.65
Import.	 2.23	 2.55	 1.62	 1.47	 1.40	 1.69	 2.51
Balance	 -1.62	 -1.86	 -.20	 -.14	 .45	 .63	 .14
Bulgaria
Export.	 1.41	 1.48	 1.03	 1.03	 1.11	 1.35	 1.67
Import.	 .46	 .53	 .59	 .75	 .89	 .95	 1.34




P.rc.ntag. of $ast.rn lurop.' a total trade account.d for by tb. IC
I !E I _____ _____ ____ _____	 _____ _____
__________ 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Bulgaria	 5.8 6.7	 10.4 15.7 30.8 16.7 16.5 14.8 20.7 32.6
CSFR	 24.2 25.7 32.0 40.7 49.5 17.7 17.8 32.1 34.3 42.0
Hungary	 22.5 24.7 34.2 47.6 49.5 25.2 28.5 31.5 40.4 42.4
Poland	 30.3 32.1 46.8 55.6 55.6 27.2 33.8 42.5 49.9 53.1
Romania	 24.0 26.7 31.4 34.2 32.5	 6.2	 6.1 19.6 27.4 37.5
Total	 22.5 24.5 33.5 44.6 48.2 19.2 20.8 27.8 39.5 44.7
Tabi. 4
Trends in Total IC-East European Trade
BC Isports	 BC Exports
_________________ Average	 Av.rag.
_________________ 1987-89 I 1990-92 1987-89 I 1990-92
______________ Annual Growth Rats	 ________
Total Extra-BC	 14.5	 3.0	 10.3	 1.8
CEEC 5	 10.3	 16.1	 13.6	 23.1
Bulgaria	 0.7	 19.1	 0.6	 -9.0
CSPR	 11.5	 29.4	 7.1	 38.0
Hungary	 13.8	 15.5	 12.2	 10.8
Poland	 15.2	 22.4	 30.0	 27.4
Romania	 2.3	 -18.1	 2.8	 39.1
Share in	 Trade (Percentage) ________
CEEC 5	 2.8	 3.3	 2.7	 4.0
Bulgaria	 0.1	 0.2	 0.4	 0.2
CSFR	 0.6	 0.9	 0.6	 1.0
Hungary	 0.6	 0.7	 0.7	 0.8
Poland	 0.9	 1.3	 0.8	 1.6
Rotnania	 0.6	 0.3	 0.2	 0.3
Source for both tables: uThe Economic Interpenetration between the European
Union and Eastern Europ.w, in Cosinission, European Economy, no. 6, 1994,
p. 157 and p. 100.














Source: Euroatat, uStatigticl in Focus: External Trade, 3, 1995
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Figure 1	 Relative Donor Contribution to Total
Assistance
Figure 2	 Relative Donor Contribution to Total Grant
Assistance
Table 1	 G-24 Assistance Commitments: Assistance Type
by Donor
Table 2	 G-24 Assistance Commitments: Sector by Donor
Table 3	 G-24 Assistance Commitments: Recipient by Donor
Source: European Commission, "Overview of G-24 Assistance to
the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 1990-1994",













Rclati''c Donor Contribution to Total AssistanCe, 1990-1994
(grant and non-grant)
Total Assistance: 74.7 billion ECU
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1990-1994 Distribution of PHARE funds
PRARE funds committed by country (in million ECU)
Albania	 Lithuania
1991	 10	 1992	 20
1992	 110	 1993	 25




1990	 24.5	 1991	 197
1991	 122	 1992	 200
1992	 76.8	 1993	 225
1993	 85.2	 1994	 208.8
1994	 85
Romania
Czech republic	 1990	 15.5
1993	 60	 1991	 138.3









1993	 12	 1992	 9
1994	 22.5	 1993	 11
1994	 24
GDR
1990	 35	 Former Tugoslovia
1990	 30.2
Hungary	 1991	 13.1
1990	 89.8	 1992	 47.8
1991	 119.5	 1993	 25
1992	 97.5	 1994	 25
1993	 99
1994	 85	 Multi-country Programs
1990	 85.9
Latvia	 1991	 98.8
1992	 15	 1992	 159.8
1993	 18	 1993	 182.7
1994	 29.5	 1994	 195.5
Source: European Commission, PHARE 1994 Annual Report, CON
(95) 366, final, 20 July 1995, p. 4.
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Source: European Commission, PHARE 1994 Annual Report, COM
(95) 366, final, 20 July 1995, P. 5.
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Appendix 4
EU Public Opinion on Enlargement to Eaat.rn Europ.
Source: Eurobarometer 42, Spring 1995, p. B.36
6.3.	 In favour of new members for the European Union (%, by country)
En faveur de nouveaux membres de I'Union Européenne (%, par pays)
Question: For each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of them becoming part of the European Un,or. in the
near future?
Pourchacun des pays suivants, seriez-vous favorable ou défavorable ace que, dans un proche avenir, ii fasse partie
de FlJnion Europeenne?
0





	 +	 -	 +	 -	 -	 -
Austria	 80	 7 86	 7 85	 85	 6 86	 4 74	 9 69	 7 76	 8
Finland	 77	 8 89	 6 81	 8i 81	 8i 82	 6 74	 9 66	 8 76	 9
Sweden	 81	 7 90 6 83	 83 7 84 5 75 9 69 7 79	 8
Norway	 79	 8 87	 7 77 11, 78 li 79	 8 73 10 68	 8 75 10
The Czech Republic	 39 42 53 36 44	 47 31 56 23 56 24 52 18 49 29
Hungary	 42 39 55 34 57	 58 23i 61 19 60 22 55 16 55 25
Poland	 41 40 54 34 42 36 43	 44 32 57 25 55 17 51 28
Slovakia (Slovakian Republic) 	 36 45 48 41 38 38i 40 36i 47 29 53 27 52 20 45 32
Bulgaria	 37 43 43 43 37 40 39	 47 29 55 27 55 16 46 32
Romania	 36 46 42 45 35 42 36 42 36 40 59 24 53 18 45 34
Slovenia	 35 45 43 44 36 39! 36 39' 36 39 53 27 51 18 44 33
F	 IRL	 I	 I	 NL	 P	 UK	 EC12+
+	 -	 +	 -	 +	 -	 +	 +	 +	 -	 +	 -	 +	 -
I'Autsjche	 76 12 75	 6 75	 9 86	 7 81	 9 63	 6 75	 9 75	 8
LaFinlande	 76 12 74	 7 76	 8 87	 5 85	 5 63	 6 74	 9 76	 9
La Suede	 78 11 78	 6 79	 7 88	 4 90	 3 68	 5 77	 8 79	 8
Lallorvège	 75 14 77	 6 77 10 83	 8 86	 5 66	 6 74 10 75 10
LaRepubliqueTcheque 	 42 40 44 30 58 21 46 38 55 29 45 19 50 28 45 29
LaHongrie	 47 37 49 26 61 19 46 39 60 24 49 16 53 27 55 25
La Pologne	 47 38 52 24 59 21 44 42 63 24 47 17 57 24 51 28
La Slovaqule (République	 36 45 42 31 56 22 38 46 50 31 44 20 46 31 45 32
Slovaque)
La Bulgarie	 38 44 44 28 56 24 40 45 49 32 47 17 47 31 46 32
La Roumanie	 37 46 45 29 56 24 39 45 48 35 45 19 47 32 45 34
La Slovénie	 35 45 41 30 57 23 38 46 48 32 44 19 44 33 44 33
The difference between "+" and "-" is the percentage of "dont know" (not shown)


































African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
Common Agricultural Policy
Common Commercial Policy
Central and East European Countries
Central European Free Trade Agreement
Common Foreign and Security Policy
Commonwealth of Independent States
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (also
known as Comecon)
Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (later became the OSCE)
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls
General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation
in the EC
Committee of Professional Agricultural
Organisations
Coreper	 Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSFR	 Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
DG
	 Directorate-General
European Bank for Reconstruction
Development
European Community (or Communities)
European Court of Justice
Economic and Finance Ministers Council




European Free Trade Association
European Investment Bank
European Monetary System




European Atomic Energy Community
footnote
Federal Republic of Germany
and
G7	 Group of 7
G-24	 Group of 24
GATT	 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR	 German Democratic Republic
GSP	 General System of Preferences
ICJ	 International Court of Justice
IGC	 Intergovernmental Conference












Joint Venture PHARE Programme
Member of the European Parliament
Most Favored Nation
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Non-Governmental Organization
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
Official Journal of the European Union
(previously European Communities)
Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe
PHARE	 Poland/Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring
Economies






TACIS	 Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of
Independent States and Georgia
Tempus	 Trans-European Mobility Scheme for University
Studies
USSR
	 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	 Western European Union
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List of Psrsons Int.rviswed
Beniamino Andreatta, former Italian foreign minister
Simon Banks, European Commission, DG IA (Political Relations)
Pablo Benavidès Salas, European Commission, DG IA
Fraser Cameron, European Commission, DG IA (Political
Relations)
Emma Chamberlain, European Commission, PHARE Information
Office (written communication)
Joris Declerck, European Commission, DG I (Economic Relations)
Herman De Lange, European Commission, G24 Coordination Unit
Constantin Economides, EU Council Secretariat
Jutta Frasch, German Permanent Representation
Simona Gatti, European Commission, PHARE Operation Service
Luis Girao, European Commission, DG I (Economic Relations)
Tom Glazer, European Commission, PHARE Information Service
Soren Halskov, EU Council Secretariat
Guido Lenzi, Italian Foreign Ministry
Enrico Letta, former Italian foreign ministry official
Richard Lewis, European Commission, DG IA (written
communication)
Annette Matthias, European Commission, DG I (Economic
Relations)
Simon Nuttall, former European Commission official
Bart Ouvry, Belgian Permanent Representation
Gaetano Testa, EU Council Secretariat
Nigel Thorpe, UK Foreign Office
Katia Viertio, European Commission, DG III (Industrial
Cooperation)
Bernard Whiteside, UK Foreign Office
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